September, 1987,theapplicant prays for leave toamendhisrecourse by substituting theorder for 1520 3 C.L.R. Koumi v. Republic PikisJ. requisition of theproperty asthesubjeci torreviewfor theorderof acquisition. Although it affects the same property, the order for requisition is a separate and independent act. the subject of separate notification in the Gazette of 15th May, 1987 5 (Notification 742/87). From whatever view point one examines the application itis intended tointroducea new cause for review insubstitution of theoriginal subject matterof the proceedings. 10 15 20 25 Counsel for therespondentssaysthisisimpermissible inviewof the provisions of Art. 146.3 laying down thatnorecourse shall be entertained unless the act is challenged w'thin 75 days from the date the act or decision was published. Allowing theamendment would be tantamounttobypassing through acircuitious routethe mandatory provisions of para.
. Applicant contended that his application is meant to remedy no more than a clerical error citing in support the provisions of Ord. 25, r. 6, of the Civil Procedure Rules putting it in the hands of the Court to remedy clerical errors noticeable injudgments and orders. Rule 18 of the Supreme Constitutional Court Rules 1962 makes the Civil Procedure Rules applicable to proceedings raised underArt. 146 subject to necessary analogies reflecting inherent differences in thenatureandobjects of thetwo species of proceedings, namely, civil and proceedings for the review of administrative action. Moreover, general liberty isacknowledged toallow correctionsof clerical errors in pleadings, in accordance with KiriakiTikkirou v. The Public Service Commission*, r. 19 of the Supreme Constitutional Court Rules 1962 acknowledges power to the Court tocorrectclerical errors. The exercise of the power, however, is subject to limitations inherent in the concept of clerical errors. InR. v. Cripps** it was 30 pointed out that the power to make corrections of clerical errors under the slip rule is necessarily limited to corrections of ambiguities of expression. The power can be invoked to correct accidental errors in expression that fail to give effect to the otherwise apparent intention of the drafter***, as well as errors 35 resulting from inadvertence****. Otherwise there is no power to •
prohibiting the institution of proceedings for the review of administrative action after the lapse of 75 days from communication. Upon thatground an application for amendment 15 of the prayer of the recourse was refused by Triantafyllides, J., as he then was, in Paralimni Bus Co. Ltd v. Republic*. If by the amendment the provisions of para.
are not transgressed the Court may, depending on the merits of the case, allow the amendmentof thecause including theintroductionof a 20 new cause for review. Themandatorynatureoftheprovisions ofpara.3of art. 146 has been acknowledged time and again**. The 75-day rule is inflexible tied tothe needtosustain certaintyinthe administrative process. However liberally we apply the concept of a clerical 25 error, it cannot embrace the application in this case. In essence applicant seeks to raise for review a decision other than that challenged by his recourse and the exercise is pursued after the lapse of 75 days from the publication. The application must necessarily be dismissed and I so direct. 30 Applicationdismissed. •(1967I3CL.R 559 " See John Moran ν Republic. 1RSCC 10,Holy See ot Kittum ν MunicipalCouncilof Limassol, 1R S C C 15;Shafkalisv CyprusTheatncalOrganisation
AI explanation based on the official legal text. Indicative, not a substitute for legal advice.