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(1986) 1985 May 18 [A. Loizou, J.] !N THE MATTER

ARTICLE 146

THE CONSTITUTION MARIA N. VASSILIADOU AND ANOTHER, A pplicants, v. THE DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION

LARNACA, Respondent. (Case No. 56/81). Act or decision in the sense

Article 146

.1

the Constitution—Which can be made the subject

a recourse—Regulation 6

(3)

the Streets and Buildings Regulations— A regulatory legislative act, the constitutionality

which can be examined in a recourse against a decision based on the said regulation. 5 Streets and Buildings Regulations—Regulation 6

(3)—Order declaring a road as a "trunk road" made thereunder—Not

a regulatory character—// has the same legal nature as a street-widening scheme made under section 12

the 10 Streets and Buildings Regulation Law, Cap. 96. Administrative Law—Administrative acts or decisions—Informatory act—Letter informing applicants that their application for a building permit could not be proceeded with because it contravened regulation 6

(3)

the Streets and 15 Buildings Regulations—Amounted to an expression

the will

the administration and not merely to an expression

intention—An executory act which could be challenged by a recourse. Streets and Buildings Regulations—"Trunk Building from—Regulation 6

(3). road"—Distance

Constitutional Law—Right to property—Article 23

the Constitution—Restrictions or limitations imposed by regu1296 20 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 30 Vassiliadou and Another v. Republic lation 6

(3)

the Streets and Buildings Regulations on the use

property for purposes

building development— Not unreasonable or arbitrary but absolutely necessary in the interest

town and country planning in the seme

Article 23

.3—Said regulation not unconstitutional—Though applicants' property seriously affected by such restrictions they do not amount to a "deprivation" in the sense

Article 23(2) and (4) and their operation is not unconstitutional.

The applicants as owners

a piece

land abutting the Larnaca-Famagusta road which was declared* a "trunkroad" ("The trunk-road") under regulation 6

(3)**

the Streets and Buildings Regulations, applied for the issue

a permit for building thereon

a two-storied building. The respondent informed the applicants that the application could not be proceeded with because the building was not at a distance

at least 50 feet from the boundary

the "high-way road", as provided by regulation 6

(3)

the Streets and Buildings Regulations. Hence this recourse. Counsel for the respondents raised the preliminary objection that the sub judice decision challenged by this recourse did not constitute an executory administrative act in the sense

Article 146

the Constitution but only a confirmatory act and/or one

an informative character

a previous act, namely the declaration

the Larnaca-Famagusta road as a "trunk-road" and that the validity

such act could not be challenged even incidentally in connection with the refusal

the application

the applicants. It was, further, urged that the sub judice act merely informed the applicants

the opinion and view

the administration and as such could not be the subject

a recourse. Counsel for the applicant mainly contended: 35 (a) That regulation 6

(3)does not provide for a distance

50 feet but for a distance

only 10 feet; and that a See Notification 122 published in Supplement No. 3

ficial Gazette

the Republic

the 10th March. 1966. Regulation 6

(3)is quoted at p. 1302 post. 1297 to the Vassiliedou and Another v. Republic
(1985)greater distance may be sanctioned only in cases

industrial buildings; (b) That regulation 6

(3)is unconstitutional as Article 23

the Constitution.

fending Held,

(1)on the preliminary objection: 5
(1)That what is challenged by the recourse is not the Notification declaring the Larnaca-Famagusta road as a trunk-road; that this Notification is not

a regulatory character and what it achieves is to specify certain individual instances as subject to certain legal rules; and that 10 it has the same legal nature as a street widening scheme made under section 12

the Streets and Buildings Regulation Law, Cap. 96 as well as notices issued under section 14

Cap. 96 as amended; that in this case what is challenged is a decision taken under regulation 6

(3)which 15 requires the construction

a building at a distance

not less than 50 ft. from a "trunk-road" so declared by the Notification; that this regulation is a regulatory legislative act, the constitutionality and legality

which can be examined in a recourse against a decision based on the said 20 regulation.

(2)That the contents

the sub judice act amounts to an expression

the will

the administration and not merely to an expression

intention; and that, accordingly, it can be made the subject

a recourse. 25 Held, (II) on the merits

therecourse:

(1)That the argument advanced that this provision regarding the distance at which the building must stand from the boundary

the plot is confined to industrial buildings or stores only, cannot stand, as the provision requir- 30 ing the building to be built at a distance

50 ft. from the boundary

a "trunk-road" is independent

the provision regarding the building

industrial premises and stores on plots outside the zones, so declared by virtue

section 14

the Law. 35

(2)That the restrictions or limitations imposed by regulation 6
(3)on the use

such property for purposes

building development are not unreasonable or arbitrary but absolutely necessary in the interest

town and coun1298 3 C.L.R. Vassiliedou and Another v. Republic 5 try planning in the sense

paragraph 3,

Article 23

the Constitution and therefore the said regulation is not unconstitutional; that, as regards this individual case, though the property

the applicants is seriously affected yet they do not amount in effect to a deprivation in the sense

paragraphs 2 and 4

Article 23

and therefore their operation or application cannot be treated to that extent as unconstitutional; accordingly the recourse must fail. 10 Per curiam: 15 Once the applicants consider and claim that they can substantiate that the value

their property is materially affected it is a case for compensation which has to be considered by the appropriate Court in the light

the overall circumstances pertaining to the assessment

compensation in the circumstances. No doubt the

fer

the respondents to examine the possibility

relaxation may meet the claim for compensation wholly, or in part. Application dismissed. 20 Cases referred to: Nemitsas v. The Municipal Corporation

Limassol and Another

(1967)3 C.L.R. 134; Lonitis Farm Ltd. v. The Republic
(1982)3 C.L.R. 124; Manglis and Others v. The Republic
(1984)3 C.L.R. 351; 25 Charalumbides v. The Republic
(1984)3 C.L.R. 1516; Nicosia Race Club v. Republic
(1984)3 C.L.R. 791; Kyriakides v. Municipality

Nicosia

(1976)3 C.L.R. 183; Sofroniou and Others v. The
(1976)3 C.L.R. 124. 30 Municipality

Nicosia RecourseRecourse against the refusal

the respondents to issue a building permit to applicant for the erection

a twostoried building consisting

ten flats on his land situated at Pyla village. 1299 Vassiliadou and Another v. Republic

(1985)A. Poetis, for the applicant. A. VassiHades, for the respondents. Cur. adv. vult. A. Loizou J. read the following judgment. The appli­ cants are the owners by one half share each

two ad5 joining building-sites, under Registration Nos. 5756-5757, Sheet/plan 41/26, plot 132/1/4 and plot 132/1/5 at local­ ity "Yiatros"

Pyla village. The extent

both sites is 12,000 sq. ft. They abut a "trunk-road" the "trunk-road" (υπεραστική οδός)

Larnaca-Famagusta, as same was so 10 declared by Notification 122, published in Supplement No. 3 to the

ficial Gazette

the Republic

the 10th March, 1966, and which was issued by virtue

regulation 6

(3)

the Streets and Buildings Regulations. On the 6th June, 1980, they applied to the District

- 15 ficer, Larnaca for the issue

a permit for the building on the said land

a two-storied building consisting

ten flats. The application in question went through the usual channels including the Departments

Town Planning and Housing and Public Works for their views. On the 20th November, 1980, the respondents wrote to the applicants (Appendix 1), informing them that it was not possible to proceed further with their application as upon examination

the plans submitted, the following were noticed: 20 25 "(a) Taking into consideration that the covered space had a clear height

more than 8 ft. and that it was not intended for the parking

cars, same was considered as a storey and consequently the build- 30 ing was a three-storied one contrary to Regulatory Order 196/76, published in the

ficial Gazette

the Republic dated 1st October, 1976. (b) The total height

the building was 29'-1 instead

not more than 27 ft. contrary to the aforesaid Regulatory Order 196/76. 1300 35 3 C.L.R. 5 10 Vassiliadou and Another v. Republic A. Loizou J. (c) The building has a building factor 0,945:1, counting also the covered part as storey but even if this covered part was altered so that it will be

fered as a covered parking space

a height

not more than 8 ft. the building factor will be 0.63:1, con­ trary to the said Regulatory Order. (d) The building is intended to be erected at a distance

11 ft. from the boundary

the 'high-way road' instead

at least 50 ft., as provided by the Streets and Buildings Regulations." The applicants by their letter dated 10th December, 1980, (Appendix 2), replied to the above as follows: 15 20 25 30 35 "With reference to your letter dated 28th November,· 1980, regarding our application for a building permit in Pyla village we enclose the set

plans which you returned to us as well as two sets

amended plans marked as ΙΑ, 2A and 3A, by which we comply fully with your suggestions under (a), (b), and (c). After this we believe that the permit applied for should be granted to us and we request you to take, for the purpose the necessary steps the soonest pos­ sible." On the 26th January 1981, the respondents informed the applicants by letter (Appendix 3)

that date, that their application could not be proceeded with because there was no compliance with paragraph (d)

their letter

the 28th November 1980, which referred to the construc­ tion

the building at a distance

at least 50 ft. from the boundary

the "high-way road". In paragraph 6

the opposition it is stated that the rejection

the application in question was based on the clear provision

regulation 6

(3)

the Streets and Buildings Regulations and on the suggestion

the Public Works Department, within the competence

which the Larnaca-Famagusta high-way road comes, that it did not agree to any relaxation

the said regulation which had already been applied to nearby properties as for example to plot 128 as this would create a bad precedent with the 1301 A. Loizou J. Vassiliadou and Another v. Republic

(1985)result not to have a satisfactory protection

the said road and the circulation thereon. Before examining a preliminary objection raised on behalf

the respondents it will be useful to set out regulation 6

(3)which reads as follows: "No part

the main building or alteration or addition to any existing main building and no open verandah higher than four feet from the ground level shall be less than ten feet from any boundary

the plot on which it stands, or less than 50 ft. from the 10 boundary

a road declared by the Council

Ministers as a trunk road, by Notification published in the

ficial Gazette

the Republic, or from the boundaries

part

such road specified in the Notification or less than 20 ft. from any boundary

the 15 plot on which it stands if the building is an industrial one or a store situated outside the zones declared by virtue

Section 14

the Law only for stores or industrial buildings, or both." The preliminary objection is that the sub judice decision 20 challenged by this recourse does not constitute an executory administrative act in the sense

Article 146

the Constitution but only a confirmatory act and/or one

an informative character

a previous act, namely the declaration

the Larnaca-Famagusta road as a "trunk-road" 25 by virtue

the aforementioned Notification 122 and that the validity

such act could not be challenged even incidentally in connection with the refusal

the application

the applicants. It was further urged that the sub judice act merely informed the applicants

the opinion 30 and view

the administration and as such could not be the subject

a recourse. I am afraid, I cannot agree with either

these contentions. The first contention

counsel for the respondents could be a valid one and born out by the authorities only 35 if what was challenged was the Notification by virtue

which the Larnaca-Famagusta road was declared as a "trunk-road". Indeed the Notification declaring the Larnaca-Famagusta road as a "trunk-road" is not

a regulatory character. 40 1302 5 3 C.L.R. Vassiliadou and Another v. Republic A. Loizou J. What it achieves is to specify certain individual instances as subject to certain legal rules. It has the same legal nature as a street widening scheme made under section 12

the Streets and Buildings Regulation Law, Cap. 96 as 5 well as notices issued under section 14

Cap. 96, as amended. (See Nemitsas v. The Municipal Corporation

Limassol and Another

(1967)3 C.L.R. 134; Lanitis Farm Ltd., v. The Republic
(1982)3 C.L.R. 124; Manglis and Others v. The Republic
(1984)3 C.L.R. 351; 10 and Charalambides v. The Republic
(1984)3 C.L.R. 1516). In the present case what is challenged is a decision taken under regulation 6
(3)which requires the construction

a building at a distance

not less than 50 ft. from a "trunkroad" so declared by the Notification. This regulation is a 15 regulatory legislative act, the constitutionality and legality

which can be examined in a recourse against a decision based on the said regulation. In this respect see inter alia The Nicosia Race Club v. The Republic

(1984)3 C.L.R. 791, where a review

the authiroties is made. 20 As regards the argument advanced that the decision merely informed the applicants

the opinion and views

the administration and as such could not be the subject

a recourse, the brief answer is that this is not warranted by the material placed before me. The contents

the let25 ter

the respondents

the 26th January, 1981, (Appendix 3), amounts to an expression

their will and not merely to an expression

intention. They made no other comment on the new amended plans submitted which were claimed by the applicants to comply with the previous com30 ments

the respondents contained in their letter

the 20th November 1980 (Appendix 1), except that there was no compliance with paragraph (d), namely the distance

50 ft. from the boundary

the "trunk-road." The very fact that long after the filing

this recourse 35 and in particular on the 27th April, 1983, (see exhibit 2) the possibility

a relaxation

regulation 6

(3)is also intimated, though admittedly new observations are made on the amended plans submitted by the applicants and which observations tend to show that there still exists non-com40 pliance with certain regulations, even by the amended plans, 1303 A. Lotzou J. Vassiliadou and Another v. Republic
(1985)does not change the situation. As regards this part

the preliminary objection reference may be made to the case

Kyriakides v. The Municipality

Nicosia

(1976)3 C.L.R. 183, in which Malachtos J., took the same stand and expounded the relevant principles

Law on the question

what constitutes an executory act. The preliminary objection therefore fails and I proceed now to deal with the merits

the recourse. shall The first ground relied upon by the applicants turns on the meaning and effect

regulation 6

(3)and I find no better way

presenting the arguments advanced on their behalf by counsel than quote here in full from the written address filed in the case. It reads: "a. 5 10 It is abundantly clear that regulation 6

(3)does not provide for a distance

50 feet but for a distance

only 10 feet. The exception, according to which 15 a greater distance may be sactioned by the appro­ priate authority applies only in cases

industrial buildings. (See, as well, the relevant amendments published in Supplement 3

the Gazette, 11.7.69, p. 545, not. 567, 21.1.65, p. 80, not. 74, 21.12.79, 20 p. 845, not. 295, 23.10.64, p. 529, not. 448, 25.5.67, p. 429 not. 404.) This is due to the fact that an industrial building may cause fumes, noise, disturbance or risk. How­ ever, in the present case, the plans which were sub- 25 mitted and the application were not for an industrial building. The amendment

reg. 6 regarding the distance from the boundary is that effected by not. 448, p. 529, 23.10.64, which provides as follows: ' Η παράγραφος

(3)του Κανονισμού 6 των βασικών 30 Κανονισμών τροποποιείται δια της διαγραφής των λέξεων, αίτινες έπονται της λέξεως ' ίστσταΓ εν τη τετάρτη γραμμή, και της αντικαταστάσεως αυτών δια των ακολούθων λέξεων: ολιγώτερον των είκοσι ποδών από των ορίων οδού εγκεκριμένης παρά του 35 Υπουργικού Συμβουλίου ως Τοπικής Κυρίας Οδού, ή ολιγώτερον των εκατόν ποδών από των ορίων οδού εγκεκριμένης παρά του Υπουργικού Συμβουλί­ ου ως Κεντρικής Οδού. ή ολιγώτερον των εβδομή1304 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Vassiliadou and Another v. Republic A. LoizouJ. κοντά πέντε ποδών εζ οιωνδήποτε ορίων, εάν η οι­ κοδομή είναι βιομηχανική τοιαύτη ή αποθήκη κειμέ­ νη εντός των ϋωνών των εγκεκριμένων δυνάμει του άρθρου 14 του Νόμου μόνον δι' αποθήκας ή βιομηχανικάς οικοδόμος ή αμφοτέρας'. However, this applies again to industrial buildings or store. The inevitable conclusion is, therefore, that either the respondent was under the impression that the application was for an industrial building, in which case the sub judice decision was taken under a misconception

fact, whereby it has been vitiated (see, among others inter alia, Piperi and another v. Republic

(1968)3 C.L.R. 365, Andronicou and Co. v. CY.T.A.
(1969)3 C.L.R. 1, Kyriacou v. Republic
(1966)3 C.L.R. 876, Christodoulou v. Republic
(1966)3 C.L.R. 887, Miliotis v. Republic
(1968)3 C.L.R. 477), or because it was under the impression that this applies to non-industrial build­ ings as well, or it acted under misconception

law and or in excess

power, in which case, again the sub judice decision should be annulled (see, among others Paschali v. Republic

(1966)3 C.L.R. 593, Ioannou v. Republic
(1978)3 C.L.R. 276, Leonida v. A. -G.
(1978)3 C.L.R. 247, Christodoulou v. Republic
(1967)3 C.L.R. 50, Christodoulidou v. Republic
(1968)3 C.L.R. 57, lacovides v. Republic,
(1966)3 C.L.R. 191, Cyprus Palestine Plantations v. Republic
(1965)3 C.L.R. 271, Demades v. Republic 1964 C.L.R. 167, Demetriou and Sons v. Republic,
(1968)3 C.L.R. 444). b. It should be noted that what reg. 6
(3)provides is that the distance provided for is 'from any boun­ dary

the plot on which the building stands' and not as required by the sub judice decision, from the boundary

the high-way road. However, since the high-way road and the building sites in question have common boundaries, the said mistake

the respondent has no bearing on this recourse." It is apparent that the aforesaid arguments were built by reference to the wording

regulation 6

(3)as it stood be­ fore the amendment effected to it by the amending regula1305 A. Loizou J. Vessiliadou and Another v. Republic
(1985)tions

the 11th February 1965, and its proper text has been set out earlier in this judgment. The argument advanced that this.provision regarding the distance at which the building must stand from the boundary

the plot is confined to industrial buildings or stores only, cannot stand, 5 as the provision requiring the building to be built at a distance

50 ft. from the boundary

a "trunk-road" is independent

the provision regarding the building

industrial premises and stores on plots outside the zones, so declared by virtue

section 14

the Law. 10 As regards the second part

this ground the answer again is to be found in the wording

the regulation itself which relates to the 50 ft. distance from the boundary

a "trunk-road" so declared as above stated. The second ground relied upon by the applicants is that 15 this regulation prescribing that buildings should be erected at a distance

not less than 50 ft. from the boundary

a "trunk-road" is unconstitutional as

fending Article 23

the Constitution. The factual basis for this contention is to be found in 20 the affidavit

Nicos Pierides, a valuer from Larnaca, which was filed on behalf

the applicants. In it an account is given

the extent

the restriction, resulting from the requirement

the 50 ft. so prescribed by the said regulation, which will be suffered by the applicants. It is 25 stated that out

669 square meters which could be covered by buildings, what can be built as a result

this 50 feet restriction is 102 square meters. This results in the market value

the two building-sites, which is given to be in the region

£90,00 being reduced to £14,40. 30 In answer to this contention the respondents have in effect confined themselves to a reference to the fact that the building-sites are in Zone C. 1 published under Notification 196 in Supplement No. 3 to the

ficial Gazette

the 1st October, 1976, with a building factor 0.60:1 and 35 maximum height 27 ft. and that as regards the valuation

the affiant,

the applicants, the alleged damage which is claimed that it will be suffered by them is the result

the refusal

the appropriate Authority to allow a relaxation

regulation 6

(3)and they conclude: "As the appropriate 40 1306 3 C.L.R. Vassiliadou and Another v. Republic A. Lolzou J. Authority by its letter 27th April, 1983, exhibit 2, does not refuse the possibility

a relaxation

regulation 6

(3)the applicants have not suffered until to-day any damage." The legal principles governing the issues like the one before me are to be found in a series

cases which were reviewed by the Full Bench

this Court in inter alia, Sofroniou and Others v. The Municipality

Nicosia

(1976)3 C.L.R. 124, and more recently in Manglis and Others v. The Republic
(1984)3 C.L.R. 351, an authority relied 10 upon by applicant's counsel. In so far as relevant to the issues before me the relevant passage is to be found in pp. 360-361: 5 15 20 25 30 35 "(d) The sanctity

the right

property, to the extent to which such right is constitutionally protected by means

Article 23

the Constitution, is not violated by the said Notices because:(i) In any individual case in which the restrictions or limitations imposed by them materially decrease the economic value

the affected property the owner

such property is entitled to compensation under Article 23.3. (ii) In any individual case in which the said restrictions or limitations entail such drastic consequences that they amount in effect to 'deprivation,* in the sense

paragraphs

(2)and
(4)

Article 23

, then the operation, to that extent,

the sub judice Notices 116 and 117 has to be treated as being unconstitutional (see inter alia, in this connection the case

The Holy See

Kitium v. The Municipal Council

Limassol, 1 R.S.C.C. 15, 28)." Having considered the facts and circumstances

the case in their totality, I have come to conclusion that the restrictions or limitations imposed by regulation 6

(3)on the use

such property for purposes

building development are not unreasonable or arbitrary but absolutely necessary in the interest

town and country planning in the sense

paragraph 3,

Article 23

the Constitution and therefore the said regulation is not unconstitutional. 1307 A. Lotzou J. Vassiliadou and Another v. Republic {1985) As regards this, individual case, though the property

the applicants is seriously affected yet, to my mind they do not amount in effect to a deprivation in the sense

paragraphs 2 and 4

Article 23

and therefore I cannot treat their operation or application to that extend as unconstitutional. 5 It is to my mind, once the applicants consider and claim that they can substantiate that the value

their property is materially affected, a case for compensation which has to be considered by the appropriate Court in the light

10 the overall circumstances pertaining to the assessment

compensation in the circumstances. No doubt the

fer

the respondents to examine the possibility

relaxation may meet the claim for compensation wholly, or in part, but I do not intend to dwell any further on this issue as not 15 all relevant facts are before me, nor is it within the ambit

this case to do so. For all the above reasons the recourse is dismissed but in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. Recourse dismissed with no order as to costs. 1308 20

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