I C.L.R. 1984 January 18 [A. Loizou, SAVVIDCS. PIKIS. JJ.] SOCRATES CHARALAMBOUS. Appiiean v. CHARALAMBIDES DAIRIES LTD.. Respondent (Civil Application No. 27/83 Civil Procedure—Appeal—Extension of time within which to uppcalInconvenicnce of Counsel—Ordinarily not afactor excusing noi< compliance with time provisionsfor appeal—Needfor finality ο proceedingswhich is a cardidalruleof publicpolicyaimedtoensttr certainty of legal rights and uphold social order. This was an application for extension of the time within whic to fiie an appeal against a decision of the Industrial Arbitratio Tribunal. The application was based on the ground tha Counsel for the applicant was confined to bed, due to Hlnes; during most but not the entire period of 21 days laid down by th Rules for raising an appeal. Held, that after the efflu.xion of the time limited for appea rights accruing from litigation vest finally in a party; that thi finality must not be disturbed except inthe face of cogent reasons that finality of proceedings is a cardinal rule of public polic aimed to ensure certainty of legal rights and uphold social ordei that procedural rules establishing time limits for the pursuit c litigation, are designed to fledge rights vesting in litigation that these rules must, in the absence of strong reasons justifyin departure, be adhered to, strictly; that inconvenience c Counsel is not ordinarily a factor excusing non-compliance wit time provisions for appeal; accordingly the application mu: fail. Application dismisset 19 Chnmlambous v. Charalambide·. Dairies Ltd.
(1984)Cases referred to: Favlou and Another v. Cacoyiannts and Others
(1963)2 C.L.R. 405 at p.406: Loizau v. Konteantis
(1968)I C.L.R. 291; Lambert v. Mainland Market [1977] 2 All E.R. 826 at p. 833; 5 Turkish Co-operative Corah Marketing Society Ltd. v. Kiamil and Another
(1973)I C.L.R. I. Application. Application for the extension of time within which to file an appeal against a decision of the Industrial Arbitration Tribunal. 10 V. Iladjivassiliou, for the applicant. M. Spanos with ΛΛ Spanos {Miss), for the respondents. Cur. adv. vidt. PIKIS J.: This is an application for extension of the time envisaged by the Rules, in order to enable the applicant to file 15 an appeal against a decision of the Industrial Arbitration Tri bunal given on 30.3.83. The relevant Rules, the Industrial Arbitration Tribunal Rules, 1968, lay down that application for the statement of a case must be made to the Industrial Tribunal within 21 days from the date judgment was given (rule 17
(1)). 20 An appeal lies to the Supreme Court by way of case stated but on legal grounds only. The Rules confer discretion on the tribunal - r.l2(l) - to enlarge at its discretion the time limited by the Rules for the initiation of proceedings. An application to the tribunal, by the applicant, for enlargement of time to 25 make possible the filing of an appeal in the manner envisaged by the Rules, was refused. The present proceedings were taken in the aftermath of such refusal. The legal basis of the application is far from clear on the face of the proceedings. Obviously, it is not an application to review 30 the discretion of the tribunal. It is not an appeal from its decision refusing extension of time. In thecourse of the address of counsel for the applicant, it emerged that the application primarily rests on the provisions of Ord. 35, r.19, not cited in the application. It confers, in appropriate circumstances, 33 20 I C.I..Κ. ChuralanilHHis \. Cliaralanibides Dairies Ltd. Pikis J. discretion upon the Supreme Court to extend the time for filing an appeal. And an extension may be granted notwith standing the prior refusal of the trial Court to extend the time for taking an appeal. 5 Counsel for the respondents disputed the applicability of Ord.35, r. 19 in respect of proceedings before the tribunal. In his submission, a matter connected with proceedings before the tribunal, can only be raised before the Supreme Court by way of case stated and. then, only on points of law. 0 The Rules governing proceedings before the tribunal seem to be exhaustive and prima facie appear to regulate every facet o\' litigation, including the circumstances under which an appeal may be taken. If this is a correct appreciation of their effect. no mattercan be raised before the Supreme Court except by wa> of case stated, which is not the position before us and. then. only on questions of law. Whereupon these proceedings would appear to be ill founded and misconceived. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the exercise of discretion by the tribunal, with regard to the enlargement of time can. under any circumstances. qualify as a question of law. In the words of Vassiliades, J., as he then was. in PavlouAnd Another v. CacoyianntsAnd Others.
(1963)2 C.L.R. 405, 406. 5 "There is a fundamental distinction between a matter o\~ law and a matter of discretion ". 5 We debated the issue of the applicability of Ord. 35, r. 19, to proceedings connected with decisions of the tribunal but in the end we decided it is unnecessary to express a concluded opinion for. on any view of the facts supporting theapplication set down in an affidavit of counsel accompanying the application, the application is doomed to failure on the merits. The reasons propounded for extension of time arise from an illness, bronchopneumonia, of the advocate of the applicant that necessitated his confinement to bed during most but not the entire period of 21 days laid down by the Rules for raising an appeal. Certainly, arrangements could have been made for the preparation of the appeal by himself or some other counsel. The filing of an appeal can be accomplished without personal attendance at the Registry (rule 13
(3)). Inconvenience of counsel is not ordinarily a factor excusing non compliance with 21 •ikis .1. Charalamboj·, v. Charalantbidcs Dames ltd.
(1984)tme provisions foi appeal. As much was decided in Pa\lou \ ^acoyuitmis, supra The same principle was affirmed in Loizou Konteatts
(1968)1 C.L R 291 It must be added however hat, in neither of the above cases did the Court aim to restnct he discretion of a Court seized with an application to extend ? ime in a manner prohibiting examination of the instrinsic nents of the facts of thecase In Pavlou, supra, emphasis was aid on the need to sustain finality of proceedings (sec also, >bservations of Megan, LJ., in Lanibeii ν Mainland Market 1977] 2 All Ε R 826, 833 (C - D)) After the effluxion of the 10 ime limited for appeal, rights accruing from litigation vest inally in a party. This finality must not be disturbed except η the face of cogent reasons Finality of proceedings is a ardinal rule of public policy aimed to ensure certainty of legal ights and uphold social order. Procedural rules establishing 15 ime limits for the pursuit of litigation, are designed to fledge ights vesting in litigation These rules must, in the absence if strong reasons justifying departure, be adhered to, strictly see. The Tuikish Co-operativeCarob Marketing Society Ltd Lutft Kiamtl And Anothei
(1973)I C L.R 1) 20 In our judgment, the application must be dismissed with osts Order accordingly Application dismissed with costs. 22