(1984)1984 June 15 [PIKIS, J.J MARCOS IACOVOU Petition?!. v. CARMENGLORIALORENZODEIACOVOU Respondent. (Matrimonial Petition No. 2/84). Matrimonial Causes—Divorce—Cruelty—Legal cruelty—Wife attacking husband by throwing objects at him andfreely insulting him inthepresence of others—Her conductcruel—// haddirectadverse repercussions upon the physical and mental health oj herhusband —Petition proved—Decree nisi granted. S This was a husband's petition for divorce on the ground of the wife's cruelty. According to the petitioner's evidence which was corroborated by two witnesses the respondent on little or no pretext would attack him by throwing at him objects within her reach while she kept freely insulting him in the pre- 10 sencc of whoever might happen to be there. Held, that legal cruelty connotes conduct causing or giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of danger to life, limb or health, bodily or mental of a kind that a spouse should not reasonably be required to endure notwithstanding his commit- 15 ment to marriage; that applying this definition to the facts of the case, subject always to the heavy onus cast on the petitioner to prove his case this Court finds the petition proven; that the conduct of the respondent was cruel; that it had direct adverse repercussions upon the physical and mental state of health 20 of the respondent; and that, therefore, a decree nisi will be issued. Decree nisi grcnled. Cases referred to: Bastadjian v. Bastadjian, 1962 C.L.R. 308; 350 25 1 C.L.R. lacovou v. lacovou Morphiv. Mashini
(1981)1 C.L.R. 253; Jabbourv. Jabbour
(1981)1 C.L.R.
- Matrimonial Petition. Husband's petition for the dissolution of marriage on the 5 ground of cruelty by the wife. P. Demetriades, for the petitioner. Respondent absent. PIKIS J. gave the following judgment. The petitioner prays the dissolution of his marriage to Carmen Gloria Lorenzo 10 D' lacovou registered befoie the Distiict Officer, Limassol, in
- Following the civil marriage the petitioner,a Cypriot, a member of the Greek Orthordox Church, and the respondent, an Argentinian national of the Catholic faith, married ecclesiastically at a Greek Orthordox church in Limassol. Disso15 lution of the marriage is sought on grounds of cruelty of the wife towards the husband. The association of the parties began in
- They met in Poland where they were studying, the petitioner medicine and the respondent sociology. In 1972 they came to Cyprus for 20 the specific purpose of getting married, for, as it was evident, they contemplated to set up the matrimonial home in Cyprus. While still abroad, in 1974, a son was born to them. Having completed their studies they returned to Cyprus in
- The petitioner set up his surgery at Limassol while the respondent 25 found employment at an hotel. It isthe casefor the petitioner that the conduct of respondent towards him was such that he should not be required to suffer further marital association with her. Not that respondent wishes the continuance of the marriage or the up-keep of the 30 matrimonial home. Since September, 1981 she left the petitioner as well as Cyprus and moved back to her native country Argentina, taking their son with her. Since, she returned to Cyprus only once for a brief visit in January, 1984, but cohabitation was not resumed. She went back to Argentina 35 in February. The present proceedings were instituted while she wis still in the country; she did not defend the proceedings. 351 Ptkis J . lacoiou \, lacovou (19S4) In evidence the petitioner gave an account of the conduct of the respondent objected to, detailing in the process specificincidents in support of thecontention thai respondent repeatedl> assaulted him and ticated him in a most humiliating manner. Fiom 1980 onwards her behaviour and attitude towards the 5 marriage ar.d petitioner was altogether negative. On little or no pretext she would attack him by throwing at him objects within her reach while she kept freely insulting him in the presence of whoever might happen to be there. She kept complaining of the inability of the petitioner to satisfy her financial h> demands. The petitioner singled out one incident that was particularly aggravating. In the middle of his birthday party she became angry with him and in the presence of his friends she picked up the birthday cake and threw it at his face. To his entreaties to see reason and make an effort to save 15 the marriage, her reaction was that there was nothing to save. The evidence of the petitioner is corroborated by two witnesses who impressed me as truthful and accurate in the narrationof eventspast. TheyareMr. Costas Papadopoulos,a sociocriminologist previously an assistant Professor of criminology 20 at Stockholm University and Mr. Elias Nicolaides. a psychiatrist -neurologist at Limassol hospital, both friends of the family. Mr. Papadopoulos who has known the couple for years, testified that the respondent kept humiliating the applicant in almost every way. Not only she insulted him without inhibition in 25 the presence of his friends but she was ever so ready to attack him' physically as well. He witnessed her throwing ashtraysat him, pulling his hair and kicking him at several paits of the body. She was a person of strong physical physique, as tall as the applicant and of stout bearing. 30 On1 the initiative of the petitioner, the couple visited Mr. Nicolaides in his capacity as a psychiatrist-neurologist in a desperate attempt on the part of the petitioner to save the marriage. It proved of no avail. The response of the petitioner was negative. Like Mr. Papadopoulos he bore witness to 35 the humiliating wayrespondent was treating her husband The doctor was impressed by the lack of reaction on the part of the husband to the atrocious conduct of his wife. The conduct of the respondent took a toll upon his health. He became depressed and melacholic necessitating prescription of anti- 40 depressants and tranquilizers for a period of time. 352 1 C.L.R. lacovou v. lacovou PikJs J. The Supreme Court was repeatedly concerned with the definition of legal cruelty and its application to the differing facts of individual cases. In Angeliki Bastadjian, then Angeliki Rigou v. Krikon Bastadjian, 1962 C.L.R. 308, Vassiliades J., 5 as he then was, adopted the definition of legal cruelty supplied in the 5th edn. of Rayden on Divorce. It has been consistently followed since. See inter alia Morphi v. Mashini,
(1981)1 C.L.R. 253 and Jabbour v. Jabbour,
(1981)1 C.L.R. 315. Cruelty in this context connotes conduct causing or giving 10 rise to a reasonable apprehension of danger to life, limb or health, bodily or mental. Ofa kind one might say that a spouse should not reasonably be required to endure notwithstanding his commitment to marriage. Applying this definition to the facts of the case, subject always to the heavy onus cast on the 15 petitioner to prove his case, 1 find the petition proven. The conduct of the respondent was cruel; it had direct adverse repercussions upon the physical and mental state of health of the respondent. Despite the gravity of her conduct, he persisted for some time in his endeavours to save the marriage. 20 He came to Court when no other option had been left to him. In the result, the petition succeeds. I hereby direct the issue of a decree nisi. Decree nisi granted. 353