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clr/1986/1986_3_2619.pdf

3 C.L.R. 1983 November 12 ITRIANTAFYLLTDES, P.] IN THH MATTER OF ARTICLE 146 OF THE CONSTITUTION SAVVAS A PATSALOS, Applicant, v. THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, THROUGH THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR, Respondent. (Case No'. 273/77). 5 Time within which to file a recourse—Requisition of abandoned Turkish Cypriot properties (Orders 671J75, 820(75 and 899/76)—Property exempted from scheme of distribution, pursuant to order 820/75, which was later,renewed by order 899/76—Revocation of exemption in 1977— In the circumstances, time began to run as from the revocation, when order 899/76 becameoperative as regardsthe property in question, and not as from tlie publicationof order 899/76. 10 Executory act—Act of execution —Requisition of abandoned Turkish Cypriot properties—Revocation of exemption of property from the scheme of distribution of suchproperties to displacedpersons—The revocationis not an actof execution of the relevant order of requisition—The revo15 cation is of an executory act or decision in the sense of Article 146 of the Constitution—Managementof abandoned Turkish Cypriot properties under requisition—Revocation of exemption of property from the scheme of distribution of such properties to displacedpersons—It is 20 within the domain of public law as it was taken in furtheranceof a purpose of public nature. The applicant, who was in possession of immovable 2619 Patsalos v. Republic

(1986)property at Aglandjia belonging to a Turkish Cypriot, requested the exclusion of the said property from the scheme of distribution of requisitioned properties to displaced persons, on the ground that such property had been leased to him by a Turkish Cypriot residing in England. 5 His request was granted, but about a year later the applicant was asked to deliver possession of the property to the Nicosia District Committee for the Protection and Management of Turkish Cypriot properties. This decision was based on requisition orders 671/75, 820/75 and 10 899/76. Hence the present recourse. Counsel for the respondents raised ithe following preliminary objections, that is that the recourse is out of time as it was filed after the exp:ration of 75, days from the publication of requisition order 15 899/76, that the sub judice act is an "act of execution" of the said order and that it is an "act of management of property". Held, dismissing the preliminary objections:
(1)Before publication of order 899/76, the applicant was informed 20 that his request for exclusion of the property from the scheme of distribution had been granted pursuant to the then in force order 820/75, which was renewed by order 899/76. It follows that order 899/76 did not become operative as regards the property in question as from its pu- 25 blication. The computation of the period of 75 days cannot be made as from publication of the said order, but as from the revocation of the exemption, because it is only as from that date that order 899/76 became operative in relation to the property in question. 30
(2)The sub judice decision is not an act of execution, but a decision to revoke the exemption and, as such, it is of an executory nature.
(3)The sub judice decision pertains to the management of property for the furtherance of a purpose of a public 35 nature and as such it comes within the domain of public law. Orderaccordingly. 2620 3 C.1..R. Patsalos v. Republic Cases referred to: MiWotis v. The Republic
(1968)3 C.L.R. 477; Chrymnthou v. The Republic
(1968)3 C.L.R. 519. Recourse. 5 10 Recourse against :he decision of the respondent whereby applicant was reuu:red to deliver to the Committee for the Protection and Management of Turkish Cypriot Properties possession of immovable property at" Aglandjia belonging lo a Turkish Cypriot. A. HadjiIoannou, for the applicant. A. Papasavvas, Senior Counsel of the Republic, for the respondent. Cur. adv. vult. TRIANIAFYLLIDES P. read the fo'lowing decision. By the 15 present recourse the applicant seeks the annulment of the decsion of the Nicosia District Committee for the Protect'on and Management of Turkish Cypriot Properties by virtue cf which he was asked to deliver to such Committee possession of immovable property at Aglandjia be20 longing to a Turkish Cypriot. The said decision was communicated to the applicant by a letter dated 16th September 1977 and was based on re~ qirsition orders (671/1975, 820/1975 and 899/1976) by means of which there had been requ:sitioned, for the pur25 pose of meeting the needs of persons displaced by the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, movab'e and immovable properties abandoned, and not being personal'y used, by Turkish Cypriots who had moved to the under Turkish military occupation area of Cyprus. 30 As it appears from documents wh:ch have been produced before this Court the applicant requested, on the 12th June 1976, the exclusion of the property in question from the scheme of distribution of requisitioned properties to displaced persons, because, according to his allegation, 2621 Tnantafyllides P. Patsalos ν Republic
(1986)such property had been leased to him by a Turkish Cy­ priot who resides in England. On the 28th August 1976 the District Officer of Nico­ sia, as Chairman of the aforementioned District Committee, informed counsel for the applicant that the request of his 5 client had been granted Subsequently, however, the said Committee decided to hand over this property, too, to displaced persons and the apphcant was accord-ngly required, on the 16th September, 1977, to deliver possession of the property to the Com- 10 mittee Counsel for the respondent has raised the preliminary objections, first, that the present recourse is out of time because the applicant failed to challenge, within the pres­ cribed by Article 146 3 of the Constitution perod of se- 15 venty-f:ve days, the last of the relevant requisition orders (899/1976) which had been published in the Official Ga­ zette on the 5th November 1976, and, secondly, that by means of his recourse the applicant challenges an "act of execution" or an "act of management of property" and, 20 therefore, not an executory administrative decsion which could be made the subject-matter of this recourse under Article 146 of the Constitution As regards the first of the above objections it has to be observed that before the publication of requisition order 25 899/1976 the applicant had been informed by a letter dated 28th August 1976 that there had been granted his request for the exemption of the property possessed by him from the scheme for distribution of abandoned Turkish Cypriot properties to displaced persons, pursuant to the 30 then in force requisition order 820/1975, which was re­ newed by requisition order 899/
  1. Thus, the computa­ tion of the period of seventy-five days prescribed by Arti­ cle 146 3 of the Constitution cannot be made in the pre­ sent case as from the date of the publication of order 899/ 35 1976 which, in view of the exemption granted as afore­ said to applicant, did not become operative as regards the property possessed by the applicant on its publication, and such period has to be treated as running as from the later 2622 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 ^0 25 30 Patsalos v. Republic Triantafyllides P- datc on which the said exemption was revoked, that is as from the 16th September 1977, because it is only as from thai date that order 899/76 became operative in relation to the property in question; and by reference to such date this recourse has been filed within the time prescribed by Article 146.
  2. Regarding the second objection ot counsel for the res­ pondent I cannot accept that the sub judice decision is merely an act of execution of the aforementioned requisition orders, since it is, in essence, a dec:sion to revoke the exempt;on granted to the applicant and it is, thus, of an executory nature and can, therefore, be challenged by the present recourse. Also, 1 cannot sustain the objection that the said decision is an act of management by the Government of property in the realm of private law, because it is a dec:sion pertaining to the management of property for the furtherance of a purpose of a public nature and as such it comes within the domain of publ ; c law and can be made the subjectmatter of this recourse under Article 146 of the Constitu­ tion (see, inter a'ia, in this respect. Milliotis v. The Repu­ blic,
(1968)3 C.L.R. 477, 479, 480, Chrysanthou v. The Republic,
(1968)3 C.L.R. 519, 525, the Manual of Ad­ ministrative Law of Spiliotopou'los (Σπηλιωτοπούλου «Έγχε·ρίδ:ον Διοικητικού Δικαίου») 2nd ed.
(1982), p. 384, para. 425, and Conclus;ons from the Case-Law of the Council of State in Greece (Πορίσματα Νομολογίας τοΰ Συμβουλίου της Επικρατείας) 1929-1959. ρπ. 232, 233). Tn the light of all the foregoing the prel;minary objeetions raised by counsel for the respondent cannot be sus­ tained and this case will be heard on its merits. Order accordingly. 2623

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