clr/1985/1985_3_2588.pdf

(85). Administrative act—Revocation of—Does not take the revoked act beyond the reviewing powers of the Court—The revocation does not automatically justify the annulment of the revoked act—The revocation per se does not confer a right to damages to persons prejudicially affected by the revoked act. Damages—Article 146.6 of the Constitution—The annulment of an administrative act a prerequisite to the right of damages thereunder—// the act affects a number of persons and is the subject-matter of more than one recourses, its annulment in anyone recourse, confers a right to pursue a claim for damages to everyone of the challengers. Recourse for annulment—Costs—They necessarily follow the event. are at large and do not The sub judice decision, concerning the choice of teaching material for instruction in the French language at Public Schools for the academic year 1985-1986, communicated by circular dated 6.6.1985, was revoked twenty days later by circular dated 26.6.85. 2588 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 Philippides St Son v. Republic As counsel for the respondents explained the revocation was made by reason of defects in the decision taking process. Counsel for the respondents submitted that the revocation wholly eradicated every effect of the sub judice decision, making its dismissal inevitable. In this respect she contended" that ihe sub judice decision could not have caused any conceivable damage to the applicants considering it was due to take effect at a future date, from ihe commencement of the academic year 1985-1986. Held, annulling the sub judice decision

(1)The revocation of an administrative decision does not take the decision, the subject matter of a recourse, beyond the reviewing powers of the Court. The annulment of an administrative act or decision is a prerequisite of the right to damages under Article 146.6 of the Constitution. The revocation per se does not confer a right to claim damages. The revocation of an act does not automatically justify the annulment of ^he act unless such annulment is justified because of breaches of the law or the principles of sound administration. For example a revocation due to change of policy of the administration does not warrant the annulment of the revoked act if such act was valid ab initio.

(2)The acknowledgement by counsel for the respondents that the sub judice decision was revoked because of defects in the decision making process obviates the need of further inquiry into its validity.

(3)This Court has no jurisdiction to examine the question whether the applicants suffered damage by reason of the sub judice act. 30 Sub judice decisionannulled. £30 towards applicants'costs. Case*: referred to: Pavtides v. The Republic

(1967)3 C.L.R. 217; Yiangou v. The Republic

(1976)3 C.L.R. 101; 35 Payiatasv. The Republic

(1984)3 C.L.R. 1239; Kambis v. The Republic

(1984)1 C.L.R. 314; 2589 PhMppldes & Son v. Republic

(1985)Kikas and Others v. The Republic

(1984)3 C.L.R. 852; Vakis v. The Republic

(1985)3 C.L.R. 534; Frangosand Others v. The Republic

(1982)3 C.L.R. 53; Booksellers Association v. The Republic

(1985)3 C.L R.

1. 5 Recour»·. Recourse against the decision of the respondents to re-define or change the teaching material for instruction in the French language at public schools for the academic year 1985-
2. A. S. Angelides, for the applicants. R. Vrahimi (Mrs), for the respondents. Cur. adv. vult. PIKIS J. read the following judgment. The decision chal­ lenged, concerning the choice of teaching material for in- 15 struction in the French language at public schools for the academic year 1985-86, was revoked twenty days later' because of defects in the procedure leading to the im­ pugned decision. Counsel for the Republic submitted this deprived the recourse not only of its subject matter but 20 abrogated the recourse in its entirety, leaving room only for its dismissal by the Court. In her contention, the revo­ catory decision wholly eradicated every effect of the de­ fective decision making inevitable its dismissal. In support, she cited two Lises of the Supreme Court, namely, Byron 25 Pavlides v. Republic (Commissioner of Income Tax and Another)*, affuTning the Administrations' duty to revoke an administrative act upon noticing facts or legal provisions invalidating it and, Nicolas Yiangou v. Republic* debating the implications of revocation with particular reference to 30 the date from w t ^ h it operates, whether "ex tunc" or "ex nunc**. Also, reference was made to the Conclusions of the 1 (The sub judice decision wes communicated by circular on β686 and recalled by circular dated 26.6.
3. 2

(1967)3 C.L.R. 217, 223 »

(1976)3 C.L.R

1. 2590 10 3 C.L.R. PhMppides & Son ν Republic Pikie J. Greek Council of State 1929-59'. where Greek caselaw on the subject of revocation is discussed. Considering the bre­ vity of time between the decision and its revocation and the reasons for its revocation, counsel argued it operated 5 retrospectively and had the effect of obliterating the deci­ sion in its entirety. Counsel for the applicants disputed the correctness of the above proposition, in particular the proposition that revocation invariably operates retrospectively. However, he 10 proceeded to submit that the time at which revocation took effect makes no difference to the case before the Court for Article 146 of the Constitution confers a right to an ag­ grieved party to have a defective decision annulled even where revoked, and made reference to a number of cases 15 supporting this proposition. We have it from the highest Authority, the Full Bench of the Supreme Court, that revocation does not take the de­ cision, the subject matter of a recourse, beyond the review­ ing powers of the Supreme Court—Payiatas v. Republic^. 20 There are dicta to the same effect in Kambis v. Republic*. Very relevant are the observations of Sawides, J., that revocation does not deprive a party of the rights safe­ guarded by paragraph 6 of Article
2. In Kambis it was reaffirmed that annulment of administrative action is a 25 prerequisite for the prosecution of a civil action for da­ mages under Article 146.
3. The implications of revocation of an administrative act or decision on the fate of extant proceedings were speci­ fically examined by this Court on two occasions—*-Kikas 30 and Others v. Republic*and Vakis v. Republics, The principles emerging from the caselaw on the amenity to annul the subject matter of a recourse after itsrevocation are:(a) Annulment of an administrative act or decision by a 1 See pages
5. 275 2

(1984)3 C L R 1239. 1245 1

(1984)1 C L R 314. 324 «

(1984)3 C L R 852 5

(1985)3 C L R 534. 2591 PIkte J. PhlllppldM & Son v. Republic

(1985)competent Court of law is a prerequisite to the pursuit of a civil action for damages under para. 6 of Article 146. (

1. b)Where the disputed act affects a number of persons and is the subject matter of more than one recourses, its annulment in any one proceeding confers a right to pursue an action for damages under Article 146.6 to everyone of the challengers. 5 (
2. c)Revocation of an administrative act as such does not per se confer a right to raise an action for damages 10 to the parties prejudicially affected by the revoked act. The challenge of the decision before a competent Court of law is essential for the validation of a party's right to damages under Article 146.6. (
3. d)Revocation of an act as such does not automatically 15 justify the annulment of the act. Its annulment must be warranted in law because of either breaches of the law or the principles of sound administration. For example, an act may be revoked because of a change of policy on the part of the Administration, though 20 valid ab initio. In such a situation the revocation, though it dissipates the subject matter of the proceedings, it will not warrant its annulment. As explained by counsel for the Republic the sub judice decision in this case was revoked because of defects in the 25 decision-taking process; an acknowledgment that obviates the need for further inquiry into the validity of the decision. Nevertheless counsel for the Republic invited us not to annul the decision because the revoked decision could not have caused any conceivable damage to the applicants con- 30 sidering it was due to take effect at a future date, from the commencement of the academic year 1985-86. Therefore, the recourse ought to be dismissed. I cannot agree. This Court will not pause to examine what damage, if any, applicant suffered from the revoked decision as it has no 35 jurisdiction whatever to go into matter, The determination of damage, if any, is in the exclusive jurisdiction of a competent civil Court. The jurisdiction of this Court is confined to ascertaining whether the decision is liable to be annulled. If so, it is duty bound to annul it at the in- 40 2592 3 C.L.R. Phillpptdes & Son v. Republic Pikls J. stance of the aggrieved applicant. And so I adjudge in this case. Court to Mr. Angelides: Doyou claim costs? Mr. Angelides: Yes, Your Honour, in view of thecircumstances of the case. 5 Mrs. Vrahimis: No order as to costs' should be made con­ sidering the practice of the Court in such cases. COURT: Unlike civil proceedings, costs do not neces­ sarily follow the event; they are at large. The pri- mary object of judicial review is the scrutiny of the legality of administrative action'. 10 Guided by these principles and the facts surround­ ing the history of these proceedings, I adjudge, in the exercise of my discretion, the respondents topay £30.- towards costs of applicants. 15 Sub judice decision annulled. with £30.- towards applicants' costs. -rX 1 Frangos and Others v. Republic

(1982)3 C L R .

1. Θ
2. And Booksellers Association v. Republic

(1985)3 C L R . 1171. 2593