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clr/1986/1986_3_2204.pdf

(1986)1986 November 21 [PlKis, J.] IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLE 146 OF THE CONSTITUTION MEAD CORPORATION OF OHIO. U.S.A:, Applicants, v. THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, THROUGH
  1. THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS, AND OR
  2. THE REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES AND OFFICIAL RECEIVER, Respondents. (Case No. 759185). Patents—Registrability—Dependent on prior registration of same patent in U.K.—The Patents Law, Cap. 266—Section 4— After expiration of the 3 years' period from registration in U.K., no registration in Cyprus is possible—The word "may" in the said section—Meaning—No power to extend 5 the period—Section 9—Effect—The Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property ratified by Law 63/65 —Does not supersede, modify or alter the provisions of Cap. 266—On the contrary benefits conferred by Convention are subject to recognition by Municipal Law. 10 Words and Phrases: "May" in section 4 of the Patents Law, Cap.
  3. This recourse is directed against two separate but not unrelated decisions, namely the refusal to register applicants' patent registered in the United Kingdom on the ground that the application was submitted after the expiration of the three years' period (Section 4 of Cap. 266) and the refusal to extend the time within which to apply for registration. 2204 15 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 Meed Corporation v. The Republic The applicants alleged that the documents were despatched three days before the expiration of the said period by express post, but did not reach Cyprus until the 31.5.85 owing to a strike of postal employees. In their address applicant laid stress on s. 9 of Cap. 266 and the Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, ratified by Law 63/65 and submitted that the three year period is not mandatory, but directory. Held, dismissing the recourse:
(1)Section 9 of Cap. 266 is confined to extension in Cyprus of the Judicial remedies obtainable in U.K. for the protection of a patent registered in Cyprus (Christodoulides v. The Republic
(1972)3 C.L.R. 71 followed). The Convention does not modify, supersede or alter the provision of Cap. 266, but on the contrary the benefits granted by the Convention depend on prior recognition by the municipal laws (Article 2.1).
(2)Registration of a patent in Cyprus is solely dependent on prior registration of the same pa'ent in U.K. In accordance with s. 4 of Cap. 266 no registration can be made in Cyprus of an English patent after the expiration of the three year period provided therein. The word "may" signifies the amenity of seeking registration, but it does not qualify the three year period nor does it confer discretion to extend it. Recourse dismissed. No order as to costs. Cases referred to: Christodoulides v. The Republic
(1972)3 C.L.R. 71; 30 Ansor Corporation v. The Republic
(1969)3 C.L.R. 325. RecourseRecourse against the decision of the Registrar of Trade Marks refusing the registration of a patent registered in 2205 Mead Corporation v. The Republic
(1986)he United Kingdom and the extension of the time of its egistration. E. Markides (Mrs.), for the applicants. St. Ioannides (Mrs.), for the respondents. Cur. adv. vult. PIKIS J. read the following judgment. The application equires us to review two separate but not unrelated deciions of the Registrar of Trade Marks refusing (
  1. a)the reistration of a patent registered in the United Kingdom, nd (
  2. b)extension of the time for its registration. 10 Registration of a patent of the applicants, registered in le United Kingdom on 3rd June, 1982, was refused on le ground that it was submitted after the expiration of the :atutory period of three years envisaged by s. 4 of the atents Law, Cap. 226. As a matter of fact, application 15 )r reg;stration in Cyprus was submitted on 21st June. 985. The decision was promptly communicated to the pplicants on 24th June, 1985 (Red. 4, exh. 1). A few ays later applicants sought extension of time to apply for :gistration, a request that was turned down on the ground 20 lere was no power to grant it. (Red 5, exh. 1). Before me it was argued that both decisions are wrong ι law, the first because the three-year-period is directive nd not mandatory, and the second because there is dis•etion to extent the time from the exercise of which the 25 egistrar abdicated. Had he addressed himself to the rea­ ms for delay associated with a postal strike he nvght well rid the exercise of his discretion in favour of the appliints duly warranted. Applicants allege the documents -r registration were despatched by express post, that is, 30 ree days before the expiry of the three-year-period but d not reach Cyprus until the 31st May, 1985, owing to strike of postal employees. Irrespective of the implications of any postal strike, spondents dispute the contention that the documents 35 uld under any circumstances be submitted to the Reitrar on or before the 3rd June, 1985, and may well right in so contending. 2206 5 3 C.L.R. Mead Corporation v. The Republic Pikis J In their address applicants laid stress on two other le­ gal provisions, notably, s. 9 of the Patents Law, making in their contention applicable in Cyprus the provisions of Engl:sh Patent Legislation and Law 63/65 ratifying the 5 Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. Neither law helps advance the case for the applicants. As authoritatively pronounced by the Full Bench in Nicos Christodoulides v. Republic^) the ambit of s. 9, Cap. 266. is confined to extension in Cyprus of the judicial remedies 10 obtainable in the U.K. for the protection of a patent regi­ stered in Cyprus. On the other hand, Law 63/65 leaving aside questions relevant to the character of its provisions whether self-executing or not. does not supersede, modift or alter the provisions of Cap. 266 but on the contrary 15 benefits granted thereunder are dependent on prior re­ cognition by the municipal laws (see Article 2.1). Whr. rema:ns to ponder is the effect of s. 4 with regard to th three-year time limit and the amenity, if any, to extend ii To understand the issue in its true light, it must first b 20 appreciated that s. 4 is not a procedural but a substantia" enactment. The genesis of the right to a patent in Cypru depends on its registration within the period envisage· therein. Registration of a patent in Cyprus is solely de pendent on prior registration of the same patent in th 25 U.K., very probably because we lack the means and in formation to pronounce authoritatively on the orig:nalit; of the patent. The gap is filled by making provision for thi registration of Eng'ish patents in Cyprus, albeit witlvn ; prescribed time limit, sufficiently long, to afford reasonabh 30 opportunity to evervone interested to register his patent ir Cyprus to do so within three years. As Hadjianastass:ou, J.. decided in Amor Corporation v. The Republic
(2)no re­ gistration of an English patent can be made in Cyprus aftei the lapse of three years from the registration of the same 35 patent in the U.K. Nor do the Patent Rules confer discre tion on the Registrar to extend the statutory period (Rule· 6 and 28 in particular). The tenor of the judgment is the after the expiry of the three-year-period there is no ma chinery for registration of an English patent in Cyprus. 1 ω
(1972)3 C.L.R. 7 1 . W
(1969)3 C.L.R. 325. 2207 Pikis J. Mead Corporation v. The Republic
(1986)am, with respect, wholly in agreement with this depiction of the effect of the law. The word "may" in the context of s. 4 merely signifies the amenity of the owner of a patent to seek its registration in Cyprus; it does not in any way qualify the three-year-period, nor does it confer discretion on the Registrar to extend it. That being the case, the first decision of the Registrar to refuse registration was inevitable, as well as his second one, there being no amenity to extend the three-year statutory period. 5 Hence the recourse is dismissed. The sub judice decisions 10 of the Registrar are confirmed in accordance with Article 146.4(a) of the Constitution. Let there be no order as to costs. Recourse dismissed. No order as to costs. 2208 15

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