(1987)1987 October15 (A. L0120U,DEMETRIADESANDPIKIS,JJ.] 1.CHARALAMBOSTILEMACHOUPSARAS, 2.RAMEZMETANOSLICHA, Appellants, v. THEREPUBLIC, Respondent. (CriminalAppeals Nos. 4715 &4718). Searchofpremises—Employee's consenttothesearchbypoliceofhisemployer's premises — Need to scrutinizefactual basis of search — The question, whether theemployee hasauthoritytoauthorise thesearch isone offact ConstitutionalLaw —Righttoprivacy—Constitution,Article 15.1—Ambit of— Businesspremises arenot apnvate domain—Businessdiaryand telephone directory — They do not constitute inherently a personal record — Note referabletocnminalconspiracy, kept inabusinessdiary—Itisnotaprivate matterinthesense ofArt..15.1. ConstitutionalLaw —Righttoprivacy—Constitution, Art 15 1— Companson between the provisions of this Article and the provisions of the Fourth Amendment ofthe Constitution of US.A. —Differences. 10 Confessions—Admissibilityof— Whenastatement isconsideredasavoluntary. Appeal — Evaluation of evidence by the trialCourt — The approach of the AppellateCourt. Evidence—Accomplice —Corroboration—Thequestionofcorroborationanses onlyifhistestimoryiscredibleenough —Whatconstitutes corroboration. 15 Evidence — Hostile witness — No rule of law that his testimony must be disregardedinitsentirety. Jurisdiction—Crimescommitted atseawithinthedistanceoftwelvemilesfromthe shores of Cyprus — Rebuttable presumption, which is a necessary concomitant ofthesovereigntyof theRepublic ofCyprus,thatCourts have jurisdiction—Presumptionmayberebutted byevidence thatthewatersform partof theBritishSovereign BaseAreas. 132 20 2C.L-R. Psaras& Anotherv. Republic Constitutional Law —ReasoningofJudicial decisions—Constitution. Art 302— The duty imposed and the nght conferred thereby — The minimum requirements whichshould beobserved— Whatconstitutesduereasoning 3 On 20 785 the Police intercepted three boats east of Cape Pyta,sailing seemingly m a convoy parallel to the coast at a distance of between 9-10 nauticalmilesfromtheshores Ittranspiredthattwoofthethreeboatsearnednarcotics Thethirdboatthat headedtheconvoy earnednoprohibited substances 10 The vessels were detained and their crew and passengers arrested, numbering 14personsin all 15 Thecircle of arrestswascompleted by the detentionlaterthesameday of Boulos Finianos andAnton El-Achel,two Lebanese subjects atthe Lamaca Hotelwhere theystayedandthesubsequentarrest,withinthenext2-3days, of Costas Georghiou and Charalambos Psaras The only other person who according to the police, was involved in the conspiracy, and subsequent commission of the offence was acertain Englishman by the name of Bnan Barker who escapedarrest He left the country onthevery day of thearrest of hisconfederates 20 ThePoliceinvestigations,which followed,ledtotheprosecution ofthe 18 arresteesbefore theAssizeCourt of Lamaca The prosecution was discontinued against two of the eighteen accused, namely Georghiou and Eid with a view to calling them as prosecution witnesses 25 30 Except for thefour personsnamedabove,the remainingaccusedpleaded guilty tooneor more of thechargesraisedagainst themandwereattheend sentenced tovaryingterms of impnsonrnent The tnalproceeded to the end against theremaining accused Finianos, PsarasandLicha were found guilty ontwo countsof conspiracy andthecountsinvolvingpossessionwithaview to supplying them to third parties Accused El Achel was acquitted and dischargedonall counts Thesubjectmatteroftheseproceedingsistheappealsagainstconvictionof Psarasand Licha 35 40 7>iecaseofappellant Psaras{a)Thenotecontaining detailsofapositionat sea seemingly identifying the point where the Lebanese importers would disposeoftheirillegalcargo,foundbythePoliceinPsaras'officeinsideadiary telephone-directory, was wronqly admitted in evidence because the search leading to the seizure of the document was illegal, as it was earned out in breach of thenght of theappellant to pnvacy safeguardedbyArticle 15 1of theConstitution,andbecause,thenotebookinwhichthenotewasfoundwas a personal document in the pnvate domain of the appellant and assuch a pnvate matter inthesenseofArticle 1 5 1 133 Psaras& Another v.Republic
(1987)(b)Wrongful admissionin evidence of thestatement of the appellant (
- c)Erroneous finding of the tnal Court asto the date of the first meeting between Psaras and Barker Whereas counsel acknowledged that incnmnating inferences could be drawn from the content of a telegram of PsarastoFinianos,ifithadbeensentafterthemeetingwithBarker,thefinding 5 oftheCourt thatsuchmeetingdidtakeplacepnortothedateofthetelegram, was unjustifiedandcontrary to thetenor of the evidence (
- d)Shorn of the above evidence and inferences drawn therefrom, the evidenceagainstPsarasandfindingsthatcouldconceivably restthereonwere inconclusive toadegreeincapable of founding theverdict 10 77iecase ofappellant Licha (
- a)Erroneous acceptance of the evidence of Eid, a self-confessed accomplice, as sufficiently credible to warrant acting upon it, in face of corroboration The casefor the appellant isthat given the contradictonness in his testimony and statements to the police, the Court ought to have wholly ignored it in the same way that aCourt of law isapt 15 disregardtheevidence ofahostile witness (b)Lackofevidenceestablishingthecompetenceandtemtonaljunsdiction of theCourt totrythecase (c)FailureonthepartofthetnalCourttoreasonitsjudgmentinthemanner ordained byArticle 30 2ofthe Constitution 20 Held, dismissing the appeal of Psaras (l)(
- a)The team of policemen who earned out the search didnot invoke thewan-ant, which had been issuedor theauthonty giventherebytocany outthesearch,butsought the permission of the employee of PsarasShipping Agency Limited then inattendance and seemingly incontrol,tocarryoutasearchofthepremisesincludingtheoffice £o of Psaras,the Manager andthe person havingcontrolof the company The tnal Court amved atthe conclusion that theconsent wasfreely given Theexistenceofauthontyonthepartofanemployee toauthonseasearchof thepremisesofhisemployersdependonavanetyoffactorsandis,ultimately aquestionof fact It ispertinent to scrutinize the background of the authonty lest the search was carried out in abuse of police powers At common law the search of premisesandseizureofdocumentstherefrom beingaspeciesofpolice power that impinges upon liberty, is viewed with apprehension and must in every casebejustified by reference to theauthonty claimedinjustification of the 3 5 search In thiscaseit appears thatthe Court properly directeditself tothe needto scrutinize the factual premise of the search and adequately summed up the evidence on the subject 134 2 C.L.R. 5 Psaras&Anotherv. Republic Supposing thatappellantwas entitledtotheprotectionofArticle 151 and, further, supposing thatitsinterpretation issubject tothepnnciplesevolvedby reference to the 4th AmendmentoftheAmencan Constitution, therulingof the Court on the admissibility of the note is reconcilable with them, establishing free and volutary waiver of the freedom toshield the premises from awarrantless search (b)ThecontentofArticle 151ofourConstitutionisnotthesameasthatof the4thAmendmentoftheConstitution oftheUS A 10 The 4thAmendment aims toentrench andregulate the pnnciple of the commonlawthatone's house ishiscastle Whereas Article 151ismodelled on the European Convention of Human Rights that proclaims a nght to pnvacy as such in turn fashioned inthespint of the 1948U Ν Universal DeclarationofHuman Rights Of course,whatispnvateinthesense of Article 15 1may beimmunefrom search and seizure 20 \nEnotiades andAnother ν ThePolice(1986J2C LR 64the Courtheld that business activity isnot in itself apnvate matter Bythesame processof reasoning business premises are notapnvate domain inthesense ofArticle 15 1 The nght to pnvacy extends to inherently pnvate personal and family matters objectively identifiable assuch,provided always thatthe beneficiary ofthenghthasnotbyhisownactionexposed apnvatemattertopublicview 25 (
- c)Thecontentofabusiness diary andatelephonedirectoryisnotofitself a documentembodying an inherentlypersonal recordinthesense of Article 15 1 Nordidtheappellant,byleavingitexposed onhisdeskandwithinreach of thepersonnelofthecompany,evince anyexpectationthatitscontentand mattersincluded thereinshould bekeptpnvate to himself 15 The claim to pnvacy in relation to thenote collapses altogether upon reflection thatitwasnopartofthe diaryandthatitwas merely keptorstored therein Certainlythe contentofthe note,referable asitwastothedetailsof a cnminalconspiracy, itwas notapnvate matterin thesense ofArticle 15 1 30 35 40
(2)Considerationoftherecordpersuaded thisCourtthatthetnalCourtdid advert toevery relevant partoftheevidence illuminatingthecircumstances under which thestatementhadbeen made leavingthisCourtinnodoubtas to the adequacy of the summing up The question of the admissibility ofa statementmustbe resolved bytheJudge inthesameway asfactual questions are determined by the jury Our Courts apply a stnngent test tothe admissibility ofastatementintheinterestoftheefficacy oftheruleoflawand asanecessary safeguard against abuse ofpolice power However allrules evolved bythe Courtsrelevant totheadmissibility ofa confession aredesigned toelicit the voluntanness ofa statement,the basic issueinevery case Astatementisvoluntary ifithas notbeen obtainedeither by fear of prejudice orhopeofadvantage held outbyapersonjnauthority 135 Psaras& Another v. Republic
(1987)Indiscerning the likelihood of prejudice resulting from fear, the Courts have increasingly laidstress onthe element ofoppression that may,inan indirect way,sapthefreewillofthemaker.Voluntannessisbasicallyaquestionoffact. There is nothing before us justifying interference with the finding of voluntariness made bythetrialCourt. 5
(3)An appellate Court must never overlook that the tnal Court, livtng through the drama of a case and following the unfolding of the nval contentions before it, isina unique position to evaluate the evidence inits proper perspective. (A passage from Papadopoulos v. Stavrou
(1982)1 C.L.R. 321adopted). 10 Tojustify the inference that the assessment made bythe trialCourt of the credibility of witnesses iswrongan appellate bench must be persuaded that the finding defies reasonand common sense. In this case there is no room for interfering with the findings of the tnal Court. Held, further dismissingthe appeal of Licha.
(1)Room for corroboration existsonly,astheCourtaffirmed inZachariav.TheRepublic,ifthe evidence of the accomplice is in the first place credible enough, only then can a question of corroboration anse. J5 Corroborative evidence, need not take the form of evidence duplicating the testimony of the accomplice, itmay be confined to evidence confirming 2 0 the testimony of the accomplice in two material respects, that a cnme had been committed and, further, thataccused wasimplicated inthe commission of thatcrime. Questions of credibility of witnesses are par excellence, the province of the tnal Court. There is no rule of law either, as explained in the case of 2 5 Georghiou v.TheRepublic
(1984)2C.L.R. 65thatthetestimonyofahostile witnessmustnecessanly bedisregarded initsentirety. Inthis case itwas perfectly open tothe trialCourt after they had properly directed themselves tothe implicationsof the evidence of an acomplice and hadgivendueconsiderationtotherelevantevidence,toacceptthetestimony 3 0 of Eid as sufficiently credible to be acted upon after due confirmation by corroborative evidence.
(2)(
- a)Contrary to submissions raised before the Assize Court, counsel acknowledgedthattheterritorialjurisdictionofcriminalcourtsoftheRepublic extends to 12milesfrom thelowwatermark inviewof theprovisions ofs.2 3 5 of the Territorial Waters Law 1964 (45/64) and that section 5(l)(
- a)of the Criminal Code (as amended by Law 3/62) should be read and applied accordingly. (b)Nosuggestion oflackofcompetence onthepart oftheCourttotrythe case wasraised before the trialCourt, norwasthecompetence of the Court 136 40 2C.L.R. Psaras& Another v. Republic questioned On theotherhand,theevidence beforethetnalCourtdidsuggest thatthepoliceauthonties oftheRepublic ofCyprus operatedfreelyinthesea area where the interception took place and the arrestsmade. 5 • 10 15 20 There is a rebuttable presumption - a necessary concomitant of the sovereignty oftheRepublic ofCyprus -thatCyprus Courtscanvalidlyassume and exercise junsdiction in respect of offences committed within 12 miles fromtheshores of(heRepublic ofCyprus.The presumption mayberebutted byevidence that the waters form part of the Bntish Sovereign BaseAreas
(3)(
- a)Failure to observe the constitutional requirement (Art. 30.2) for the reasoningoftheJudgmentrenderstheverdictoftheCourt,intheexercise of both itscnminal and civiljunsdictions, a nullity A non-reasoned judgment is notavaliddetermination ofthejudicial cause.Not onlyArticle 30.2 imposes a duty on the state to ensure compliance with thejudicial standards setforth therein, italso confersa correspondingnght on the litigant tohaveajudicial pronouncement affecting him, duly reasoned Reasoning is a.constituent element ofavalidjudicial pronouncement (
- b)The following are the minimum requirements to be observed for a judicial pronouncement in order to qualify as duly reasoned: The evidence must be analysed by reference to the matters in issue, and there must be a clear statement of the findings of the Court coupled with an unambiguous pronouncement of the outcome ofacase In acnminal casethe main issueis definedby the plea of the accused tothecharge or arraignment. 25 30 (
- c)in this case, the judgment appealed from provides an example of a robustly reasonedjudgment.The Court isnot boundtoreproducethe whole ol the evidence in its evidential analysis, or refer to every detail of it The reasoning of a judgment may take a vanety of forms.What is required of a CourtofLaw isthat reasonsshouldbegivenforitsdecisionandthosereasons should relate to the law applicable and be referable to the evidence given in the cause,so that itmay appear that theverdict is notmerely thereaction of theCourt tothedisputebutwarranted bythelaw applicable andthe evidence adduced. Appealsdismissed. 'Cases referredto A-G of Gambia v.MomodouJobe [1984)3 W.L.R. 174; Thomhill v. A-G ofTnnidadand Tobago
(1981)A.C.6 1 ; 35 see v_ Seaf/e, U.S.S.CR., 18L Ed. 2d.943; Schneckloth v.Buntamante, 93S. Ct.2041,2051
(1973), US. v.Matlock, 39 L.Ed ,2nd.Senes242; R ν Heston Franscois [1984] 1All E.R 785 (C.A.); 137 Psaras &Another v. Republic
(1987)R. v. Watson[1980) 2All Ε R.293; Enotiades andAnother v.ThePolice
(1986)2 C.L.R.64; Police v. Georghiades{\983) 2CL.R 33; Oueissv. TheRepublic
(1987)2 C.L.R.49. R. v.Renme [1982] 1All Ε R.385; 5 Kokkinos v.ThePolice
(1967)2 C.LR.217; Petriv.ThePolice
(1968)2 C.LR 40; Azinasand Another v. ThePolice
(1981)2C.L R.9; Imbrahimv. R. [1914] AC.599, Foumides v.TheRepublic
(1986)2 C.L R.73; 10 DPP. v.PingLin[1975]3All E.R 175; Papadopoullos v.Stavrou
(1982)1C.L.R. 321; Liatsosv. ThePolice
(1968)2 C.L.R. 15; Zachanav. TheRepublic, 1962 C.L.R 52, D.P.P.v.Hester [1972]3All E.R. 1056, 15 D.P.P.v.Kilboume [1973] 1All E.R.440; Georghiou v.TheRepublic
(1984)2CLR. 65; Yollnessand Othersv.TheRepublic
(1982)2 C.L.R.46; Panayiv.ThePolice
(1968)2 C.L.R. 124, loannides v.Dikeos
(1969)1C.L.R 235, 20 Bell v.D.P.P. of Jamaica (1985]2All ΕR. 585; Neophytou v. ThePolice
(1981)2C1.R.195, Pioneer Candy Ltd.v. Tryfon and Sons
(1981)1C.L.R.540. Appealsagainstconvictionand sentence. Appeals against conviction and sentence by Charalambos 25 Telemachou Psarasand Anotherwho were convictedonthe3rd December, 1985 attheAssizeCourtof Famagusta (CriminalCase No.3455/85) ononecountoftheoffence ofconspiracytocommit a felony contrary to sections 5 and 371 of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154andononecountoftheoffence ofpossessing controlled 30 138 2 C.L.R. Psaras & Another v.Republic drugs with intent to supply them to others contrary tosections 2, 6
(3), 30, 31 and 38 of Part IIof the First Schedule and theThird Schedule of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychctrop.c Substances Law, 1977 (Law No 29 of 1977) and were sentenced by 5 Papadopoullos, ΡDC , Constantintdes S DJ and Arestis. DJ to four years' imprisonment on the first count and to eight years' impnsonment on the second count, the sentences to run concurrently Chr Pourghoundes with \ Theohlou, for appellant1 10 L Clendes, for appellant 2 A Frangos, Senior Counsel of the Republic, for respondent Cur adv vult A LOIZOUJ The judgment of the Courtwill be delivered by Pikis,J 15 PIKISJ A co-ordinated sea operation of the police and other authonties of the Republic led on 20th July, 1985 to the interception of three boats east of Cape Pyla, the arrest of their crew and passengers and the seizure of their cargo - 14 tons and 250 kgs of cannabis resin Information reaching the police 20 alerted them to the impending importation of narcotics and caused them to make advance preparations to frustrate the venture andarrest theperpetrators of theconspiracy Fromabout midnight the previous day a gunboat and a launch patrolled the sea areawhere thesmugglers were anticipatedtocome, according 25 to police information, in furtherance of a pre-arranged plan to deliver them at sea to buyers with a view to shipment abroad In that way, the police lay in waiting to confront the smugglers, foil their objects and cause their arrest And they were not long to come 30 Atabout9 30 thefollowing morning,20thJulv, 1985, thethree boats were spotted sailing seemingly in a convoy parallel to the coast atadistance of between 9-10 nautical miles from the shore When thesmugglers realized they were under police surveillance andabouttobe apprehended,theybegan hastily discharging their 35 cargo into the sea, in a last minute effort to avoid the consequences of theiracts Ittranspired thatonly two of thethree boats earned narcotics The third boat that headed the convoy earned no prohibited substances Appellant Licha who was a passenger inthatboatclaimed hehadno knowledge ofthenature 139 PikisJ. Psaras & Another v. Republic
(1987)of the cargo carried by the other two vessels. In that he was contradictedbyanotherpassengerinthatboat,namely Eid,aselfconfessedaccomplice whotestifiedthatnot onlyLicha wasinthe know but was one of two persons who master-minded the operationandorganizedthecrimefromtheLebaneseshores.The 5 other wasBoulos Finianoswho arrivedinCyprustwodaysearlier andstayedataLamacahotelinanticipation of iheii arrival. Following their detection the three boats were chased and eventually intercepted.Thevesselswere detainedandtheir crew and passengers arrested,numbering 14persons inall.The cargo 10 that was dumped and scattered at sea made up of many sacks containing cannabis resin was collected after apainstaking effort of many hours. The circle of arrests was completed by the detention later the same day of Boulos Finianos and Anton ElAchel. two Lebanese subjects at the Larnaca Hotel where they 15 stayed and the subsequent arrest, within the next 2-3 days, of Costas Georghiou and Charalambos Psaras. The only other person who, according to the police, was involved in the conspiracy, and subsequent commission of the offence was a certain Englishman by the name of Brian Barker who escaped 20 arrest. He left the country on the very day of the arrest of his confederates. A vigorous police investigation followed that led to the prosecutionofthe18arresteesbeforetheAssizeCourtofLarnaca. Fourjointchargeswerepreferredagainstalltheaccusedinvolving 25 possession of narcotics with a view to supplying them to third parties, the supply of narcctics to third parties, and offering to supply narcotics to third parties. Two additional charges were .preferred against Finianos, Psaras, Licha and Achel regarded by thepoliceasresponsible fortheplanningofthecommissionofthe 30 offences the perpetrators of the importation of narcotics for the purpose ofsupplying themtocustomersoff theshoresofCyprus. The two additional charges prefened against the prime culprits involved conspiracies to come into possession of narcotics witha view to supplying them to third parties. 35 The prosecution was discontinued against two of the eighteen accused,namely GeorghiouandEidwithaviewtocallingthemas prosecution witnesses. A nolle prosequi was filed, whereupon they were discharged, facilitating thereby the adduction of their evidence asprosecution witnesses. Except for the four ring leaders, named above, the remaining accused pleaded guilty to one or mo-e of the charges raised HO 40 2 C.L.R. Psaras & Another v. Republic Pikis J. against them and were at the end sentenced to varying terms of impnsonment The trial proceeded to the end against the remaining accused Finianos Psa»dS and Licha were found guilty on the two counts of conspiracy and the counts involving 5 possession with a view to supplying then to third parties They were acquitted and discha^ec! on the remaining two counts concerning the supply or offer to supply third parties with narcotics Accused ElAchel was acquitted and discharged on all counts 10 The subject matter of these proceeding? is the appeals against conviction of Psaras and Licha The case against Psaras was founded on circuirr.tanciai evidence establishing to the satisfactit η of the Assize Court that he held a senes of meetings with Finianos with a view to facilitating the latter and his 15 confederates to i mpcn a considerable quantity of narcotics near the bhores of Cvpruo and then supply them to third parties for purposes of re-exportation One of his confederates was Licha who ononeoccasion accomna ιled Finianosonavisittothe office of the first appellant Furthcimore the tnal Court found again on 20 circumstancial evidence that Psara-, was responsible for introducing to Finianos, Brian Barker, a potential byer, and provided theground for allthreeof them tomeetandwork outthe details of the conspiracy the implementation of which was thwarted by thearrests made on the morning of 20th July, 1985 25 Two documents admitted in evidence, after overruling objections of the defence, added considerably to the cogency of the case for the prosecution against Psaras The first was a telegram despatched by Psaras to Finianos on 20th May, 1985 (exhibit 8) Itscontentcouched in cryptic language suggested the 30 existence of a conspiracy between them and possibly others to promote an illegal venture It read «PLS COME URGENT TO CYPRUS ! HV VERY GOOD CUSTOMER FOR YR CARGO PAMBOS PSARAS» ThetnalCourtfound thetelegram had been sentafter Psaras metBnanBarker for theverypurpose of bnnging 35 seller and buyer together Psaras admitted sending the telegram but maintained it had been sent tor a purpose other than that found by theCourt,notably toappnse Finianosoftheexistence of a customer for the purchase of olive oil in Greece The second document admitted in evic_nce after rejecting defence objections 40 to itsadmissibility consisted of a notefound at theoffice of Psaras inside a diary-telephone directory indicating a position at sea 141 PiUs J. Psaras &Anotherv. Republic
(1987)coincidingwiththat recorded ina note tothesameeffect foundin thepossession of Eid.The trial Court inferred from the contentof thisdocument (exhibit36)knowledge onthepart ofthe appellant ofwhatwascontemplated totakeplaceneartheshoresofCyprus on 20th July, 1985, rendered abortive by the intervention of the police. 5 Another piece of evidencefrom which incriminating inferences were drawn wasastatement, thethird made byPsaras during the period of hisdetention,made about a morithafter hisarrest. Inhisdefence, comprehensively articulatedinastatement from 10 thedock, Psarasacknowledgedthathehadsurreptitious meetings with Finianos and Barkerbut maintained they were fora purpose unconnected with narcotics, namely for the exportation of cigarettes and whiskey from Cyprus to Lebanon. He disowned knowledge of exhibit 36suggesting that one of hisenemies -and 15 he had many as he said - may have planted it in his office. The telegram addressed to Finianos was despatched before being introduced toBarker. Consequently, itwasunrelated towhatever mighthavebeenjointlyplannedbyFinianos,Barkerandhimself. Psarascalled twowitnessesinhisdefence. Thefirstanofficer of 20 the police, namely N. Stelikos, and the second an advocate of Limassol,M.Malachtou.Ascanbegathered,theobjectofPsarasin callingStelikoswastobnngtothenoticeoftheCourtthatfar from being an accomplice of Finianos,he collaborated with the police with aviewtohisarrest.Bethatasitmay,theevidence ofStelikos 25 holed his defence by the disclosure that Psaras was aware that Finianoswasintheillicittradeofnarcotics,hardlycompatiblewith the main line of his defence. The plan of Psaras, according to Stelikos, was to trap Finianos to the advantage of both. Psaras wouldreap a money benefit whileStelikoswould scoreasuccess 30 by arresting him. According to Stelikbs, Psaras told him that the the interest of Finianos dried up at the end of March,
- Thereafter, Psaras was unable to give him further information despite hisinquiries leavinghim with the impression thatthe plan of Finianos had been dropped. Nonetheless, there was ample 35 evidence that meetings between Psaras and Finianos continued throughout the ensuing period albeit for a different object according to Psaras, for the purpose of exporting cigarettes and whiskey to Lebanon. 142 2 C.L.R. Psaras &Anotherv.Republic PUds J. The caseagainst Licharested primarilyonthetestimonyofEid, a self-confessed accomplice, and the corroboration provided by the detailsofthe commission ofthe offence and the note found in the possession of Eid, earlier referred toand the inscription at the 5 back thereof ofthe first name of Finianosand the room where he stayed atthe Lamaca Hotelwherehewasfound and arrested.Eid testified that Licha and Finianos approached him with a view to providing a boat to spearhead the other two vessels that would transportnarcoticstoCyprusandthatinfact Lichasupervised the 10 loading of narcotics and assumed control of the expedition to Cyprus. 77jeAppeal ofPsaras. The conviction of Psaras was mainly challenged on the following three counts: 15 (a)Wrongful reception ofexhibit36,thenotecontaining details of a position at sea seemingly identifying the point where the Lebanese importerswould dispose oftheir illegalcargo.The case for the appellant, depicting itaswellas we can, isthat the search leading to the seizure of the document was illegalbecause itwas 20 carried out in breach of the right of the appellant to privacy safeguarded byArticle 15.1of the Constitution. Furthermore, the notebookinwhichexhibit36wasfound wasapersonal document intheprivatedomain oftheappellant andassuchaprivate matter in the sense of Article 15.
- For both or either of the 25 aforementioned two reasons, the seizure and production in evidence of the incriminating note was impermissible and inadmissibleinevidence. (b) Wrongful admission in evidence of the statement of the appellant (exhibit38). Itisthe case for the appellant that the trial 30 Court erred in admitting the statement in evidence because of what had preceded and accompanied the making of the statement. (c)Erroneous finding of the trial Court as tothe date of the first meeting between Psaras and Barker. Whereas counsel 35 acknowledged that incriminating inferences could be drawn from thecontentofthetelegramofPsarastoFinianos,ifithadbeen sent after the meeting with Barker, the finding of the Court that such meeting did take place prior to the date of the telegram, was unjustified and contrary tothe tenor of the evidence. 143 Pikis J. Psaras &Another v. Republic
(1987)Shorn ofthe above evidence andinferences drawn therefrom, the evidence against Psaras andfindings that could conceivably rest thereon were inconclusive toadegree incapable of founding the verdict. Therefore, wewere invited, provided we upheldthe case fortheappellant,toacquitanddischargehim.Nosubmission 5 was made that the findings of the Court, recorded in the Judgment, could not support the verdict or that we should interfere with theJudgment of thetrial Court on that account. Therefore, theappeal ofPsarasturnsprimarily,ifnot exclusively, on the validityofthe aforementioned groundsofappeal oranyof 10 them and ifvalid their impact on the verdict. Below weshall deal with the appeal ofPsaras takingthe points raised intheorder above outlined. Thereafter, we shall deal with the appeal ofLicha. The Right of Pnvacy Safeguarded by Article 15.1 of the 15 Constitution. Article 15.1 reads: «Every person hasthe right to respect forhisprivateand family life.» Therighttoprivacy asdefined above,ispartofthefundamental 20 human rights safeguarded by part IIof the Constitution asthe inalienable liberty ofevery human being. Article 35binds every banch oftheCyprusStateincludingtheJudiciary tosafeguard the efficient application of the rights entrenched in that part ofthe Constitution. Byway of introduction totheinterpretation ofthis 25 and every other Article of the Constitution safeguarding fundamental human rights, we may note with approval the following passage from the Judgment ofLord Diplock inA-G of Cambia v.Momodou Jobe,* «A Constitution and in particular that part of it which 30 protects andentrenches fundamental rights andfreedoms to which allpersons intheState are tobe entitled, istobe given generous and purposive construction.» In order to appreciate and explore the arguments raised in connection with therighttoprivacy, itisnecessary torefer tothe 35 factual background andcircumstances ofseizure ofthe exhibitin question. • 11984}3WLR 61 174at 183 SeealsoTliornhillv.AC otTnnidadam:Tobago,119811A C. 144 2 C.L.R. Psaras & Another v. Republic Pikis J. Although asearch warrant for thesearch of the premises of the appellantwas inexistence, having been issued byamemberofthe Distnct Courtof Lamaca, theteam of policemen who earned out the search did not invoke the warrant or the authonty given 5 thereby tocarry outthesearch They sought thepermission of the employees of PsarasShippingAgency Limitedthen in attendance and seemingly in control, to carry out a search of the premises including theoffice of Psaras, theManagerandtheperson having control of the company Permission was given and the premises 10 were subsequently searched As earlier indicated, the incriminatingdocumentrecording acertain latitudeand longitude at sea was found inside a diary/telephone directory of the appellant thatwas exposed on his desk After sifting the evidence relevant to this issue, the tnal Court 15 concluded that consent was sought uncoercively and then freely given in circumstances that validated the search and made the document sei7ed admissible in evidence They dismissed the suggestion thatthesearch unrrantwas invalid though its existence was nottheauthorityby reference towhich thesearch was earned 20 out Responding to the submission that Article 15 1 confers an identical or a similar nght to that safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment to the Amencan Constitution, prohibiting the warrantless search of premises including offices, they ruled that 25 assuming this is the effect of Article 15 1, the nght had been waived by the consent given for thesearch of the premises Counsel for the appellant raised a similar argument before us, and submitted thatArticle 15 1bestows anghtcomparable tothat conferred by the 4th Amendment to the Amencan Constitution, 30 that being the case it is reasonable that our Courts should be guided by the pnnciples evolved by Amencan Courts in the interpretation andapplication ofArticle 15 1 The4thAmendment to theAmencan Constitutionspecifically prohibits the warrantless search of, interalia, houses and theireffects Ithas been held that 35 theprotectionextends tobusiness premises andoffices *Thenght given by the4thAmendmentcan,asacknowledged by counsel,be waived with the consent of a person having it in his power to authonse asearch of thepremises, provided such consentis freely and voluntanly given Neitheracquiescence nor consent induced •bee interaha See ν beatle US SCR lbL Ed 2d 943 145 pikisJ. Psaras & Another v. Republic
(1987)by anindirectinvocation of authoritywillsuffice.* Atthegistofthe precepts emerging ircm American case law relevant to the applicationofthe4thAmendment,istheprinciplethattheconsent must have been given freely and voluntarily uninduced by coercion ordisguised claimtoauthority.And theconsentmustbe 5 giver, by a person having it in his power to authorise the search and not by anyone who happens to be physically present inthe premises. An employee is notby virtue of his office necessanly invested with authority to authorise a search of the premises of his 10 employer. The existence of such authority is dependent on a variety of factors including the position of the employee in the company, the instructions of his principal, and moreimportantly the access enjoyed to the various parts of the premises.** Ultimately, itisa question of fact for thetrialCourtwhose findings 15 will notbe disturbed onappeal unless demonstrably wrong. Irrespective of the validity of the submission respecting the applicability oftheprinciplesrelevanttothe4thAmendment,once the consent of those physically in charge of the premises at the timeprovided theauthorityclaimed by thepolice for thesearch of 20 the premises, it is pertinent to scrutinize the background lest the search was carried outinabuse of police powers. Atcommonlaw the search of premises and seizure of documentstherefrom being a species of police power that impinges upon liberty, is viewed with apprehension and must in every case be justified by a 25 reference totheauthorityclaimedinjustification ofthesearch.*** On a review of the relevant part of the ruling of the trialCourt leading totheadmissibility of exhibit 36, itappears thattheCourt properly directeditself totheneedtoscrutinizethefactual premise of the search and adequately summed up the evidence on the 30 subject. Thefinding of theCourtthattheconsentofthe employees of Psaras Shipping Agency Ltd. was freely and voluntanly given cannot be faulted onappeal,nordoes anything onrecordsuggest " Thesubjectisextensivelydiscussedin Search <indSeizure by Ρ Polyviou and isthesubject of extensive analysis in. inter alia, the caseof Schneckloth ν Buntamante 93 S Ct 2041 2051
(1973)An interesting analysisof the law isalsoto be found inSearch andSeizure by WjyneR LaFave'O! 3 pp 5^ and565jnd Searches andSeizures ArrestsandConfessions by Wf- Rmgel ρ 638 et seq ••Seeinter a/u.Poly\-iou (supra)pp 214,215-U.S ν Matlock. 39 L ed 2ndsenes 242 "•See. interalia. R ν HestonFranscois I1984J1AIIER 78b (CA) 146 2 C.L.R. Psaras &Anotherv.Republic PlktsJ. that it was induced by a disguised claim to authority. The employees of the agency then physically present had physical control of the premises and unhindered access to every part thereof. No directive of the company was cited or any other 5 evidence whatever suggesting alimitation oftherightofaccessto individual parts of the premises, particularly the office of the Manager, to which, according to the evidence, they had unimpeded access. Supposing that appellant was entitled to the protection of Article 15.1 and, further, supposing that its 10 interpretation issubject to the principles evolved by reference to the4thAmendment oftheAmericanConstitution,therulingofthe Court on the admissibility of exhibit36 isreconcilable with them, establishing free and voluntarywaiverofthefreedom toshield the premisesfrom awarrantless search. 15 Furthermore,thetrialCourtproperlyaddresseditselftoevidene adduced after the admission of exhibit 36 bearing on the circumstances surrounding the search and recovery of the incriminating note. Inagreement with thetrialCourt, wefind that such testimony did not alter the complexion of the.evidence 20 touching upon the subject of the admissibility of the exhibit. The trial Court in resolving the issue was properly directed by the pnnciples approved in R. v. IVafson,*that were correctly applied to the facts of the case dismissing the suggestion that there was room forupsettingtherulingontheadmissibilityofthe document. 25 Ontheotherhand, thefindingsonthe factual background leading to the search rested on a judicial assessment of the evidence before the Court. Nextweshalladdressourselvestotheimportantquestionofthe ambit of Article 15.1 with a view todetermining first whether the 30 protection given thereby extends to the search of business premises and, secondly, but equally importantly, whether the appellant had a valid claim to privacy under Article 15.1 to the content ofthediaryinwhich exhibit36wasfound orexhibit36in itself,forthatmatter.Weshallbeginourinquirywithacomparison 35 ofthe provision of Article 15.1 with those of.the4th Amendment totheAmerican Constitution with aviewtodecidingwhether the compass of the two enactments is co-extensive or their effect similar or analogous, a necessary task in order to determine whether guidance may be derived from the case lawbuilton the 40 interpretation and application of the4th Amendment. *11980)2AllE.R. 293. 147 PiklsJ. Psaras &Another v.Republic
(1987)The wording of the twoconstitutional provisions, theCyprus and Amencan one, isrifferent Article 151 protects specifically pnvate and family matters, whereas the 4th Amendment is directed to regulating the search of premises and offices Incontrovertibly,thecontentofthetwo constitutionalenactments 5 is different as well as their objects The 4thAmendment aimsto extend and regulate the pnnciple of the commonlawthatone's house is his castle Whereas Article 15 1 is modelled onthe European ConventionofHuman Rights*thatproclaimsarightto pnvacy as such, inturn fashioned inthe spint of the 1948UN 10 Universal DeclarationofHuman Rights Of course, what is pnvate inthe sense ofArticle 15 1 may be immune from search andseizure InEnotiatesandAnother ν The Police,** the Court noticed the matenal differences betweenthe contentandaimsofArticle 15 1andthoseofthe4thAmendment 15 TheCourtheld thatbusiness activity isnotinitself aprivatematter and by thesame process of reasoning we hold in this case that business premises are notapnvate domain inthesense ofArticle 151 The conceptofpnvacy was debated atgreat length inPoliceν 20 Georghiades***,acaseinwhichimportantpronouncements were made ontheimportanceofhuman nghtsandthedutyofCourtsof Law to uphold and apply them effectively as a necessary safeguard of thedignity of theindividual andsustenance of a quality oflife befitting ahumansociety Wefind itunnecessary to 25 repeat any particularaspect oftheJudgment given inthatcaseor thetenorofthejudgments delivered byindividual membersof the Court Wecontentwith repeating thatthe nghttoprivacy extends to inherently pnvate personal and family matters obiectively identfiabie as such, provided always that thebeneficiary of the 30 nght has notbyhisown action exposed apnvate mattertopublic view UnlikeArticle 151,theobject ofthe4th Amendmentis not to institutionalizeanghttoprivacy buttoprotectfrom warrantless search the premises specified therein Nodoubttheobjects ofthe 4th Amendment hinge on the concept of pnvacy butare not 35 identical with andin matenal respects differ from a self exis'ent nght to pnvacy Article 15 1 safeguards a fundamental human nght,aims toscreen from publicviewandoutsideinquiry andthe pressures associated therewith, inherently pnvate matters, asa 'Articles **
(1986)2CLR 64 *"
(1983)2CLR 33 64 148 2 C.L.R. Psaras &Anotherv.Republic Pikls J. necessary safeguard of the autonomy of the individual in that territory.Weneed notdebateinthisappeal,asitdoesnotpose for decision whether therighttoprivacy safeguarded byArticle 15.1 can bewaived, and ifsounder what circumstances.We conclude 5 thispartoftheJudgment withaffirming thatbusinesspremisesare not, on account of the business activity carried out therein, immune from search byvirtue of the provisions ofArticle15.
- Inclined as we are to accord every fundamental human right safeguarded bytheConstitution abroadandliberal interpretation, 10 we cannot extend their scope beyond the limits set by their wording aswe were invited todo inthiscase inrelation toArticle 15.1.Weremind that inarecentdecision ofthisBench, Queissv. The Republic.* we decided that the notion of a dwelling house and the inviolability attaching thereto by virtue of Article 16.1 15 extends to a hotel room in the interest of the comprehensive protection of the rightentrenched theiein. Lastly,theclaimtoprivacyandsequentiallytherightclaimedto " v shield from search the business diary and telephone directory found on the desk of theappellant inexercise of a rightallegedly 20 safeguarded byArticle15.
- Thesubmission made,asweperceivedit,isthatthediary found on the desk of the appellant inwhich the incriminating note was found concerned a personal matter in respect of which arightto privacy attached.The content ofabusinessdiaryanda telephone 25 directory is not of itself a document embodying an inherently personal record inthesenseofArticle 15.1.Nordidthe appellant, byleavingitexposedonhisdeskandwithinreachofthepersonnel of the company, evince any expectation that its content and matters included therein should be kept private tohimself. 30 The claim to privacy in relation to exhibit 36 collapses altogether upon reflection thatitwasnopart ofthe diaryand that it was merely kept or stored therein. Certainly the content of exhibit 36, referable as it was to the details of a criminal conspiracy, itwasnotaprivate matterinthesenseofArticle15.
- 35 In our Judgment, this aspect of the appeal fails. Exhibit 36 was properly admitted in evidence. Moreover, itwasopen tothe trial Court to treat the content of exhibit36asevidence of complicity '
(1987)2C.LR 49 149 S C.L.R- Psaras&Anotherv. Republic
(1987)of the appellant in the conspiracy and criminal venture that followed,involvingtheimportationof thenarcotics,subject matter of the charges. Admissibility of the Statement of Appellant. The first statement of appellant made shortly after his arrest was 5 rejected by the Court on the ground that it was obtained in suspicious circumstances, therefore, the Court found that the prosecution failedtolay thefoundations for theadmissibility of the statement, namely, a voluntary expression of the will of the appellant. The second statement made by the appellant to the 10 police was notproduced seemingly because theprosecution took the view that it was tainted by the same suspicion as the first statement and on that account refrained from producing it in evidence. Thethird statement,thesubject matterof thisground of appeal was made about a month after the first statement 15 of the appellant whilehe was stillincustody. After a review of the evidence bearing on the circumstances of its making, the trial Court held that the ill-effects of the circumstances that rendered the first statement inadmissible had dissipated owing to the time that elapsed between the two statements and the meetings 20 appellant had, inthe meantime,with his c;unsel. Inthestatement itself appellant affirmed by his own sigmure that the statement had been voluntarily made and that he had been given every chance tomake any correctionsoralterations thathechose before authenticating it as correct. Counsel doubted the finding of the 25 Court that the circumstances that rendered the first statement inadmissible had dissipated by the time the third statement had been made, and further submitted that the reception of the statement in evidence w^.s at the least unsafe because of the conversation held betr. '* -Ί the appellant and his wife following 30 contacts of the latter w'.o members of the police and others associated in the investigation of the case Consideration of therecord nersuades u5thatthetrialCourtdid advert to every relevant part of the evidence illuminating the circumstances under which thestatement had been made leaving 35 us in no doubt as to the adequacy of the summing up. In R. v. Rennie* itwas emphasized thatquestions of fact pertaining tothe *[1982]1All E.R.385 (C.A.) 150 2 CX.R. PsoraΛ& Anotherv.Republic Pikls i . admissibility of a statement must be resolved by theJudge inthe same way as factual questionsare determinedby thejury.Guided by the principles relevant to admissibility and the spirit in which those principles should be applied, the Judge, it was said, must 5 ultimately apply his own sense totheadmissibility of astatement in the same way as thejury decides factual issues. Indeed,this is the road trodden by the trial Court.There is no suggestion that they misdirected themselves respecting theprinciples thatshould guide them indeterminingthe issue; norcouldsuch a submission 10 beentertained. InCriminalProcedurein Cyprus* it is noted on analysis of the Cyprus case law that our Courts apply a stringent test to the admissibility of astatementintheinterestof theefficacy of therule oflawandasanecessary safeguard against abuse ofpolice power. 15 Thedecisionsof theSupremeCourtinKokkinos v.ThePolice** andPetriv.ThePolice***illustratetheunwillingness oftheCourts to admit in evidence a statement unless the circumstances surrounding its making are freed from suspicion and every element of oppression. Butas reaffirmed inAzinas andAnother v. 20 The Police**** all rules evolved by the Courts relevant to the admissibility ofaconfession aredesigned toelicitthevoluntariness of a statement, the basic issue in every case. In defining voluntariness, the Courts here and in England have consistently been guided by thedefinition of voluntariness of Lord Sumner in 25 Imbrahim v. R.***** A statement is voluntary if it has not been obtained eitherby fear of prejudice orhopeof advantage heldout by a person in authority. Indiscerning the likelihood of prejudice resulting from fear, theCourtshave increasingly laid stress onthe element of oppression that may, in an indirect way, sap the free 30 will of themaker******. *ByLoizouandPikis "
(1967)2C.LR 217 •'•
(1968)2CLR 40 •'"(198D2CLR 9 ""·[1914IAC.599,o09-U914-15]AIIER Rep 874.377 ******See, interalia. R ν Rennle, 119821 1All ΕR 385 (CA) AzinasandAnother ν The Police
(1981)2CLR 9 151 PiklsJ. Psaras &Anotherv.'Republlc
(1987)In Foumtdes ν The Republic * the Court reminded of what Lord Hailsham L C stressed in DPP ν Ping Lin** that voluntanness isbasically a question of fact andso itis rhere is nothing before us justifying interference with the finding o* voluntanness made by the tnal Court either OP account of misdirection or any inadequacy in the summiro up of the evidence This ground of appeal isdismissed too 5 Relevance of TelegramExhibit 8 to the Conspiracy Counselacknowledged thatgiventhefindings of theCourtwith regard towhat hadpreceded itsdespatch incnminatinginferences 10 couldbe denved from itscontent What we areabkedtoreviewon appeal are not those inferences but the factual background thereto,especially thefinding of theAssiseCourtthatthetelegram had been sent after the first meeting between Psuras and Barker We agree with counsel thathadthefirst meeting between the rwo 15 taken place after the date on which the telegram had been sent,it would be unsafe to relate the telegram necessarily to the promotion of the objects of the conspiracy In essence we are required to review a factual aspect of the case, moreprecisely, thefinding of theCourt,thatthefirstmeeting 20 between Psaras and Barker tookplacebefore the20th May, 1985 To establish the existence of room for interference with factual aspects of the case the appellant must climb an uphill road considenng the uniqueness of the position of the trial Court to evaluate the individual parts of the evidence in the context of the 25 case in its totality The following passage from Papadopoullos ν Stavrou*** is indicative of the position of the tnal Courtto bring judgment tobear on the facts of the case «Inreviewingthe findings andultimatejudgment of thetnal court an appellate court must never overlook that the tnal 30 court, living through the drama of a case and following the unfolding of the rival contentions before it, is in a unique position to evaluate the evidence in its proper perspective The live amiospnere of the trial court is preeminently the forum for the elucidahon of theevidence and the assessment 35 of its impact •> •(198bl2CLR "> •*119~% 1AIICR 17h **·
(1982)1 CLR L·'! 152 2C.L-R· Ρ · · Γ Β · A Another».Republic PBOmS. Tojustify interference with the assessment made by the trial Court of the credibility of witnessesan appellate bench must be persuaded that the finding defies reason and common sense. {Foumtdes(supra)).*ThepersonwhointroducedPsarastoBarker 5 - witnessGeorghiou - as counsel pointed out,ultimately putthe date on which he brought them together after 20th May, 1985. ThetrialCourtnotedthisaspect of theevidence ofthewitness,a friend of Psaras,andtheway heprevaricated inhisrecollectionof thedateonwhich theintroductionhadbeen made. Furthermore, 10 theyexaminedhisevidenceinthecontextofthecaseasawhole,a far reaching examination that leaves us persuaded that their finding isneitherarbitrary norinanysense a finding thatwasnot open to them. The trial Court inferred, having regard to the evidence as a whole, that the telegram was solely intended to 15 apprise Finianosofthefactthatacustomerhadbeenfoundforthe • purchaseofthenarcotics,thesoleventureinthecontemplationof both Psaras and Finianos, namely to import near the shores of Cyprus narcoticsfor trading purposes. Here again we remain unpersuaded of the existence of any 20 roomfor interference withthefindings ofthetrialCourt.Withthe dismissalofthisground,theappealcollapses initsentirety.In our judgment, the findings of the Courtwarranted its verdict. Inthe absence of any room for interference with pertinent findings questioned onappeal,theappeal initsentiretymustbedismissed 25 andsowedirect. TheAppealofLicha Thefollowingthreegroundswerepropoundedinsupportofthe appeal ofLicha: (a) Erroneous acceptance of the evidence of Eid, a self30 confessed accomplice, as sufficiently credible to.warrant acting uponit,inface ofcorroboration.Thecase for theappellantisthat giventhecontradictorinessinhistestimony andstatementstothe police,theCourtoughttohavewhollyignoreditintheseme way that a Court of law is apt to disregard the evidence of a hostile 35 witness. If the submission of t ounsel is upheld, necessarily we must quash the conviction, for the testimony of Eid laid the foundation ofthecase fortheprosecution withoutwhich thecase for theprosecution couldnotgetoff theground. *
(1986)2 C.L R. 73,91. 153 Plkls J . Psaras & Anotherv.Republic
(1987)(b)Lack of evidence establishing thecompetenceandterritorial jurisdiction of the Court to try the case. In the submission of counsel thecase for theprosecutionwas, at itsbest, equivocal as to whetherthe area atseawhere theboatswereapprehended was within theterritory of Cyprus and notthatof theBritish Sovereign 5 Base Area. Equally uncertain in the contention of counsel was evidence pertaining tothedistance between theaforementioned spot and the low water mark.Thecase for the appellantwas that the evidence didnotestablish thatthespot was within the 12mile territorial waters (Law 45/64) otthe Republic of Cyprus. 10 (c) Failureon thepartof the trialCourttoreason itsjudgmentin the mannerordained by Article 30.2 of the Constitution. Credibility of Witness Eid. Counsel submitted there were contradictions of such a magnitude between the testimony of the witness and statements 15 made to the police, particularly with regard to the reasons for possession of (a)a money proof machine;and (b)an amountof 100,000 Lebanese pounds that the Court ought to have treated his evidence as no different from thatof a hostile witness, andon that account disregard it as testimony deserving no credit 20 whatever. As in the case of Liatsos v. The Police* counsel submitted thatthetestimony of Eid should have been disregarded as evidence unworthy of any credit in which case no question of corroboration could have arisen. Room for corroboration exists only, as the Court affirmed in '25 Zachana v. TheRepublic,**iftheevidence of the accomplice i- π the first place credible enough; only then can a question of corroboration arise. If the finding of the Court on this issue is negative, there is nothing to reinforce by way of corroboration. Conoboration is 30 looked for only if the evidence of the accomplice is, in the first place,regarded ascreditworthywhereupon corroborationmay be looked for toremove doubtsas totheprovenanceof the evidence that necessarily affect the quality of the testimony of an •
(1968)2CLR 15 " 1962 C.L R. 52 154 2 C.L.R. Psaras &Another v.Republic PlklsJ. accomplice. Corroborative evidence, we may remind, need not take theform of evidence duplicating thetestimony of the accomplice, it maybe confined to evidence confirming the testimony of the accomplice intwo material respects, thata crime 5 had been commutedand. further, thataccused was implicated in the commission of thatcrime.'" ThetrialCourtmadeathoroughexaminationof theevidenceof Eid and duly directed itsmind to every point that could casta shadow on the veracity and reliability of histestimony; duly 10 warning itself in the process ofthe dangers ofacting upon the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice. They concludedthat they were not prepared toact on the evidence of the witness witr t corroboration, but were ready to do so if duly corruoorated. There was a mass ofevidence that the crime had 15 been committed.Counsel didnotdoubtthevalueof the evidence cited by the Court as corroborative of the fact that Lichawas involved in the commission of the offences. Corroborative evidence was forthcoming from the content ofthe note in the possession of Eidinscribing thenameof Finianosandinforming of 20 his room number atAqua MarineHotel, Lamaca;previous stay of Finianosand Licha at thesame hotel andotherevidence bearing on theassociation between thetwo. Onanyviewof the evidence it provided ample conoborationof the evidence of EidthatLicha was implicated in the commission of the offences. 25 As earlier indicated,questions of credibility of witnessesarepar excellence, theprovince of thetrial Court.Thereis norule of law either,aswe explained inthecase of Georghiouv.TheRepublic** that thetestimony of a hostile witness must necessarily be disregarded in its entirety. Inthe case of a hostile witness too, the 30 weight to be attached to his evidence isamatterfor the Courtas indeeditisthecase with theevidence ofanaccomplice.Infact,the trial Courtmay. after warning itself of the danger of acting onthe uncorroborated evidence ofan accomplice, act on his testimony withoutcorroboration.Itwas perfectly opentothetrialCourt after 35 they had properly directed .ΐlemselves on the implications of the evidence of anaccompliceandhadgiven dueconsiderationtothe ' Sec interalia. Decisionof theHouseofLords inD ΡΡ ν Hester11972]2AllΕR 1056and DPP v. Kilboumefl973) 1A11ER 440 ••(1984J2CLR 65.93 155 Plkls J. Psaras &Another v. Republic
(1987)relevant evidence, to accept the testimony of Eid as sufficiently credible tobe acted upon afterdue confirmation by corroborative evidence.Thisground of appeal alsofails. Competence and TerritorialJurisdictionof theAssize Courtof Lamaca to trythe Case. Contrarytosubmissions raisedbeforetheAssizeCourt, counsel acknowledged that the territorial jurisdiction of criminal courtsof the Republic extendsto 12milesfrom the lowwater markinview oftheprovisionsofs.2 oftheTerritorialWatersLaw1964(45/64) and thatsection 5(l)(a)oftheCriminal Code (asamended byLaw 10 3/62) should be read and applied accordingly. (Yollness and Othersv. TheRepublic)*. Nonetheless,heraisedtwootherpoints thataffect the competence and territorialjurisdiction ofthe Court. Thefirst isthatthe evidence didnotconclusivelyestablish thatthe area where theboatswere intercepted and thenarcoticsdumped 15 into the sea was within the territorial waters of Cyprus and not within those of the British Sovereign Base Area, foreign soil according tos.5
(1)
(3)of theCriminalCode (asamended byLaw 3/62). The area forming part of the S.B.A. isdefined byArticle 1 of the Treaty of Establishment. Consequently, the premise for 20 assuming and exercisingjurisdiction ina criminal cause or matter had not been laidand the accused ought, therefore, tohave been discharged. No suggestion of lack of competence on the pari of the Court totrythe case wasraised before the trialCourt, norwas the competence of the Court questioned. On the otherhand, the 25 evidence before the trial Court did suggest that the police authoritiesoftheRepublicofCyprusoperatedfreelyintheseaarea where the interception took place and the arrests made. We can safely assume that CyprusCourtscanvalidlyassumeand exercise jurisdiction inrespect of offences committed within 12milesfrom 30 the shores of the Republic of Cyprus in the absence of evidence that thewatersform part oftheBritishSovereign BaseAreas.This rebuttable presumption is a necessary concommitant of the sovereigntyoftheRepublicofCyprus.Nothingonrecordsuggests the assumption ofjurisdiction bythe trial Court totrythe accused 35 was illfounded or unjustified. We find no merit in this ground of appeal. •(19; 2 2CLR 46 156 ° 2 C.L.R. Psaras & Another v.Republic PiklsJ . Thesecond pointaffecting jurisdiction relatestothearea where the narcotics were dumped into the ;ea. In the submission of counsel that sea territory was not the same asthe spot where the boatswereintercepted. Consequently, itwasunsafe fortheCourt 5 to conclude that the boats were at any time in possession of narcotics within the territorial watersof Cyprus. The evidence before thetrialCourtestablished thatthecrewof the boats began dumping their illicitcargo intothe sea assoon as theywerespotted withinashort distancefrom theareawhere the 10 boatswerestopped andtheircrewapprehended Consideringthe shortness of the distance between the two, and the fact that the boatswereinterceptedatadistanceofbetween9-10nauticalmiles from theshore,thefinding oftheCourtisnotonlycompatiblewith theevidence,butvirtuallyinevitable.Thequestionwasessentially 15 one offact, and,havingregardtothefindings oftheCourt,thereis no room for interference on this ground of appeal either. Consequently,itisdismissed. Reasoningof Judgment Counsel argued that the Judgment of the Court is not duly 20 reasoned and, therefore, itdefies the provisionsofs.113
(1)of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155 and, more importantly. breaches the mandatory requirements of Article 30.2 of the Constitution. The Judgment was faulted for failure to reason or reasonadequatelyprominentfindingsaffecting theevidenceofthe 25 principal witness for the prosecution and the rejection of the version of the appellant articulated ina statement from the dock. We were referred to Panayi v. The Police* and Ioannides v. Dikeos**asexamplesofjudicialfailuretoreasontheverdictinthe mannerordainedbytheConstitutionandinordertoexemplify the 30 implications of such failure, rendering the verdict of the Court abortive •
(1968)2CLR. 124.126 **
(1969)1 CL.R 235 157 POdsJ- Psaras A Anotherv.Republic
(1987)Article30.2enumeratestheattributesofthejudicialprocessand postulates the requisites for the valid exercise of the judicial power. Itisnot sufficient fora Courtof Lawmerelyto pronounce its verdict indicating the outcome of a judicial cause. The reasoning of a Judgment is a concomitant of a valid judicial pronouncement. 5 Failure to observe the constitutional requirement for the reasoningoftheJudgment renderstheverdict ofthe Court,inthe exercise of both its criminal and civil jurisdictions, a nullity. A non-reasoned Judgmentisnotavaliddetermination ofthejudicial cause. Itisnot necessary to debate inthis case the order that the 15 Court of Appeal may make upon settingaside theJudgment ofa trial Court for failure to reason itas required bythe Constitution. Article30isincludedinthatpartoftheConstitutionthatentrenches fundamental rights and freedoms. The Judiciary must, no less, because of the specific provisions of Article 35, give effect to 20 Article 30 and Courts of law must reason their judgments as a conditionfortheirvalidity.NotonlyArticle30.2imposesadutyon theStatetoensure compliancewiththejudicialstandardsset forth therein;italsoconfers acorrespondingrightonthelitiganttohave ajudicialpronouncementaffecting him,dulyreasoned.Reasoning 25 is a constituent element of a valid judicial pronouncement. The implicationsfrom thebreach offundamental rights relevanttothe attributesofthevalidexerciseofthejudicialpowerwerethesubject ofexamination andanalysisbythePrivyCouncilinthecaseofBell v. D.P.P. ofJamaica.* The Court wasconcerned to interpret the 30 provisionsofs.20
(1)oftheConstitutionofJamaicasafeguarding a right to fair hearing within a reasonable time, a right which is likewiseentrenchedbyArticle30.2ofourConstitution.Itwasheld thattherightsafeguardedbys.20
(1)oftheJamaicanConstitutionis a positiverightbreachofwhichentitlesthepartydeniedhisrightto 35 discontinuance oftheproceedings.AtcommonlawtootheCourts arenotpowerless,itwaspointedout,tosuppressunjustified delays and generallyabuseofthejudicialprocess. *11985)2AllE.R. 585. 158 2C.L.R. Psaras & Anotherv. Republic Plkls J. A similar approach has been adopted by Cyprus Courts tothe interpretation of Article 30 2 acknowledging a positive nght toa litigant to demand observance of judicial standards specified therein as a condition precedent to trie valid determination or 5 adjustment of his nghts through thejudicial process The case of Neophytou ν ThePolice*isinstructive on the nature of the nght entrenched by Article 30 2 and the importance of reasoning for sustenanceoftheefficacy ofthejudicial process 10 15 20 25 30 «The supply of properreasoning for thedeliberations ofthe Court, particularly the reasons for the conviction of the accused, is mandatonly warranted by the Constitution1, notably Article 30 2, and constitutes at the same time a fundamental attribute of the judicial process In the longer run, faith in the judiciary ot the State, and its mission, depends, toa very large extent, on the persuasiveness of the reasons given by theCourtsinsupport of theirdecisions Any laxity in this area would inevitably undermine faith in the premises of justice Theneedfor proper reasoning isnotonly warranted by the interests of the litigants but also by the interests of the general public inthe proper administrationof justice Theimpression of arbitranness istheone^elementthat must constantly be kept well outside the sphere of judicial deliberations » In theabove case theSupreme Courtreaffirmed the pnnciples adopted in Pioneer Candy Ltd ν Tryfon and Sons** as to the minimum requirements to be observed for a judicial pronouncement in order to qualify as duly reasoned The evidence must be analysed by reference tothemattersinissue In a cnminal case the main issue is defined by the answer of the accused tothecharge onarraignment Furthermore,theremustbe a clear statement of the findings of the Court coupled with an unambiguous pronouncementof the outcomeof a case Far from agreeing with counsel that the judgment of the tnal Court is not duly reasoned, we are of the view it provides an 35 example ofarobustly reasonedjudgment Therequirementof due reasoning does notoblige thecourttoreproducethewhole of the evidence initsevidential analysis, orrefer toevery detail of it The reasoning of a judgment may take a vanety of forms What is required of a Court of law is thatreasons should be given for its •
(1981)2CLR 195 "
(1981)2CLR 540 159 Plkls J . Psaras & Another v.Republic
(1987)decisionandthosereasonsshouldrelatetothelawapplicable and be referable to the evidence given in the cause, so that it may appear that the verdict is not merely the reaction of the Court to thedispute butwarranted bythelawapplicable andthe evidence adduced.We find no substance inthisgroundof appeal. 5 Theappeals aredismissed.Orders accordingly. Appealsdismissed. 160