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Obsah (7)Article 72Article 73Article 149Art. 137Article 143Article 159Article 50

3 C.L.R. 27 Δεκεμβρίου, 1985 [ΤΡΙΑΝΤΑΦΥΛΛΙΔΗΣ, Πρ., Α. ΛΟΤΖΟΥ. ΜΑΛΑΧΤΟΣ, ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΑΔΗΣ, ΛΩΡΗΣ, ΣΤΥΛΙΑΝΙΔΗΣ. ΠΙΚΗΣ, ΚΟΥΡΡΗΣ, Δικασταί] ΑΝΑΦΟΡΙΚΑ ΜΕ ΤΟ ΑΡΘΡΟ 149(6) ΤΟΥ ΣΥΝΤΑΓΜΑΤΟΣ. Α. Β. ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΣ ΛΑΔΑΣ Κ

ARTICLE 149(b) .

THE CONSTITUTION (A) GEORGHIOS LADAS AND OTHERS, (B) THE PARLIAMENTARY GROUP

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (ΔΗΚΟ) IN THE HOUSE

REPRESENTATIVES, Applicants. (Case Nos. 1061/85 and 1062/85). Constitutional Law—Constitution, Articles 135, 149(b), 72, 78.1 and 73.12—The Supreme Constitutional Court Rules

Court, Rule 15

(2)(b)—Application for leave to commence proceedings under Article 149(b) for the interpretation, because

ambiguity,

Article 72

regarding the election

the President

the House

Representatives. The applicants in these two cases seek, under rule 15

(2)(b)

the Supreme Constitutional Court Rules

Court, the leave

the Court to commence proceedings under Article 149(b) for the interpretation, because

ambiguity,

Article 72

the Constitution regarding the election

the President

the House

Representatives. Held, Pikis and Kourris, JJ. dissenting:

(1)Rule'I5
(2)(b)

the Supreme Constitutional Court Rules

Court, which were made under Article 135

the Constitution, lays down that for the commencement

proceedings for interpretation

the Constitution under . Article 149(b) in a case such as the present one, there is required the leave

the Supreme Constitutional Court, now the Supreme Court.

(2)It seems that there arises for examination a matter

ambiguity

Article 72

in conjunction with Article 78.1 regarding the election

the President

the House

2831 In re Udas and Others

(1985)Representatives. Such election is a matter

supreme state importance and the applicants Representatives are directly affected by the interpretation and application

Article 72

. In the light

the above the applied for leave is granted to the said Representatives. 5

(3)There is not granted, however, the leave applied for in Case 1061/85 by the applicants Representatives as con­ stituting the Parliamentary Group

the Democratic Party in the House

Representatives because such group has not yet been constituted by virtue

Article 73

.2

the 10 Constitution. For the same reason such leave is not granted to the Democratic Party in Case 1062/85. Orderaccordingly. Cases referred to: Republic v. CharaktmbosZacharias,2 R.S.C.C. 1; 15 Muderrisoglouand Others v. The Council

Ministers, 5 R.S.C.C 130. Application. Application by the Representatives

the Democratic Party in the House

Representatives and by the 20 Parliamentary Group

the Democratic Party for leave

the Supreme Court to commence pro­ ceedings imder Article 149(b)

the Constitution, for the interpretation, because

ambiguity,

Article 72

the Constitution regarding the election

the President

25 the House

Representatives. P. Polyviou with Chr. Triantafyllides, cants. for the appli­ Ph. Clerides personally as a Representative and for the other Representatives

ΑΚΕΛ-ΑΡΪΣΤΕΡΑ in the House

Representatives and, also, for ΑΚΕΛ as a political party which is represented in the House

Representatives. 30 M. Christophides personally as a Representative and for the others, except Mr. A. Markides, Represen- 35 tatives

the Democratic Rally (ΔΗΣΥ) in the House

Representatives. 2832 3 CL.R. In re Ladas and Other· A. Markides personally as a Representative and for the Democratic Rally (ΔΗΣΥ) as a political party which is represented in the House

Representa­ tives. 5 E. Efstathiou and D. Eliades personally as Represen­ tatives and for the other Representatives

Σ.Κ. ΕΔΕΚ in the House

Representatives and, also, for Σ.Κ. ΕΔΕΚ as a political party which is repre­ sented in the House

Representatives. 10 TRIANTAFYLLIDES P. read the following decision

the Court: In these two cases which were filed, on the 23rd December 1985, before the Supreme Court, which exer­ cises, also, the jurisdiction

the Supreme Constitutional Court, the applicants seek, under rule 15

(2)(b)

the 15 Supreme Constitutional Court Rules

Court, the leave

the Supreme Court to commence proceedings, under Arti­ cle 149(b)

the Constitution, for the interpretation, be­ cause

ambiguity,

Article 72

the Constitution re­ garding the election

the President

the House

Re20 presentatives. All Representatives who are the applicants (Al -16) in case 1061/85 are the Representatives

the Democratic Party in the House

Representatives. Pursuant to directions given by the Supreme Court an 25 opportunity was afforded to all the Representatives

ΑΚΕΛ-ΑΡΙΣΤΕΡΑ,

the Democratic Rally (ΔΗΣΥ) and

Σ:Κ. ΕΔΕΚ in the House

Representatives, as well as to ΑΚΕΛ, to ΔΗΣΥ and to Σ.Κ. ΕΔΕΚ as political parties which are represented in the House

Representatives, to 30 express their views in respect

the leave which the appli­ cants seek. The hearing

these cases before the Supreme Court took place on the 24th December 1985 and in relation to both

them there is now given the following unanimous 35 judgment

the majority

the Members

the Court(M. Triantafyllides, A. Loizou, Y. Malachtos, D. Demetriades, A. Loris and D. StyHanides): 1. The Supreme Constitutional Court Rules

Court were made under Article 135

the Constitution and rule 2833 Triantafyllides P. In re Ladas and Others

(1985)15
(2)b)

the said Rules

Court lays down that for the commencement

proceedings for interpretation

the Constitution, under Article 149(b)

the Constitution, in a case such as the present one, there is required the leave

the Supreme Constitutional Court, and now

the 5 Supreme Court. 2. It seems that there arises for examination a matter

ambiguity

Article 72

the Constitution in conjunction, as the applicant Representatives contend, with Article 78.1

the Constitution, regarding the election

the President 10

the House

Representatives. The House

Representatives decided unanimously, on the 12th December 1985, to refer the aforesaid matter to the Supreme Court and though such decision was not implemented it was not revoked but was only suspended on the 19th December 1985. 15 3. The election

the President

the House

Representatives is a matter

supreme state importance and the applicant Representatives are directly affected by the interpretation and application

Article 72

the Constitution regarding the election

the President

the House

20 'Representatives. 4. In view

all the foregoing the applied for leave

the Court is granted to the applicant Representatives in case 1061/85 for the commencement

proceedings under Article 149(b)

the Constitution. There is not granted, 25 however, the leave applied for in case 1061/85 by the applicants Representatives as constituting the Parliamentary Group

the Democratic Party in the House

Representatives because such Group has not yet been constituted by virtue

Article 73

.12

the Constitution, and for the 30 same reason such leave is not granted to the Democratic Party in case 1062/85 which is, consequently, dismissed. 5. The Supreme Court prescribes as follows the further proceedings in case 1061/85: (a) The application under Article 149(b)

the Constitu- 35 tion on the part

the applicant Representatives should be filed and served today, through the House

Representatives, on all other Representatives. (b) The hearing

the case is fixed for tomorrow, the 2834 3 C.L.R. In re Lade· and Other· Trlantafyllide· P. 28th December 1985, at 10 a.m. PIKIS J.: The group

Representatives

the Democratic Party, 16

the 56 Members

the new House

Representatives, applied for leave to file an application for 5 the interpretation

Article 72

the Constitution that provides for the election

the President

the House. The application is based on Article 149(b)

the Constitution that lays down that the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to interpret the Constitution in case 10

ambiguity. The remaining Members

the House, belonging to the other Parties, opposed the application basically for two reasons, because: ts

(1)The recourse is premature as the House

Representatives is in the process

solving the problem that has arisen in relation to the election

the President

the House, and

(2)The Constitution presents no ambiguity justifying the intervention

the Supreme Court. 20 The regulation

matters referrable to the composition and functioning

the House

Representatives constitute, in their submission, a privilege

the House. The Court would be only justified to render an interpretation

the provisions

Article 149

(b) when the House

Repre25 sentatives itself as a collective body seeks the interpretation

the Constitution as a necessary prerequisite for the exercise

the powers vested in it under the Constitution. After due consideration

the subject, here under con30 sideration, I have reached the conclusions recited hereinafter in synopsis. The full text

judgment will be available in a few days; it will be filed with the Registry

the Supreme Court and copies will be distributed to the interested parties: 35

(1)Article 149(b)

the Constitution is a substantive provision

the Constitution that specifies the organ

the State with jurisdiction to interpret the Constitu2835 ύ. In re Ladas and Others

(1985)tion in case

ambiguity

its provisions. This com­ petence was assigned to the Supreme Constitutional Court (transferred in 1964 to the Supreme Court under Law 33/64) in contradistinction to other Courts or authorities

the Republic. The absence

any re- 5 ference in Article 149 (b) to litigants and procedural measures was not accidental but aimed to emphasize the Jurisdictional character

this article

the Con­ stitution, Comparison

the provisions

Article 149

(b) with those

Art. 137

, 138, 139, 140, 141, 10 142, 143, 144, 146 and 147

the Constitution,• that make specific reference to the authorities or persons in whom a right

recourse to the Supreme Constitu­ tional Court vests and the time within which it must be exercised, reinforces the view that Article 149(b) 15 is exclusively a jurisdictional provision. In any case it has been decided by the Supreme Con­ stitutional Court in the case

Republic v. Charalambos Zacharia, 2 R.S.C.C, p.l, that invocation

the jurisdiction for interpretation

the Constitution, is 20 only justified where absolutely necessary for the reso­ lution

a dispute that has arisen. Granting leave, at this stage, while the House

Representatives is in the process

solving the matter

election

President

the House in opposition to the will

the majority 25

the Members

the House

Representatives, would undermine the self-existence and autonomy

the legislative power and would disturb the principle

separation

powers. In the case

Muderrisoglu and Others v. The Councilof Ministers, 5 R.S.C.C, 30 130, the Supreme Constitutional Court unanimously refused to recognize the Turkish Members

theHouse as an organ

the Republic and dismissed their ap­ plication for examination

alleged violations by the Council

Ministers

the competence

the House 35

Representatives. Notwithstanding the fact that the decision was given in a recourse under Article 139, the principles adopted therein in relation to the status

a,group

Representatives apply in • every-other case; no group

Representatives constitutes a sepa- 4 0 rate entity or organ

the State. 2836 3 C.L.R. In re Ladas and Outers Pikis J. It was stressed in the above case that Members

the House

Representatives whose rights are prejudiced are not remediless. The Constitution provides mechanism for the protection

the rights

Members

the House and the 5 entrenchment

the rule

law. In the present case no suggestion was made that the rights

the applicants or those

anyone

them were in any sense injuriously affected. Where the constitutional legislator intended to confer a 10 right

recourse to the Supreme Court on a segment

1 the House

Representatives independently

the House as a collective organ, it said so expressly as in the case

Article 143

the Constitution that confers a right on the one fifth

the Representatives

a newly elected House 15 to seek the decision

the Supreme Court as to the existence

"urgent and exceptionally unforeseen circumstances*', justifying the taking

any decision under Article 68

the Constitution. 20 25

(3)The pre-emptive or preliminary interpretation

provisions

the Constitution is an extraordinary measure justified only in exceptional circumstances. Otherwise the role

the Court would be extended far beyond the established framework

its jurisdiction, that is, the resolution

judicial disputes. It is not the work

the Court to furnish apriori guidance to the other two powers

the State in the exercise

their competence. (Further reasons for the judgment given on 27.12.85). In the judgment given on December 27, 1985, I outlined 30 the reasons for refusing leave to 16 Representatives

the Democratic Party to apply, under Article 149Cb), for the resolution

alleged ambiguities in Article 72

the Constitution, indicating at the same time that comprehensive reasons for the judgment would soon be delivered. In fulfil35 ment

that obligation the following decision is given that should be read as a part

the aforesaid judgment. The brevity

time between reservation

judgment and its delivery made impossible a comprehensive statement

the reasons in support thereof. 2837 Pikis J. In re Ladas and Others

(1985)Leave to apply was mainly refused for three reasons:(a) Lack

jurisdiction to invoke the provisions

Article 149

(b) outside the framework

extant legal proceedings. (b) Inamenity to assume jurisdiction under Article 149 (b), unless resolution

an ambiguity in the Constitution is material for the determination

a concrete and definable dispute that has arisen. 5 (c) Undesirability

avoiding an apriori interpretation

the Constitution. A comprehensive exposition

my reasons for the above decision is given below. ARTICLE 149(b)

THE CONSTITUTION— COMPASS AND EFFECT. ITS Article 149(b) does not in terms confer a right to seek 15 an interpretation

the Constitution unless resolution

an ambiguity in a constitutional provision is essential for the determination

a judicial proceeding. The wording used to introduce Article 149 "The Supreme Constitutional Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction"—strongly suggests 20 it is a substantive enactment, solely intended to denote the authority

the State vested with jurisdiction to resolve an ambiguity. Paragraph (b)

Article 149

reads: "(

  1. a)(
  2. b)To make, in case

ambiguity, any interpre- 25 tation

the Constitution due regard being had to the letter and spirit

the Zurich Agreement dated 11th February, 1959 and the London Agreement dated 19th February, 1959." The word "exclusive" aims to indicate the organ

the 30 State possessed

jurisdiction to resolve constitutional ambiguities in contra distinction to any other' judicial body or Authority

the State. Observations in decisions

the Supreme Constitutional Court reinforce the view that Article 149 is solely designed to earmark the body vested with S$ competence to interpret the Constitution in case

ambi2838 10 3 C.L.R. In re Ladas and Others Pikis J. guity. As much was specifically stressed in NicosPelides And The Republic (Council

Ministers and Another)*. Article 149 must be read and applied in the context

the constitutional division

judicial power between the 5 Supreme Constitutional Court on the one hand and, the High Court and courts subordinate thereto, on the other. The Supreme Constitutional Court was entrusted with jurisdiction in matters

constitutional and administrative law, while the High Court and courts inferior thereto with juris10 diction in the domain

civil and criminal law. The case

Osman Saffet and CyprusPalestinePlantationsCo. Ltd. and Another^, exemplifies the circumstances in. which a valid recourse to the provisions

Article 149can be made.

Reference under Article 149(b) was made to the Supreme 15 Constitutional Court by a district court to interpret the provisions

Article 159

.3

the Constitution in view

the ambiguity inherent thereto as to the composition

a civil court where one

the litigants was a juristic entity, that is, a company. An interpretation

the provisions

20 Article 149.3 was furnished in order to guide the competent judicial authorities to determine the composition

the district Court. In the Cooperative Grocery

Vasilia Ltd. andCharalambos N. Ppirouand Others^,it was made abundantly'clear that only the Supreme Constitutional Court 25 Was vested with jurisdiction under Article 149(b) to clarify• constitutional provisions fraught with ambiquity to the exclusion

any other Court

the Republic. Article 149 is, it appears to me, a jurisdictional enactment intended to distinguish the judicial body vested with competence to 30 resolve ambiguities in the Constitution to the exclusion

any other Court or Authority

the Republic. The attempt

the constitutional legislator to specify that only a judicial body would have jurisdiction to interpret the Constitution, was not superfluous. Some countries acknowledge jurisdiction 35 to interpret the law to non judicial authorities as, indeed, it is the case with the Constitutions

Greece

1952* and 19755, that provide that the authentic interpretations 1 3 R.S.C.C.

  1. 2 4 R.S.C.C.
  2. 3 4 R.S.C.C.
  3. • Article
  4. s Article
  5. 2839 Pikis J. In re Ladas and Others (198S)

laws is a competence

the legislature. Article 149(b) is not an isolated provision in its effect, but conforms to the pattern

separation

powers enshrined in the Constitution, acknowledged by the Supreme Court as "the bas^s

our constitutional structure"!. Consistenily with our scheme

separation

powers underlying our Constitution, it has been repeatedly held that the interpretative function

the Constitution, and laws made thereunder, is the exclusive province

the judiciary2. 5 In Re Georghiou*I intimated that Article 149 cannot 10 be invoked outside the context

a substantive conflict. More extensively, the ambit

Article 149was debated in Attorney-General v.

Georghiou*. Although there are dicta that tend to suggest that Article 149(b) may confer adjectival rights too, outside the context

extant legal pro- 15 ceedings, they are obiter because in that case a definite dispute had arisen as to the implementation

a judicial order whereby a Representative was sentenced to imprisonment. The discussion

Article 149

(

  1. b)in the above case revolved primarily round the test for determining an ambiguity. 20 The only dec:sion that directly supports the proposition that Article 149(
  2. b)confers an independent right

recourse to the Court, is the one given in Case No. 6/62 (unreported)

the Supreme Constitutional Court, whereby leave was given to the Vice-President

the Republic to 25 institute a recourse for the interpretation

certain provisions

Article 50

the Constitution. The case was brought to our knowledge by the learned President

the Court who had a recollection

the case as he was, at the time, a Member

the Supreme Constitutional Court. 30 Leave was granted upon an ex parte application and as 1 Keramourgia tAIAS» Ltd. v. Yiannakis Christoforou

(1975)1 C.L.R.
  1. 2 See, inter alia. The Republic and Charalambos Zacharia, 2 R.S.C.C. 1, 5; Malachtou v. Attorney-General (1981} 1 C.L.R.
  2. 457: Diagoras Development Ltd. v. National Bank

Greece,

(1985)1 C.L.R. 5 8 1 ; see, also the decision

the Privy Council in Chokolingo v. A-G

Trinidad [1981] 1 All E.R. 244. 247, 248. 3

(1983)2 C.LRi 1 . 9. *
(1984)2 C.L.R. 2 5 1 . 2840 3 C.L.R. In re Ladas and Others Pikis J. we may gather from the record, the range

application

Article 149(b) was not at.

all discussed before the Court. Certainly, the Court did not aim to furnish an authoritative interpretation

the compass and ambit

Article 149(b).

5 Moreover, the Rules made by the Supreme Constitutional Court under Article 135

the Constitution, cannot be read but subject to the Constitution. It is subject to this reservation that r. 15

(2)

the Rules must be read and applied. No rule

Court can be enacted beyond the limits 10

the enabling legislation, in this case Article 149(b)

the Constitution. Comparison

Article 149

with other articles found in the same part

the Constitution, Part IX, remove any doubt that might be entertained as to the exclusive juris15 dictional character

this article

the Constitution. It is evident from the provisions

Articles 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146 and 147 that, where the constitutional legislator intended to confer a right

recourse to the Court in furtherance to a particular provision

the 20 Constitution, it stated this to be the case, expressly. It is no accident that in Article 149 (b) there is total absence

any reference to a right

action. To my comprehension this is the first case that the Court is required to define the juristic effect

Article 149

(b) 25

the Constitution. For the reasons indicated above, I am clearly

opinion it is a substantive provision, solely designed to indicate the Authority

the State vested with jurisdiction to resolve ambiguities

the Constitution. It does not confer any independent right

action. 30 RECOURSE TO THE SUPREME WHEN JUSTIFIED. COURT- Even if I were to hold that Article 149(b) made possible invocation

its provisions outside the context

pending legal proceedings, there would still be insuperable obsta35 cles to assumption

jurisdiction in this case for the reasons given below. The principal function

courts

law is the resolution

defined legal disputes! Courts

law are not advice2841 Pikis J. In re Ladas and Others

(1985)rendering bodies, nor is it their function, under our legal system, to guide anyone in the exercise

his rights. In Republic and P. Loftis* the Supreme Constitutional Court emphasized that Article 149 can only be invoked if reso­ lution

a constitutional ambiguity is material for the determination

a particular dispute2. 5 As we have been informed the newly elected House

Representatives is presently engaged in a process

devising, an appropriate solution to the problem that has arisen, that is, the election

the President

the House

Represen- 10 tatives. No decision has been taken on the subject and, therefore, no dispute exists as to the validity

any decision

the House. To grant leave and assume fursidiction to interpret Article 72 in the absence

any dispute as to the validity

any act

the Representatives or the House, IS would be contrary to authority and wholly unjustified. Further, assumption

jurisdiction to interpret the Con­ stitution in order to guide the body in opposition to the will

the majority

the Representatives, would under­ mine the self-existence and autonomy

the House and 20 disturb the principle

separation

powers. Significantly, in Orhan Muderrisoglou And Others and the Council

Ministers*, the Supreme Constitutional Court refused to recognise the Turkish Representatives as an organ

the Republic and dismissed their recourse for alleged violation 25

the competence

the legislature by the Council

Mi­ nisters. The principle behind that decision is that the so­ vereignty

the legislature is indivisible and cannot be fragmented into its component parts.

course, the deci­ sion in the above case related to a recourse under Article 30 149 but the principle adopted applies with equal force to every other case; namely, that no group

Representatives constitutes a separate entity or an organ

the Republic. In case

violation

their rights the Representatives are not remediless, as the Court observed in the above case. 35 The Constitution provides approriate mechanism for the ι

  1. R.S.C.C.
  2. 2 See, also. Republic and Charalambos Zacharia, 2 RS.C.C 1 ι 5, R.SC.C.
  3. 2842 3 C.L.R. In re Ladas and Others Pikis J. protection

injured rights

Representatives and the entrenchment

the rule

law. The right

access to the Court, as stated in Attorney-General

Trinidad v. McLeod*is safeguarded so long as the judicial system 5 affords a procedure whereby the person interested in establishing the invalidity

a purported law or decision can have recourse to the courts

justice "in which the plenitude

the judicial power

the State is vested" for a declaration

invalidity that will be binding on the legis10 lature. Where the constitutional legislator intended to confer on a segment

the House a right

action, independently

the collective will

the Representatives, it said so expressly in the Constitution, as in the case

Article 143

.1 15 that vests a right on one fifth

the Members

a newlyelected House to have recourse to the court in order to ascertain whether ".... there exist such urgent and exceptional unforeseen circumstances as to justify a House

Representatives which continues to be in

fice until the 20 assumption

fice

a newly-elected House to make any laws or take any decisions as in Article 68 provided." To recapitulate, even if Article 149(b) made possible recourse to the Court, independently and outside the context

existing legal proceedings, there would be no justi25 fication. for the reasons indicated above, to assume jurisdiction to provide an interpretation

Article 72

in the circumstances

this case. APRIORI INTERPRETATION

THE CONSTITUTION. 30 The apriori interpretation

the provisions

the Constitution by the judicial Authorities, is, by its nature, an extraordinary* measure to which resort could only be had in exceptional circumstances. Such apriori interpretation is not intrinsically a judicial function but opinion rendering, 35 ordinarily the task

legal advisers. The Courts declare the law in order to resolve a dispute as to the validity or justification

a given act, decision or action and, then, remedy any deviation from the law or infringement

l [ 1 9 8 4 ] 1 All E.R. 694. 7 0 1 . Letters B - D IPC). 2843 Pikis J. In re Ladas and Others

(1985)rights given by law. This is the framework action.

judicial It is not the function

the Courts to guide the other two powers

the State—the Legislature and the Executive —in the exercise

their respective competence; if this 5 were to happen we would come close to government by the courts, a position contrary to the spirit and letter

the Constitution. Members

both the Legislature and the Executive give, before assuming

fice, an affirmation

respect for the Constitution and laws made thereunder (see Arti- 10 cles 69 and 59.4, respectively). We cannot but presume consistently with the presumption

legality that they wiil operate within the limits

their power and in accordance with the Constitution and laws made thereunder. Therefore, to assume jurisdiction to guide them in the discharge

15 their duties by furnishing an apriori interpretation

provisions

the Constitution, as required in this case, would be nothing less than a denial

this presumption in the case

Members

the House

Representatives. If we were to entertain the present application, we would 20 be establishing a very dangerous precedent involving the acknowledgment

a right to a minority

members

collective organs

the State, such as the House

Representatives and the Council

Ministers; to have recourse to the Court with a view to forestalling what they 25 foresee to be a decision disagreeable to them. Such a precedent would undermine, I repeat, the sovereignty and autonomy

the other two powers

the State to the detriment

the doctrine

separation

powers. Koi.'RRis J.: I agree with the judgment

Pikis, J., and for the same reasons I dismiss the application for leave to file a recourse under Article 149(b)

the Constitution. I am

opinion, in agreement with Pikis, J., that granting leave under the circumstances

the present case would create an unjustified precedent in the exercise

State powers. 30 35 Order accordingly. 2844

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