(1983)1983 October 14 [PIKIS, J.] IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLE 146 OF THE CONSTITUTION HEBE NISSIOTOU, Applicant, v. THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, THROUGH THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION, Respondents. (Case No. 311/83). Educational Officers—Headmasters—Secondary Education—Transfers —Postings—Request for posting to another school in the light of the expected introduction of the division of schools into Gymnasiums and Lyceums— Whether it could be treated asan application for transfer—Regulations 14
(1)and 15 of the Educational Service 5 Regulations, 1972—Time-limit for making applications for transfer—Is set only for transfers from one geographic area to another and notfor transfersfrom one school to another within the same town—Regulations 17
(2)and 18(a) of the above Regulations—Section 39
(2)of the Public Educational Service Law, 10 1969 (Law 10/69). Administrative Law—Administrative acts or decisions—Executory act—Educational officers—Secondary Education School Masters —Transfers—Postings from one school to another within the same town—Have a direct impact upon theposition of education- \5 alists—They do not constitute an internal administrative measure but an executory administrative act which is amenable to judicial review. Educational Officers—Secondary Education Headmasters—Transfers —Appropriate Authority (the Minister) doing nothing more 20 than approving the decision of his subordinate the Director of Education—Thus failing to assume and exercise the powers entrusted to him by law as the appropriate authority—And acting 974 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Nisdotou v. Republic in abuse of power.by relinquishing the discharge of a legal duty andsurrendering effectiveauthorityto another organ—Moreover the Minister has not carried out an adequate inquiryin thathe did not inquireinto the wishesof headmasters for transfer,in contravention of regulation 14
(1)of the Educational Service Regulations,1972—Also subjudice decisionnot duly reasoned because it referssolelyto theprinciple underlying it andnot to the reasons therefor—Annulled. Administrative Law—Abuse ofpower—Statutory competence—Failure of appropriate authority toassume it andentrusting it to another organ—Appropriate authorityactingin abuseofpower. Administrative Law—Inquiry—Absence of dueor adequate inquiry— Transfers of Secondary Education Headmasters—Ministerfailing to inquireinto the wishesof Headmasters for transfers—Sub judice decision annulledfor absence of adequate inquiry—Regulation 14
(1)of the EducationalService Regulations, 1972. Administrative Law—Administrativeacts or decisions—Reasoning —Requirement for due reasoning—How satisfied—Transfers ofSecondary Education Headmasters—Relevantdecisionreferring onlytotheprinciple underlying it andnot to thereasons therefor —Annulled for lack of duereasoning. The educational authorities decided to introduce during the current academic year a division of secondary schools into two self-composed branches, each involving a three-year cycle of education, the Gymnasium and Lyceum which, henceforth would function and be accommodated separately. In anticipation of the transfers expected to become necessary by the introduction of the division the applicant, the headmistress of the A* Gymnasium of Phaneromeni, applied by letter dated 8.6.1983, to be transferred to a school classified as a Lyceum, namely Makarios C Gymnasium at Nicosia. In support of her application for transfer she gave as a reason the elevated status of the school to which she applied to be transferred earmarked as a Lyceum, in contrast to the schooi wheresheserved,designated asa Gymnasium; and alsopersonal and family convenience served by the proximity of Makarios C*Gymnasium, to the place of work of her husband. No reply was ever given to the letter of the applicant nor reasons were 975 Nissfotoa v. Republic
(1983)givento her at any time for not meeting her request. On 16.7. 1983 11transfers of headmaslers, posted at Nicosia- Secondary schools were decided by the Minister of Education, in the context of the new classification of secondary schools. These transfers entailed movement of headmasters to different schools at Nicosia. As the applicant was not among those transferred by her recourse filed on 21.7.1983, she challenged the validity of the tranfers and questioned the omission of the Minister of Education to consider and satisfy her application for transfer. 5 On the questions: 10 (a) Whether in view of regulation 15 of the Educational Service Regulations, 1972 the request of applicant did not constitute or amount to an application for transfer because she asked to be posted. (b) Whether regulations 17
(2)and 18(
- a)relieved the admi- 15 nistration of any duty to consider the application as it was made out of time. (
- c)Whether the decision of the Minister of Education of 16.7.1983 was an executory act. (
- d)Whether the decision of 16.7.1983 emanated from the 20 Authority entrusted by law for effecting transfers within the same geographic area, namely the "appropriate authority", in this case the Minister of Education. (
- e)Whether the sub judice decision was a valid one, 25 bearing in mind the inquiry made and the reasons given in support of it. With regard to(d)above all the Minister did inthis casewas to signify approval of the recommendation of the Director of Secondary Education for transfers channelled to the Minister 30 by writing the word "approved" on the recommendations. Hela\(\) that unlesssomeruleor regulation absolvedtheadministration ofthe dutytoconsider applicant's letterinthe context of the contemplated transfers pertinent to the classification ofschools,theyweredutyboundtotakeit properlyintoaccount, 35 as required by regulation 14<1)ofthe Educational Service Regulations, 1972, and in exercising the discretionary powers vested in them under section 39
(2)of the Public Educational Service 976 3 C.L.R. Nisslotou τ. Republic Law, 1969 (Law 10/69)notwithstanding that sheused the word "posfed". 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
(2)That ona proper interpretation of regulations 17
(2)and 18(a) a time-limit is set for making applications for transfer, onlywithregardtotransfers from onegeographic areatoanother andtheseregulations donotenvisageatime-limitfor submitting applications for transfer from one school to another within the same town.
(3)That the Public Educational Service LawandRegulations made thereunder, lay down the same criteria for the transfer of educationalists, whether they concern movement from one school to anotherwithin the same town or,from one geographic location to another; that the test in both cases are educational needs and the wishes of individual educationalists—see regulation 14
(1); that unlike the transfer of public officers governed by thePublic Service Law, 1967(Law33/67) specific criteria are laid down establishing a firm legal basis governing transfers; that this is regarded as a legislative acknowledgment that transfers of educationalists, be it within thesame town, have a direct impact upon theposition of educationalistsand, as such, should be amenable to review; that, moreover, their implications on the effectiveness of the educational system is another ponderousreasonfortaking thedecisionunderconsider ation outside thecompass of internal administrative measures; that reflection ontheimplications of the newclassification of schools upon the position of headmasters, leaves no'doubt thatpostingtoaschool onthelower orupperstrataofsecondary education, has direct foreseeable repercussions upon their career and standing inthe service; and that,therefore, the sub judice decision is justiciable (Yiallottrouv. Republic
(1976)3 C.L.R. 220and Karapataki v. Republic
(1982)3 C.L.R. 88 distinguished).
(4)That even if the apparent implications, arising from the mannerinwhich the decision inquestionwastaken,wereto be overlooked, there is nothing to suggest, on a consideration of the records placed before theCourt, that theMinister applied himself, other than merely approve, to thematter in handin order to decide himself how educational needs would best be served, including consideration of individual preferences of educationalists; that, on the contrary, there is everything to 977 Nissiotou τ.Republic
(1983)suggestthatthe Minister of Educationdid nomorethan approve the decision of a subordinate, failing, in the end, to assume and exercise the powers entrusted to him by law as the appropriate authority;thatit is anabuse of power to relinquish the discharge of alegal duty andsurrendereffective authoritytoanotherorgan. And as such it is liable to be set aside. 5 Held, further, that one is inexorably driven to the conclusion that the transfers were made without inquiring into the wishes of headmasters for transfer, in contravention of the provisions of regulation 14
(1); that at the least the inquiry was inadequate 10 to that extent.
(5)That the reasoning of the sub judice decision is brief and does not purport to justify the decision; that all it does is to assert its necessity in satisfaction of educational needs; that the reasoning of an administrative decision must be explicit 15 to the extent of enabling the parties affected by the decision to advise themselves as to their rights on the one hand and administrative Courts exercise proper control over admi nistrative action on the other; that vague generalities are no substitute for a reasoned decision; that nor repetition, as 20 such of the statutory criteria absolves the administration of the duty to reason how they apply in the circumstances of a particular case; that the facts of the case must be explicitly evaluated; that administrative bodies mustnotlimittheir reason ing to listing the guide-lines upon which they relied for their 25 decision; thatthesubjudice decision refers solelytotheprinciple underlying it, not the reasons for the decision; that it does not, for example, reason why headmasters with lesser experience than the applicant were placed in charge of Lyceums, schools of exalted status under the new scheme, in preference to the 30 applicant—a headmistress with a long and successful career, asevidencedby a series of documentsproducedbefore theCourt; accordingly the sub judice decision will be annulled so far as it concerns the applicant and the interested parties. Subjudice decision annulled. 35 Per curiam: Important changes, reflecting changes in policy, should not be introduced by administrative measures, but should be undertaken within the framework of legislation. It is, in the first place, desirable that 978 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 Nissiotou τ. Republic important changes ineducation, affecting our educa tional system andthequality of education in general, should have explicit approval from the legislature. Also, legislation provides for certainty and a more definite guide tothe rights of parties affected thereby. Such legislation should lay down the criteria that should govern assignment of educationalists tothefirst and second level of secondary education. Cases referred to: Yiallourou v. Republic
(1976)3 C.L.R.220; Karapataki v. Republic
(1982)3 C.L.R. 88; Sofocleous (No. I)v. Republic
(1972)3 C.L.R. 56; Sofocleous v. Republic
(1974)3 C.L.R. 63; Re CushlaLtd.[1979] 3 All E.R. 415; Frangos andAnother v. Republic
(1982)3 C.L.R. 53; Tooulias v. Republic
(1983)3 C.L.R. 465; Papakyriacou v. Republic
(1983)3 C.L.R. 870; Papadopoullos v. Republic
(1982)3 C.L.R. 1070 at p.
- 20 25 30 35 Recourse. Recourse against the refusal of the respondent to transfer applicant from Phaneromeni Gymnasium *A* to Makarios *C* Gymnasium. A. S. Angelides, for the applicant. R. Vrahimi (Mrs.), for the respondent. Ph. Vatiantis, for interested party C. Karayiannis. Cur. adv. vult. PIKIS J. read the following judgment. Important changesin the structure of secondary education were under consideration last year, programmed to be introduced during the current academic year. They involved the division of secondary schools into two self-composed branches, each involving a three-year cycle of education - the Gymnasium and Lyceum. Hitherto the first and second cycle of secondary education coexisted and were accommodatedinthe same school. Henceforth, theGymnasiums would function andbeaccommodated separately from schools earmarked to function as Lyceums. The expected changes became known to educationalists and 979 Pttrfa J . Nissiotou •. Republic (1»3) seemingly were, for obvious reasons, of especial concern to headmasters. In anticipation of thetransfers expected to becomenecessary by the introduction oftheaforementioned schematic changesin secondary education, Mrs. Nissiotou, the headmistress of the 5 A*Gymnasium of Phaneromeni, applied to be transferred to a schoolclassified asaLyceum,namely,MakariosC Gymnasium at Nicosia. In support of her application for transfer, as may begathered from thecontent ofherletter,shegavetworeasons: Firstly, the elevated status of the school to which she applied 10 to be transferred earmarked as a Lyceum, in contrast to the school where she served, designated as a Gymnasium. Her long and successful experience entitled her, as stated in her letter, to the assignment ofdutiesto a schoolinthe upperlayer of secondary education. Secondly, personal and family con- 15 venience served by the proximity of Makarios C Gymnasium, to the place of work of her husband. Theletter settingforth herrequest for transfer, wasaddressed to the Director of Secondary Education on 8.6.1983; it was receivedon 10.6.1983anddrawntotheattention oftheDirector 20 onthesameday, ashisinitialsonthelettersignify (see, Appendix A* to the opposition). On 16.7.1983 a number of transfers of headmasters were decided by the Minister of Education, including no less than the transfer of eleven headmasters posted at Nicosia secondary 25 schools. The transfers were made in the context of the new classification of secondary schools noticed above, and entailed movement of headmasters todifferent schools at Nicosia. The applicant was not among those transferred. By her recourse filedon 21.7.1983, she challenged the validity of the transfers 30 and questioned the omission of the Minister of Education to consider and satisfy her application for transfer. It is undisputed that no reply was ever given to the letter of the applicant. Nor were reasons given to her at any time for not meeting her request. 35 Therecourse was opposed primarily on procedural grounds. According to the opposition, the foremost reason for not considering the request of the applicant, or satisfying it, or give any reply thereto, was the nature of her request, an 980 3 CX.R. Nissiotou v. Republic Pikls J. application tobeposted,not tobetransferred toanother school. Inasmuch asthereisno power under the lawto post secondary school educationalists, except upon appointment on probation oroncontract,asprovided inreg. 15 oftheEducational Service 5 Regulations 1972, applicant's letter merited nc consideration for, it embodied a request unwarranted in law. Therefore, her letter was rightly ignored. Even if this contention was well founded, there was no excuse for not replying to the applicant as administrative authorities are bound to, under 10 Article 29 of the Constitution. A citizen addressing the administration has a right to a timeous reply, within thirty days, from his application. An omission to reply isreviewable under Article 29,unless it merges in an act or omission encompassing the substance of his request.' 15 In the alternative, assuming the letter amounted to an application for transfer, it is contended, it could likewise be disregarded for it was made out of time. The contentious issues, as they emerged after the riling of the opposition, were— 20 (a) Thenature of therequest of theapplicant, particularly whetheritamountedtoanapplication for transfer and, (b) The timeliness of the request if it amounted to an application for transfer. At the hearing the respondents, without abandoning the 25 groundsadumbrated intheopposition,theyplaced little reliance uponthem,whereastheylaidstresson other impleaded grounds in support of the submission that the application ought to be dismissed. Their main contention, at the trial, was that the transfers effected on 16.7.1983 were an internum of the admi30 nistration and, as such, non-justiciable. If it werenot for the fact that thejusticiability of a recourse,judged from the angle of the nature of the act, is always a matter necessarily inissue, I would disregard the submissions made in view of Ord. 14 r.2 and Ord. 18 of the Supreme Constitutional Court Rules 35 made applicable to recourses before the Supreme Court under Article
- Although the jurisdiction under Article 146 is pre-eminently of an inquisitorial nature, the parties are not relieved of theduty ofpleadingthe issuesindispute and setting forth the material facts supporting their case. Pleading 981 Pikis J. Nissiotou v. Republic
(1983)the issues succinctly, is a necessary safeguard for the proper administration of justice. It serves to forewarn the parties of the case of their opponents, whereas the issues in dispute are elucidated in the interests of order and certainty in the process of litigation. Now, the contention that the letter of 8.6.1983 did notcon stitute or amount to an application for transfer is, with respect to counsel, based on a short-sighted view of its contents and the attribution to the writer of an intention to use ordinary words in daily parlance, such as "posted" (τοποθέτηση), 10 as terms of art, that is, inthedistinct sense used by the Regula tions, notably reg. 15. Thisis awhollyunwarrantedconstruct ion of the letter of applicant thatsimply andclearly put forward a request for transfer. And as such, it ought to be faced by the Minister of Education and his subordinates. Unless some 15 rule or regulation absolved the administration of the duty toconsider thisletterinthecontextofthecontemplated transfers pertinent to thereclassification of schools, they weredutybound totakeitproperly intoaccount,asrequired by reg. 14
(1). Mrs. Vrahimi submitted that regulations 17
(2)and 18(a) relieved 20 the administration of any duty to consider her application, as it was made out of time. On a proper interpretation of the aforesaid Regulations, atime-limit is setfor making applications for transfer, only with regard to transfers from one geographic area to another. And the printed form approved for making 25 such applications, expressly lays down that its use is restricted to applications for transfers from a town or village to another (exhibit 3). So,contrarytothepleaded caseof therespondents, the Regulations do not envisage a time-limit for submitting applications for transfer from one school to another within 30 the same town. Counsel for the respondents raised a supplementary ground involving factual issues not raised in the opposition, deriving from a letter of theMinistry dated24.2.1983, addressed tohead masters of secondary schools, requesting that applications for 35 transfer by secondary school teachers should be submitted the latest by 16.4.1983. To begin with, this factual issue must be disregarded as an impleaded factual issue; not thatits consider ationwould make any difference totheoutcomeof therecourse. It is doubtful whether it was at all addressed to headmasters 40 982 5 3 C.L.R. Nissiotou v. Republic Pikis J. and not solely directed to teachers. At best, it was an administrative directive that did not close the door to consideration ofapplications madesubsequent to thedatenamed inthe letter, provided there was proper opportunity for their consideration. 5 Undoubtedly there was ample time to consider the request of the applicant for transfer considering the time at which the letter was received and the date on which transfers were made. There was no justification in law for disregarding or ignoring the request of the applicant. On the contrary, the Minister 10 of Education, as the appropriate authority, was dutybound, in the light of the provisions of reg. 14
(1)to take the request into account in exercising the discretionary powers vested in him by s. 39
(2)of the Public Educational Service Law—10/
- The remaining issues that properly arise and merit consider15 ation, are, in my view, the following:
- Was thedecision of theMinister ofEducation o/16.7.1983 an executory actl If the answer is in the affirmative, the next question is, 20 25 30
- Didthedecision of 16.7.1983 emanatefrom the authority entrusted by law, for effecting transfers withinthe same geographicarea, namely the "appropriate authority", in this case the MinisterofEducation! All the Minister did in this case was to signify approval of the recommendation of the Director of Secondary Education for transfers channelled to the Minister with the approval of the Director-General of the Ministry. It has been submitted that the Minister did no more than rubberstamp the decision of a subordinate without himself goinginto thematter. If thedecisionchallenged stands this test as well, the third question that must be answered is,
- Wasthedecision a valid one,bearing inmindthe inquiry madeand the reasons giveninsupport of ft? CHARACTER OF A DECISION INVOLVING TRANSFER 35 OF HEADMASTERS WITHIN THE SAME TOWN: In Greece, the Code for Public Employees distinguishes between transfers from one geographic area to another and 983 Pikis J. Nissiotou v. Republic
(1983)transfers within the same town. Different labels are attached to the two acts, the latter ranking as a "move"(μετακίνηση), in contradistinction to a transfer (μετάθεση) adopted in the former case. The Greek Council of State has consistently adhered to the view that, movement of employees from one 5 department of government to another within the same town is an internaladministrative measure and, as such, not suscept ible to judicialreview—See,Conclusionsfrom the Jurisprudence of Greek Councilof State 1929-1959, p. 238 and, Decision 364y'57—Decisions of GreekCouncil of State 1957. A similar 10 view was adopted by the Supreme Court, respecting transfers of employees of central government within the same town provided, always, the transfers did not involve an alteration of status, hierarchically or otherwise—See, Chrystalla Yiallourou v. Republic (Minister of Interior And Another)
(1976)3 C.L.R. 15 220 and, Karapataki v. Republic
(1982)3 C.L.R. 88. In the latter case it was emphasized that thetransfer rates as aninter num of the administration so long as it does not objectively entail an alteration in thepositionheld by theofficer concerned in theservice. Bothcases relatedtotransfers of officers serving 20 in the lower hierarchy of government, required by the schemes of service governing their position, to serve in more than one departments,inaccordancewiththedirectionsoftheappropriate authority. The aforesaid cases do not lay down a hard and fast rule that transfers of public officers within the same town 25 must inevitably be treated as internums of theadministration; much will depend on the implications of individual transfers upon the position of the officers concerned. Ontheotherhand,thepositionof aheadmasterof secondary educationcannotreadily becomparedtoanoffice administrator. 30 The position of a headmaster carries vast responsibilities and the choice of a headmaster for individual schools is a matter of grave importance for our educational system. There is direct authority supporting the proposition that transfers of headmasters of schools of secondary education, be it within 35 the same town, are executory acts subject to judicial review. In Sofocles Sofocleous (No. 1) v. Republic
(1972)3 C.L.R. 56, the Supreme Court-exercised revisional jurisdiction over the transfer of a headmaster from one Nicosia secondary school to another and, in the end, annulled the decision for lack of 40 due reasoning. Revisional jurisdiction was similarly exercised 984 " -' 3 C.L.R. Nissiotou v. Republic Pikis J. respecting thetransfer of a secondary school headmaster within thesametown,inSofoclesSofocleousv.Republic
(1974)3C.L.R. 63. That the recourse was dismissed on its merits, does not diminishtheforce ofthedecisionasaprecedentfor theexistence 5 of jurisdiction to review the transfer of headmasters within the same town. Whether revisional jurisdiction would be exercised over transfers ofteachersofsecondary education within the same town, is still an open question although, for the reasons that are given hereinbelow as to the implications of 10 the law,jurisdiction may exist in their case as well. The decisions cited above, are decisions of first instance. They come from Courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction and, as such, arenot strictly binding upon me. Theyare, nevertheless, of high persuasive authority to be followed, except when they 15 embody a wrong principle or mistake the law because of an oversight, or contain an error in their reasoning—See, Re Cushla Ltd. [1979] 3 All E.R. 415 and FrangosAnd Others v. Republic
(1982)3 C.L.R. 53. Not only Ifindno reason for departingfrom the abovedeci20 sions of the Supreme Court but, I feel wholly persuaded that theyembodyacorrectprincipleofthelawthat should befollowedinthiscase. ThePublicEducational ServiceLawand Regulations made thereunder, lay down the same criteria for the transfer of educationalists, whether they concern movement 25 from one school to another within the same town or, from one geographic location to another. The test in both cases are educational needs and the wishes of individual educationalists —see regulation 14
(1). Unlike the transfer of public officers governed by Public Service Law—33/67, specific criteria are 30 laid down establishing a firm legal basis governing transfers. This I regard as a legislative acknowledgment that transfers of educationalists, be it within the same town, have a direct impactupontheposition ofeducationalistsand, as such,should be amenable to review. Moreover, their implications on the 35 effectiveness of the educational system is another ponderous reason for taking the decision under consideration outside the compass of internal administrative measures. Reflection on the implications of the new classification of schools upon the position of headmasters, leaves me in no doubt that posting 40 toa school ontheloweror upper strata ofsecondaryeducation, 985 Pikis J. Nissiotou v. Republic
(1983)has direct foreseeable repercussions upon their career and standing in the service. On principleandauthority,Irulethatthesub judicedecision is justiciable. Its origin and merits must be discussed next. THE MERITS OF THE APPLICATION: 5 Is the Decision complainedof, thatof theMinister ofEducation**. —The Sufficiency of theInquiry—The Reasoning of the Decison. The decision of the Minister is signified by oneword, namely "approved"—a word of ambivalent meaning in the context in which it was used. In Tooulias v. Republic
(1983)3 C.L.R. io 465, I had opportunity to debate the implications of the word "εγκρίνεται" (approved) and its proper connotation in the process of decision taking. Primarily it signifies ratification of the act of another, ratherthan theissue of a decision by the approving body. In Papakyriacouv. Republic—Revisional\$ Jurisdiction AppealNo.293,given on5.7.1983, not yetreported,* the Full Bench of the Supreme Court annulled thecontractual appointment of a number of secondary school educationalists for thereason,interaha,thatthedecisiondidnotemanatefrom the body charged by law todecide,in thatcase the Educational 20 Service Committee, who merely assented to another body's decision. All they did, was to rubberstamp the decision of the Council of Ministers having no authority in the matter, abdicating the duties entrusted to them. The outcome was an abortive decision that was set aside. Even if we were to 25 overlook the apparent implications arising from the manner in which the decision in question was taken, there is nothing to suggest, on a consideration of the records placed before the Court, that the Minister applied himself, other than merely approve, to the matter in hand in order to decide himself how 30 educational needs would best be served, includingconsideration of individual preferences of educationalists. On the contrary, there is everything to suggest that the Minister of Education didnomorethan approvethedecision of a subordinate, failing, in the end, to assume andexercise thepowers entrusted to him 35 by law as the appropriate authority. It is an abuse of power torelinquish thedischarge of alegalduty andsurrender effective authority to another organ. And as such it is liable to be set • Now reported in
(1983)3 C.L.R. 870. 986 3 C.L.R. Nissiotou v. Republic Pikis J aside. Interwoven with this aspect of the case, is the adequacy oftheinquiryandthesufficiency ofthereasoningofthedecision. There isnothing to suggest that the letter of the applicant for transfer wasever placed before the Minister. On the contrary, 5 there isevery indication that it wasnever heeded or considered. The decision of 16.7.1983 was neither recorded nor embodied in thefileof the applicant. The absence of reply is suggestive of total disregard of the letter. Judging from the statement offactsinsupport oftheopposition,itmayjustifiably beinferred 10 it was never considered, the administration taking the view it had no duty to consider it or reply to the writer. One is inexorably driven to the conclusion that the transfers were made without inquiring into the wishes of headmasters for transfer, in contravention of the provisions of reg. 14
(1). 15 At the least the inquiry was inadequate to that extent though on perusal of the records it appears inadequate in many other respects as may begathered from thereasoning of thedecision. The reasoning of the decision is brief and does not purport to justify the decision. All it does is to assert its necessity in 20 satisfaction of educational needs. Why educational reasons * dictated the particular transfers, isnot explained. How educational needs were perceived and appreciated in view of the newdivision of schools, is not mentioned. Theintrinsic knowledgeoftheadministration ofeducational needsdoesnot relieve 25 them of the duty to reason their decision at least to the extent of making possible judicial review. Time and again it has been emphasized that the reasoning ot an administrative decision must be explicit to the extent of enablingtheparliesaffected bythedecisiontoadvisethemselves 30 as to their rights on the one hand and, administrative Courts to exercise proper control over administrative action, on the other. In Petrondas v. Attorney-General
(1969)3 C.L.R. 214, at 222, 223, it was pointed out that vague generalities are no substitute for a reasoned decision. Nor repetition, as such, 35 of the statutory criteria absolves the administration of the duty to reason how they apply in the circumstances of a particular case. In Sofocles Sofocleous(No. 1), supra, it is explained that the reasoning is properly regarded as vague if it docs not disclose, as indeed it is the case here, the facts upon which the 40 administration based its decision. Recently, I had occasion,in Papadopoulos v. Republic
(1982)3 C.L.R. 1070,-1079, to review 987 PHds J. Nissktfoo •. Republic (1983 the principles baring on the adequacy of the reasoning of an administrative act. Their duty "__._ . is to articulate as thoroughly asitispossible,thereasonsthat ledit toa particular decision and not content itself (referring to the Public Service Commission) with an enumeration of the criteria taken into 5 account which, almost invariably, take the form of listing the criteria set down by the law. The Greek Council of State, by a series of decisions, enjoins administrative bodies trusted with decision making, to reason their decision in a way disclosing the reasons behind their decision. The facts of the case must 10 be explicitly evaluated. They must not limit their reasoning to listing the guide-lines upon which they relied for their decision". Asexplained, thedecision inthis case refers solely to the principle underlying their decision, not the reasons for their decision. It does not, for example, reason why head- 15 masters with lesser experience than the applicant were placed in charge of Lyceums, schools of exalted status under the new ~~ scheme, in preference to the applicant—a headmistress with a long and successful career, as evidenced by a series of documents produced before the Court—see exhibits 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), 20 2(d) and 4. For all the above reasons, the subjudice decision is hereby annulled sofar asitconcernstheapplicantandinterestedparties, namely, Mr. Hadjinicolaou, Mr. Prodromou, Mr. Chambakis, Mrs. Dymiotou, Mr. Karayiannis, Mr. Menas, Mr. Philippou, 25 Mr. Yiannakas, Mr. Papavassiliou and Mr. Constantinides. This judgment rests on the premise common to the parties that the transfers did not entail a change in the status of headmasters and, therefore, could be validly made by the Minister of Education in his capacity as appropriate authority under 30 Law 10/69 and not by the Educational Service Committee. This proposition I regard as doubtful, considering the implicationsstemmingfrom therestructureoftheschools,theirdivision, and the exalted status of Lyceums under the new scheme. If it affects their status, then the Public Service Committee is 35 the appropriate organ for making thetransfers.- The confusion is probably due to the fact that the authorities introduced far ranging changes in the structure of secondary schools without recourse to legislation, relying on a series of administrative measures. I am definitely of opinion that important changes, 40 988 3 C.L.R. Nissiotou τ. Republic POds J. reflecting changes in policy, should not be undertaken except within theframework of legislation. It is, in the first place, desirable that important changes in education, affecting our educational system and the quality of education in general, 5 should have explicit approval from the legislature. Also, legislation provides for certainty andamoredefinite guidetothe rightsof parties affected thereby. Such legislation should lay down thecriteria that should govern assignement of educatio nalists to thefirstand second level of secondary education. 10 As may benoticed, 1 concludedthehearing of this casewithin the shortest possible interval of time, in the interest of effective judicial review. Judicial control loses its value if subsequent events render judicial deliberations superflous. It is hoped that the administration will proceed with equal speed, first 15 inerasing theeffects of thedecisioninvalidated by thisjudgment and, then, just as quickly, come to grips with the problem of assigning duties to headmasters at Gymnasiums and Lyceums, after due consideration of all factors bearing on the matter. In the result, the sub judice decision, so far as theapplicant 20 and interested parties are concerned, is hereby annulled and set aside. Let there be no order as to costs. •^ Subjudicedecision annulled. No order as to costs. 989