clr/1984/1984_1_475.pdf

(1984)was 16years of age, was loading the shovel of the tractor with gravel and was carrying it at the site of the pumping station. The accident occurred when the tractor blocked the road at a distance of about 20feet from the car. On the day in question the tractor was engaged in removing soil from a private plot some 150metresawayfrom the pumpingstation andwasdriven bythebrother of appellant 2; andwhenthelatter left appellant 1switched onthetractorbytheuseofacoinandstartedbringing gravel near to the pumping station works, allegedly on the instructions of the foreman of the works. 5 Respondent Iwhowasaged 16at thetimeoftheaccident and 26 at the time of judgment sustained multiple injuries on his forehead and nose and a serious injury to his right eye which lost its vision by 90%. Thetrial Court found thatat the material timeappellant Iwas 15 the servant of appellant 2; that on the day in question he was drivingthetractorassistingthebrotherofappellant2inhiswork and that suchactwasauthorised byhisfather; andthat though accepting to remove the gravel might not have been expressly authorised by appellant 2 nevertheless it was an act so closely 20 connected in the circumstances of the particular case,with what appellant No. 1had been authorised to do, that is driving the tractor, that it cannot be regarded as an act outside the course of his employment; and upon these findings the trial Court held that appellant 2wasvicariously liable for the negligence of 25 appellant 1 andawardedtorespondent 1 £9,000bywayofgeneral damages and to respondent 2£646 for the damages to his car (£496 for the repairs and £150 for loss of use). Regarding the amount of £150for lossof usethe trial Court saidthat although plaintiff 2failed togiveanyexactfigures, consideringthathewas 30 not cross-examined on thisitemhisclaimpleaded for £2.500 per day was reasonable. Upon appeal by the defendants. Held,

(1)that there isno reason to interfere with the findings ofthetrialCourt basedastheyareonthecredibilityofwitnesses, 35 and the conclusions drawn thereon as well as with the application of the relevant legal principle, which led them to the conclusion that appellant 2wasvicariously liable for thewrongful actofappellant 1,namelythatthoughacceptingtoremovethe 476 10 I C.L.K. 5 10 15 20 25 Aloupou and Another v. HJiGeorgbiouand Another gravel might not have been expressly authorised by appellant nevertheless, it was an act so closely connectedin thecircumsta ces of the particular case, with what appellant 1had been auth rised to do,that is, driving the tractor,that it cannotbe regard. as an act outside the course of his employment.

(2)That having considered the totality of the circumstan· and having adapted the comparable awards to the facts of t case and to local conditions the amountof C£7,000.-would b< reasonable compensation for the injuries suffered by respondi Iwhich in effect consisted of the loss of an eye, and some fac injuries (Pavlides v. Andreou

(1984)1C.L.R. 385 whereby itv» held that Courts have to proceed to assess general damages reference to comparable awards in comparable cases adopte

(3)That allegations in the pleadings in general and in resp. of special damages as it is the present case regarding the item 1 loss of use of the car, claimed to have been suffered and whi are denied in the defence cannot be considered as proved by t mere fact of the non-cross examination of witnesses on si; issues who have not deposed an iota as regards such allegatio without the party making these allegations in his pleadii adducing positive evidence; that the omission to cross-exami a witness may amount as such to an admission of the mat deposed by a witness and in respect of which he has not be cross-examined but not in respect of matters for which he I. notdeposed and are merely averred in thepleadings; accordir ly theamountof £150 awarded to respondent 2 for loss of use his car must be set aside. Appealpartly allow* Cases referred to: 30 Sadler v. Henlock [1855] 4 Ε & Β 570 at p. 578; Hewitt v. Bonvin [1940] 1 K..B. 188; PerformingRight Society v. Mitchell andBooker (Palais de Dans Ltd.) [1924] 1 K.B. 762; 35 Ferguson v. John Dawson & Partners (Contractors) [1976] W.L.R. 1213; Tsiopanis v. Avraam

(1978)1 C.L.R. 27 at p. 35; Hancke v. Hooper [1835] 7 C. & P. 81; Clelland v. Edward Lloyd Ltd. [1938] I K.B. 272; 477 AloupouandAnotherv.HjiGcorghiouandAnother

(1984)Ilkiw v.Samnels [1963]2AllE.R. 839at p.884; [1963] 1W.L.R. 991; Marsh v. Moores [1949] 2 K.B. 208 at p. 215; Staton v. National Coal Board [1957] 2 All E.R. 667; Costa and Another v. Municipal Corporation of Limassol

(1975)I C.L.R. 84; 5 County Plant Hire v. Jackson and Lane Bros. (Builders)Third Parties [1970] 8 K.l. R. 989 (C.A.); Century Insurance Co. v. Northern Ireland Road Transport[1942] 1 All E.R. 491 at p. 497; 10 Attorney-General v. Hartley [1964] N.Z.L.R. 785; London County Council v. Cuttermoles Garages [1953] 2 All E.R. 582; Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. Lockhart [1942] 2 All E.R. 464; Harvey v. R.G. O' Dell Ltd. & Another (Galway Third Party) [1958] I All E.R. 657; Rose v. Plenty [1976] 1 W.L.R. 131; Launchbury v. Morgans [1973] A . C 127; Hilton v. Thomas Burdon (Rliodes) Ltd. [1961] 1 W.L.R. 705; Laycock v. Grayson [1939] 55 T.L.R. 698; Joel v. Morison [1834] 6 Car. & P. 501; A. & W. Hemphill v. Williams [1966] 110 S.J. 549; Limpus r. London General Omnibus Co. [1862] I H. & C. 526; Whatman v. Pearson [1868] L.R.3 C.P. 422; Pavlides v. Andreou

(1984)1 C.L.R.

1. 15 20 25 Appeal. Appeal by defendants 1 and 2 against the judgment of the District Court of Nicosia (Nikitas, P.D.C. and Fr. Nicolaides, Ag. S.D.J.) dated the 25th September, 1982(Action No. 2628/73) 30 whereby they were adjudged to pay jointly and severally to plaintiff No. 1 £9,002.- for personal injuries suffeied as a result of an accident and the sum of £646.935 mils for damage to property resulting from the same accident. L. Papaphilippou, for the appellants 1 and
2. St. Charahmbous, for the respondents 1 and
3. G. Co'^tantinou (Miss), Counsel of the Republic, for respondent
4. 478 35 1 C.L.R. Aloupouand Another v. HjiGeorghiou and Another A. LoizouJ. gavethefollowingjudgment oftheCourt. This is an appeal from the judgment of the Full District Couit of Nicosia bywhichtheappellants (defendants 1 and 2atthe tiial) were adjudged to pay jointly and severally to respondent 1 5 (plaintiff 1), the sum of £9,002.- for the personal injuries he suffered as a result of a motor-cai accident, and the sum of £646.935milstoplaintiff No.2for damagetopiopeity lesulting from the same accident with costs, and against the dismissal of theactionagairst theAttorney-General oftheRepublicwhowas 10 joined asdefendant 3ontheallegationofbeingvicariously liable for the aforesaid injuries and damage to property. Thecauseof action arose out of a road accident which occurred on the 17th March, 1973, at about 1:30 p.m. near Philia village,whenatractoi admittedlydrivenatthetimt byappellant 15 1, came into collision with motor-car under registration No. G.N. 330 driven by respondent 2, with respondent 1, ai its passenger. The grounds of appeal and the reasons therefor aie the following: 20 25 30 35 "1· The trial Court waserroneous in its finding that the 2nd defendant was vicariously liable for the negligence of the 1st defendant, in that: (a) the Trial Court was wrorg to find oi infer that a relationship of master and servant existed in the ciicumstances; (b) even on the assumption that a lelationship of master and seivant between them existed, the Trial Court was wrong to find or infer that the 1st defendant was driving the vehicle in question in the course of his employment oi incidentally thereto oi in connection therewith; (c) the Trial Couit was wrongto find or infei that the 1st defendant was authorised to drive the vehicle in question by the 2nd defendant, and/or driving of the vehicle waswithinthedutiesofhisemployment; such finding or inferences are against the weight of the evidence. 479 A. Lolzou J. Aloupou and Another τ.HjiGeorghfou andAnother

(2)of Cap. 148 it is laid down that:- 15 20 "An actshall be deemedto have beendoneinthecourseof a servant's employmentif it was doneby himinhiscapacity as a servant and whilst rjerforming the usual duties of and incidental to his employment notwithstanding that the act was animproper mode of performing an act authorised by the master; but an act shall not be deemed to have been sodoneif it was doneby aservant for his ownendsandnot on behalf of tht mastei." It is wtll settled that Cap. 148 <snot exhaustive and that it embodits to a certain extent the common law of England. 25 Section 13

(2)apptars to have been based on relevantcommon law principlesandtheicfore theEnglish cases onthemattermay prove very useful. A servant is onewhois boundtoobey any lawful orders given bythemasterastothemannerinwhichhiswoik shall becarried 30 out. The mastei retains the power of controlling him in his work, andmaydirect notonly what heshall dobuthow heshall do it. (Per CromptonJ. in Sadlerv. Henlock,

(1855)4 Ε &Β 570 at 578; see also Hewitt v. Bonvin, [1940] 1 K.B. 188). The test to be generally applied in deterrniningthe existence 35 of a contractof service, lies in thenatureanddegree of detailed control over theperson alleged to bea servant (PerMcCardie J. in Performing Right Society Ltd. v. MitchellandBooker (Palais de DanseLtd., [1924] 1 K.B. 762). 481 A. Loizou J. Aloupou and Another v. HjiGeorghiou and Another

(1984)In Ferguson v. John Dawson & Partners (Contractors), [1976] 1 W.L.R. 1213, it was held that the Plaintiff was a servant and not a subcontractor, sincehehad no powei to delegate his work to someone else to do for him. A labourei or other person carrying on an unskilled occu- 5 pation if employed to do work himself will usually be a servant (see, Fergusonv.Dawson,(supia)). For the purposes of the law relating to vicarious liability it appears never to have been doubted that an apprentice isa servant (sec, Tsiopanisv. Avraam,

(1978)1 C.L.R. 27 at 35; Hancke v. Hooper,

(1835)7C & P. 10 81; Clelland v. Edward Lloyd Ltd., [1938] 1 K.B. 272). Howevei, the meie fact that the wrong doer isthe servant of a person does not render that person automatically liable foi the acts of his servant. A master is liable for the negligence of the servant if committed in the course of hisemployment, but is not 15 liable for negligence committed outside the scope of his employment. In Tsiopanisv.Avraam, (supia), A. Loizou, J. adopted at p. 33 a passage from Clerk &Lindsell on Torts, 13th Edn. paia. 218:"The question of vicarious liability to thiid persons for the 20 negligence of one's servants came up foi consideration by this Court on a number of occasions and useful lefeience may be made to the case of Municipal Corporation of Limassol v. Agathangelos Constantinou,

(1972)1 C.L.R. p. 119,wheie at p. 128the Couit cited with approval a passage 25 from Clerk and Lindsell on Toits, 13th Edn. para. 218, regarding the test as to whether a wrongful act isdeemed to be done in the course of one's employment. The test formulated by SaJmond in his Law of Torts and adopted in in the above passage is: 30 'If it is either

(1)a wrongful act authorised by the master, or

(2)a wrongful and unauthorised mode of doing some act authorised by the master. It is clear that the master is responsible for acts actually authorised by him: for liability would exist in this case, even if the relation between the 35 parties was merely one of agency, and not one of service at all. But a master, as opposed to the employer of an independent contractor, is liable even for acts which he has not authorised, provided they are so connected with acts which 482 I C.L.R. Aloupou and Another v. HjiGeorghiou and Another A. Loizou.1. he has authorised that they may rightly be regarded as modes - although improper modes - of doing them'. 5 Of course the lime and place at which an act is committed are important factors and in aproper casemay show clearly if the servant has been acting in the course of his employment." (Seealso Salmond on Torts, (13th Edn.) art. 36at p. 122; Ilkiw v. Samuels, [1963] 2 All E.R. 839 at p. 884). In Marsh v. Moores, [1949] 2 K.B. 208, Lynskey J. stated at 10 p. 215:- 15 "lt is well settled law that a master is liable even for acts which he has not authorized provided that they are so connected with the acts which he has authorized that they may rightly be regaided as modes, of doing them. On the other hand, if the unauthorized and wrongful act of the servant is not so connected with the authorized act as to be a mode of doing it but is an independent act, the mastei is not responsible for, in such a case the servant is not acting in the course of his employment but has gone outside it." 20 An act is done in the course of the employment not only when the servant is actually doing the work, which he is employed to do, but also when the act isan incident in performing something he is employed to do and when it is about business which concerns the master and the servant; (See Staton v. National Coal 25 Board, [1957] 2 All E.R. 667; see also Stavrinou Costa & Another v. Municipal Corporationof Limassol,

(1975)1 C.L.R. 84.) The servant does not cease to act in the course of his employment unless he has plainly gone beyond the bounds. (See, 30 County Plant Hire v. Jackson and Lane Bros. (Builders) (Third Party),

(1970)8 K.I.R. 989 (C.A.). Li determining whether or not a servant's wrongful act is done inthe course of hisemployment itisnecessary that a broad view of all the surrounding circumstances should be taken as a 35 whole and not restricted to the particular act which causes the damage. In Century insurance Co. v. Northern Ireland Road Transport Board, [1942] 1 All E.R. 491, Lord Wright said at p. 497:"The duty of the workman to hisemployer is so to conduct 483 A. Loizou J. Aloupou and Another τ. HjiGeorghiou and Another

(1984)himself indoing his work as notnegligently tocause damage cither to the employer himself or his property or to third persons or their property, and thus to impose the same liability on the employer as if he had been doing the work himself and committed the negligent act. This may seem too obvious as a matter of common sense to require either argument or authority." 5 There is no simple test which can be applied to cover every set of circumstancesand so essential it always remains a question of fact for decision in each case (per Finnemore J. in Staton v. 10 N.C.B., (supra) at p. 895.) What happens if a servant disobeys the orders of his master? The fact that a servant disobeys the orders of his master does not necessarily mean that he is acting outside the course of his employment. In Att.-Gen. v. Hartley,

(1964)N.Z. L.R. 785, 15 the New Zealand Court of Appeal held that it is not enough to decide whether what was done was a prohibited act since piohibition may cither limit the scope of the employment or merely regulate the conduct of the employee within its sphere. The distinclion is between an order which limits the scope of the 20 employment, the disobedience which means that the servant is not in the course of his employment, and an order which limits the method in which theduties of the servant shall be performed, the disobedience to which it does not mean that the servant is outside his employment. 25 As we said earlier, it is essential to avoid the approach of isolating the wrongful act of the servant from its surrounding facts in order to determine whether or not it was done in the course of his employment. (See,also London County Councilv. Cattermoles Garages Ltd., [1953] 2 All E.R. 582; Canadian 30 Pacific Railway Company v. Lockhart, [19421 2 All E.R. 464; Harvey v. R.G. O'Dell, Ltd. &. Another (Galway Third Party), [1958] 1 All E.R. 657.) In Rose v. Plenty, [1976J 1W.L.R. 131, Scarman L.J. stated that:"The employer is made vicariously liable for the tort of his employee not because the plaintiff is an invitee nor because of the authority oossessed by the servant, but because it is a 484 35 1 C.L.R. Aloupou and Another \.HjiGeorghiou and Another A. Loizou .1. case in which theemployer,having putmattersinto motion, should be liable if thejnotion that he has originated.leads to damage to another." Apart from the above general principlesina number of cases the 5 question of the liability of the master for thenegligent driving of motor vehicles and operation of other machinery by a servant was examined. In Launcltbury v. Morgans, [1973] A.C. 127, it was held that when a vehicle belonging tothemaster isentiustcd tothe seivant 10 to be driven or used in any other way, the master is liable if the servant is negligent while using it for any other purposes, even though thu servant has the master's permission to use it for those purposes. (Sec also Hilton v. Thomas Burdon (Rhodes) Ltd., [1961] 1 W.L.R. 705). It is presumed that the vehicle is 15 being used for themaster's purposes if the seivant hasauthoiity to use it at all. (See, Laycock v. Grayson, [1939] 55 T.L.R. 698). Deviation from the master's orders does not necessarily prevent the user from being for the master's purposes; it : s a question of degree. (See, Joel v. Morison,

(1834)6 Car. & P. 20 501; Α. ά W. Hemphill v. Williams,

(1966)110 S.J. 549). In //A/if v. Samuels, [1963] 1W.L.R. 991, it was hold thatthe the master was liable in that his driver had been negligent in allowing an incompetentworkman to drive the lorry, which act had taken place in the course of his employment, he was em25 ployed not only to drive but also to take charge and control of it in all circumstances during the times when he was on ditty, and he remained in charge of it even when he was not sitting at thecontrols. Thiswas soeven thoughhewas forbidden toallow anyone to drive his lorry. 30 In Limpus v. London GeneralOmnibus Co.,

(1862)1 H. & C. 526,where an omnibusdriver drove his omnibusacross the load in front of a rival omnibus, thereby causing it to overturn, de­ spite the written instructionsby the employers thattheir drivers were not to race or obstruct other omnibuses, the employers 35 were held liable because the injury resulted from an act done by the driver in the course of his employment and for his master's purposes. The decisive point was that it was not done by the servant for his own purposes but was done for his master's purposes. Willes J. said at p. 539:485 A. Loizou J. Aloupou and Another v. HjiGeorghiou and Another

(1984)*'Itmay besaid that it wasnopart ofthedutyofthe defendants' servant to obstruct the plaintiff's omnibus, andmoreover the servant had distinct instructions not to obstruct any omnibus whatever. In my opinion those instructions are immaterial. If disobeyed, the law casts upon the 5 master a liability for the act of his servant in the course of his employment; and the law is not sofutile as to allow a master, by giving secret instructions to his servant, to discharge himself from liability". A carter, incharge of his master's horseand cart for theday, 10 is acting in the course of his employment if he leaves his hoise and cart unattended during the dinnei hour, so that the horse runs away and an accident occurs. (See, Whatman v. Pearson,

(1868)L.R. 3 C.P. 422). If an employee leaves his horse and cart with a boy who goes with him to deliver parcels and the 15 boy,contrary to his master'sorders,drives thecart and has an accident, he is in the course of his employment to look after the horse and cart during theday, and hismaster will be liable for the damage. (See, Engelhardt v. Farrant& Co. [1897] 1 Q.B. 240)" Guided bythe aforesaid exposition of the Lawthetrial Court madethe followingfindingswhich havebeencontested bylearned counsel for the appellants. The gist of the arguments advanced by him are to be found in grounds of Law l(a)(b) and (c)inthenoticeofappealhereinabovesetout. Thesaid findings 25 and conclusions are as follows: "That Defendant 1was the servant of Defendant 2 at the material time is an undeniable fact. Although there is no definite evidence about the terms of his employment the fact remains that for the time being he was working 30 for Defendant

1. Whether the employment is by the day or not or whether the amount of wages paid is great or large is of little assistance in deteimining the existence of a contract of service (Sadler v. Henlock (supra) ). Equally established is the fact that D.W.3, Athanassis 35 Chaialambous, the brother of Defendant 2 was at the time his servant. He was working for the owner of the tractor, he was getting his instructions from his employer who retained a detailed control over him. The next question which must be answered is whether the driving of Defen- 40 486 20 1 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 30 Aloupou and Another τ. HjiGeorghiou and Another A. Loizou J. dant 1of the tractor was donein thecourse of his employ­ ment. Inotherwords,was hisactauthorisedbyDefendant 2 or was it a wrongful and unauthorised mode of doing some act authorised by the master. Certainly Defendant 2 could not authorise Defendant 1 to remove the gravel because obviously he was not aware that such a situation would arise. Therefote, we mustexamine whethei Defend­ ant 1was authorised to drive the tractor for the purposes of his master. Defendant 2 and all his witnesses denied emphatically that Defendant 1 was driving the tractor and furthermore, they tried to convince the Court that Defendant 2 never permitted his son to drive the tractor. Having watched the witnesses in the witness box we are not preparedtoaccepttheirallegations. We donot believe that Defendant's 1job was merely to keep an account of the work done. This could easily be done by the driver of the lorry, Athanassis Charalambous, with no reper­ cussions on his work. There was not even a question of trust involved because the person who would possibly be interested in the number of loads carried, would be the owner of the plot and he was not present. We do infer onthebalanceof probabilities andinthelight of thetotality of the evidence that Defendant 1 was driving the tractor on the day in question assisting Athanassis Charalambous in his work and that such act was authorised by his father, Accepting to remove the gravel might not have been ex­ pressly authorised by Defendant 2, but nevertheless, it was an act so closely connected, in the circumstances of the particulai case, with what Defendant 1 had been authorised to do, that is, driving the tractor,thatitcannot beregarded asanactoutside thecourse of hisemployment". Having considered the totality of the circumstances of the case and the evidence adduced, we find no reason to interfere with the findings of the trial Court based as they are on the 35 credibility of witnesses, and the conclusions drawn thereon as well as with the application of the relevant legal principles whichledthemtotheconclusionthatappellant2was vicariously liable for the wrongful act of appellant
2. Thefirstground of appeal therefoie fails. 40 Consequently we need not examine the alternative ground 487 A. Loizou J. Aloupou and Another v. HjiGeorghiou and Another

(1984)upon whichappellant 2wasfound bythetrial Court vicariously liable, namely that through his employee Athanassios Charalambous he failed in the discharge of hisdutytolook aftei the tractor and the lorry duringthe day as he ought to havetaken all piecautions inordei to prevent the tractor from beingdriven 5 by an unauthorised person. As regards the third ground of appeal the trial Couit dealt with the relevant issues by reference to the evidence adduced and the law governing the liability of the Republic for any wrongful act or omission causing damage, committed in the 10 exerciseoi purported exercise oftheduties of officers or authorities of the Republic, as provided by Article 172of the Constitution. On the evidence before it the trial Court concluded that appellant 1,by no stretch of imagination could be found to be 15 in the employment of defendant No.

1. Appellant 2, had at the time the said tractor engaged in removing soil from a private plot some 150meters away from a pumping station under construction by the Water Development Department. The allegationofappellant 1,that hewasapproached bytheforeman 20 of the said department and asked to bring some gravel near the site was rejected by the trial Court as the accident occurred at about 1:30 p.m. whereas the foreman had left the site at 11:00 a.m. when the work came to an end, being a Saturday. The versionoftheforemanisdulysupportedbytherestoftheeviden- 25 ce and we see no reason to interfere with these findings of the trial Couit based on the credibility of witnesses. The third ground of appeal therefore fails. Finallywecometothelasttwogroundsofappealthatturnon the question of general and special damages. We have no 30 difficulty in allowing the appeal asregardstheamount of£150.lossofuseofthemotor-car. ThetrialCourtsaidthat "although to itsjudgment the plaintiff 2 failed to give any exact figures, considering that again he was not cross-examined on this item either, we find hisclaim pleaded foi £2.500pei day as reason- 35 able." Allegationsinthepleadingsingeneralandinrespect ofspecial damages asit isthe present case,claimed to have been suffered and which are denied in the defence cannot be considered as 488 1 C.L.R. AloupouandAnother r.HjiGeorghiou and Another A.LoizouJ. proved bythemerefact ofthe non-CToss^xarnination ofwitnessesonsuch issueswhohavenot deposed aniota asregardssuch allegations, without the party making these allegations in his pleadings adducing positive evidence. The omission to cross5 examine a witness may amount as such to an admission of the mattei deposed by a witnessand in respect of whichhehasnot been cioss-exainined but not in respect of matters foi which he has notdeposedandaremerelyaverred inthe pleadings. The ground of appeal, however, that has given us some 10 anxiety, is that of general damages regaidmg the personal injuries of respondent 1, which as the trial Court summed it up "concerns the loss of an eye, although his injured eye lost its visionby90%,but for practicalpurposeshemust beconsidered one-eye man." I 15 0 Respondent 1, sustained face injuries, the most serious one being theinjury to hisrighteye which wasa penetrated trauma of the cornea with piolapse of the iris and haemophthalmes. He was taken to the Nicosia General Hospital wheie he was seenbyDr.Pierides,asurgeonOphthalmologist inchargeofthe Ophthalmological Department of the Nicosia General Hospital, wherean operation wasperformed and thetrauma wassatured. He had also multiple injuries on hisforehead and nose. He stayed in the hospital until March 21, 1973 and then he was takento London. Dr. Pieridessawhimagain inJanuary 1974, 25 after his return from London and later on January 3,
2. His condition had by the time of the trial of the case settled and is described in thejudgment of the trial Court as follows: 30 35 "The vision of his right eye is not more than 10% of a normal eyeand cannot becoirected with glasses or contact lenses. Atthisstagethecataract cannot beoperated upon. Glaucoma and detachment of the retina with consequent deterioration ofthevisionorthecompletelossofthevision of the eye is a usual comp'ication of injuries likethe ones the Plaintiff sustained. An operation for the removal of cataract is verydifficult duetothe nature of the injury and the young age of the patient. There is no possibility, howevei, for the left eye to be affected adversely. The colourof theeyeisdeterminedbythecolour of the irisand 489 A. Loizou J. Aloupou and Another v.HjiGeorghiou andAnother

(1984)due to the absence of the iris the injured eye looks black whereas the left eye is blue-green. The post-operative treatment for a month was very painful. The Plaintiff suffered discomfort for two months after the accident. Later on the Plaintiff had only minor discomfort with tears 5 in his eye, due to wind, light, smoke etc. This discomfort is not painful but is peimanent. The Plaintiff could not toleiate the application ofa contact lenswhichwould impiove his vision by 10% and which would add an artificial iris." 10 It may be noted that according to the medical evidence there is no possibility for the left eyeto be affected adversely and that the chances of his condition to deteriorate are limited. In dealing with the general damages the trial Court referred to the significance of the age of respondent 1, who was at the time a 15 young man of sixteen or twenty-six at the time of the judgment. It alsoreferred to thepsychological problems whichhiscondition undoubtedly causes and will continue to cause. In assesing the general damages the trial Court stated that it had to consider the natuie of the injuries, the length of the treatment, the pain 20 and suffering, the discomfort and loss of amenities of life and the possibility of future loss of earnings and that the sum to be awarded should besuchastoputtheplaintiff inthesameposition as he would have been had he not sustained the injury. This is no doubt a correct direction regarding the law govern- 25 ing the issue. The trial Court in the relevant passage of its judgment referred to comparable awards in comparable cases and stated that general damages for the loss of an eye are in the region of C£8,000.- and referred to foui cases from Kemp and Kemp The Quantum of Damages, Volume 2, Personal Injury 30 Reports in pp. 5121-5144, namely Dent v. Levi Strauss, (U.K.); Hewitt v. Braff Engineering; Condon v. Condon; Jones v. Nidum Precision Tooling; Dermody v. Mottram; Singh v. Darlington. The trial Court then felt that they should follow the trend emanating from the aforesaid awards taking into consi- 35 deration the current rate of exchange and the rate of inflation and it awarded C£9,000.- by way of general damages, having pointed out that as regards the loss of earnings or the loss of future earnings, no evidence which might have helped them was adduced. These awards of general damages by English Courts cul490 40 1 C.L.R. Aloupouand Another\. HjiGeorghiou and Another A.Loizou J. minated as far as the reported cases in the aforesaid textbook ate concerned in Vickerman v. Parker, of the 16th July, 1982, (paragraphs 5 - 132) in which it was stated per curiam that the current conventional award for loss of an eye was £10,000.5 (U.K. sterling). Havingconsidered the totality of the circumstances and having adapted the comparable awards referred to earlier in this judgment to the facts of this case and to local conditions we have come to the conclusion that the amount of C£7,000.- would be 10 areasonable compensation for the injuries suffered by respondent 1 which in effect consisted of the loss of an eye,and some facial injuries. As regards awards of general damages we would like to reiterate what this Court said in Androulla Chr. Pavlides v. 15 Anthimos Andreou (Civil Appeal No. 6658,not yet reported).* 20 25 "Whilst on this point we would like to say that some parts making up the award of general damages other than loss of future earnings are not capable of being estimated in terms of money and thetefore Courts have to proceed in assessing them by reference to comparable awards in comparable cases and follow the trend emanating from such comparable awards. Such comparable cases do not, however, constitute as in other categories of judicial pronouncements precedents, as the necessary adjustments with regard to changes through the evei decreasing worth of monetary unitsand allreasonable adaptations tothe circumstances of the case, have to be made." In the result the appeal is allowed in so far as the amount of general damages awarded to respondent 1, for the personal 30 injuries suffered by him by reducing same by C£2,000.- and in so far asthe amount awarded to respondent 2foi thedamage to his vehicle by reducing same by £150.-. The judgment of the trial Court is varied accordingly. As regards costs we have come to the conclusion that in the 35 ciicumstances we should not interfere with the order made in the Court below and as regards those in this Court, there will be no order as to costs. Appealpartly allowed. No orderas to costs. * Now reported in

(1984)I C.L.R. 385. 491