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(19M) 1984 Septembei 27 [PIKIS, J.] IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLE 146 OF THE CONSTITUTION ANDREAS AVRAAM, Applicant. v. THE PORTS AUTHORITY OF CYPRUS, Responderts. (Case No. 244/83). Cyprus Ports Authcrity Low, 1973 (Law 38/73)—Management Board of—D^lϊgotion of disciplitiary powcn to a Sub-Committal— Board has an unfettered discretion in the matter by virtue of section 8 of the Law. Competence—Statutory competence—Delegationof—Principles applicable—Management Board of Cyprus Ports Authority—Vistcd with unfett?rcd discretion to delegate its disciplinary powers to a Sub-Committee—Section 8 of the Cyprus Ports Authority Law, 19/3 (Law 38/73). On February 19, 1983 the Mpnagement Board of the respond- 10 ents delegated Authoiity to a Sub-Committee, consisting of "the Chairman of the C .ard and two of i;s members, to deal with disciplinary accusations agcinst lie apnlicant and decide accordingly. At the end cf its deliberatiors the Sub-Committee found the applicant guilty of gra\e and unpardonable corduct 15 and decided to revoke lis licence as a port woiker. Hence this recourse! Counsel for 'he applicant mainly conttrded: (?) That in the absence of cxpiess power to delegate dis­ ciplinary power or functioi s, it is impermissible to do so, and, any attempt m that direction must be disowned a? illegal. 1042 20 5 3 C.L.R. Avraam v. Cyprus Ports Authority (

  1. b)That the dehgatior if permissible by the provisions of s.8 of Law 38/73 was ultra \ires the law because of failure on the part of the Management Board to define the scope of the aulhority cf the Sub-Committee; 5 10 15 20 (
  2. c)That the decision was, in any event impropei because of failure to specify the reasons for the delegation and explain depaituie from the original decision of the Board to deal with the mattei itself. Held, that the exercise of disciplinary power or functions and, generally the exercise of functions of a broadly judicial character cannot be delegated in the absence of express authorisation by the law vesting the competence in a particular body; that section 8 of the Cypius Ports Authority Law, 1973 (Law 38/73) places no censtraint ov the power to delegate; that the Management Board has an unfettered discielion in the mattei subject only to the bona fide exeicue of the power and there was nothing before the Court to doubt the bona fide of the Management Board in delegating the exercise of their competence to a Sub-Committee presided ovei by the Chairman of the Authority; that the comDetence was delegated in its tntiiety to the Sub-Committee while its terms of reference were clearly defined; and that accoidingly the recourse must be dismissed. Application dismissed. 25 30 Cases referred to: Avraam v. Ports Authority

(1981)3 C.L.R. 368; Barnard v. Natural Dock Labour Port [1953] 1 All E.R. 1113 (C.A.); Vine v. NaturalDock LabourPort [1956]3All E.R. 939(H.L.); Osgood \. Nelson [1872] L.R. 5 (H.L.) 636; RatnagOfOl \. Attorney-General [1970] A.C. 974 (P.C.); Medcon Construction and Others v. Republic
(1968)3 C.L.R. 535 at pp. 542-543. Recourse. Recourse against the decision of the respondent whereby 35 applicant's licence as a port worker was revoked. Chr. Pourgourides, for the applicant. P. Ioannides, for the respondent. Cur. adv. vult. 1043 Avraam v. Cyprus Ports Authority
(1984)PIKIS J. read the following judgment. The case turns on the interpretation of s.8 of the Cyprus Ports Authority Law*, in thefirstplace, and the validity of a decision of theManage­ ment Boaid of the Cyprus Ports Authority, hereafter referred to as "The Authority"**, whereby they delegated to a sub- 5 Committee their powei to inquiry into accusations against the applicant, a licensed poit worker, that he had misappro­ priated funds of the Union of Port Workers, of which he was the treasurer, in the second place. Fusing the two questions into one, what is at issue is the 10 competence of the sub—Committee,in contra-distinction tothe Management Board, to exercise the disciplinary powers of the Board and take cognizance of the matter. Other challenges to the validity of the decision of the sub-Committee, raised in the application,revolvinground the exercise of their discre- 15 tionary powers, assuming any such powers vested in them, were abandoned. Examining the record of the proceedings before thesub-Committee,paiticularly theopportunity afforded to the applicant to put his case before it, Τ incline to theview the withdrawal of these complaints was justified and are hereby 2J dismissed. At the end of its deliberations the sub-Committee found the applicantguilty ofgraveandunpardonableconduct,anddecided to revoke his licence as a port worker. The decision was brought to thenotice of the Management Board who instructed 25 the General Manager to inform the applicant accordingly. The recourse is directed against the validity of this decision, ill founded in law, in the contention of the applicant,for lack of competence on the part of the sub-Committee, as earlier indicated, to takj cognizance of and resolve themattei referred 30 to them. To complete the histoiy of the proceedings, it must be noted that an earlier decision of the Management Board itself, to withdraw the licenceoftheapplicant,wasannulled*** for breachoftherulesofnaturaljustice. TheCourtproclaimed, it is a fundamental principle of our law, that proceedings of 35 an essentially disciplinary character, irrespective of the label attached to them, must be conducted in accordance with the * Law 38/73. ·* dated 19.2.1983. '*· See, Avraam v. Pons Authority
(1981)3 C.L.R. 368. 1044 3 CX.R. Avraam τ. Cyprus Ports Authority Pikis J, rules'of naturaljustice. Andeverydeviation therefrom mustbe stiuck down as illegal. Following the annulment of the deci­ sion of the Board, they decided,after taking notice of thedeci­ sion, that the Board should re-examine the matter. Owing 5 to the inability of counsel for the applicant to attend, or the applicant himself, consideration of the matter was adjourned twice. On19.2.1983 theManagementBoarddelegatedauthority to a sub-Committee,consisting of the Chairman of the Board and two of its members, to deal with accusations and decide 10 accordingly. The validity of this decision is disputed by refer­ ence to the powers of the Management Board, denned in s.8 of Law 38/73, and the nature of the power delegated. If 1 can summarise the arguments laised in support of the submission, they may be stated as follows: 15 20 25 (
  1. a)Intheabsence of express power todelegate disciplinary power or functions, it is impermissible to do so,and, any attempt in that direction must be disowned as illegal. (
  2. b)The delegation, if permissible by the provisions of s.8, it was ultra viresthe law because of failure onthe part of the Management Board to define the scope of the authority of the sub-Committee. And (
  3. c)the decision was, in the event, improper because of failure to specify the reasons for the delegation and explain departure from the original decision of the Board to deal with the matter itself. Counsel for the applicant went to great lengths in suppotting his submissions, referring us to Cyprus, English and Greek authorities; that the fruit of his labour will not feature in this 30 judgment in all its aspects, is no reflection onhiscommendable effort. Counsel for the respondents likewise tried to help theCourt in every way possible. In his submission, delegation was ex­ presslyauthorisedby s.8 andwas validlymade,whilethe powers 35 vested thereby were properly exercised in the context of this case, by assigning authority to a sub-Committee to deal with the matter. Below, I shall examine the rival submissions in the light of the legislation applicable, the relevant principles of administrative law, and, the facts of the case. 1045 Pikis J. Avraam v. Cyprus Ports Authority
(1984)There is undoubted power in the Management Board of the Authority to regulate entry and activities within the ports' area*. Counsel are in agreement as to the effect of the law on the subject, and that power vests in the Management Board of the Authority to.revoke a porter's licence. There is some 5 disagreement, however, as to the scope of the power to delegate, of no great significance for the purposes of this case. For the applicant it was submitted, the power to delegate is solely regulated by the provisions of s.8, whereas for the iespondents it was argued that respondents' power in this regard emanates 10 from and isregulated bytheprovisions of s.2A—Cap. 184**. To my mind, what is vested in the Management Board of the Authority is the competence of the Director, under s.2A and not the manner of its delegation, although it makes little difference for the outcome of this case for neither provision makes specific 15 reference to delegation of disciplinary functions, upon which submission many of the arguments for the applicant were founded. I consider it pertinent to make reference to the principles of lawrelevant to the delegation ofa competence, with particular 20 reference to.the delegation of the exercise of disciplinary power, a course that will facilitate our deliberations and resolution of the case. It is noteworthy that principles of administrative law, as fashioned in Greece and other continental countries practising administrative law as a separate system of law, and 25 English principles of administrative law,are largely identical***. (
  1. a)The exeicise of disciplinary power or functions and, generally, the exercise of functions of a broadly judicial character cannot bedelegated in the absence of express authorisation by the law vesting the competence irL-p. 30 particular body****. Mr. Pourgourides submitted that the caselaw requires satis* See, s.l0(2Xd)—Law 38/73. and sections 2 and 2A—Cap. 184, as amended by Law 55/68 and Notification 131, Supplement 3 of the official gazette of 12.5.1977. *· See, Law 55/68. ·** See, de Smiths—Judicial Review of Administration Action, 4th ed., p.298 et seq.; Stassittopouhs—Law of Administrative Acts, 1951, p. 190 et seq. ***· See, Stassittopouhs,supra, p. 190, 194; de Smiths, supra, 'p.298 et. seq.; Barnard v. NaturalDock Labour Port [1953] 1 All E.R. 1113 (C.A.);Vine v. Natural Duck Labour Port [1956] 3 A11E.R. 939 (H.L.). 1046 3 C.L.R. Avraam v. Cyprus Ports Authority Pikis J· faction of one more condition befoie it is competent for the vestces of disciplinary power to delegate it. He argued that the possibility of delegation of disciplinary functions must be expressly contemplated by the law in the sense that a provision 5 mustappeartotheeffect thatdelegation ofdisciplinary functions is permissible. Neilhei Greek jurisprudence nor English caselaw lend support to this proposition. The test is whether the law does empower expressly, or by necessary implication, the vestees of a competence or function to delegate it to another. 10 Delegation of a power must be distinguished from the establishment of a committee to take evidence and generally inquire into the facts and report to the decision-making body*. Such body is not intended to substitute but aid the holdei of power to elicit the facts. 15 (
  2. b)Statutory provisions enabling an authority entrusted with a competence or function to sub-delegate, must be strictly construed. No delegation can be made except to the extent clearly warranted by law. 20 25 (
  3. c)The act of delegation must be intia vires the law; consequently, delegation may be scrutinised with a view to ascertaining the competence delegated and the manner of its exercise. It has been held that the scope and authority of the delegate must be succinctly defined**. Delegation must be solely accomplished by the custodian of the power delegated. Short of that, delegation will be imperfect. In the above case, delegation was found to be ultra vires thelawbecauseoffailure onthepart ofthedelegatingauthority to define precisely the terms of leference of the delegate, as 30 well as the scope of his authority. Once a competence or function is validly delegated, the delegate steps into theshoes and assumes all the powers of the body entrusted by law to excrcue the power. Foi the applicant it was submitted that the disciplinary fun35 ctions of the Management Board were,in this case, imperfectly delegated because of failure to specify, with precision, the See, Osgood v. Nehon [1872] LR 5 (H.L.), 636. See, Ratnagopal v. Attorney-General [1970] A.C. 974 (P.C.). 1047 Pikis J. Avraam v. Cyprus Ports Authority
(1984)competence transferred and generally the authority of the sub-Committee. I fail to agree. Mere examination of the subjudioe decision of 19.2.1983clearly establishes the contrary (seeexhibit 3). The sub-Committee wasentrusted to dealwith the complaint and come to a decision. The competence was 5 delegated, in itsentirety, to thesub-Committee, whileits terms of reference were clearly defined. Hence the submission made onbehalfoftheapplicantinthisrespect,cannotbutbedismissed. Mr. Pourgourides made one more submission bearing on the validity of the decision to delegate. He argued that the 10 reasons for the delegation ought to have been indicated in the decision of the Management Board. In his submission, delegation was an exceptional measure that could be adopted only in the face of special circumstances. Foi these propositions he relied mostly on the authority of Medcon Constructions 15 And Othersv. TheRepublic
(1968)3 C.L.R. 535 at 542-543. In that case, Triantafyllides, J., as he then was, decided that the power of the Minister of Finance, under reg. 41(
  1. a)of the Store Regulations, to suspend consideration of a tender by the Tender Board, in order to tcfer the same to the Council 20 of Ministers, must be— (
  2. a)clearly minuted and, (
  3. b)justified by reference to special ciicumstances. In the opinion of the learned Judge, supension was a measure that could be adopted only in exceptional circumstances. 25 The question in Medcon was totally different from the one before us in the instant case. The Court was not there concerned with the• xercise ofpower to delegate but withtheexercise of a power to interfere with the process ordained by law. Notwithstanding my initial hesitations, the above case is dis- 30 tinguishable from the present one. Need for a clear record of a decision, on the other hand, was warranted by elementary principles of administrative law, a requisite that was plainly satisfied in this case. Section 8 of Law 38/73places no constraints on the exercise 35 of the power to delegate. The Management Board has an unfettered discretion in the matter, subject only to the bona fide exercise of the power. And there is nothing before me 1048 3 C.L.R. Avraam v. Cyprus Ports Authority Pikis J. todoubt the bonafidesofthe Management Board in delegating the exercise of their competence to a sub-committee presided over by the Chairman of the Authority. For the reasons indicated in this judgment, the recourse is 5 dismissed. Let there be no order as to costs. Order accordingly. Recourse dismissed. No order as to costs. 1049

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