clr/1984/1984_3_815.pdf

(1984)Officer was appointed. By a letter* dated the 25th November, 1983 which he addressed to the Public Service Commission the Minister of Health stated that the Investigating officer will be confronted with difficulties in the taking of therelevant state­ mentsincasetheapplicantispresentondutyathisplaceofwork 5 because a number of witnesses are hierarchically inferior tohim and,thus,thereisapossibility oftheir beinginfluenced; andpro­ posed, for these reasons, that applicant bs interdicted. The Public Service Commission ifter taking into consideration the above letterof the Ministerandall thematerialbefore itdecided 10 to interdict the applicant "until thefinalcompletion of the case against him'* persuant to section 84

(1)of the Public Service Laws, 1967-1983. Hencethis recourse. Counsel for theappli­ cant mainly contended that the applicant has been treated in a discriminatory manner and that the respondent acted in excess 15 of power by extending the interdiction beyond the period of the investigation. Held,

(1)that the question of discrimination can only arise as between persons being in equal situations (see Paschali v. Republic

(1966)3 C.L.R. 593); that the onusis on the applicant 20 to establish such discrimination (see Miliotisv. Republic

(1969)3 C.L.R. 597); that in the instantcase even theaverments made by the applicant in connection with "discrimination" are far too vague and the applicant has failed to discharge thd onus cast upon him. 25

(2)That though it was reasonably open to the Public Service Commission to reach a decision that the applicant should be interdicted in the public interest for the period of theinvestiga­ tionintotheallegedoffences itwas notopentothePublic Service Commission to interdict the applicant until the final disposal 30 of the case against him as the Public Service Commission was neither moved to that effect by the appropriate authority nor was any material before it justifying a decision for interdiction until the final disposal of a probable disciplinary case; accord­ ingly that part of the sub judice decision which goes beyond 35 the date of the completion of the investigation envisaged by regulations 1-8 (both inclusive), set out in the Second Schedule Part I of Law 33/67, must be annulled. Subjudice decision partly annulled. * The letter is quoted at pp. 819-821 post. 816 3 C.L.R. Chryssaflnls v. Republic Cases referred to: Payiatas y. Republic

(1984)3 C.L.R. 165; Grigoropoullos v. Republic

(1984)3 C.L.R. 449; Paschali v. Republic

(1966)3 C.L.R. 593; •5 Miliotis v. Republic

(1969)3 C.L.R. 597; Georghiades v. Republic

(1969)3 C.L.R. 396 at p. 405. 10 Recourse. Recourse against the decision of the respondent to interdict applicant from his duties as Senior Specialist Gynaecologist. K. Talarides with G. Tornaritis, for the applicant. N. Charalambous,Senior Counsel of the Republic with M. Flourentzos, Counsel of the Republic, for the respondent. > Cur. adv.vult. 15 LORIS J. read the following judgment. The applicant by means of the present recourse contests the validity of the decision of the respondent Public Service Commission to interdict him from his duties as Senior Specialist Gynaecologist, praying for a declaration of this Court to the effect that the 20 aforesaid decision is null and devoid of any legal effect. The said decision of the respondent is set out in a letter dated 26.11.1983, addressed to the applicant (vide exh. 1 attached to the recourse) which reads as follows: 25 Αρ. Φακ.: Π. 12039 "ΤΕΚΜΗΡΙΟΝ Ύ ΓΡΑΦΕΙΟ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗΣ ΔΗΜΟΣΙΑΣ ΥΠΗΡΕΣΙΑΣ ΛΕΥΚΩΣΙΑ. ΠΟΛΥ ΕΠΕΙΓΟΥΣΑ ΕΜΠΙΣΤΕΥΤΙΚΗ 26 Νοεμβρίου 1983 30 Κύριο Ανδρέα Μ. Χρυσαφίνη, Ανώτερο Ειδικό Ιατρό, (Μέσω Γεν. Διευθ. Υπ. Υγεία? και Διευθυν. Ιατρ. Υττηρ. και Υττηρ. Δημόσια? Υγεία?). 35 Έχω οδηγίε? να αναφερθώ στην πειθαρχική έρευνα που δια­ τάχθηκε εναντίον acts με απόφαση του Υπουργικού Συμβουλίου με ημερομηνία 24.11.1983 και να aas πληροφορήσω ότι η Επι817 Loris J. Chryssafinis r. Republic

(1984)τροπή Δημόσια? Υπηρεσία?, αφού έλαβε υπόψη όλα τα ενώπιον τη? στοιχεία, έκρινε ότι είναι προ? το δημόσιο συμφέρον νατεθείτε σε διαθεσιμότητα. . 2. Γι* αυτό, η Επιτροπή σα? Θέτει σε διαθεσιμότητα από την ερχόμενη Δευτέρα28 Νοεμβρίου 1983και μέχριτηντελικήσυμπλήρωση τη? εναντίον σα? υπόθεση? σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 84

(1)των περί Δημοσία? Υπηρεσία? Νόμων του 1967 έω?

1. 5
2. Η Επιτροπή αποφάσισε περαιτέρω να σα? επιτραπεί να λαμβάνετε το 1/2 των απολαβώντη? θέση? σα? κατά τηδιάρκεια τη? περιόδου τη? διαθεσιμότητα? σα?. 10 Για Πρόεδρο Επιτροπή? Δημόσια? Υπηρεσία?". ( ("Exhibit 1 File No. P. 12039 OFFICE OFTHEPUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 15 NICOSIA VERY URGENT CONFIDENTIAL 26 November,
3. Mr. Andreas M. Chryssafinis, Senior Specialist, (Through Dir.-Gen. Min. of Health and Dir. of Med. Services and Public Health Services). 20 I am directed to refer to the disciplinary investigation directed against you by a decision of the Council of Ministers dated 24.11.1983 and to inform you that the Public Service Commis- 25 sion, after having taken into consideration all the material before it, decided that it is in the public interest that you should be placed under interdiction.
4. For this reason, the Commission places you under inter­ diction as from next Monday 28th November, 1983 and until 30 the final completion of the case against you in accordance with section 84

(1)of the Public Service Laws, 1967-

2. The Conimission has further decided that you will be allow­ ed to receive 1/2 of the emoluments of youi post during the period of your interdiction. 35 For Chairman Public Service Commission"). 818 3 C.L.R. Chryssafinis τ. Republic Lorls J. The salient facts of this case are as follows: 5 The applicant is a Senior Specialist Obstetrician and Gynae­ cologist in the Government Service; in fact he is the Director of the Departmentof Obstetrics and Gynaecology of the Nicosia General Hospital. As it appears from the relevant documents before me, follow­ ing reports for alleged private practice, in medicine and alleged use of the Chambers and other facilities of Nicosia General Hospital for treatment of private patients by the applicant, 10 an investigation for the alleged disciplinary offences, as afore­ said, was directed on 24.11.1983 by the appropriate authority under theprovisions of paragraph (b) of section 80 of the Public Service Law 1967 (Law No. 33/67). On 25.11.1983 the Minister of Health addressed a letter to 15 the respondent Public Service Commission (attached to the opposition) requesting the latter to inteidict the applicant, suspending him from duty pending the completion of the investi­ gation into the aforesaid alleged disciplinary offences for the reasons stated therein. A copy of the letter in question which 20 is attached to the opposition (marked Appendix 1) reads as follows: "ΠΑΡΑΡΤΗΜΑ 1 ΥΠΟΥΡΓΕΙΟΝ ΥΓΕΙΑΣ 25 ΓΡΑΦΕΙΟΝ ΥΠΟΥΡΓΟΥ ΛΕΥΚΩΣΙΑ, ΚΥΠΡΟΣ Αρ. Υ.Υ. 407/61/5/V 25 Νοεμβρίου, 1983 ΕΜΠΙΣΤΕΥΤΙΚΗ-ΕΠΕΙΓΟΥΣΑ Πρόεδρο Επιτροπή? Δημόσια? Υπηρεσία?, Ύστερα από πρόσφατε? καταγγελίε? διατάχθηκε σήμερα η 30 διεξαγωγή έρευνα? σε βάρο? του ιατρού Χρυσαφίνη για άσκηση ιδιωτική? ιατρική? και ότι χρησιμοποίησε του? θαλάμου?, διευ­ κολυνθεί? και πόρου? του Γενικού Νοσοκομείου Λευκωσία? για περίθαλψη των ιδιωτικών του ασθενών. Προ? τούτο διορίστηκε ύστερα από σχετική απόφαση του Υπουργικού Συμβουλίου 35 (24.11.1983) σαν Ερευνών Λειτουργό? ο κ. Ν. Συμεωνίδη?,Γενικό? Διευθυντή? Υπουργείου Δικαιοσύνη?. Η αρμόδια αρχή πιστεύει ότι ο Ερευνών Λειτουργό? θα αντι­ μετωπίσει δυσκολίες κατά τη λήψη όλων των αναγκαίωνμαρπυ819 Loris J. Chryssafinis v. Republic

(1984)ριών, στη περίπτωση παρουσία? του καταγγελλομένου ιατρού στο χώρο όπου εργάζεται, διότι αρκετοί από του? μάρτυρε? βρίσκονται ιεραρχικά κάτω από τον καταγγελλόμενο ιατρό και υπάρχει ' η δυνατότητα επηρεασμού, θ α αντιμετωπίσει επίση? δυσκολίε? στην αναζήτηση και μελέτη των απαραίτητων εγγράφων που θα μπορούσαν να βοηθήσουν την έρευνα και που φυλάττονται στο Τμήμα του οποίου προΐσταται ο καταγγελ­ λόμενο?. 5 Για όλου? του? πιο πάνω λόγου? εισηγούμαι όπω? ο ιατρό? Χρυσαφίνη? τεθεί σε διαθεσιμότητα. 10 Στην περίπτωση αποδοχή? τη? εισηγήσεω? μα? οι υπηρεσίε? μα? δεν θα επηρεασθούν γιατί μπορούμε να προβούμε σε προσω­ ρινή αντικατάσταση με άλλου? ιατρού? τη? ίδια? ειδικότητα?. (Υπ.) ΤΑΚΗΣ ΠΕΛΕΚΑΝΟΣ Υπουργό?". 15 ("SCHEDULE 1 MINISTRY OF HEALTH No. Μ. H. 407/61/5/V MINISTER'S OFFICE NICOSIA, CYPRUS 25 Novembei, 1983 CONFIDENTIAL-URGENT 20 Chaiiman, Public Service Commission, After recent reports the commencent of an investigation was ordered today against Dr. Chryssafinis for private practice in medicine and that he used the Chambers and other facilities 25 and means of the Nicosia General Hospital for treatment of his private patients. For this purpose, Mr. N. Symeonides, Director-General, Ministry of Justice was appointed as an investigating officer after a relative decision of the Council of Ministers (24.11.1983). 30 The appropriate authority believes that the investigating officer will face difficulties during the taking of all the necessary statements, in the case of the presence of the accused doctor at the place where he works, because many of the witnesses are hierarchically under the accused doctor and there is a possi- 35 bility of their being influenced. He will also face difficulties in the search and study of the necessary documents which could 820 3 C.L.R. Chryssafinis v. Republic Loris J. help the investigation and which are kept in the Department of which the accused is the Head. For all the above reasons 1 suggest that Dr. Chryssafinis be placed undeT interdiction 5 In the case of the acceptance of our submission our services will not be affected because we can proceed with a temporary replacement with other doctors of the same speciality. (Sgd.) Takis Pelekanos Minister"). 10 The respondent P.S.C. at its meeting of 26.11.1983 decided to interdict the applicant from 28.11.1983 "and until the final completion of the case against him" pursuant to s. 84

(1)of the Public Service Law 33/67 as amended. Copy of the relevant decision of the respondent P.S.C. is 15 appended to the opposition (Appendix 2) and reads: "ΠΑΡΑΡΤΗΜΑ

1. Απόσπασμα από τα Πρακτικά τη? Συνεδρίαση? τη? Επιτροπή? Δημόσια? Υπηρεσία? με ημερομηνία 26.11.1983—9 π.μ.
2. Πρόταση για διαθεσιμότητα του Ανδρέα Μ. ΧΡΥΣΑΦΙΝΗ, 20 Ανώτερου Ειδικού Ιατρού στι? Ιατρικέ? Υπηρεσίε? και Υττηρεσίε? Δημόσια? Υγεία?. Ο Υπουργό? Υγεία?, ω? ενδιαφερόμενη αρμόδια αρχή, με επι­ στολή του με αρ. Υ.Υ. 407/61/5/V και ημερ. 25.11.1983, πληρο­ φόρησε την Επιτροπήότι ύστερα απόκαταγγελίε? ότι ο Ανδρέα? 25 Μ. Χρυσαφίνη?, Ανώτερο? Ειδικό? Ιατρό? στι? Ιατρικέ? Υττηρεσίε? και Υπηρεσίε? Δημόσια? Υγεία?, ασκεί ιδιωτικά την ιατρική και ότι χρησιμοποιεί θαλάμου?,διευκολύνσει? και πόρου? του Γενικού Νοσοκομείου Λευκωσία? για την περίθαλψη ιδιωτικών του ασθε­ νών, το Υπουργικό Συμβούλιο με Απόφαση του ημερ. 24,11.1983 30 όρισε το Νίκο Συμεωνίδη, Γενικό' Διευθυντή του Υπουργείου Δικαιοσύνη?,1 ω? Ερευνώντα Λειτουργό για τη διεξαγωγή πειθαρ­ χική? έρευνα? εναντίον του πιο πάνω υπαλλήλου. Ο Υπουργό? Υγεία? εισηγήθηκε να τεθεί ο Χρυσαφίνη? σε δια­ θεσιμότητα αναφερόντα? ότι, αν αυτό? συνεχίσει να εργάζεται, 35 αναμένεται ότι ο Ερευνών Λειτουργό? θα αντιμετωπίσει δυσκολίε? 821 Loris J. Chryssafinis v. Republic

(1984)στη λήψη των αναγκαίων μαρτυριών και στην αναζήτηση και μελέτη των απαραίτητων εγγράφων που θα μπορούσαν να βοη­ θήσουν στην έρευνα, γιατί τα έγγραφα αυτά φυλάσσονται στο τμήμα του οποίου προΐσταται ο υπάλληλο? και αρκετοί από του? μάρτυρε? είναι υφιστάμενοι του. 5 Ο Υπουργό? περαιτέρωανάφερεότι δεθαεπηρεαστεί ηυπηρεσία σε περίπτωση που ο Χρυσαφίνη? θα τεθεί σε διαθεσιμότητα, γιατί υπάρχει δυνατότητα προσωρινή? αντικατάσταση? του από άλλου? ιατρού? τη? ίδια? ειδικότητα?. Η επιτροπή λαμβάνοντα? υπόψη τα ανωτέρω καθώ? επίση? και όλα τα ενώπιον τη? στοιχεία, έκρινε ότι είναι προ? το δημόσιο συμφέρον να τεθεί σε διαθεσιμότητα ο Ανδρέα? Μ. ΧΡΥΣΑΦ1ΝΗΣ, Ανώτερο? Ειδικό? Ιατρό? στι? Ιατρικέ? Υπηρεσίε? και Υπηρεσίε? Δημόσια? Υγεία?. 10 Έτσι, Η Επιτροπή αποφάσισε να θέσει τον υπάλληλο σε δια- 15 θεσιμότητα από 28.11.1983 και μέχρι την τελική συμπλήρωση τη? εναντίον του υπόθεση?, σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 84

(1)των περί Δημοσία? Υπηρεσία? Νόμων του 1967 έω?

1. Η Επιτροπή αποφάσισε περαιτέρω να επιτραπεί σ' αυτόν να λαμβάνει το 1/2 των απολαβών τη? θέση? του κατά τη διάρκεια 20 τη? διαθεσιμότητα? του. ("SCHEDULE
2. Extract from the Minutes of the Meeting of the Public Strvice Commission dated 26.11.1983—9 a.m.
3. Submissionfor the interdictionof Andreas M. Chryssafinis, 25 Senior Specialist in the Health Services and the Services of Public Health. The Minister of Health as the interested appropriate author­ ity, by his letter No.M.H.407/61/5/V dated 25.11.1983, informed the Commission that after accusations that Andreas M. Chryssafinis, Senior Specialist in the Health Services and the Services of Public Health exercises private medicine and that he uses Chambers, facilities and means of the Nicosia General Hospital for the treatment of his private patients, theCouncil of Ministers by its decision dated 24.11.1983 appointed Mr. Nicos Symeoni822 30 35 3 C.L.R. Chryssafinis τ. Republic Loris J. des, Director-General of the Ministry of Justice as an inve­ stigating officer for thecarrying out of disciplinary investigation against the above officer. The Minister of Health suggested that Chryssafinis be placed 5 under interdiction stating that if he continues to woik, it is expected that the investigating Officer will face difficulties in obtaining the necessary statements and in the search and'Study of the necessary documents which could help the investigation because these documentsare kept in the department of which 10 heistheHeadandmanyof thewitnesses are his subordinates. The Minister further stated that the service will not be affected incaseChryssafinis is placed under interdictionbecause there is a possibility of his temporary replacement by other doctors of the same speciality. 15 The Commission having taken into consideration the above and also all the particulars before it, decided that it is in the public interest that Andreas M. Chryssafinis, Senior Specialist in the Health Services and Public Health Services be placed under inteidiction. 20 Therefore the Commission decided to place the officer under interdiction as from 28.11.1983 until the final completion of the case against him in accordance with section 84

(1)of the Public Service Laws, 1967-1983. The Commission has furthei decided that he will be allowed 25 to receive 1/2 of the emolumentsof his post during the period ofhisinterdiction. :: "). The above mentioned decision of the respondent P.S.C. was communicatedto the applicant on 26.11.1983 by means of a letter (exh. 1attached to the recourse) the contents of which 30 are set out above at the beginning of the present judgment; the present recourse impugnes the decision therein contained. TherespondentP.S.C.filedanopposition inwhich itisstated that "theact and/ordecision attachedis duly reasoned and was reached at correctly andlawfully pursuanttotherelevant provi35 sions of the Constitution, the Laws and/or Regulations, after due exercise by the Respondent of the powers vested in them after due consideration of all material facts and circumstances of the case". 823 Loris J. Chryssafinis v. Republic

(1984)1may as welladd herethat pursuant to the directions of this Court a written addressand a reply werefiledbythe applicant, the respondent having also filed a written address. Several copies of documents were attached to the recourse, the opposition and the written address of applicant; all these documents 5 appear in thefileand 1 do not intend making specific reference to them at least at this stage. Finally Counsel on both sideshad the opportunity of clarifying viva voce before me several points but they adduced no evidence. In order to complete the picture as regards the salient facts it may be added here, that at least up to the 13.4.1984(the day on which oral clarifications were made) the investigation into the disciplinary offences was not completed and the investigating officer who was appointed by the Council of Ministers 15 pursuant to regulation 1, of Part 1 of the Second Schedule to Law 33/67 (as amended), did not submit his repoit. He addressed though a confidential letter to the applicant on 13.

1. 1984consistingofthreepages,(videexh.3attachedtothewrilten address of the applicant) wherein the case against the applicant 20 is stated with sufficient particularity and the applicant is given opportunity of being heard either orally or in writing. From the letter in question I shall confine myself tonoteat this stage that the probable disciplinary charges amount to 10 whilst one of these referring to private practice, is sub-divided 25 into 17different periods commencing from June 1977 and extending up to August
2. In view of legal argument advanced by both sideson "interdiction"and in particular in view of the doubts cast by the respondents in their written address as to thejusticiability of a 30 recourse impugning "interdiction" owingtothefactthat "inteidiction"isonlyapreparatoryprocessofthesubsequentinvestigation and probable prosecution of a disciplinary charge I consider it pertinent at this stageto deal asbriefly aspossiblewith the object and character of interdiction as well as to its amen- 35 ability to thejurisdiction under Article 146of our Constitution. Thus in the recent case of Payiatas v. TheRepublic

(1984)3 C.L.R. 165,the nature and effect of interdiction is described by my brother Judge Savvidcs J. as follows: 824 10 3 C.L.R. 5 Chryssafinis τ. Republic Lorfe J. "Interdiction, and this is theeffect of Vetsand Azinas cases, is neither a disciplinary punishment nor does it form part of the disciplinary process in its strict sense. It is a mea­ sure resorted to by the administration when a disciplinary investigation is ordered, in order to facilitate the task of the investigation "* In the same judgment the learned Judge had this to say on the "justiciability" of a recourse impugning "inteidiction"; 10 15 20 25 30 35 "Interdiction, according to the decisions in the case of Vets& Others v. The Republic

(1979)3 C.L.R. 390 at pp. 405, 406 and Azinas v. The Republic

(1980)3 C.L.R. 510, amounts to an administiativc action which has all the essen­ tialattributesof anexecutory decision thatcanbe challenged by recourse underArticle 146of theConstitution, and which while it lasts, affects adversely and directly existing legi­ timate interests of an applicant in the sense of paragraph 2 of the said Article 146. Therefoie the applicant in the present recourse is entitled to challenge such decision by recorse " And most recently, on 15.3.1984 in case No. 544/83 Nicos Grigoropoullos v. The Republic (still unreported)* my biother Judge Pikis J. gave the character of interdiction as follows: "Notwithstanding the inconclusive character of interdiction and the absence of any permanent repercussions on the status of the officer in the Force, it is, nonetheless, an executory act because of its immediate legal consequences resulting in the removal, be it temporarily, of the officer from the Force and the financial lepercussions consequent thereupon. So, although interdiction is an incident of a preparatory act, that is, the investigation, it is, because of its consequences, detachable, theiefrom and justiciable as an independent executory act It is a discretionary power, exercisable, like eveiy discretionary power, in the interest of promotion of the purpose for which it is gi\en... The principal object of the power to interdict is, to ensure the unobstructed investigation of a case. Temporary suspension from the Forceis justified whenever the removal Now reported in

(1984)3 C.L.R. 449. 825 Lorts J. . Chryssafinis v. Republic

(1984)of the officer from therank isjudged expedient intheinterests of the efficacy of the investigation. Failure to specify the reasons leadingto adecision inthe notification of the decision, is not fatal. The reasoning maybesupplemented and, in a proper case,extracted from 5 the file " It is abundantly clear fiom the above that "interdiction"is not adisciplinarypunishment; interdiction isonlyapreparatory process either for the subsequent investigation into an alleged offence or it may be also a preparatory process both for the subsequent investigation and for the probable prosecution for disciplinary charges. Such a preparatoiy process is because of its consequences as decided in Grigoropoulos v. Republic (supra) detachable and therefore justiciable as an independent executory act. In the present case it is clear that an investigation of a disciplinary offence was directed against the applicant under the provisionsofparagraph(b)ofs.80of Law33/67;andthePublic Service Commission on being moved to that effect and after exercising its discretion was legitimately entitled to interdict 20 the officer ifin itsopinion the public interest so required. Providedthat all essential ingredients werepresent, the interdiction, accordingtos.84(l)ofLaw33/67,couldbeeitheran"interdiction pending the investigation" only, or an interdiction covering the period of investigation and the period of a probable pro- 25 secution, until final disposal of such disciplinary case against the applicant. The subjudice decision is being impugned on nine grounds of law set out in the present recourse; all these grounds in the light of applicant's written addiess and oral clarifications may 30 be dealt with under two broad heads: A. Discrimination B. Misconception of facts. In lespect of 'discrimination' it has to be borne in mind that (i) "the question of discrimination can only arise as between 35 persons being in equal situations" (Paschali v. Republic

(1966)3C.L.R.593)(ii)"the onusison the applicant to establish such discrimination" (Miliotis v. Republic

(1969)3 C.L.R. 597). 826 10 15 •3 C.L.K Chryssafinis v. Republic Loris J. In the instant caseeventhe averments made bythe applicant in connectionwith"discrimination"are far too vagueand Ican state straight away that the applicant has failed to discharge the onuscast upon him. Definitely Icannot gointo thedetails 5 of the inteidiction of other government Doctors named in the recourse and compare them with the subjudice interdiction of the applicant. In the fiist place I do not have befoie me the facts of those casessoas to comparethem withthefacts ofthe case in hand; but the most impoitant factor is that the cases 10 of those doctors are pending as I undeistand, before another Judge or Judges of the Supreme Court. How then can I know whether the applicant in the present recouiseand other government doctorsnamed herein arebeing in equal situation? 15 As regards the collateral complaint of the applicant that the respondent P.S.C.should not giveits sub judice decision before the judgment is pronounced by another Judge of this Court in recourse 204/83 in which the applicant in the present case is also an applicant together with a number of other Govern20 ment Doctors, I shall confine myself in saying that it is impermissiblefor meeither todealwithfactssetoutinapendingcase before another Judge or attempt even to deduce inferences from facts which form pait of a pending case and which facts were never brought oi established before me. 25 Havingdealt withthe fust head ofthecomplaints Ishallnow proceed to examine the second which includes the specific submission contained in para. 9 of applicant's written address to the effect that respondent P.S.C. acted in excess of power byextending the inteidiction beyond the period of theinvestig30 ation covering without reasoning the period of future probable prosecution untilfinaldisposal of suchdisciplinary case against the applicant. It hasbeen submitted byleadingcounsel appearing for applicant that when an investigation of a disciplinary offence is 35 directed under the provisions of paragraph (b) of section 80 of Law 33/67 against an officer the P.S.C. does not proceed under s. 84of the same Law to interdict the officer in question acting ex proprio motu but it has to be moved to that effect; I agreewiththissubmission of learned counseland Ishallpio827 Loris J. Chryssafinis τ. Republic

(1984)ceed to examine the motion of the appropriate authority as well as the material placed before the P.S.C. for that purpose. As I have already stated earlier on in the present judgment, the respondent P.S.C.was moved by a letter of theMinister of Health on 25.11.1983 (Appendix 1). 5 The material placed before the P.S.C, which the P.S.C.took into consideration in reaching theimpugned decision according to the sub judice decision itself which is appended as appendix 2 tothe opposition, already referred to earlici on in the present judgment, is stated at para. 4 thereof to have been the letter 10 of the Minister of Health dated 25.11.1983 as well as "και όλα τα ενώπιον τη$ στοιχεία". The said letter of the Minister of Health addressed to the 'P.SiC.,asI read it, clearly speaks of the difficulties the investig­ ating officer will be confronted with, during .the investigation 15 and invites theP.S.C.tointerdicttheapplicantduringtheinvest­ igation intothe alleged offences. I could not trace therein any furthei request for the extension of the interdiction beyond the investigation and until the final determination of a probable disciplinary case against the applicant. 20 Learned counsel appearing for the respondent Commission submittedthatonlythefacts which wereplaced before theP.S.C. at thetime when the relevant administrative decision was taken should be considered. I could not agree with him more; it is abundantly clear to my mind that the P.S.C. had before it 25 at the material time of issuing the sub judice decision only the relevant letter of the Minister of Health which, I repeat, was giving reasons for the application to interdict the applicant pending the investigation into the alleged disciplinary offences. Having considered his above letter I hold the view that it 30 was reasonably open tothe Public Service Commission toreach a decision that the applicant should be interdicted in the public interest for the period of theinvestigation intothealleged offen­ ces. It was not open to the Public Service Commission to inter- 35 diettheapplicant until thefinaldisposal of the case against him as the Public Service Commission was neither moved to that effect by the appropriate authority nor was any material before 828 3 C.L.R. Chryssafinis v. Republic Loris J. it justifying a decision for interdiction until the final disposal of a probable disciplinary case. It is true that in the aforesaid decision of the Public Service Commission one can read that the commission took into 5 consideration the facts contained in the letter of the Minister as well as "και όλα τα ενώτπον τη$ στοιχεία". The decision does not disclose what "και όλα τα ενώπιον της στοιχεία" were, nor could 1trace any other ingredients in the relevant documents before me to that effect. 10 15 20 25 30 35 learned counsel appearing for the Republic vehemently argued before me that the gravity of the offence under examin­ ation, the nature of the complaint against the applicant, and the position of the applicant as a Director of Obstetrics and Gynaecological Department of Nicosia General Hospital should be taken into consideration and would entitle th Public Service Commission to interdict the applicant both pending the investigation and the completion of a probable prosecution of the relevant disciplinaty charge or charges against the appli­ cant. In this respect I have to repeat that all this factual substratum was placed before the Public Service Commission by the letter of the Minister of Health who substantially asked the Commission to interdict the applicant pending the investig­ ation into the alleged disciplinary charges. Undoubtedly as s. 84

(1)of Law 33/67 entitles the Public Service Commission to interdict the applicant fiom duty pending the investigation only or even pending the investigation and final disposal of a future case against him as well; but in so doing the Public Service Commission has to exercise a wide discretion in the public interest on facts which are placed before it and in this particular case I hold the view that the Public Service Commission was moved only to interdict the applicant pending the investigation of the alleged offences and the facts placed befoie it being the facts contained in the letter of the Minister were confined only to mattersconnectedwith theinvestigation of thealleged offences and not to probable future disciplinary prosecution. It was argued on behalf of the applicant that even if theappli­ cant were to be suspended pending the investigation such invest­ igation should be completed within 30 days as provided by Law 33/67. In this connection I feci duty bound to mention two 40 things: (a) In the case Lefcos Georghiadesv. Republic

(1969)829 Loris J. Chryssafinis r. Republic

(1984)3C.L.R. 396at pp. 405and 406it was stated that the regulation "which specifies a period of 30 days for the completion of the investigation is not a provision which entails invalidity in case of non-compliance with it, but it is in the nature of a directive only " 5 (b) It is impermissible at the hearing of the present recourse to deal with the question of time within which the alleged offence or offences ought to have been investigated*'into. This could probably be the subject of a different recourse. In respect of the present recourse I shall confine myself in 10 noting only that the investigation into the alleged offences was stillincomplete(inthe sense envisaged bythe legulations relating to the investigation of offences in the Second Schedule Part I of Law 33/67) on the 13th April, 1984 when the hearing of the present recourse was completed. 15 For all the above reasont I hold the view that the sub judice decision is a valid decision which was reasonably open to the * respondentsonlyuptoandincludingthecompletionoftheinvestigation as envisaged by the Regulations relating to the investigation of offences set out in the Second Schedule Part I of Law 20 33/67, (Regulations 1-8 both inclusive). That part of the sub judice decision which goes beyond the date of the completion of the investigation envisaged by regulations 1-8 (both inclusive) set out in the Second Schedule Part I of Law 33/67 is hereby annulled. 25 My present judgment does not in any way exclude the Public Service Commission after due motion from the appropriate authority, from le-examining and reaching at a new decision as regards imposition of a new period for interdiction in the case of probable prosecution of disciplinary charges against 30 the applicant. In the circumstances 1shall refrain from making any order as to the costs of the present case. Subjudice decisionpartly annulledNo order as to costs. 35 830