clr/1983/1983_3_536.pdf

(1983)1982 December 20 [TRIAKTAFYLLIDCS, P., HADJIANASTASSIOU, MALACHTOS, SAVVIDES, JJ.] VASSOS HJilOANNOU AND ANOTHER, Appellants, v. THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, THROUGH THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, Respondents. {Revisional Jurisdiction Appeals Nos. 193 and 194). Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law, 1962 {Law 15 of 1962)— "Town and country planning or housing"—In section 3

(2)(i) of the Law—Meaning—Compulsory acquisition of land for tlw purpose of creating a housing estate—Such a purpose a "public benefit" purpose wit/tin the meaning of the said section 3

(2)(i). 5 Administrative Law—Compulsory acquisition of land—Principles of administrative law applicable—Compulsory acquisition may be resorted to without a prior offer to the owner of the property to purchase it privately if suchproperty is the only one suitable for the achievement of the purpose—Use of the words "techni- 10 cally suitable" by trial Judge does not introduce a new notion into the principles of administrative law. Compulsory acquisition of land—Principles of administrative law applicable—Compulsory acquisition may be resorted to without a prior offer to the owner of the property to purchase it privately 15 // such property is the only one suitable for the achievement of the purpose. Administrative Low—Administrative acts or decisions—Reasoning— Due reasoning—Appears in the files of the administration. These appeals were directed against the dismissal of the recour- 20 ses of the appellants by means of which there was challenged the validity of compulsory acquisition orders relating to immovable property of theirs. The purpose of the acquisition was the creation of a housing estate by the laying out and the const536 3 C.L.R. Hjiloannou v. Republic ruction of streets and drains, the division of the said immovable property into building sites and the construction either on all or on a number of them of houses suitable for the lower middle social class, and the disposition of the building sites to be created and 5 or the houses to be built thereon by hirepurchase and or on lease. Counsel for the appellants mainly contended: ]0 15 (

1. a)That the purposes for which the acquisition order was made are not purposes of public benefit within the meaning of Article 23 of the Constitution and section 3 of the Acquisition of Property Law, 1962 (Law 15/62) in that the schemes in question are neither town and country planning nor housing and that the trial Judge was wrong in reaching a different conclusion. (
2. b)That the trial Judge was wrong in finding that the properties in question were the only suitable for the purposes of the acquisition and that in so deciding he introduced into Law 15/62 thewording "technically suitable*' upon which he relied, whereas there isnothing in the lawor the jurisprudence applicable about "technically suitable". 20 (
3. c)That there was violation of the principles of administrative law, concerning acquisitions, to the effect that the onerous measure of compulsory acquisition should not be resorted to without exhausting the efforts for the acquisition of the property by private agreement. 25 (
4. d)That the decision of the Council of Ministers to acquire the property compulsorily instead of by private agreement, is not duly reasoned. Held,per Savvides J., Malachtos J. concurring and HadjiAnastassiou J. dissenting: 30 35 (I) That the purposes for which the acquisition was made were purposes of public benefit coming within the provisions of section 3

(2)(

1. i)of Law 15/62; accordingly contention (
2. a)must fail.

(2)That the taking away of property belonging to a private individual, through compulsory acquisition is an onerous measure and that the principles of proper administration and of lawful use of discretionary powers demand that before resorting to such measure, the State should exhaust the possibilities of 537 Hjiloanoou τ. Republic

(1983)either using for the relevant purpose State land or finding property which is being voluntarily offered by its owners and which is moreor lessequally suitable for thepurpose concerned; that on the material before this Court the discretion of the Acquiring Authority was properly exercised in the present case, inthelight of all relevant matterstakeninto consideration, after a due inquiry intothe matter,and this Courtcannot inter­ fere with the exercise of such discretion and exercise its own discretion in substitution to that of the respondent,as tothe choice of the most suitable area. 5 10 Held, further, that the use of the words "technically suitable" by the trial Judge does not in any way introduce a new notion into the principles of administrative law or into the text of the Law. It is merely a conclusion reached by the trial Judge in the circumstances of thecase; accordingly contention (b) should 15 fail.

(3)That it is well settled that the compulsory acquisition may be resorted to if the required immovable property is considered the only suitable for theachievement of thepurpose, when a prior offer to its owner to purchase it privately is not 20 necessary; accordingly contention (c) should fail.

(4)That a perusal of the various exhibits before the Court which were extracts from the files of the administration, show that such reasons for acquiring the property compulsorily appear in detail therein; that a thorough study is included 25 about all the areas under consideration and the reasons why the area in question was preferred as the most suitable for the purpose of the scheme; that in the circumstances, once the property in question was found the most suitable and such finding was based on proper inquiry, as in the present case, 30 the decision was sufficiently reasoned; accordingly contention (d) should fail. Per TriantafyHides, P.: Since the onus was on the appellants to satisfy us mat these appeals should succeed Ihave,after muchanxious consideration, 35 and not without quite some reluctance,reached theconclusion that Iamnotsatisfied that,inthelightof theirparticularcircum­ stances, these appeals should succeed. I agree, therefore, that they should be dismissed. Appeals dismissed. 40 538 3 C.L.R. 5 10 HJUWBBOO v. RepaNk Cases referred to: , Chrysochou Bros v. CYTA and Another

(1966)3 C.L.R. 482 at p. 497; Venglis v. Electricity Authorityof Cyprus

(1965)3 C.L.R. 252; Tikkiris and Others v. Electricity Authority of Cyprus

(1970)3 C.L.R. 281; Mammidou andOthers v. Attorney-General

(1977)3C.L.R. 462; Pissas {No.2) v. The Electricity Authority of Cyprus

(1966)3 C.L.R. 784 af pp. 791, 792; Decisions Nos.300/1936, 1023/1949, 92/1957, 826/1969, 505/68, 3409/70, 2034/52, 2579/69, 2575/69, 1344/70 of the Greek Council of State. Appeals. Appeals against the judgment of a Judge of the Supreme 15 Court of Cyprus (A. Loizou, J.) given on the 29th December, 1977 (Revisional Jurisdiction Cases Nos. 201/75 and 204/75*) whereby appellants' recourses against the validity of a compulsory acquisition order affecting their properties were dismissed. P. Ioannides, for appellant in appeal No.

1. 20 M. Christofides, for appellant in appeal No.
2. N. CharalambouSySenior Counsel of the Republic, for the respondent. Cur. adv. vult. TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P.: The first judgment of the Court will 25 be delivered by Mr. Justice Hadjianastassiou. HADHANASTASSIOU, J.: In these two Revisional Jurisdiction Appeals Nos. 193 and 194 the appellants, Mr. Vassos Hjioannou and Sofoclis Hjissif Real Estate Limited, challenge the decision of a Judge of this Court, under section 11

(2)of the 30 Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Law 1964 in dismissing their two Recourses Nos. 201 and 204/75 for the compulsory acquisition of their lands by the Acquiring Authority, the Republic of Cyprus. The Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law 1962'was 35 enacted on the 1st March, 1962 and section 6 which deals with the order of acquisition says; * ReportedasMammidou and Othersv.Attornty-Gtmral

(1977)3C.L.R.

1. 539 Hadjianastassiou .
2. Hjiloaniiou v. Republic

(1983)"

(1)On the expiration of the period specified in the notice of acquisition, the acquiring authority or, where the acquiring authority is the Republic, the appropriate Minister shall proceed with all reasonable speed to the examination of any objections to the acquisition made 5 during the period aforesaid and, unless such authority is a municipal corporation or a Communal Chamber, shall forward to the Council of Ministers the objections aforesaid together with such observations and recommendations as the acquiring authority or the appropriate 10 Minister, as the case may be, may deem fit to make thereon.

(2)Where, regard being had to all circumstances of the case, it is considered expedient that any property to which the notice of acquisition relates shall be acquired 15 for the purposes stated therein, the acquisition of such property may, subject to the provisions of the Constitution and this Law, be authorised by an order (in this Law referred to as an 'order of acquisition') published in the official Ga7ette of the Republic: 20

(3)Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the order of acquisition shall be made (

1. a)where the acquiring authority is the Republic, by the Council of Ministers; 25 (
2. b)where the acquiring authority is not the Republic, by the acquiring authority; Provided that where the acquiring authority is a public corporation or a public utility body, no order of acquisition shall be made by such acquiring authority with- 30 out the sanction of the Council of Ministers previously obtained". According to the facts related by the learned trial Judge theCompulsoryAcquisitionOrderpublished on26thSeptember, 1975, and the purposes of public benefit and the reasons for 35 the acquisitions in questionareset out inthe NoticeofAcquisition published in Supplement No. 3 to the offiicial Gazette of the Republic, No. 1183of the 25th April, 1973,which reads as follows: 540 3 C.L.R. Hjiloannou v. Republic Hadjianastassion J. ".... the immovable property set out in the Schedule is necessary for the following purposes of public benefit, namely, for housing and town planning, and the acquisition is required for the following reasons, i.e. 5 10 15 20 (
3. a)the creation of a housing estate by the laying out and the construction of streets and drains, the installation of electricity cables and water supply system and the creation of any necessary, in relation thereto, installations, the creation of open green spaces as well as the dfvision of the said immovable property into building sites and the construction either on all or on a number of them (building sites) of houses suitable for the lower middle social class, from the point of view of income, and or the lower social class, from the point of view of income, of the type of semi-detached houses of blocks of flats and terrace houses, as well as the construction of shops and other buildings for the use, convenience and comfort of the inhabitants of the housing estate; (
4. c)the lease of the shops and other buildings which will be constructed, and 25 30 (
5. d)provided that the legislation in force at the time will permit this grant, with the approval of the Council of Ministers, part of the said immovable property to organisations which may be set up by law, the purpose of which will be the solution of the housing problem either by granting of housing loans or by the disposal of building sites and or houses under such terms as the Council of Ministers would deem appropriate to impose at the time of such disposal". The immovable property affected by this acquisition, when the learned Judge heard the case was of an extent of about 35 145 donums, 3 evleks and 1800 sq. ft. consisting of 22 plots situated outside the Nicosia Water Supply Area. In addition, Government owned land of a total extent of 7 donums and 200 sq. ft. under plots 200, 172,J50 and 560 was granted by the Government for the needs of the said scheme. 40 The first appellant, applicant in Recourse No. 201/75 is 541 Hadjiaoastassiou J. Hjiloannou τ. Republic

(1983)the one-half owner of plots Nos. 169 and 173, and the other half is owned by a certain Loucas P. Hadjioannou. These two plots, as it appears from the plan produced, are of a con­ siderable extent, although their si7e is not actually given. The appellant company, applicants in Recourse No. 204/75, 5 of Strovolos, are the owners of three plots, namely, (

1. a)plot 199 of an extent of 3 donums, i evlek and 3000 sq. ft. under Reg. No. Η 183, Sheet Plan XXX 5 WII, Block H, (
2. b)plot 174 of an extent Of 16 donums, 3300 sq. ft. under Reg. No. Η 159, Sheet Plan XXX 6WII, Block Η and (
3. c)plot 203 of 10 an extent of 3 donums, 2 evieks and 3400 sq. ft. under Reg. No. Η 187, Sheet Plan XXX 6 WII, Block H. The two ap­ pellants are developers in land, as shown from the relevant files, and in particular, exhibit "B" in Recourse No.201/75, and the letter of the Chairman of the Strovolos village Corn- 15 mittee dated 6th June, 1975, who said that he was shocked when he saw the Notice of Acquisition, because the opinion of the village authority was not asked on such a serious matter, and further stated that one basic reason for their objection was the fact that their information was given orally to them 20 at various periods, the Hadjiosif Estate Co. Ltd. in co-opera­ tion with the Hadjioannou brothers of Greece, made plans for the development of a total area of about 70 donums which is now affected by the said Notice of Acquisition and which development included the construction of a big modern hous- 25 ing estate. There is no doubt, as the learned Judge says, that the housing project of the Government was conceived before the tragic events of 1974. Several studies were carried out by the Housing and Country Planning Department, as well as by experts of the United Nations, who ascertained the exis- 30 tence of an acute housing problem in Cyprus especially affec­ ting the lower income and the lower middle income classes. The Government in order to face this problem took a num­ ber of decisions, one of which was theconstructionof low cost houses, intended for the lower income and lower middle in- 35 come classes, and, for that purpose, it was found necessary to find suitable areas. Unfortunately in spite of the fact that suitable land was found, because of the Turkish invasion, were no longer suitable as being either within the part occupied by theTurkish army ortooneartoit tobeusedfor thepurposes 40 needed. In addition, the implementation of that housing 542 3 C.L.R. Hjiloannou v. Republic Hadjianastassiou J. scheme was brought to a standstill until October, 1974, when because of the additional-needs caused by the displacement of people theintentionof the Governmenttoincrease its activity in thefieldof Governmenthouse schemes, instructions were given 5 to the Housing and Town Planning Department to find other suitable areas for such purposes. Infact threeareas were chosen by the said Department,identified as Strovolos A, Strovolos Β and Latsia, outside the water supply area, and the Lands and Surveys Department was asked by a letter dated 1st October, 10 1974, (see Appendix 1of exhibit 1),for the assessment of their market value, the category of ownership, i.e., whether State, Church, private, Greek or Turkish, owned, and information - regarding the extent of the whole or part of each plot affected by the scheme. By a letter dated 30th January, 1975, (Ap15 pendix 2), the Director of the Department of Lands and Sur­ veyshaving given his views about the market value of the lands in question, attached also a table of the approximate price of each as on July 1974. He further made an observation that the anomalous situation had created new conditions which 20 should be noted. Then he went on ιο add that prices of land had suffered a drop which differed, depending on the locality of the property. In the cases under examination, that drop was assessed at 20 per cent, but as under the then prevailing cir­ cumstances such prices were very sensitive depending on deve25 lopments, and it was possible to have a spectacular increase in case of improvement of the political situation, given that the areas examined were υ the south part of the island which in the light of the new circumstances, was deemed safer for the expansion of the town and the absorption of the displaced 30 population. Then the Director further pointed out that in Strovolos A area there were four plots, in Strovolos Β area two plots and in Latsia area three plots of State owned land. See also the study of the Housing and Town Planning Depart­ ment containing also their recommendations on the matter, 35 contained in their letter dated 29th February, 1975, which was addressed to the Minister of Interior (Appendix 3). In addition there was a comparative table of the cost and other information set out in para. 3 thereof, for which it ap­ pears that the per donum cost of the land in Strovolos Β area 40 is higher by about £1,090 or about 81.5 per cent, as compared with Strovolos A area. This makes the price of Strovolos Β area almost double in value than that of Strovolos A area. 543~ " Hadjianastassiou J. Hjiloannou v. Republic

(1983)In the said exhibit in para. 4 are to be found further factors relative to the ultimate choice of area A. In fact, both Stro­ volos A and Βareas arewith in theboundaries of andarecom­ patible, regarding their use to the requirements of the"Local Nicosia Plan";and both are outside the boundaries of the Gr- 5 eater Nicosia Water Supply plan but area A is only a short distance from an inhabited area, which, from the point of view of social services, such as schools, church, public tran­ sport and shops gives it an advantage over area Β which is also on a plateau, but it is so slopy and rough in certain parts 10 that additional expense will be needed for its development. It is true that it is near certain industries and for that suitable for housing schemes, yet, it is at a disadvantage with regard to area A from the point of view of position in general and other factors. The area of Latsia is outside the boundaries of the"Local Nicosia Plan"although it forms an extension of a village and it consists of good quality agricultural land, densely planted with olive trees, the water supply may present problems and it is likely that there will be an increase in the problems of 20 public transport, so that the intended hire purchasers will have to pay additional trasport expense of about 100 mils per day, than the hire purchasers of Strovolos A area. Paus­ ing here for a moment, it appears that the main purpose of the acquisition of thelands in question was to facilitate the low 25 income earners to acquire a homeon hire purchase agreement. Turning once again to the facts of these cases, according to the learned Judge the conclusions and recommendationsof that Department, as they are set out ir paras 5-11 of the said Appendix arebriefly totheeffect thatbothareas A andΒshould 30 be acquired as a matter of a long term policy, as the acqui­ sition of the necessary land is a prerequisite to a housing pro­ gramme and this will render unnecessary future acquisitions of adjacent land which, inevitably, will have its priceenhanced by the carrying out of a housing scheme in the vicinity, and so 35 any future extensions of such housing schemes will still be possible at a low cost. Further,if a Housing FinanceAgency or a LandDevelopmentCorporation is established itwill inevit­ ably need land for housing purposes and part of the acquired land may, if necessary, be placed at its disposal for its purposes. 40 544 15 3 C.L.R. Hjiloannou v. Republic Hadjianastassiou J. With that in mind, the learned Judge goes on it was also con­ sidered whether, in view of the economic difficulties of the State, it would be more beneficial for the Government to pre­ fer Strovolos Β area, half of which was Government owned 5 land and consequently its purchase price would not have to be paid but it was observed, and rightly so, that for the hire purchasers the situation would not be changed and they would still have to pay the extra costs for this more expensive land, unless the Governmentdecided to reduce the price of its land 10 to the level of the price of land within Strovolos A area. Then the learned Judge goes on that elaborate reasons are further given in the said exhibit in support of the recommendations of the Department. There was also the view of the Director of the Planning Bureau and according to Appendix 4, his view 15 was that Strovolos A area should be preferred, and in addi­ tion to the existing Government land lying therein to acquire only about 153 donums of privately owned land, as against 290 donums proposed by the Housing and Town Planning Department. 20 Eventually, a submission (Appendix 5) was made by the Minister of Interior to the Council of Ministers for the app­ roval of ahousing scheme underthe said Law. The Council of Ministers at its meeting of 27th March, 1975, approved the scheme by its Decision No. 13884 (Appendix 6) which 25 reads as follows: "2. The Council: 30 35 (a) considered the housing scheme prepared by the Hou­ sing and Town Planning Department under section 3 of the Housing Law, Cap. 222 as same is described in detail in para. 3 of the submission and decided on principle to approve it under section 4 of the Hou­ sing Law, Cap. 22. (b) Decided to approve the acquisition by the Govern­ ment, either by private agreement or by compulsory acquisition, of the Immovable Property in the area of Strovolos of an extent of 145 donums, 3 evleks and 1800 sq. ft. which is shown delineated with green colour on the survey plan lodged with the secretary of the Council and which was approved as suitable 545 Hadjiarusta'^iou J. Hjiloannou v. Republic

(1983)for the implementation of the said scheme at the estimated expense of £185,600. (

1. c)Decided to grant under section 18 of the Immovable Property (Tenure, Registration and Valuation) Law, Cap. 224 and Laws 3/60, 78/65, 10/66, 75/68 5 and 51/71 and section 2 of the Government Loans Law, Cap. 221 and Law 54/72, to the Director of the Housing and Town Planning Department of Government owned land of a total extent of 7 donums and 200 sq. ft. which is shown delineated with yellow 10 colour on the survey plan for the needs of the said housing scheme and, (
2. d)it decided to authorize the Minister of Finance to find the necessary funds and if necessary by submitting a supplementary budget to the House of 15 Representatives". Finally in pursuance the notice of the intended acquisition was published in the official Gazette in spite of the fact that four objections were made by the owners of the land affected and together with the views of the District 20 Officer of Nicosia, the Director of Housing and Town Planning and the legal advice from the office of the Attorney-General, were submitted to the Council of Ministers by the Minister of interior (see Appendices 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16), but on Uth September, 1975, the objections were rejected by the 25 Council of Ministers by its Decision No. 14620 (see Appendix 17). Finally, the learned trial Judge having listened to a number of legal arguments by all counsel concerned in dismissing the recourses had this to say at pp. 95 and 96 regarding the prin- 30 ciple to acquire private property by agreement in the first place. 'This principle, however, is not complete, unless it is added that the onerous measure of compulsory acquisition may be resorted to if the required immovable pro- 35 perty is considered the only technically suitable for the achievement of the purpose, when a prior offer to its owner to purchase it privately, is not necessary. In such instances, the ground that there exists an obligation to 546 3 C.I-.R. Hiiloannou v. Republic Hadjianastassiou J. acquire immovable property by private treaty, as a matter of general principle of law, cannot stand. (See paras. 19 and 20 and Decisions 505/68, 2579/69, 1344, 3409/ 70). 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 It was argued on behalf of the respondents that this • was a principle of law which they had in mind when they were deciding the making of the order of the acquisition. Appendix 14 of Exhibit 1 is the legal advice from the office of the Attorney-General attached to the submission made to the Council of Ministers, together with the objections filed pursuant to the publication of the Notice of Acquisition and the other views expressed by the appropriate Government Departments to which I have already referred. It is stated clearly in the said advice, that compulsory acquisition may be resorted to without prior offer to purchase privately the property in question, if it is the only suitable for the achievement of the desired purpose, and reference is made to some of the decisions of the Greek Council of State, to which I have already referred. That the area in question was found to be, after a proper inquiry, the only technically suitable for the purpose, it is apparent from the whole approach of the matter as emanating from the relevant file. It had to be acquired as a compact area and the exelusion of any part therefrom would frustrate the realisation of the object of the acquisition. The option given by the decision of the Council of Ministers of the 27th March, 1975 (Appendix 6) to acquire the property either by private treaty or by compulsory acquisition, does not change the situation, because, after that decision, we have the decision to acquire the property compulsorily when examining the objections made which, incidentally, it may be mentioned, were only in respect of six plots out of the 22 affected by the Notice of Acquisition". Now regarding the question of compulsory acquisition, time and again it was said, that the requirements of proper administration and the proper use of the relevant discretionary powers render it imperative that a compulsory ac547 Hadjianastassiou J. Hjiloannou v. Republic

(1983)quisition should not be ordered if its object can be achieved in any less onerous manner; and it should only be resorted to if it is absolutely necessary to do so and after exhausting the alternative possibility of achieving its object by means of purchasing other suitable property which is voluntarily offered 5 for sale by its owner. Moreover, before resorting to compulsory acquisition of a particular immovable property the acquiring authority must exhaust the possibility of acquiring compulsorily other suitable immovable property the acquisition of which will entail a deprivation less onerous than the de- 10 privation entailed in the proposed acquisition. See Triantafyllides J., as he then was, in Chrysochou Bros, and

(1)The Cyprus Telecommunications Authority,

(2)The Republic of Cyprus, through The Councilof Ministers,

(1966)3 C.L.R. 467 at p. 497; see also MariaCh. Venglis and The Electricity \$ Authority of Cyprus

(1965)3 C.L.R. at p.

1. These principles are in line with the Conclusions from the Jurisprudence of the Greek Council of State 1929-
2. Turning now to the Decisions of the Greek Council of State, in Decision No. 300/1936 it was held that it is not permis- 20 sible to take away from a private individual, through compulsory acquisition more than what is indispensably necessary for the achievement of the relevant public utility purpose and it is, thus, not proper for the acquisition to go to the extent of taking away ownership if the saidpurposemaybeachie- 25 ved by less onerous means, such as the acquisition of a servitude on the property concerned. In Decision 1023/1949it was held that the principles of proper administration and of lawful use of discretionary powers demand that the Administration should not resort to the very 30 onerous method of compulsory deprivation of ownership, before it exhausts the possibilities of either using for the relevant purpose State land or of finding property which is being voluntarily offered by its owner and which is more or less equally suitable for the purpose concerned; and if State land 35 is not available and it has been established that it is not possible to secure the necessary land by means of an ordinary rnarehace, then the Administration has to choose for compulsory acquiaitioh, put of the suitable properties, the one the acquisition of which entails'less onerouoconsequences, both 40 &8 3 C.I..Κ. v Hjiloannou v. Republic Hadjianastassion J' from the point of view of the use being served by the property to be acquired and from the point of view of the interests of the fiscus. In Decision 608/1955 it was held that the Administration 5 should not resort to the extremely onerous measure of de­ privation of onwership, except only in case of absolute neces­ sity. In Decision 92/1957 it was held that the Administration when exercising its discretionary powers and choosing for 10 acquisition a property as suitable to serve a particular lawful public utility purpose has, among other things, to.examine if there are other properties equally suitable for the purpose of acquisition, and has to prefer the property the acquisition of which will entail for its owner a deprivation of ownership 15 less onerous in comparison to the cases of owners of other properties which may be equally suitable for the purpose of the acquisition. In Costas G. Tikkiris and others and The Electricity Aut­ horityof Cyprus

(1970)3 C.L.R. 281, in delivering the judg20 ment of the Court, I had this to say with regard to the extent of the area of the land acquired by the authority in question, at pp. 300, 301, 305 and 306: 25 30 35 "With regard to the fourth submission of counsel, with due respect, the position is different because this point is covered by a Greek authority. In decision 300/1936 it was held by the Greek Council of State, that is not per­ missible to take away from a private individual, through compulsory acquisition, more than what it is indispensably necessary for the achievement of the relevant public utility purpose and it.is, thus, not proper to go to the extent of taking away ownership if the said purpose may be achieved by less onerous means, such as the acquisition of a servitude concerned; the question, however, of the necessary extent of the acquisition is, as a rule, a matter within the decision of the acquiring authority. It is in evidence that the acquiring authority in this case, required^ more land in extent than the one acquired from the Applicants, in order to achieve the purpose of this big public utility project. Moreover, it has already acquired 549 Hadjianastasslou J. Hjiloannou \. Republic

(1983)government land of about 26 donums in extent, which isnext tothe land oftheApplicant,aswellasother private land by private agreement of an extent of 5 1/2 donums. Having in mind the principles of proper administration with regard to the use of lawful discretionary powers, 5 and the fact that the necessary extent of the acquisition to meet both the technical point of view as well as the other purposes of the acquiring authority is within its discretion, I have reached the view that the said authority has properly exercised its discretionary powers under 10 the law. In anyevent,the Applicants have failed toadduce any evidence to show to the Court that really the extent of the property acquired by the acquiring authority was more than necessary to achieve its public utility purpose. 1 would, therefore, dismiss also this contention of coun- 15 sel". Then dealing with the evidence of the experts 1 continued in these terms: "In view of the main contention of counsel for Applicants, after considering the whole evidence before me 20 with regard to the properties lying in the Pouyeros area and in the forest, I am satisfied that the land in Pouyeros area does not meet with the technical requirements needed for the construction of a sub-station for thereasons given in evidence by Mr. Papageorghis and Mr. Jubb. 25 Moreover, 1 have approached this problem from another angle viz., that assuming that I am wrong and, that the properties in question are also equally suitable, then again, I would have been prepared to say that the Respondent, in exercising its discretionary powers as to which 30 would be the best possible property from all aspects, has done so properly in deciding to acquire the property of the Applicants. In my view, therefore, the Respondent did not act in abuse of the powers vested in it...." See Decision 92/1957 of the Greek Council of State already 35 quoted in Revisional Jurisdiction Appeals Nos. 193 and 194. Then I proceeded as follows: "In the present case, regarding the fact that this substation could possibly be erected on to the private pro550 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 HJiloaonou v. Republic Hadjiaaastasskiu J. perties within the Pouyeros area - and this point has not been pressed by counsel for the Applicants - it would appear that the same amount of hardship would have been caused to those owners as to the Applicants. In my view, therefore, I cannot reach the conclusion thatthe decision of the Respondent has been taken in contraven­ tion of the administrative principles. It goes without say­ ing, of course, that such principles could have been con­ travened if less onerous means of achieving the purpose of the compulsory acquisition had been overlooked by the acquiring authority; and not because one out of equally onerous solutions has been preferred, ί would reiterate once again that the Respondent has properly exercised its discretion, and it is not for this Court to exercise its own discretion in substitution of the discretion of the Respondent regarding the choice among equally suitable properties the acquisition of which entails more orlessequal hardship. SeePissas {No. 2)v. E.A.C.

(1966)3 C.L.R. 784 at pp. 791-792. Counsel for the applicants mainly argued with force, relying on a passage from the well-known text-book of Kyriacopoulos 4th edn., Vol. 3 at p. 732, that the Res­ pondent has failed to utilize State land for its relevant purpose of erecting a sub-station the acquisition of which would be less onerous to the Government" See Decision 1023/49 of the Greek Council of Si£te. Then I had this to say at pp. 309, 310, 311: 35 "There is no doubt that the construction of the sub­ station is intended to be an important feature of the Respondent's transmission system for the best deployment and use of generation and for the security of supply of electricity; and quite rightly in my view the experts of the Electricity Authority have considered which )? the most suitable property from every technical point of view, ineluding also the point of view of the interest of thefiscus. . 40 Inviewof theevidence,Iamsatisfied thatthedxision of the acquiring authority to acquire the property of the Applicants was validly taken for the purpose of cons­ tructing an electricity sub-station, whfc&, pa ^oubt, if a project of pub'jV hmf.fr V/i;\ ?wgard to the evidence 30 551 Hadjianastasslou J. Hjiloannou v. Republic

(1983)of the experts, I would like to make it clear, that I am indebted to Mr. Jubb who has been so fair and so lucid, and I accept his evidence. As regards the evidence of Mr. Georghios Lartides, my opinion of this witness is that he has been very frank and that his evidence has also 5 helped the Court to have before it the technical version of the Applicants. In view, however, of the fact that he had no practical experience in designing or constructing a sub-station, I would definitely prefer the evidence of Mr. Papageorghis who has a lot of experience in these 10 technical matters viz., with regard to the location of the sub-station and the technical consideration as to how the lines will enter into that sub-station. In view, therefore, of the evidence as a whole, I have reached the conclusion that from the technical and other 15 reasons put forward, the property under acquisition is the most suitable from every point of view compared to the lands covered by the forest.. .. At the same time, I would like to make it quite clear, that if the property at Athalassa was not utilized as a 20 forest, then I would perhaps have been prepared to find in favour of the Applicants, because I accept the principle enunciated by the Greek Council of State, that the administration should not resort tothemore onerous method ofcompulsory deprivation of private property before it 25 exhausts the possibility of using for the relevant purpose State land which is more or less equally suitable, even if it would cost more to the administration for its public utility purpose. For the reasons I have endeavoured to explain, I have 30 reached theviewthatthedecisionoftheacquiring authority toacquirethepropertyoftheApplicantsisthemostsuitable from every point of view, and is not contrary to any of the provisions of this Constitution or of any law or is madeinexcessor inabuse ofpowersvestedin suchauthor- 35 ity". Reverting once again to the Greek Council of State, in Decision No. 826/1969, a case of acquisition of land by the Electricity Authority of Greece, in annulling the decision the Council had this to say at pp. 4-6: 40 552 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 Hjiloannou v. Republic Hadjianastassiou J. " Επειδή, κατά τήν έννοιαν των διατάξεων τούτων, έρμηνευομένων έν τ φ πλαισίω καί τών δια τή? νομολογία? τοΰ Δικαστηρίου τούτου διαμορφωθεισών σχετικών γενικών τοΰ δικαίου άρχων, ή κατ' έφαρμογήν αυτών κηρυσσομένη αναγκαστική άπαλλοτρίωσι?, ακινήτου, ώ? αναγόμενη εί? τήν λήψιν μέτρου έπαχθοϋ? εί? βάρο? τοΰ πολίτου, συνι­ σταμένου εί? τήν άκουσίαν στέρησιν της συνταγματικού? προστατευόμενη? ιδιοκτησία? του, δέον πλήρω? νά αΐτιολογηται εϊτε έν αύτη τη πράξει τή? αναγκαστική? άπαλλοτριώσεω?, είτε έκ τών συνοδευόντων αυτήν στοιχείων. Πλή­ ρη? δέ είναι ή αιτιολογία κατ' αρχήν όσάκι? έξ αυτή? προ­ κύπτει σαφώ? ή ανάγκη τη? λήψεω?, κατά περίπτωσιν, τοΰ ώ? άνω εξαιρετικού μέτρου καΐ δή άπό τή? άπόψεω? ότι ό δι* οΰ ή αναγκαστική άπαλλοτρίωσι? σκοπό? δημοσία? ωφελεία?, συγκεκριμένω? προσδιοριζόμενο?, δέν δύναται νά έκπληρωθη επαρκώ? κατ' άλλον τρόπον, ώ? έπϊ παραδείγ­ ματι διά τή? άπ' ευθεία? άγορα? καταλλήλων ίδιοτικών ακινήτων οίκειοθελώ? προσφερομένων ύπό τών είδικώ? προ­ σκαλουμένων προ? τούτο Ιδιοκτητών των, έκτο? έάν το διά τη? αναγκαστική? άπαλλοτριώσεω? πλησσόμενον άκίνητον, κρίνηται ώ? το μόνον κατάλληλον διά τήν έπίτευξιν τοΰ επιδιωκομένου συγκεκριμένου σκοπού. 35 Ώ?προκύπτει όμω?έκτών λοιπών στοιχείων τοΰφακέλλου, υπεδείχθη ύπό τή? αίτούση? προ? τήν Δ.Ε.Η. αντί τοΰ άπαλλοτριωθέντο? γηπέδου έτερον τοιούτον τη? αυτή? έκτάσεω?, κείμενον ώσαύτω? έπϊ τη? 'Εθνική? Όδού καί έπϊ τη? αύτη? πλευρά?, εί? άπόστασιν 90 μ. περίπου, ανήκον Ιν μέρει εί? τήν αίτοϋσαν καΐ έν μέρει εί? έτερου? Ιδιόκτητα?. Ή προ­ ταθείσα αύτη εκτασι? απερρίφθη ώ? μειωνεκτοΰσα τή? έπιλεγείση?, λόγω ύπάρξεω? έν αύτη 'χωματερή?' καί διότι 'ή οδευσι? καίείσοδο?τών γραμμών 150 Κ εί?τόνύποσταθμόν ώ? καί ή προσπέλασι? έκ τή? 'Εθνική? Όδού είναι δυσχερέστεραι' καί διότι οί λοιποί Ιδιόκτητοι *ώ? φαίνεται δεν είναι διατεθειμένοι νά πωλήσουν τά μερίδια των* (εγγραφον Δ.Ε.Η. ύπ" αριθ. πρωτ. 2644/11/23.5.1968). 40 'Επειδή, έκ τών έν τη προηγουμένη σκέψει αναφερομένων, αΐτιολογεΐται μέν ή ανάγκη τη? κηρύξεω? τη? υπό κρίσιν άπαλλοτριώσεω?, δέν δύναται δμω? νά θεωρηθή ώ? πειστική καί επαρκή? ή ανωτέρω αΐτιολογία, έπϊ τη οποία ή Δημοσία Έπιχείρησι? 'Ηλεκτρισμού όέν εδέχθη τήν ύπό τη? αίτούση? 25 30 553 Hadjianastassiou J. Hjiloannou v. Republic

(1983)υττοδειχθεϊσαν λύσιν τή? χρησιμοποιήσεω? έκτάσεω? κει­ μένη? εγγύτατα προ? τήν άπαλλοτριωθεΐσαν τοιαύτην καί ήτι? έχει πρόσωπονέπϊ τη? αύτη? όδού,έν όψει και τοΰ λίαν έπαχθοΰ? διά τήν αΐτοϋσαν τοΰ ληφθέντο? μέτρου τη? αναγκαστική? άπαλλοτριώσεω?, πλήττοντο?τήν συνταγ- 5 ματικώ? κατωχυρουμένην (Βιοκτησίαν αυτή?, δοθέντο? άλ­ λωστε ότι δ Ισχυρισμό?τή? Δ.Ε.Η.,Οτι ή οδευσι? καιήπροσπέλασι? πρό? τήν ύποδειχθείσαν εκτασιν είναι δυσχερέστεραι, τυγχάνει τελείω? αόριστο? καί ασαφή?. Κατ' άκολουθίαν, δέον όπω? άκυρωθή ή προσβαλλομένη πραξι?, 10 λόγω άναιτιολογίτου ώ? πρό? τήν επιλογήν τού άπαλλοτριωθησομένου γηπέδου, ΐνα επανερχόμενη ή Διοίκησι?, έφ' όσον τυχόν ήθελεν εξακολουθεί κρίνουσα άνσγκαίσν την άπαλλοτρίωσιν, αίτιολογήση πλήρω? καί διά συγκε­ κριμένων στοιχείων τήν άπόρριψιν τοΰ ένό? γηπέδου καί 15 τήν πρόκρισιν τοΰ έτερου" ("Whereas according to the meaning of these provisions, interpreted within the framework of the relative general rules of law formed by the jurisprudence of this Court, the declared compulsory acquisition of an immovable by 20 their application as attributed to the taking of a measure onerous to the citizen, founded on the involutary deprivation of his constitutionally protected ownership, must be duly reasoned either in the act of compulsory acquisition itself or in the particulars accompanying it. 25 The reasoning, as a rule,is full when thereappears evidently the need of the taking, ineach case, of theabove exceptional measure and especially in view of the fact that the purpose of public utility for the compulsory acquisition, specially defined, cannot be duly effected in any other way, as for 30 instanceby thedirectpurchase of suitable private properties, voluntarily offered by the owners specially invited for the purpose, unless the affected by the compulsory acquisition property, is considered as the only suitable for the achieve­ ment of the required express purpose. 35 But as it appears from the rest of the particulars in the file, another site was pointed out by the applicant D.E.H. instead of the acquired site, of the same extent, situated also on the National Highway, and on the same side, at a distance of about 90 m. belonging in part to the applicant 40 554 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 Hjiloannou t. Republic Hadjianastassiou J. and inpart to other owners. Thisoffered sitewas refused as lacking regarding the one chosen due to the existence in it of 'chomateri' and because 'the installation of lines 150kinthe sub-station aswellasaccessfrom the National Highway are difficult' and because the rest of the owners 'as it seemsarenot inclined to selltheir shares' (Document D.E.H. No. F. 2644/11/23.5.1968). Whereas from what is referred to in the aforequoted reasoning though the need to declare the acquisition under consideration is reasoned, the above reasoning cannot be considered as convincing and adequate by virtue of which the Public Electricity Company did not accept the solution, proposed by the applicant, for the use of land situated very near to the acquired land and which faces the same road, in view of the very onerous, for the applicant, measure taken of the compulsory acquisition, affecting her constitutionally protected ownership, in view also of the allegation of D.E.H. to the effect that movement upon and access to the proposed property are more difficult, is altogether vague. Therefore the sub judice act must be annulled due to lack of reasoning as to the choice of the acquired field, so that the Administration may, in reverting, if it would still continue to consider necessary the acquisition, reason duly and by express particulars the refusal of one site and the preferment of the other"). On appeal, Mr. Ioannides, counsel for appellant No. 193, having agreed to adopt the addressof Mr. Christofides, counsel for appellants No. 194, very ably indeed argued in support ofhisgrounds of law(a) that thelearned Judge wrongly and in 30 violation of the principles enunciated regarding the compulsory acquisition, and the principles of administrative law did not annul the order of acquisition of the properties in question; (b) the trial Judge wrongly and contrary to law came to the conclusion that theproperties inquestion acquired bytheresponde35 ents were the only ones technically suitable for the purpose asemanatingfrom therelevantfile;andthathewronglyaccepted to introduce into Law 15/62thewording "technically suitable", once the word "suitable" is the one accepted by the Courts. Finally, he argued that the learned Judge wrongly reached 40 the conclusion that the acquiring authority has considered 555 Hadjianastassiou J. Hjiloannou v. Republic

(1983)all the possibilities and investigated all matters before issuing the order of acquisition and has completely failed to consider the true principles, as expounded in our case law, and relied only on the wording of "technically suitable" in order not to follow the principles regarding acquisition. There is no doubt, going through the various files, that the Council of Ministers was fully aware of theprinciples regarding the compulsory acquisition, and particularly that it should not be ordered if its object could be achieved in a less onerous manner, and after exhausting the possibility or probability 10 of purchasing other suitable property which could be voluntarily offered for sale. That this is so, it appears from the decision of the Council of Ministers of 27th March, 1975, and which shows that the Council approved the acquisition and decided to do so either by private agreement or by compulsory 15 acquisition of immovable property in the area of Strovolos of the extent of 145 donums, and which was also approved as being suitable for the implementationof the housing scheme in question. It is equally true to add that in spite of that decision, not- 20 hing was done to implement their decision to acquire land by a private agreement and/or to utilize the Governmentland on the pretext that such land was an expensive one, as com­ pared to the other land acquired by compulsory acquisition. Indeed, this became very clear because the Council of Minis- 25 ters, when the notice was published in the official Gazette that they had resorted to acquiring land by compulsory ac­ quisition only and when the notice of acquisition was pub­ lished in the official Gazette, all the objections put forward by the owners of the land in question were rejected on 11th 30 September, 1975 by counsel without giving any reasons at all. It is also true to say thatthe Council of Ministers has fai­ led to follow their own decision and the principles regarding compulsory acquisition in spite of the fact that recommen­ dation was made by the officials that both A and Β areas of 35 Strovolos were suitable and should be acquired for the rea­ sons stated. Finally, it appears that one of the reasons of choosing St­ rovolos area A was that the Governmentland which was con­ sidered by all the experts as being more expensive should not 40 556 5 3 C.L.R. Hjiloannou v. Republic Hadjianastassiou J. be utilized, in accordance with the accepted principles of ad­ ministrative law, and that land of lower prices should be pre­ ferred for the scheme in question. What is surprising, howe­ ver, is that, as far as we are aware, no reasons were given to 5 the owners of the land and no reasons were given in the op­ position why the land of the applicants was the only technically suitable land for thepurpose of acquisition. We would go even further and state that this point, in spite of the fact that no evidence was called, was put forward in the present case before 10 the learned trial Judge. Counsel for the respondent, in arguing his case, put for­ ward that regarding the omission of the administration to try to purchase the properties of the appellants by private agreement, he contended that argument cannot stand once 15 the property in question, under acquisition is considered to be the only technically suitable land for the purpose of the acquisition. He further invited this Court to accept that in spite of the general principle which lays down that the Go­ vernment has to utilize its own property, and in the alterna20 tive to try to acquire property by private agreement before it resorts to the onerous method of acquisition, that princi­ ple, counsel contended, is not applicable to the present cases, because he repeated, the property under acquisition is the only technically suitable for the purpose, and that the Go25 vernment was not bound to follow the principles formulated by the Courts. We have considered very carefully the decisions of the Full Bench of the Greek Council of State and our decisions, and we have reached the conclusion that the argument of counsel 30 cannot succeed because the cases relied upon, 505/68 and 3409/ 70, are distinguishable. With that in mind, we turn once again to the decisions of the Greek Council of State, and in Decision No. 505/68, the Full Bench had this to say in dismissing the case at p. 543 35 40 " 'Επειδή κατά τήν έννοιαν τών διατάξεων τούτων,έρμηνευομένων έν τ φ πλαισίω καί τών διά της νομολογίας τοΰ Δικαστηρίου τούτου διαμορφωθεισώνσχετικών γενικών τοΰ δικαίου άρχων, ή κατ* έφαρμογήν αυτών κηρυσσομένη α­ ναγκαστική άπαλλοτρίωσι? ακινήτου, ώς αναγόμενη els τήν λήψιν μέτρου επαχθούς είς βάρος τοΰ πολίτου συνι­ σταμένου els τήν έκουσίαν στέρησιν της συνταγματικώς 557 Hadjianastassiou J. Hinoannou v. Republic

(1983)προστατευόμενης Ιδιοκτησίας του, δέον πλήρως νά αΐτιολογήται είτε Ιν αύτη ifj πράξει της αναγκαστικής απαλ­ λοτριώσεως, είτε έκ τών συνοδευόντων αυτήν στοιχείων. Πλήρης δέ είναι ή αίτιολογία κατ' αρχήν οσάκις έξ αυτής προκύπτει σαφώς ή ανάγκη της λήψεως, κατά περίπτωσιν, ' 5 τοΰ ώς άνω εξαιρετικού μέτρου καί δή άπό της απόψεως ότι ό δΓ ού ή αναγκαστική άπαλλοτρίωσις σκοπός δημοσίας ωφελείας, συγκεκριμένως προσδιοριζόμενος, δέν δύναται νά έκπληρωθη επαρκώς κατ*άλλον τρόπον, ώς ένπαραδείγματι διά διαθέσεως προσφορών δημοσίων κτημάτων, ή διά της 10 άπ* ευθείας άγορας καταλλήλων ϊδιωτικών ακινήτων οίκειοθελώς προσφερομένων ύπό τών εϊδικώς προσκαλουμένων προς τοΰτο ϊδιοκτητών των, έκτος έάν το διά της αναγκα­ στικής απαλλοτριώσεως πλησσόμενον άκίνητον κρίνηται ώς το μόνον κατάλληλον διά τήν έπίτευξιν τοΰ επιδιωκομένου 15 συγκεκριμένου σκοπού, οπότε ή άξίωσις περί προηγουμένης προσκλήσεως τοΰ Ιδιοκτήτου αύτοϋ υποχωρεί. 'Επειδή έν προκειμένω έκ της προσβαλλομένης πράξεως και τών σχετικών προς ταύτην προπαρασκευαστικών πρά­ ξεων προκύπτει ότι αναγκαστικήάπαλλοτρίωσις της επιδίκου 20 εκτάσεως εκρίθη αναγκαία προς έπέκτασιν τοΰ είς τήν περιφέρειαν Ροΰφ λειτουργούντος υποσταθμού της παρεμβαινούσης και τήν έν αύτη άνέγερσιν εγκαταστάσεων, αΐτινες Θάτροφοδοτήσουν τά νέα κέντρα κατανομής ηλεκτρικής ενερ­ γείας της περιοχής Άθηνών-Πειραιώς καί Περιχώρων. Εί- 25 δικώτερον, έκ της ύπ* αριθ. 473/1966 αποφάσεως τοΰ Διοι­ κητικού Συμβουλίου τής ΔΕΗ, προς τον Πρόεδρον τοΰ Διοι­ κητικού Συμβουλίου σχετικής άπό 25.7.1966 είσηγήσεως τοΰ Γενικού Διευθυντού αύτηςκαίτοΰ ύπ* άρ. 32659/11.6.1966 διαγράμματος της ηλεκτρολογικής διατάξεως τοΰ ύπό έπέ- 30 κτασιν ώς άνω Υποσταθμού προκύπτει ότι ή εκλογή της άπαλλοτριωθείσης εκτάσεως έγένετο ύπό μηχανικών της διευθύνσεως μελετών, παραγωγής καί μεταφοράς κατόπιν προηγηθείσης μελέτης, κατά τά πορίσματα τής οποίας έπεβάλλετο ή έπέκτασις τοϋ υποσταθμού κατά τόν άξονα 35 τών υφισταμένων πύργων γραμμών μεταφοράς 150 ΚΥ καί τοΰ λοιπού έν λειτουργία ηλεκτρολογικού εξοπλισμού αυτού καί ότι ή περί ής πρόκειται έκτασις θέλει χρησιμοποιηθη: α) διά τήν έπ* αύτης εγκατάσταση» κυψελών αΐτινες θέλουσιν εξυπηρετήσει διά καλωδιακών έγκαταστά- 40 σεων 150 ΚΥ τά ύπό μελέτην κέντρα κατανομής περιοχής 558 3 CI.Κ. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Hiiloatmoa τ. Republic Hadjianastassiou J. πρωτευούσης, β) διά τήν έκτέλεσιν έκτος τών βάσεων τών πύργων τών μεταλλικών Ικριωμάτων και έτερων δομικών έργων εξυπηρετούντων τήν λειτουργίαν τού Υποσταθμού έν τ φ συνόλω του και γ) διάτήν δημιουργίαν προσπελάσεως προς τήν όδόν Σαλαμίνος τόσον τής άπαλλοτριουμένης εκτάσεως, όσον καί τών προσφάτως άγορασθεισών ύπό τής Δ.Ε.Η. εκτάσεων προς δημιουργίαν εγκαταστάσεως αυτής. Το είς τήν αΙτούσαν 1360 τ.μ. προώρισται κυρίως όπως χρησιμοποιηθή ώς οδός προσπελάσεως προς τήν όδόν Σαλαμίνος. Ύπό τά δεδομέναταύτα ή προσβαλλομένη πραξις παρίσταται πλήρως ήτιολογημένη, έφ' όσον δέ έκ τών μνησθέντων στοιχείων προκύπτει ότι τό άκίνητον τής αΙτούσης, γειτνιάζον προς τάς λοιπάς ώς άνωεγκατα­ στάσεις τής ΔΕΗ,ήτο, διά τους εκτεθέντος τεχνικούςλόγους, καίτό μόνον κατάλληλονδιά τήν έπέκτασιντοΰ υποσταθμού Ρούφ, δέν άπητεϊτο,προηγουμένη, πρόσκλησις αύτης προς διεξαγωγήν διαπραγματεύσεων διάτήν άπ* ευθείας,πώλησιν τοΰ ώς άνω ακινήτου της προς τήν παρεμβαίνουσαν". ("Whereas according to the meaning of these provisions, interpreted within the framework of the relative general rules of law formed by the jurisprudence of this Court, the declared compulsory acquisition of an immovable by their application as attributed to the taking of a measure onerous to the citizen, founded on the involuntary deprivation of his constitutionally protected ownership, must be duly reasoned either in the act of compulsory acquisition itself or in the particulars accompanying it. Thereasoning, as a rule, is due when thereappears evidently the need of the taking, in eachcase,of theabove exceptional measure and especially in view of the fact that the purpose of public utility for the compulsory acquisition, specially defined, cannot be duly effected in any other way, as for instance, by offering for use public properties or by the direct purchase of suitable private properties, voluntarily offered by the owners specially invited for the purpose, unless the affected by the compulsory acquisition property, is considered as the only suitable for the achievement of the required express purpose, when the claim for the previous invitation of this owner subsides. Whereas, in this respect, from the attacked act and the relative to it preparatory acts it appears thatthe compulsory 559 Hadjianastassiou J. Hjiloaaoou v. Republic

(1983)acquisition of the subject property was considered necessary for the extension of the sub-station operating at Roof locality by the intervening party and the erection in it of structures, which will provide the new distribution centres for electric power in the area of Athens, Piraeus 5 and suburbs. Especially by decision No. 473/1966 of the Managing Committee of D.E.H., to the Chairman of the Managing Committee relevant, as from 25.7.1966, submission of its Director-General and to the diagram No. 32659/11.6.1966 of the electrical arrangement of the 10 above under extension sub-station, it appears that the choice of the acquisitioned site was made by the engineers of the Study, Supply and Transport Section, after a prior study and according to its conclusions the extension of the sub-station was necessary on the axis of the existing 15 towers of transmission lines 150 KY and the rest of its in use electrical equipment and that the said site will be used:

1. a)for the installation on it of transformers which will serve by cable installations 150 KY the distribution centres under consideration for the area of the capital, 20
2. b)for the construction outside the base of the towers and the metal scaffolding, of other building works serving the operation of the sub-station in its entirety, and
3. c)for the creation of an access to Salamina Street, by the acquired site as well as of the recently bought sites by D.E.H. for 25 the creation of its structures. That of the applicant of 1360 sq.m. is mainly intended to be used as an access street to Salamina street. On these facts the attacked act is duly reasoned since from the referred facts it appears that the immovable of the applicant, which is near the 30 other above installations of D.E.H., was, for the technical reasons stated, the only suitable for the extension of the Roof sub-station, no requirement was necessary for the prior invitation for carrying out negotiations for the direct sale of her above immovable to the acquiring authority". 35 In case No. 3409/70, the Full Bench of the Greek Council of State, in dismissing the case, had this to say at p. 5248:"Έττειδή, έκτώνανωτέρω προκύπτει,ότιolλόγοιακυρώσεως καθ* ους, τό μέν, ό ανωτέρω σκοπός ήτο δυνατόν νά έπιτευχθη διά μέσων όλιγώτερον επαχθών, ήτοι διά της δια- 40 θέσεως ώρισμένης εκτάσεως ανηκούσης €Ϊς τό Δημόσιον είς 560 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 30 . 35 40 Hiloannou v. Republic Hadjianastassiou J. τήν θέσιν Κάλαθος τής νήσου, τό δέ, δτι ή επιλεγείσα έκτασις τυγχάνει, έν πάση περιπτώσει, ακατάλληλος διά τήν δημι­ ουργίαν αερολιμένος, προβάλλονται άβασίμως καί ώς τοιούτοι τυγχάνουσιν απορριπτέοι, δοθέντος δτι έκ τών εκτιθεμένων έν τή ηγουμένη σκέψει αποδεικνύεται ότι ή επιλεγείσα Θέσις εκρίθη,έξόλης τής νήσου Ρόδου,ώς ή μάλλον κατάλληλος όπως υπηρέτηση τον ανωτέρω σκοπόν, τής ουσιαστικής έπϊ τοΰ είδικοϋ τούτου θέματος κρίσεως τής Διοικήσεως διαφευγούσης τον ελεγχον τοΰ Συμβουλίου τής 'Επικρατείας, δικάζοντος έπϊ ακυρώσει. Επειδή, οσάκις ό σκοπός διά τόν όποιον κηρύσσεται ή άπαλλοτρίωσις ακινήτου τινός δέν δύναται νά ίκανοποιηθή εΙμή μόνον διά τοΰ ακινήτου τούτου, δέν δύναται, κατά τά νενομολογημένα, νά τύχη εφαρμογής ή αρχή καθ* ήν ή Διοίκησις υποχρεούται, πρό της κηρύξεως της απαλλοτριώσεως, όπως καλέση τόν Ιδιοκτήτην νά διαπραγματευθη μετ1 αυτής προς άγοράν τοΰ ακινήτου (Σ.τ.Ε. 1344/1970). "Οθεν, έφ* όσον ή περί ής ή παροΰσα άπαλλοτρίωσις έκτασις εκρίθη κατά τά εκτιθέμενα ανωτέρω ώς ή μάλλον κατάλληλος προς έγκατάστασιν τοΰ νέου αερολιμένος έν τή νήσω Ρόδω, δέν άπητεΐτο πρόσκλησις τών Ιδιοκτητών ταύτης, έν οΐς καί οί αΐτοϋντες, προς διαπραγμάτευσιν μετά τής Διοικήσεως έπϊ τ φ σκοπφ τής αγοράς τών κτημάτων των, άβασίμως προβαλλομένου και τοΰ τελευταίου λόγου ακυρώσεως καθ1 όν ή είρημένη απαλλοτρίωσης έκηρύχθη κατά παράβασιν τής ανωτέρω αρχής τής διεπούσης τά δίκαιον τών αναγκα­ στικών απαλλοτριώσεων". ("Whereas from the above it appears that the grounds for annulment, by which, on the one hand, the above purpose was possible to be achieved by less onerous means, i.e. by making available a certain site belonging to the State at Kalathos locality in the island, and on the other hand, that the site chosen happens, in any. case, to be unsuitable for the creation of an airfield, are unfounded and as such are unacceptable, given that from what was stated in the previous reasoning it is proved that the place chosen was. considered, from the whole island of Rhodes, as the most suitable to serve the above purpose, the substantive on this special subject decision of the Administration escaping the control of the Council of State trying on annulment. 561 Hadjianastassiou J. Hjiloannou >. Republic

(1983)Whereas whenever the purpose for which the acquisition of any property is declared, cannot be satisfied but only by means of this property, cannot, in accordance with the jurisprudence, beapplied therule that theAdministration is obliged, before the declaration of acquisition, to call the 5 owner and negotiate with her the purchase of the property (C.S.I344/1970). Therefore, since the property in respect of which this acquisition was considered by what was stated above as the most suitable for the erection of the new airfield in Rhodes island, it was not necessary for the 10 calling of its owners, including the applicant, for nego­ tiations with the Administration for the purpose of the purchase of their properties, and rendering as groundless the last ground for annulmentwhereby the said acquisition was declared in contravention of the above rule governing 15 the law of compulsory acquisition"). With the greatest respect, as we have said earlier, both cases are distinguishable from the facts of the present case, once it was clearly conceded by the administration that the land in question, compulsorily acquired was not the only suitable land 20 for the purpose in question. In addition, it is clear that even the experts of the Government, in agreeing that both areas A and Β were suitable for the housing project, nevertheless, they thoughtthatthelandwhichwas theproperty of the Govern­ ment and which was estimated at £5,000 per donum, would 25 have been a very expensive project to carry out, and ironically, in order not to utilize an expensive land, and as it was not considered profitable, the Government proceeded to acquire the land of the appellants compulsorily because in their view it would have cost the Government less money. We would 30 reiterate once again that the reason why the Government did not proceed to acquire land by private agreement, was the question of money, and with respect had nothing to do with the point raised now by counsel, once we repeat, all the land there was suitable for the purpose in question. 35 For these reasons, and for the fact that no evidence was adduced to show that it was the only area technically suitable for the purpose of the acquisition, we have reached the con­ clusion not to accept that principle because we think that the learned trial Judge wrongly accepted and followed such prin- 40 562 3 C.L.R. Hjiloannou v. Republic Hadjianastassiou J, ciples. We would, therefore, annul the decision of the learned Judge. Appeal allowed. Decision annulled. SAWIDES J.: These two revisional appeals are directed 5 against the dismissal by a Judge of this Court, sitting in the first instance, of the recourses of theapplicants under Nos201/75 and 204/75 contesting the validity of a compulsory acquisition order of properties belonging to them. Such recourses were heard together with recourse 200/75 by which another owner of pro10 perty affected by the same acquisition order contested both the validity of the acquisition order and the validity of a requisition order of the same property made for the purpose of facilitating expeditious entry in the properties compulsorily acquired and which recourse was also dismissed. 15 The subject matter properties were compulsorily acquired by the Republic of Cyprus under a compulsory acquisition order No. 714 published in Supplement No. 3 to the official Gazette of the Republic, No. 1223 of the 26th September, 1975. The requisition order in respect of the same properties was published 20 in the official Gazette No. 1233dated 7th November, 1977 (No. 807). The reasonsfor thesaidacquisitionasset out inthe notice of acquisition published in Supplement No. 3 to the official Gazette of the Republic, No. 1183 of the 25th April, 1975, are: 25 30 35 " the immovable property set out in the Schedule is necessary for the following purposes of publicbenefit, namely, for housing and town planning, and the acquisition of same is required for the following reasons, i.e. (a) the creation of a housing estate by the laying out and the construction of streets and drains, the installation of electricity cables and water supply system and the erection of any necessary, in relation thereto, installations, the creation of open green spaces as well as the division of the said immovable property into building sitesand the construction either on all or on a number of them (the building sites) of houses suitable for the lower middle social class, from the point of view of income, and or the lower social class, from the point of view of income, of the type of semi-detached houses or blocks of flats and terrace houses, as well as the 563 Savvides J. Hjiloannou v. Republic

(1983)construction of shops and other buildings for the use,convenience and comfort of the inhabitants of the housing estate; (b)the disposition of the building sites to becreated and or the houses to be built thereon by hire purchase and or 5 on lease to citizens of the Republic of the lower middle social class, from the point of view of income, and or the lowsocial class,from the point of view of income, who, at the time of submitting the relevant applications for the disposition of the building sites and or the concession of 10 houseswillberesidingwiththeirfamilies withintheGreater Nicosia Area (including the quarters of Omorphita, Kaimakli and Pallouriotissa, aswell asthe suburbs of Trachonas, Aglandjia, Strovolos, Engomi and Ayios Dhometios), and, possibly, at a second stage, in the villages of Yero- 15 lakkos, Mia Milia, Pano and Kato Lakatamia, Tseri, Yeri and Latsia, and will not possess owned houses in the said area and villages; (

1. c)the lease of the shops and other buildings which will be constructed, and 20 (
2. d)provided that the legislation in force at the time will permit this grant, with the approval of the Council of Ministers,partofthesaidimmovablepropertytoorganisations whichmaybesetupbylaw,thepurposeofwhichwillbethe solution of the housing problem either by the granting of 25 housing loans or by the disposition of building sitesand or housesunder such terms asthe Council of Ministerswould deemappropriatetoimposeatthetimeofsuchdisposition." The facts material to the present appeal, as related by the learnedtrialjudgeinhisjudgment,areasfollows: (SeeMammi- 30 dou& othersv.Attorney-General

(1977)3C.L.R. 462,at pp.468 474). "The immovable property affected by this acquisition isof an extent of about 145 donums, 3 evleks and 1800 sq. ft. consisting of 22plots — infact fields — situated outside the 35 Nicosia Water Supply Area. In addition, Government owned land of a total extent of 7 donums and 200 sq. ft. under plots 200, 172, 150and 560was granted by the Government for the needs of the said scheme. 564 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 Hjiloannou v. Republic Sawides J. Out of the properties acquired, the applicant in Re­ course No. 200/75, Vassiliki Efthymiou Mammidou, a housewife of Strovolos, married with five children is the owner of plot No. 146, a field of six donums 2 evleks and 1700 sq. ft. under Reg. No.Η 133,Sheet PlanXXX 6WII, Block Η at locality "Ftana". In fact, this is the only pro­ perty she owns and which she says,she intended to use for building thereon for her own family. Applicant in Recourse No.201/75, Vassos Pelopidha Hadjioannou, of Greece,is theone-half owner of plotsNos 169 and 173,the otherhalf is owned by a certain LoucasP. Hadjioannou. These two plots, as it appears from the plan produced, are of a considerable extent, but their size is not actually given in the material before me. Applicants in Recourse No. 204/75, SofocUs Hadjiosif Estate Co.Ltd.,of Strovolos, are the owners of threeplots, namely, (a)plot 199 of an extent of 3donums, 1evlekand 3000sq. ft. under Reg. No.Η 183,Sheet PlanXXX 5WII, Block H,(b) plot 174 of an extent of 16donums,3300 sq. ft. under Reg. No. Η 159, Sheet Plan XXX 6WII, Block Η and (c)plot 203 of an extent of 3 donums, 2 evleksand 3400sq. ft; under Reg. No.Η 187, Sheet Plan XXX 6WI1, Block H". The two last mentioned applicants appear to be developers 25 in land, as shown from the relevant file, and in particular, exhibit 'B*in Recourse No. 201/75, the letter of theChairman of the Strovolos Village Committee of the 6th June, 1975, who saysthathewas shockedwhenhereadtheNoticeof Acquisition, as the opinion of thevillage authority was not asked on such a 30 serious matter and further states thatone basic reason for their objection,was thefact thattheirinformation givenorally tothem at various periods,theHadjiosif Estate Co.Ltd.inco-operation. with the Hadjioannou brothers of Greece,made plans for the development of a total area of about 70 donums which now is 35 /affected by the said Notice of Acquisition and which develop­ ment included the construction of a big modern housing estate. This housing project of the Governmentwas conceived before the tragic events of 1974. Several studies carried out by the HousingandCountryPlanningDepartmentaswellasby experts 565 Saw ides J. Hjiloannou v. Republic

(1983)of the United Nations,ascertained theexistence in Cyprus of an acute housing problem, especially affecting the lower incomeand the lower middle income classes. The Government in order to face this problem, took a number of decisions, one of which was the construction of low cost 5 houses, intended for the aforesaid income classes, and, for that purpose, it was found necessary to find suitable areas. Those. however, found before the Turkish invasion, were no longer suitable, as being either within the part occupied by the Turkish army or too near to it to be used for the purpose needed. Fur- 10 ther, the implementation of this housing scheme was brought to a standstill until October, 1974, when, because of the additio­ nal needs caused by thedisplacement of people and theintention of the Government to increase its activity in the field of the Government house schemes, instructions were given to the 15 Housing and Town Planning Department to find other suitable areas for such purpose. Three areas were in fact chosen by the said Department,iden­ tified as Strovolos A, Strovolos Β and Latsia -- all outside the water supply area ~ and the Lands and Surveys Departmentwas 20 asked by letter dated the 1st October, 1974 (Appendix 1of ex­ hibit 1),for the assessment of their market value, thecategory of ownership, i.e. whether State,Church,private, Greekor Turkish, owned, and information regarding the extent of the whole or part of each plot affected by the scheme. 25 By letter dated the 30th January, 1975 (Appendix 2) the Di­ rector of the Department of Lands and Surveys gave his views about their market value, attached thereto a table of the appro­ ximate price of each plot as on July, 1974 and observed that the anomalous situation had created new conditions which should 30 be noted. Prices of land had suffered a drop which differed, depending on the locality of the property. In the case under examination, that drop was assessed at 20 per cent, but as under the then prevailing circumstances such prices were very sensitive depending on developments, it was possible tohave a spectacular 35 increase in case of improvement of the political situation, given that the areas examined were in the south part of the Island which, in the new circumstances, was deemed safer for the ex­ pansion of the town and the absorption of the displaced popu­ lation. He concluded that any decision regarding acquisition 40 566 3 C.L.R. Hjiloannou τ. Republic Sawldes J. should beexpedited and any development should bemade ona corresponding height of building density so that thewasteof useful landinasafe areashouldbeavoided. Hefurtherpointed out thatinStrovolos A Area therewere four plots, in Strovolos 5 ΒArea two plots and inLatsia Area threeplots of Stateowned land. Astudy oftheHousing and Town Planning Department containing also their recommendationsonthematter, is to be found intheirletterofthe29.2.1975addressed totheMinisterof Interior (Appendix 3). 10 A comparative table of the cost and other information is set outin para. 3 thereof, from which it appears that the per donum cost of the land inStrovolos ΒArea ishigher byabout £1,090 or about 81.5 per cent, as compared with Strovolos A Area. This makes the price of Strovolos Β Area almost 15 double than that of Strovolos A Area. Further factors relevant to the ultimate choice of Area A are tobefound inpara. 4of the said exhibit. Both Strovolos A andΒ Areas arewithin theboundariesofand arecompatible, regarding their use, totherequirements of the "Local Nicosia 20 Plan"; both areoutside theboundaries of the GreaterNicosia Water Supply plan butArea A is only a short distance from an inhabited area, which, from the point of view of social services, such as schools, church, public transport and shops gives it anadvantage over Area Β which is also ona plateau, 25 but it is so slopy and rough in certain parts that additional expense will be needed for its development. It is true that it is near certain industries andfor that suitable for housing schemes, yet, it is at a disadvantage with regard to Area A from thepointofviewof position ingeneral and other factors. 30 Thearea of Latsia is outside theboundaries of the "Local Nicosia Plan" although it forms an extension of the village; it consists of good quality agricultural land, densely planted with olive trees; thewater supply maypresent problemsand it is likely that there will be an increase in the problems of 35 ' public transport, so that the intended hire purchasers will have to pay additional transport expense of about 100 mils per day, than thehire purchasers of Strovolos A Area. The conclusions andrecommendations of this Department, as they areset outin paras. 5-11 of the said Appendix are 567 Hjiloannou v. Republic Savvides J.

(1983)briefly to theeffect thatbothAreas A and Β should beacquired as a matterof a long term policy as theacquisition of theneces­ sary land is a prerequisite to a housing programme and this will render unnecessary future acquisitions of adjacent land which, inevitably, will have its price enhanced by the carrying 5 out of a housing scheme in the vicinity, and so any future extensions of such housing schemes will still be possible at a low cost. Further, if a Housing Finance Agency or a Land Development Corporation is established, it will, inevitably, need land for housing purposes and part of the acquired land 10 may, if necessary, be placed at its disposal for its purposes. It was also considered, whether, in view of the economic difficulties of the State, it would be more beneficial for the Government to prefer Strovolos Β Area, half of which was Government owned land and consequently its purchase price 15 would not have to be paid but it was observed, and rightly so, that for the hire purchasers the situation would not be changed and they would still have to pay the extra cost for this more expensive land, unless the Government decided to reduce the price of its land to the level of the price of land 20 within Strovolos A Area. Elaborate reasons are further given in the said exhibit in support of the recommendations of the Department, but I need not go into them. The view of the Director of the Planning Bureau (Appendix 4) was that Strovolos Area A should be preferred, and in 25 addition to the existing Government land lying therein to acquire only about 153 donums of privately owned land, as against 290 donums proposed by the Housing and TownPlan­ ning Department. Eventually, a submission (Appendix 5) was made by the 30 Minister of Interiorto theCouncilof Ministers for the approval of a housing scheme under the said Law. The Council of Ministers at its meeting of the 27th March, 1975, approved the scheme by its Decision No. 13884(Appendix 6)which reads as follows: 35 "2. The Council: (

1. a)considered the housing scheme prepared by the Housing and Town Planning Department under section 3 of the Housing Law, Cap. 222 as same is ^_ " 568 3 C.L.R. Hjiloannou v. Republic Savrides J . described in detail in para. 3 of the submission and decided on principle to approve it under section 4 of the Housing Law, Cap. 222. (
2. b)Decided to approve the acquisition by the Government, either by private agreement or by compulsory acquisition, of the Immovable Property in the area of Strovolos of an extent of 145 donums, 3 evleks and 1800 sq. ft. which is shown delineated with green colour on the survey plan lodged with the secretary of the Council,and which was approved as suitable for the implementation of the said scheme at the estimated expense of £185,600.-. 5 10 (
3. c)Decided to grant under section 18 of the Immovable Property (Tenure, Registration and Valuation) Law, Cap. 224 and Laws 3/60, 78/65, 10/66, 75/68 and 51/71 and section 2 of the Government Loans Law, Cap.22and Law 54/72, totheDirectorof the Housing and Town Planning Department of Government owned land of a total extent of 7donumsand200 sq. ft. which is shown delineated with yellow colour on thesurveyplanfor theneedsof thesaidhousing scheme and, 15 20 (
4. d)it decided to authorize the Minister of Finance to findthenecessary funds and if necessary by submitting a supplementary budget to the House of Represent­ atives. 25 In pursuance thereof the notice of the intended acquisition, already set out in thisjudgment, was published in the official Gazette. 30 35 ι Four objections were made by owners of land affected thereby and together with theviews of the District Officer, Nicosia, the Director of Housing and Town Planning andthelegaladvicefrom theoffice of theAttorney-General, weresubmitted to the Council of Ministers by theMinister of Interior (see Appendices 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16). The objections were on the 11th September, 1975 rejected by the Council of Ministers by its decision No. 14260 which is to be found in Appendix 17". 569 Sawides J. Hjiloannou v. Republic

(1983)The legal grounds on which the recourses of the applicants were based and which were raised before the trial Court were that the notice of acquisition and the order of acquisition which were published in the official Gazette of the Republic were not in accordance with the provisions of 5 the Law, that the objects for which the acquisition was made were not objects of public interest, that the preliminary investigations and procedure contemplated by the Law were not followed, that the respondents failed to consider the opinion of the Village Commission of Strovolos concerning other 10 available land suitable for the acquisition, that the decision was not duly reasoned and that the respondents acted in abuse and/or in excess of power and contrary to any legal principle. The learned trial Judge after having heard extensive argument by counsel on both sidesdismissed the recourses and hisreasons 15 for doing so, appear in his elaborate judgment. It is against suchjudgment that appellantsfiledthepresent revisional appeals. The grounds of appeal relied upon and argued before us in these appeals were as follows: In recourse 201/75 {Revisional Appeal No. 193): 20

1. The Court of first instance wrongly and unlawfully and badly applying the principles of administrative law regarding Acquisition did not annul the attacked Order of Acquisition.
2. The first instance Court wrongly and unlawfully 25 considered the acquisition of the immovable property described in the recourse as the only technically fit for the purposes of the intended acquisition.
3. The Court of first instance wrongly and unlawfully found that a due inquiry has been carried out in issuing 30 the Order of Acquisition.
4. The appellant reserves his right to add new grounds of appeal as soon as the record of the proceedings is made available and/or at a subsequent stage.
5. The Court of first instance wrongly accepted that there 35 existed the purpose of public benefit and/or that the 570 3 C.L.R. Hjiloannou v. Republic Sawides J. objects of the acquisition are covered by section 3

(2)of Law 15/62. In Recourse 204/75 {Revisional Appeal No. 194): 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 The decision of the trial Court, contrary to the Law and by a wrong application and/or interpretation of it, unjustifiably and by wrong evaluation of the facts, the material in the file and the evidence in general: I. Accepted that the purposes and/or reasons of the acquisition can be considered as aiming at objects of public benefit or as covering generally the Public interest or that they are covered by section 3

(2)of Law 15/62. The Court wrongly and mistakenly accepted that there exists a case of Public Benefit and/or that the reasons advanced fall within the objects of Public Benefit. 2(A). Accepted that the acquired area was found after a proper inquiry, to be the only one technically suitable for the required object and that the respondents had not, therefore, any obligation in the sub judice acquisition, to attempt to acquire the affected immovable property by private agreement and/or by using properties voluntarily offered by their owners. (BXa) The respondents had an obligation to try to acquire the property by private agreement. Such obligation is imposed both by the relevant Law and the General Principles of Administrative Law. The decision of the Council of Ministers to approve the acquisition of the property by the Government either by private contract or by compulsory acquisition creates a selfbinding obligation on the Administration to try and exhaust the possibilities for the acquisition of the property by private contract. The respondents not only did not take any action for the acquisition of the property by private contract but, on the contrary, they made every attempt to avoid the acquisition of such property by private contract. (b) In the sub judice acquisition it was possible to attain the intended object by using Government property and/or by using immovable property voluntarily 571 Sawides J. Hjiloannou v. Republic

(1983)offered by theirowners or acquired by privatecontract. This is apparent in the file of the Administration. (c) in the alternative it is not shown from thefileof the Administration that the intended object could be attained only by compulsory acquisition. 5 3. Dismissed all the legal grounds of recourse 204/75 . relevant with the above anddid not annul the effected acquisition. In dealing with grounds

(1)and

(5)of R.A. 193 and ground

(1)of R.A. 194 counsel for appellants contended that the pur- 10 poses for which the acquisition order was made are not pur­ poses of public benefit within the meaning of Article 23 of the Constitution and section 3 of the Acquisition of Property Law, 1962 (Law 15/62) in that the schemes in question are neither town and country planning nor housing and that the 15 trialJudgewas wrong inreachingadifferent conclusion. Refer­ ence was made by counsel to the English legislation onmatters of town and country planning and housing and submitted that under the English standards which are so strict, one cannot say thatto build houses for a class of a populationis town and 20 country planning. Counselargued that"thepurposes of public benefit" (01 ο-κοπο! δημοσία? ώφΕλείας) are enumerated in section 3

(2)of Law 15 of 1962 restrictively and not indicatively, a fact which means that no additional purposes can be introduced depending on the prevailing circumstances 25 each time. Counsel added that laws interfering with the protection of the right of ownership should be interpreted strictly and concluded their argument on this ground that in any event the word "οΙκιστική" (housing) could not be construed in such a way as to include thebuidling of houses 30 for refugees. The same arguments were advanced before the trial Court and thelearned trial Judge had this to say in this respect: (pp. 474-476 of the report, supra). "In my view, the terms 'town and country planning or 35 housing' tobefound insection 3

(2)(i)of Law 15/62,should be given their ordinary meaning and not be interpreted by reference to the legislation of the United Kingdom and the powers given therein to the various appropriate 572 3 10 15 20 25 30 35 C.L.R. Hjiloannou v. Republic Savxides J. authorities for its implementation. These terms should be understood as including, inter alia, the development and use of land in relation to existing urban areas and the social and environmental requirements of a place, as well as the housing needs of the society, in particular, of those classes of the society which cannot, without public assistance or planned facilities, solve their housing needs. If anything, the creation of a housing estate is nothing but a housing purpose and the layout of the streets and other facilities are clearly town and country planning purposes. Under Article 23 para. 4 of the Constitution, any immovable property may be compulsorily acquired by the Republic only— "(

1. a)for a purpose which is to the public benefit and shall be specially provided by a general law for compulsory acquisition which shall be enacted within a year from the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution; and (
2. b)when such purpose is established by a decision of the acquiring authority and made under the provisions of such law stating clearly the reasons for such acquisition; and (
3. c)upon the payment in cash and in advance of a just and equitable compensation to be determined in case of disagreement by a civil court'. The lawenvisaged by section 23.4(a)of the Constitution which containsa directive to the legislature that the latter was bound to comply with, is the Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law, 1962 (Law 15/62). It is obvious that the purpose of this directive was that unlike the situation that existed before Independence where different procedures were prescribed under different laws, one general law should regulate matters of compulsory acquisition. Further, under section 3 of this Law and subject to the provisionsoftheConstitution and oftheLaw,anyproperty may be compulsorily acquired for a purpose which is to the public benefit and under sub-section

(2)thereof, the purposes enumerated as being to the public benefit include, under para, (i) 'town and country planning or housing'. 573 Sanides J . Hjiloannou v. Republic 0983) In view of the aforesaid, 1 have no difficulty, bearing in mind the purposes of public benefit and the reasons for the acquisition as set out in the Notice of Acquisition. to say that they are indeed purposes of public benefit coming within the provisions of section 3

(2)(i) of Law 15/62. It is true that a comprehensive Town and Country Planning Law was enacted in 1972 (Law 90/72) which has not, as yet, been put into operation, but that does not change the situation, nor can it be said, that because the Streets and Buildings Regulation Law, Cap. 96 considered as containing town planning powers of a rudimentary nature, does not contain powers to create housing estates, the purposes for the acquisition in question are not purposes of public benefit". (See Mammidou and Others v. The Attorney-General of the Republic

(1977)3 C.L.R. 462 at pp. 474, 475, 476. 1 fully agree with the conclusion reached by the learned trial Judge and with the reasons he gives on this issue. 1 wish also to refer to the following extract from the Greek Administrative Law, 4th Edition, Vol. Ill by Kyriacopoulos at pp. 373, 374, 375, where the learned author after considering the protection of the right to property which is safeguarded under the Constitution of Greece whereby the citizen cannot be deprived of his property except in the cases expressly provided by the Constitution, deals with such exceptions one of which is the "existence of public benefit". 5 10 15 20 25 "Α. Ή ΰπαρξις 'δημοσίας ωφελείας'. Ή έννοια τοΰ όρου 'δημοσία ωφέλεια', οΰσα άλλοτε ττεριωρισμένη, επειδή όφεώρα, ιδίως, εϊς την άναγκαστικήν οηταλλοτρίωσιν χάριν 30 δημοσίων έργων (οδών, σιδηροδρόμων κ.ά.δ.), διηυρύνθη σύν τ φ χρόνω, ούτως ώστε νάεΐναι δυνατήήάπαλλοτρίωσις και δι' άλλους σκοπούς. Ή εν λόγω έννοια, εξελισσόμενη σύν τη προόδω τοΰ πολιτισμού,καθιστή δυνατήντήν όλονέν εΰρυτέραν έξυπηρέτησιν τών σκοπών, τους οποίους έπι- 35 διώκει εκάστοτε τό κράτος, ή, άλλως, τοΰ δημοσίου συμφέ­ ροντος. Εις τήν τοιαύτην διά τής εξελίξεως διεύρυνσιν τής εννοίας τής 'δημοσίας ωφελείας' οφείλεται ουχί μόνον ή κατασκευή οχυρωματικών έργων καί ή στρώσις αμαξιτών οδών ή σιδη- 40 574 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Hjiloannou v. Republic Sawides J . ροδρομικών γραμμών καί ή άνέγερσις δημοσίων κτιρίων άλλα καί ή έξυγίανσις περιοχών, ό εξωραϊσμός πόλεων, ή στέγασις προσφύγων, ή άνακάλυψις αρχαιολογικών θησαυρών, ή γεωργική άποκατάστασις ακτημόνων, ή χρησιμοποίησις Ιαματικών πηγών, ή αστική άποκατάστασις αναπήρων, ή έπέκτασις βιομηχανιών, ή άναδάσωσις κ.ά. Ύπό τήν εύρυτάτην ταύτην εννοιαν ήρμήνευσε καί ή νομο­ λογία τόν όρον 'δημοσία ωφέλεια'. Έκ τών ανωτέρω εύνόητον αποβαίνει",δτι δέν είναι δυνατόν νά καθορισθώσιν επακριβώς αϊ περιπτώσεις, καθ' &ς δικαι­ ολογείται άπαλλοτρίωσις, τοΰ ημετέρου συντάγματος ούδενός περιέχοντος περιορισμού σχετικώς. Άρκεϊ ότι τό δημόσιον συμφέρον απαιτεί εν δεδομένη τινί περιπτώσει. τήν Θυσίαν τοΰ ατομικού δικαιώματος της Ιδιοκτησίας. Άπαλλοτρίωσις χωρεί πάντοτε οπόταν αύτη ύπαγορεύηται Ικτίνος πολιτειακού σκοπού, όστις ουδέποτε όμως επιτρέ­ πεται νά είναι οίκονομικός, ήτοι ν* άποβλέπη είς τό νά προσπορίση είς τόν υπέρ ού ή άπαλλοτρίωσις πλείονα έσοδα. Δημοσία ωφέλεια δέν σημαίνει 'ωφέλεια τού δημοσίου' ". ("Α. Existence of 'public benefit'. The meaning of the term 'public benefit' being formerly restricted, because it referred, especially, to the compulsory acquisition in favour of public works (streets, railways and others) was enlarged in the meantime, so that an acquisition will be possible for other purposes. The said meaning having been developed with the progress of civilization, makes possible the continually broader service of the objects which the State aims at the time, or, otherwise, of the public benefit. In such, by progress enlarged meaning of 'public benefit' is not only possible the construction of fortification works and the laying of asphalted roads or railroad lines and the erection of public buildings; but also the sanitation of districts, the embellishment of towns, the sheltering of refugees, the discovery of archeological treasures, the agricultural re-establishment of the poor, the use of curative springs, the civil settlement of the invalid, the extension of industries, the reforestation and others. Under this enlarged meaning jurisprudence interpreted the term 'public benefit*. 575 Sawides J . Hjiloannou \. Republic (198.1) From the above it becomes obvious that it is not possible to fix precisely the cases in which acquisition is justifiable. our Constitution having no restriction on the matter. It is enough if the public interest demands in a given case, the sucrifice of the private interest of ownership. Acquisition is always possible when it is dictated by a purpose for the State, which is never allowed to be economic, that is to aim to get inaddition for the one in whose favour the acquisition is, more assets. Public benefit does not mean 'benefit of the State' "). Reference may also be made to the decision of the Greek Council of State in Case 2034/52 where it was held that the housing of citizens devoid of home accommodation, isa purpose of public benefit. lu the present case there is no room for suggesting that the object of the acquisition was one intended to fetch any profit to the Government or financially benefit the fiscus but it was a purpose of public benefit as rightly found by the learned trial Judge. In the result, grounds (I) and

(5)of R.A. 193 and ground

(1)of R.A. 194, fail. I am coming now to grounds 2 and 3 of R.A. 193 and 2(A) and (B) of R.A.

1. Counsel for applicants argued that the learned trial Judge was wrong in finding that the properties in question were the only suitable for the purposes of the acquisition and that in so deciding he introduced into Law 15/62 the wording "technically suitable" upon which he relied, whereas there is nothing in the law or the jurisprudence applicable about "technically suitable". He further submitted that the learned trial Judge wrongly reached the conclusion that the Acquiring Authority had considered all the possibilities and investigated all matters before making the order for acquisition. Counsel contended that bearing in mind our jurisprudence and the general principles of administrative law, deprivation of property by compulsory acquisition is an onerous measure and should only be resorted to after all efforts to acquire same by private agreement or utilising property belonging to the Acquiring Authority was 576 3 C.I..K. 5 Ί0 15 20 Hjiloannou v. Republic Sawides .
2. exhausted, whereas, in the present case, no effort was made for the acquisition of the properties in question by private agreement or utilizing property belonging to Government. Furthermore, counsel submitted that the mode of compulsory acquisition was adopted contrary to the decision of the Council of Ministers that the property was to be acquired either by private agreement or acquisition. By such decision the Admi­ nistration was "self bound", ("αύτεδεσμεύθη") counsel contended, and, therefore, was bound to proceed to acquire properties by private agreement and if such procedure became impossible, then resort to the method of compulsory acquisition. Counsel for appellants further submitted that the reason why area Ά ' of Strovolos, in which the properties of the appel­ lants were situated, was preferred to area 'B' was because Government did not wish to utilize its property situated within area 'B' as such land was considered more expensive than that privately owned in area *A\ The learned trial Judge in dealing with the issue whether the omission of the respondent to exhaust all efforts to acquire the properties in question by private agreement in the first instance before resorting to the method of compulsory acquisi­ tion had rendered the said decision null and void, had this to say at pp. 477, 478, 479 of the judgment (supra): >.0 "The next ground of law relied upon is that the omission of the administration to exhaust all efforts to acquire this property by private agreement in the first place and then resort to the onerous measure of acquisition, renders the sub judice decision null and void. This is a duty, it was argued, to be found in the Housing Law and also in the general principles of Administrative Law. 35 I have already dealt with the procedural provisions of the Housing Law which have been superseded by the procedure laid down in the Acquisition Law. The issue, therefore, has to be approached with reference to the general principles of Administrative Law. 25 For that purpose, I was referred to the Case Law of the Greek Council of State, wherein the general principles of Administrative Law on the matter are stated to be 577 Sa\tides J. Hjiloannou i. Republic

(1983)that the act of compulsory acquisition must be fully reasoned, either in the act itself or in the accompanying elements, so that the necessity to take this exceptional measure shall appear clearly and particularly from the point of view that the purpose of public benefit could not 5 be achieved otherwise, e.g. by the disposal of proper Government property or by the direct purchase of privately owned immovable property from owners specially contacted for that purpose. (See Digest of Cases of the Greek Council of State, (1961-1970) Vol. 1, p. 536, paras 16 10 and 17 and Decisions 276/66, 2136, 2660/60 referred to therein). This principle, however, is not complete, unless it is added that the onerous measure of compulsory acquisition may be resorted to if the required immovable property 15 is considered the only technically suitable for the achievement of the purpose, when a prior offer to its owner to purchase it privately, is not necessary. In such instances, the ground that there exists an obligation to acquire immovable property by private treaty, as a matter of 20 general principle of law, cannot stand. (See paras. 19 and 20 and Decisions 505/68, 2579/69, 1344, 3409/70). It was argued on behalf of the respondents that this was a principle of law which they had in mind when they were deciding the making of the order of the acquisition. 25 Appendix 14 of exhibit 1is the legal advice from the office of the Attorney-General attached to the submission made to the Council of Ministers, together with the objections filed pursuant to the publication of the Notice of Acquisition and the other views expressed by the appropriate 30 Government Departments to which I have already referred. It is stated clearly in the said advice, that compulsory acquisition may be resorted to without prior offer to purchase privately the property in question, if it is the only suitable for the achievement of the desired purpose, and 35 reference is made to some of the decisions of the Greek Council of State, to which I have already referred. That the area in question was found to be, after a proper inquiry, the only technically suitable for the purpose, it is apparent from the whole approach of the matter as emanating from 40 578 3 C.L.R. Hjiloannou v. Republic Sav\ides J. the relevant file. It had to be acquired as a compact area and the exclusion of any part therefrom would frustrate the realisation of the object of the acquisition". e It is well settled under our jurisprudence following in this respect the principles laid down by the jurisprudence of the Greek Council of State, that the taking away of property belonging to a private individual, through compulsory acquisition, is an onerous measure and that the principles of proper admiJQ nistration and of lawful use of discretionary powers demand that before resorting to such measure, the State should exhaust the possibilities of cither using for the relevant purpose State land or finding property which is being voluntarily offered by its owners and which is more or less equally suitable for the ]5 purpose concerned. Such principles have been elaborated in Chrysochou Bros and

(1)The Cyprus Telecommunications Authority

(2)The Republic of Cyprus, through the Council of Ministers

(1966)3 C.L.R. 482, in which, TriantafyHides, J. (as he then was) h a d this t o say at p p . 497,4 9 8 , 4 9 9 : 2Q 25 H5 IQ " I n this connection it is useful t o bear in m i n d that the requirements of proper administration and the proper use of the relevant discretionary powers render it imperative that a compulsory acquisition should not be ordered if its object can be achieved in any less onerous manner; and it should only be resorted to if it isabsolutely necessary to do so and after exhausting the alternative possibility of achieving itsobject bymeans of purchasing other suitable property which is voluntarily offered for sale by its owner. Moreover, before resorting to compulsory acquisition of a particular immovable property the acquiring authority must exhaust the possibility of acquiring compulsorily other suitable immovable property the acquisition of which will entail a deprivation less onerous than the deprivation entailed in the proposed acquisition; (see Conclusions from the Jurisprudence of the Greek Council of State 1929-1959 p. 87):— and the above principles render all the more striking the already found, in this Judgment, lack of proper consideration of the matter by the Board of CYTA. The adoption of the said principles can be seen in the following Decisions of the Greek Council of State: 579 Simides J. Hjiloannou i. Republic

(1983)In Decision 300/1936 it washeld that it isnot permissible totakeawayfrom aprivateindividual,through compulsory acquisition more than what is indispensably necessary for the achievement of the relevant public utility purpose and it is, thus, not proper for the acquisition to go to the 5 extent of taking away ownership if the said purpose may beachieved by less onerous means, such as the acquisition of a servitude on the property concerned; the question, however, of the necessary extent of the acquisition is, as a rule, a matter within the discretion of the acquiring 10 authority. In Decision 1023/1949 it was held that the principles of proper administration and of lawful use of discretionary powers demand that the Administration should not resort to the very onerous method of compulsory deprivation of 15 ownership, before it exhausts the possibilities of either using for the relevant purpose State land or of finding property which is being voluntarily offered by its owner and which is more or less equally suitable for the purpose concerned; and if State land is not available and it has 20 been established that it is not possible to secure the necessary land by means of an ordinary purchase, then the Administration has to choose for compulsory acquisition, out of the suitableproperties, theonethe acquisition of which entails less onerous consequences, both from 25 the point of view of the use being served by the property to be acquired and from the point of view of the interests of the fiscus. In Decision 608/1955 it washeld that the Administration should not resort to the extremely onerous measure of 30 deprivation of ownership, except only in case of absolute necessity. In Decision 92/1957 it was held that the Administration when exercising its discretionary powers and choosing for acquisition a property as suitable to serve a particular 35 lawful public utility purpose has, among other things, to examine if there are other properties equally suitable for the purpose of acquisition, and has to prefer the property the acquisition of which will entail for its owner a deprivation of ownership less onerous in comparison to 40 580 3 C.L.R. Hjiloannou v. Republic Saντides J. the cases of owners of other properties which may be equally suitable for the purpose of the acquisition. 5 10 All the above decisions propound widely—accepted principles of Administrative Law which are, in my opinion, to be regarded as applicable to compulsory acquisition of immovable property in Cyprus, (see also Venglis and Electricity Authority

(1965)3 C.L.R. p. 252) in that they regulate the proper exercise of the relevant discretionary powers in accordance with the notions of proper administration; it is to be borne in mind, in this respect, that the relevant constitutional provisions (Article 23 in Cyprus and Article 17 in Greece) are provisions in pari materia"'. And concluded as follows at page 501: 15 20 25 "On the basis of the foregoing Ihave reached theconclusion that the sub judice Order of acquisition has to be annulled as made contrary to well-established principles of Admini­ strative Law (and, thus, contrary to law—see PEO and Boardof Films Censorsand another,

(1965)3 C.L.R., p. 27) and in abuse and excess of powers, in that it was made without sufficient study of possible alternatives, especially from the point of view of the possibility of acquiring access through any other suitable property, either by means of voluntary sale or, if by compulsory acquisition, with less onerous consequences than those existing in the case of the acquisition of Applicants' property". In Venglis and The Electricity Authority

(1965)3 C.L.R. 252, referred to in the above case, Munir, J., in dealing with the exercise of discretion by the Acquiring Authority in that case, had this to say at page 262: 30 35 "Inconclusion, Iwould state thatinexercise of thestatutory powers vested in it the Respondent having exercised a discretion, which 1am satisfied has been properly exercised after taking into account all relevant factors, to acquire the property in question of the Applicant, this Court is not prepared to substitute its own discretion for the Respondent's discretion and to say that the discretion should have been exercised in some other way by the acquisition of some other property. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the Respondent has not acted in abuse 581 Sawides J. Hjiloannou v. Republic 1983 of the powers vested in it, as alleged by counsel for Applicant, and has not acted contrary to the principles ofadministrative law referred to bycounsel for Applicant". Also, in Charalambos Pissas{No.2)v. The Electricity Authority of Cyprus

(1966)3 C.L.R. 784, Triantafylhdes, J. (as he 5 then was) concluded at pp. 791, 792, as follows: "The fact that the sub-station could, perhaps, be erected equally suitably on some other neighbouring property causing, on the whole, the same amount of hardship to theownerconcerned, asApplicant istosuffer inviewofthe JO erection of the sub-station in his own backyard (and such a neighbouring property appears to be plot 222on exhibit 1) cannot in my opinion lead to the conclusion that the decision toerectthesub-stationonthepropertyof Applicant has been taken in contravention of the relevant principles; 15 such principles could only have been contravened if a less onerousmeans of achieving the purpose of the compulsory acquisition had been overlooked; and not merely because one out of equally onerous solutions hasbeenpreferred, as inmy opinion is the position in the present case. It isnot 20 for this Court to exercise its own discretion, in substitution ofthediscretionofRespondent, regardingthechoiceamong equally suitable properties, the acquisition of which entails more or less equal hardship". The principles of proper administration and theproper use of 25 discretionary powers in cases of compulsory acquisitionof land enunciated inthe abovedecisionswerealsoreiterated inTikkiris andothersandTheElectricityAuthorityofCyprus

(1970)3C.L.R. 291. In dealing with the contention that the discretionary powers of the Acquiring Authority were wrongly exercised, 30 Hadjianastassiou, J. had this to say at pp. 300, 301: "Having in mind the principles of proper administration with regard to the use of lawful discretionary powers, and the fact that the necessary extent of the acquisition to meet boththetechnicalpointofviewaswellastheotherpurposes 35 of the acquiring authority is within its discretion, I have reached theviewthatthesaidauthority hasproperlyexercised its discretionary powers under the law. In any event, the Applicants have failed to adduce any evidence to show 582 3 C.L.R. Hjiloannou v. Republic Savtides J. to the Court that really the extent of the property acquired by the acquiring authority was more than necessary to achieve its public utility purpose. I would, therefore, dismiss also this contention of counsel." 5 And at page 300: 10 15 20 25 *'ln the present case, regarding the fact that this sub-station could possibly be erected on to the private properties within the Pouyeros area - and this point has not been pressed by counsel for the Applicants - it would appear that the same amount of hardship would have beencaused to those owners as to the Applicants. In my view, therefore, I cannot reach the conclusion that the decision of the Respondent has been taken in contravention of the administrative principles. It goes without saying, of course, that such principies could have been .contravened if less onerous means of achieving the purpose of the compulsory acquisition had been overlooked by the acquiring authority; and not because one out of equally onerous solutions has been preferred. I would reiterate once again that the Respondent has properly exercised its discretion, and it is not for. this Court to exercise its own discretion in substitution of the discretion of the Respondent regarding the choice among equally suitable properties the acquisition of which entails more or less equal hardship. See Pissas {No. 2) v. E.A.C.

(1966)3 C.L.R. 784 at pp. 791-792." In the present appeals, it is apparent from the contents of the relevant files of the administration which were before the first instance Court and to which reference was made in these proceedings, that the Council of Ministers before taking the decision 30 to acquire the subject properties and publishing the Notice of Acquisition, had before it, the planning scheme of the Housing and Country Planning Department (Appendix 3 to the Opposition)and theconclusionsand recommendations of such Department which it studied carefully, as it appears from the minutes 35 of the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the 27th March, 1975. Theexistenceofan acutehousingproblem for the lower middle social class from the point of income, and the lower social class from the point of income, within the greater Nicosia area, which 40 became more pressing after the Turkish invasion, necessitated 583 <s.midcs .1. Hadjiloannuu \. Republic

(1983)the intervention of the Government for the solution of such nroblem and this necessity for intervention has not been disputed ny the appellants. Before taking its final decision for the compulsory acquisition of the properties in question, the Council of Ministers recon- 5 Mdered the position in the light of the written objections (Ap­ pendices 8-11) made by the owners of six out of the 22 plots which were submitted by the Minister of Interior together with the written observations of the District Officer through whom the objections were made (Appendix 12), the observations of the 10 Director of the Housing and Country Planning Department <• Appendices 13 - 15) and the legal opinion from the office of the \ttorncy-General of the Republic as to the legal principles to be born in mind before making a compulsory acquisition order 'Appendix 14). After "a careful consideration" ("ενδελεχούς 15 εξετάσεως") and having taken into consideration all the circumstances of the case, the Council of Ministers rejected the objections and decided toproceed with thecompulsory acqui­ sition of the properties in question. Its decision is embodied in the letter (Appendix 17) sent to the District Officer of Nicosia 20 by the Minister of the Interior authorising him to inform the persons whose objections were rejected, accordingly. The material part of such decision, reads as follows: "Τό Συμβουλίου:(α) έμελέτησε ένδελεχώς τάς ενστάσεις τάς έπισυνημμέυας 25 εις την πρότασιν ώς Παραρτήματα ΙΙ-ν έκ μέρους τών κατά τής σκοπούμενης απαλλοτριώσεως ώρισμένης ακι­ νήτου Ιδιοκτησίας αυτών κειμένης είς Στρόβολου και, λαμβανομένων ΰ π ' όψιν άττασών έν γένει τών περιστά­ σεων, άττεφάσισεν όπως άπορρίψη ταύτας και (β) απεφάσισε,λαμβανομένων ΰπ' όψιν άπασών ευγένει τών περιστάσεων όπως έγκρίνη, δυνάμει τοΰ άρθρου 6 τοΰ περί 'Αναγκαστικής 'Απαλλοτριώσεως Νόμου,άρ. 15 ιοΰ 1962, τήν έκδοσιν τοΰ Διατάγματος 'Απαλ­ λοτριώσεως ". ("The Council:(

1. a)studied thoroughly the objections attached to the 584 30 35 3 C.I..It. Hjiloannou \. Republic Sawides .1. submission as Appendix ll-v on behalf of Messrs. 5 against the proposed compulsory acquisition of some of their immovable property situated at Strovolos and taking into consideration generally all circumstances. decided to dismiss them and (
2. b)decided, taking into considerationgenerally all circum­ stances, to approve under section 6 of the Compulsor\ Acquisition Law, No. 15of 1962, the issue of an Acqui­ sition Order"). 10 15 20 25 30 35 The planning scheme and the conclusions and recommen­ dations of the Housing and Country Planning Departmentwhich the Council of Ministers took into consideration, appear in Appendix 3 attached to the Opposition. A perusal of these documents makes it clear that the experts of the Housing and Country Planning Department carried out a careful and exten­ sive study for the selection of the most suitable area for giving effect to the object of the scheme which was the building of houses at a low cost for sale to the low middle social classes and lower social classes from the point of income, of citizens of the Republic. A comparative study is contained therein in respeci of the three areas under consideration,setting out the advantages and the disadvantages of each one over the others, and dealing also with the social and economicaspect pertaining to each area. After such study and comparison. Appendix 3. concludes that "Area Ά ' of Strovolos is the most suitable from all aspectscom­ pared both with Area 'B' of Strovolos and with that at Latsia village". It is correct that in such scheme there is a suggestion that in addition to Area Ά". Area 'B' of Stro\olos should also be acquired for future extension of the scheme because if the acquisition of that area as well was left for a later stage, theprice of land in Area 'B' would be enhanced on the basis of the deve­ lopment which would take place in Area *A' as a result of the housing scheme. This suggestion, however, does not mean ihai the advantages of Area *A* of Strovolos which make it the ΠΙΟΛΙ suitable for acquisition, according to the opinion expressed should be ignored and Area 'B* preferred, because the latter IN also deemed as suitable for the extension of the housing scheme It has been suggested that in Area B* there was Government land of an extent of around ?u donums which could bo utilised 585 S l i d e s J. Hjiloannou r. Republic

(1983)for the materialisation of the housing scheme without resorting to the onerous measure of compulsory acquisition. It is abun­ dantly clear from Appendix 3 and the other appendices to the Opposition that an area of 70 donums was not sufficient tomeet the demands of the scheme, and that for effectively carrying out 5 same, an area of about 209 donums was necessary. The acqui­ sition of land to that extent was originally proposed by the Housing and Town Planning Department, which by a later proposal of the Director of the Planning Bureau (Appendix 4) was reduced to 153 donums of privately owned land, in addition 10 to the existing Government land lying therein. The Council of Ministers approved the compulsory acquisition of only 145 donums, 3 evleks and 1800 sq. ft. of privately owned land in addition to the grant of an area of 7 donums and 200 sq. ft. of Government land situated in the same area. 15 It has not been suggested by the appellants that the Govern­ ment land of 70 donums was sufficient for the purposes of the scheme, but theirargument was to theeffect that Area *B' should have been preferred to that of Area Ά ' within which the pro­ perties of the appellants were situated. If such submission was 20 accepted, provided that all considerations both from social and economical aspect were the same, the compulsory acquisition of properties within Area 'B* instead of Area Ά ' would have entailed shifting of the onerous measure of the acquisition upon the shoulders of the owners of land within Area 'B' instead of 25 the appellants. I find that the discretion of the Acquiring Authority was properly exercised in the present case, in the light of all relevant matters taken into consideration, and after a due inquiry into thematter, and 1have come to the conclusion that this Court cannot interfere with the exercise of such dis- 30 cretion and exercise its own discretion in substitution to that of the respondent, as to the choice of the most suitable area. As to the contention that the trial Court by finding that the properties in question were the only "technically suitable" for the purpose, has introduced a new notion which is unknown in 35 the administrative law, that is the notion of "technicality'*, I i'ind myself unable to agree with such contention. The tenor of the whole judgment of the trial Court shows that the word "technically" used by the trial Judge, does not mean anything more than expressing in short terms that for technical reasons 40 586 3 C.L.R. Hjiloannou v. Republic Sawides J. the area in question was the most suitable for the purposes of the acquisition. Looking at the Index of the Jurisprudence of the Greek Council of State (1961 - 1970),Vol. 1,at page 536, under para, 19 one 5 finds theuseof the expression "technically suitable"asthe word summarily describing'that for technical or other reasons compulsorily acquired land isthemost suitable inthe circumstances. The following is stated in the said paragraph: "Unless the compulsorily acquired immovable property is considered to be 10 the only technicallysuitable for giving effect to the purpose (of the acquisition) in which case the previous invitation of the owner to negotiate, is not required". (Reference is made to the cases of the Greek Council of State Nos 505/68, 2575/69, 1344/70, 3409/70). 1, therefore, find that the use of the words 15 "technical suitable" by the learned trial Judge does not in any way introduce a new notion into the principles of administrative lawor intothetext of the law. It ismerely a conclusion reached by the trial Judge in the circumstances of the case. As to the contention that there was violation of the principles 20 of administrative law concerning acquisitions, that the onerous measure of compulsory acquisition should not be resorted to without exhausting the efforts for the acquisition of the property,by private agreement, it iswell settled that the compulsory acquisition may be resorted to if the required immovable pro25 perty is considered the only suitable for the achievement of the purpose, when a prior offer to its owner to purchase it privately isnot necessary. There isample authority in this respect in our jurisprudence adopting in this respect the principles enunciated by the decisions of the Greek Council of State (see, amongst 30 others thedecisions ofthe Greek Council of State 505/68,826/69, 2575/69, 1344/70, 3409/70). As to the contention that the decision of the Council of Ministers to acquire the property compulsorily instead of by private agreement, isnot duly reasoned, I find that such contention 35 is unfounded. A perusal of the various exhibits before the Court which were extracts from the files of the administration, show that such reasons appear in detail therein. In the various appendices and in particular Appendix A, a thorough study is included about all the areas under consideration and the reasons 40 why the area in question was preferred as the most suitable for 587 Sawides J. Hjiloannou v. Republic

(1983)the purpose of the scheme. In the circumstances, once the property in question was found the most suitable and such find­ ing was based on proper inquiry, as in the present case, the de­ cision was sufficiently reasoned. Dealing lastly with the contention that the Council of Mini- 5 sters was "self-bound" ("αύτεδεσμεοΌη") by its first de­ cision that the properties should be acquired by private agree­ ment or compulsory acquisition and that it should have first proceeded to private negotiations with the owners, and in case that the acquisition of the property in that way became impos- 10 sible, then proceed to the method of compulsory acquisition, I find myself unable to agree with such contention. The Coun­ cil of Ministers by its decision thattheproperty should be acqui­ red by private agreement or compulsory acquisition, allowed a discretion to the departments concerned, to adopt either me- 15 thod and not to adopt the oneinpreference to the other. It was after consideration of all the circumstances of the case and the recommendations made by the appropriate Departments and after consideration of the objections raised by the owners of the six plots out of the 22, andhaving accepted thesubmission made 20 by the experts that the land under consideration was the most suitable for the purpose of the scheme, that it decided to com­ pulsorily acquire same without any private negotiations. No evidence was called by the appellants in this case to con­ tradict what appears in the files from the reports of the experts 25 that (a) the land in question was the most suitable as compared 4 toArea B or(b)thatthe schemecouldbe carried outby utilising the Governmentland only inArea *B'without the need of acqui­ ring privately owned property. For all the above reasons, the appeals are dismissed but in the circumstances of the case, J make no order for costs. 30 MALACHTOS J.: 1 have had the advantage to read both judg­ ments just delivered and I must say that I fully agree with the judgment of my brother Judge Sawides, for the reasons given and the conclusions reached by him, and I have nothing useful 35 to add. 1, therefore, dismiss both appeals and I would make no order as to their costs. THIANTAFYLUDES P.: 1 have had the opportunity of discus­ sing at length these cases with all my brother Judges sitting on this Bench. 588 40 3 C.L.R, Hjiloannou v. Republic Triantaf)Hides P. I have, in particular, discussed with Mr. Justice Hadjianastassiou the judgment which has just been delivered by him and I fully agree with all the principles enunciated therein. Mr. Justice Sawides has, also, kindly furnished me in advan5 cewith a copy of hisjudgment and it is to benoted that there is really no difference of opinion, among all four of us who arc dealing with these appeals or between us and the learned trial Judge, as regards the principles of law applicable to a matter of this nature. 10 What has to be decided is whether or not this is an instance in which, in the light of such principles, there ought to be upheld the relevant decisions of the administration, bearing in mind that such decisions were reached in the exercise of really very wide discretionary powers. 15 Since the onus was on the appellants to satisfy us that these appeals should succeed 1 have, after much anxious consideration, and not without quite some reluctance, reached the conclusion that Iam not satisfied that, in the light of their particular circumstances, these appeals should succeed. 1 agree, therefore, 20 that they should be dismissed. In the result these appeals are dismissed by majority, but without any order as to t