3C.L.R 1987 February25 [KOURR1S,J.] ΪΝTHEMATTEROFARTICLE 146OFTHECONSTITUTION GEORGHIOSIACOVOU, Applicant v. 1.THEREPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, 2. THEDIRECTOR OFINLANDREVENUE,THROUGH THEATTORNEY-GENERALOFTHEREPUBLIC, Respondents (Case No.829/85) Natural Justice—Opportunity of beingheard—Rule not applicable to purely administrativematters Reasoningofanadministrativeact—Objectofrulerequiringthatanadministrative actshouldbedulyreasoned. Ο Words andPhrases: 'Resides* and'Area* inparagraph (
- f)ofsection 18of the ImmovablePropertyTaxLaw, 1980asamendedbys.6(f)ofLaw25/81. 10 Theapplicantisafarmer residinginthetownofPaphos. Heisthe owner ofagriculturallandsituatedinthevillagesofTimiandArgakaintheDistrictof Paphos, which aresevenandthirty-one miles respectively away fromthe townofPaphos. By means of this recourse theapplicant challenges thevalidity ofthe decision, wherebyhisclaimsthathissaidlandsbeexemptedfromimmovable propertytaxwas rejected. 15 Held, dismissingtherecourse.
- il)Itiswellsettled thattheburdentoprove anexemptionordeductioninfiscallawsisonthe applicant. {2}Therelevant provision ofthelawiss.18(0oftheImmovableProperty TaxLaw 1980 asamendedbys.6(f)ofLaw25/81. 20 itreads asfollows.«Notaxshall beleviedorcollected inrespect ofthe following... (f)Agricultural immovable property (excluding anystructure or othererectionsorworks)belongingtoanindividual who carries onmainly agricultural or husbandry business andwhoresidesinthearea where the agricultural land is situate which is used by the owner exclusively for agriculturaloranimalhusbandrypurposes». 167 lacovou v. Republic
(1987)
(3)Theword «resides»intheabove sub-section should be given itsordinary natural meaning, signifying a man's abode or dwelling as explained in >vene ν IRC {1928}A C 217 (followed in Razis and Another ν The 'pubhc
(1979)3CLR 127)and inR ν North Curry, 4BandC959 Itfollows thatthe word «resides»does not cover the temporary stay of the iplicant at the villages of Timi and Argaka, where he used to go for the itivation of his lands
(4)The true constructiontobe placed intheword «area»should be such as denote the boundanes of a town,a municipality,an improvement board, illageor,where theresidenceof afarmer issituateinonearea andtheland another and the distance between thetwo is very short Itfollows thatthe cision that the applicant was residing inan area different from the area in nch the lands inquestion aresituated must be upheld 10
(5)The contention that the sub judice decision is not duly reasoned is founded 15
(6)The contention that the respondent had an obligation to afford the ρ'.ι-ani an opportunity of being heard is erroneous because the rules of ural justice are not applicable to cases such as the present one as the ->cedureinvolved isnotjudicialorquasijudicial,butpurely administrative
(7)Finally and as regards 1980, the contention that as for 1980 the •plicant was in any event entitled to exemption under sub-section 18(f). cause he carried on mainly agncultural business, does not help the iphcant because sub section 18(0 of theLaw came intoforce on 23 4 81 Recoursedismissed No orderas to costs 20 25 isesreferred to Georghalhdes ν The Republic, 23CLR 249, HadjiYiannts ν The Republic
(1966)3 C LR 338, Rambowv TheRepublic {\9&4) 3 C LR 846, Razisand Another ν TheRepublic
(1979)3 C LR 127, Levenev IRC 11928]A C 217, R ν North Curry. 4B andC959, lomdesv TheRepublic [1982)3 C LR 1136, Ceorghiades and Others ν TheRepublic (\967) 3 CL R 653. 168 30 3C.L.R lecovou v. Republic Kittidesv TheRepublic
(1973)3 C L R 123 HedjiSawav TheRepublic
(1972)3 CLR 174 Mouzounv TheRepublic
(1972)3 C L R 43 Mikrommatis ν TheRepublic,2 RS CC 125 5 Kynakides ν The Council for Registration of Architectsand Civil Engmee
(1965)3CLR 159 Riditts ν Karayiorgisand others
(1965)3 C LR 230 HjiLouka ν TheRepublic
(1969)3 C LR 570 Pantehdouν TheRepublic,4 RS CC 100 10 Kontemeniotis ν CBC
(1982)3 C LR 1027 Groupof FiveBus TourLtd ν TheRepublic{19S3) 3 C LR 793 Kauerv Committee ofMissing Persons
(1985)3 CLR 2668 Recourse. Recourse against the decision of the respondents to rejet 15 applicant's claim for exemption from immovable property taxι respect of his land in the villages of Timi and Argaka inPapho District Μ Vassiliades, for the applicants Y, Lazerou, for therespondents 20 Cur adv vul KOURRIS J read thefollowingjudgment Bythisrecourseth» applicantchallenges thevalidity ofthedecision oftheresponden DirectoroftheDepartmentofInlandRevenuedated12/7/19851( reject applicant's claim for exemption from immovable properh 25 tax inrespect of his land mthevillagesof TimiandArgaka in th* districtofPaphos Itiscommongroundthattheapplicantisafarmer residing inth« town of Paphosand hisland isagncultural land inthevillagesο TimiandArgakawhich areseven andthirty-onemiles awayiron 30 Paphos respectively The only issue which the Court has to decide is whether tht applicant «διαμένει εντόςτηςπεριοχής» where theagncultura 169 KourtiaJ. Iacovouv.Republic
(1987)andissituate. The sub judice decision which is attachedtotheapplication as Exhibit 1, is impugned on three grounds, the following:-
- a)the decision is based on a misinterpretationandmisapplicationof the elevant law
- b)itlacks duereasoning and c)itwas reached under 5 ι misconception of the factual situation and without giving the ipplicant an opportunitytobe heard. «round(
- a)Itis well established principle of Income Tax Law thatwhere a axpayer claims any exemption ordeductionfrom tax, theonusis 10 on him to support such claim for exemption or deduction.This jrinciple was expounded by the Supreme Court in the case of Charis Georghallides, 23 C.L.R. 249 at p.256 which reads as •ollows:«One dealing with fiscal legislation should carefully 15 examine first whether thetaxpayer is clearly within the words of the provisions by which he is charged with tax and, secondly, if he claims any exemption or deductionfrom taxto which liability is either admitted or established -whether such claim issupportedby therelevantprovisions of theLaw. 20 Inadisputed case theonustosatisfy theCourtas toliability to pay tax is on-the Tax Authorities and the onus to support a claim for exemption or deduction allowance is on, the taxpayer». Further, itwasheld inthe casesofAndreas HadjiYiannisv. The 25 Republic
(1966)3 C.L.R, 338 atpp. 350; 371and Nina Rainbow v. TheRepublic
(1984)3 C.L.R. 846 that the burden toprovean exemption ordeduction infiscallawsisonthe applicants, The applicant in the case in, hand is contending that he is exempted from thepaymentof immovable property taxby virtue 30 of paragraph (
- f)s.18 of the Immovable Property Tax Law 1980 as amendedby s.6 (Στ)of Law 25/81 which reads as follows:«Δεν επιβάλλεται η εισπράττεται φόρος επί των ακολούθων:35 (
- f)Γεωργικής ακινήτου ιδιοκτησίας (εξαιρουμένων οιωνδήποτε οικοδομημάτων*ή ετέρων κτισμάτων ή έργων) ανηκούσης ειςφυσικόν πρόσωπον τ ο οποίον 170 3C.L-R lucovonv.Republic KourrieJ. ασκεί κα,ά κύριον λόγον γεωργικήν ή κτηνοτροφικήν επιχείρηση και διαμένει εντός της περιοχής ένθα ευρίσκεται η γεωργική ιδιοκτησία η οποία χρησιμοποιείται υπό του ιδιοκτήτου αποκλειστικώς διαγεωργικούς ήκτηνοτροφικούς σκοπούς». 5 In English itreads as follows:«No tax shall be levied or collected in respect of the following:- 10 (
- f)Agricultural immovable .property (excluding any structures or other erections or works) belonging to an individual who carries on mainly agricultural or animal husbandry business and who resides in the area where the agricultural land is situate which is used by the owner exclusivelyfor agricultural or animalhusbandry purposes». 15 From the foregoing provisions itis clear that in order to qualify for the relief provided thereunder the immovable property must firstly be agricultural and secondly, such property must belong to an individual who carries on mainly agricultural or animal 20 husbandry business and who «διαμένει εντός της περιοχής» where theagricultural landis situate.Theexpressions «διαμένει» and «περιοχή» are not defined in the Immovable Property Tax Law and also they are not defined in the Income Tax Laws. Therefore, the general principles of construction have to be 25 applied whicharetotheeffect thatthewords shouldbe giventheir ordinary grammatical meaning. As I have stated hereinabove it is common ground that the immovable property in question is agricultural land and that the applicant isa person who carries on mainly agricultural business. 30 What remains tobe decided iswhether theapplicant «διαμένει εντός της περιοχής» where the agricultural land issituate. 35 The Μεγάλο Λεξικό της Νεοελληνικής Γλώσσας states the meaningof«περιοχή» asfollows:-Τόπος, χώρος, περιφέρεια δικαιοδοσίας κάποιου. Έκτααις γης μικρή ήμεγάληandthe meaning of the word «διαμονή» in thesame dictionary is stated «διαβίωση σε κάποιοτόπον -Τόπος κατοικίας». The Λεξικό Ορθογραφικό-Ερμηνευτικό, 171 Εταιρείας ourris J. lacovou v. Republic
(1987)λληνικών Εκδόσεων, «περιοχή» is stated as followsΙεριφέρεια, χ ώ ρ ο ς δικαιοδοσίας μιας Υπηρεσίας,εκτασις ης μικρήςημεγάλης Inthesame dictionarythemeaningofthe ;ord «διαμονή» isstatedas follows -Διαβίωσησεένα μέρος,ο ο π ό ς διαβιώσεως In the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, Vol 1, the meaning of the ;ord «area» is stated tobe «a particularextent of (esp the earth's jrface, aregion Also, inthesameDictionary,Vol II,themeaning fthe word «residence» isstated as follows - To have one's usual welling place orabode, toreside 5 10 It appears from the meaning of the above words thatthe Greek /ord «περιοχή» corresponds tothe English word «area» andthe ireek word «διαμονή» with the English word «residence» Inthecase of Razis and another ν TheRepublic
(1979)3 C L R 27 theCourtfollowed theEnglish caseofLevene ν IRC [1928] 15 C 217 where Viscount Care LC at ρ 222 said as follows «My Lords the word 'reside' is a familiar English word and is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as meaning to dwell permanently or for a considerable time, to have one's settled, or usual abode, to live in or at a particular place No 20 doubt this definition must for present purposes be taken, subject to many modifications which may result from the termsof the IncomeTaxActandSchedulesbut,subject tothat observation, it may be accepted as an accurate indicationof the meaning of theword 'reside' » *-5 Similarly judicial pronouncement was made inthecase of R ν orthCurry, 4 Β& C959 where Barley J , stated«What is the meaning of the word 'resides' Itake it that that word, where there is nothing to show that it is used in a on, more extensive sense denotes the place where an individual eats, dnnks and sleeps or where his family, his servants eat, dnnk, and sleep » Counsel for theapplicantcontendedthattheCourtshouldgive very wide interpretationtotheword «resides/διαμένει» tocover ie temporary stay of the appellant at the villages of Timi and 35 rgaka where he used togo for the cultivation of his fields On the otherhand counsel for the respondents submitted that 172 3 C.L.R lacovou v. Republic KourrisJ. the word «resides/διαμένει» as used in paragraph (0 of s 18 should be given its ordinary or natural meaning as signifying a man's abode or dwelling as explained in the cases above He contended that the applicant m the present case had his usual 5 abode or was settled as from 1959 inthetown of Paphosat No 8 Ellada Avenue I have considered thearguments of both counsel and I have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the word «resides/ διαμένει» should be given its ordinary or natural meaning 10 signifying a man's abode or dwelling as explained in the hereinabove cases Thus. I am of the view that the applicant resides in the town of Paphos and not as alleged by learned counsel for theapplicant at thevillages of Timi and Argaka The nextquestion iswhether theresidence of theapplicant \b in 15 the «area/περιοχή», where the agricultural land is situate namely, at the villages of Timi and Argaka The answer to this question depends onthe constructionof the word «area-* Itwas contendedon behalf of theapplicant thattheterm «area/ περιοχή» which is not statutonly defined, should be construed 20* widely as denoting a region consisting of groups of village;. municipalities, such as the Distnct of Nicosia or the territory over which the DistnctCourtshave jurisdiction Counsel for the respondents submitted that the expression «area» used in paragraph
- f)of s 18 of the Law has a nanου, 25 meaning and denotes a town, a village a municipality or an Improvement Board and he submitted that the respondent s interpretation of the word «area»was acorrectinterpretation Inmyviewthetrueconstructiontobe placed on the expression «areau/βπεριοχή» should be such as todenote theboundaries ot 30 a town, a village, a municipality or an Improvement Board, or where the residence (house)of a farmer is situate in one area and the agncultural land is situate in another area and the distance between the two is very short If Iplace the construction of the expression «areafr/Λπεριοχή» as contended by learned counsel 35 for the applicant, such an interpretationwillrender the use of the term superflous andwilldefeat the object of the law inquestion 1 amofthe opinionthatthe respondents'constructionplacedonthe expression «βΓβ3»/«περιοχή» as used in paragraph (0 of s 18 of the Law was acorrectinterpretationand itwas reasonably opento 173 Kottirf* J. lacovottv. Republic (1M7) hem to place such an interpretation and their decision that the applicant resided inadifferent areaviz. thetown of Paphostothat >vhere the agricultural land is situate i.e. thevillagesof Timi and Argaka must be upheld. Ground (
- b)5 Iam of the view that applicant's allegation thatthe sub judlce decision lacks due reasoning is totally without merit and should fail. It is apparent from the respondents' determination letter dated 12/7/1985, attachedtotheapplicationas Exhibit 1Inwhich there are sufficient reasons for their decision to reject the 10 applicant's claim for the relief granted under s.l8(
- f)of the Law, which was made on 21st November, 1984 and attached to the opposition as Appendix (Ψ). The object of the rule requiring reasons to be given for administrative decisions istoenable theperson concernedaswell 15 as the Court on review to ascertain in each case whether the decision iswellfounded infact andinlaw. Thesubjudice decision contains ample reasoning tosatisfy theabove principle (see cases Phanoslonidesv, TheRepublic
(1982)3CLR. 1136 atpp. 11491150, Athos Georghiades and others v. The Republic
(1967)3 20 C.L.R.653 atp.666, Kittidesv.TheRepublic
(1973)3 C.L.R. 123 atp.143, GeorghiosHadjiSawav. TheRepublic
(1972)3 C.L.R. 174 at p.205, Christos P. Mouzouri v. The Republic
(1972)3 C.L.R. 43. Ground (c) 25 The contentionadvanced by counsel for theapplicantthatthe respondentwas underan obligation togivehimahearing priorto reaching their decision is, in my view, erroneous because the principles of naturaljustice arenotapplicable tocases such as the present one as the procedure involved is not judicial or quasi 30 judicial (Mikrommatis v. TheRepublic,2R.S.C.C.125)butpurely administrative. Itwas pointed out by this Courtthat administrative bodies are under no obligation to act judicially with regard to purely administrative matters: Kyriakides v.TheCouncil forRegistrationofArchitectsandCivil Engineers
(1965)3 C.L.R. 159; Riditis v. Karayiorgis and others
(1965)3 C.L.R. 230; HjiLouka v. The Republic
(1969)3 C L R . 174 35 3 C.L.R lacovou v. Republic Kourris J 570;Maro Pantelidou v. The Republic, 4 R.S.C.C. 100: Kontemeniotis v. C.B.C.
(1982)3C.L.R. 1027; Groupof FiveBus Tour Ltd., v. The Republic
(1983)3 C.L.R 793: Kaizer v. Committee of MissingPersons
(1985)3 C.L.R. 2668. 5 However, irrespective of the above legal principles, in pointof fact,theapplicantasisapparentfrom paragraph 10and Appendix (Ψ) to the opposition, was given the opportunity to express his views. Year1980 10 Counsel for theapplicant contendedthattheapplicant in 1980 carried on mainly agricultural business and therefore relief from taxation of his agricultural land should be granted under paragraph (f)Section 18ofthe Lawandthatthe respondentsacted under a misconception of fact in not holding that in 1980 he 15 carried on mainly agricultural business. This allegation as to misconception of the factual situation whether the applicantcarriedonmainlyagncultural ora carselling business in 1980 is irrelevant as paragraph (0 of s 18 of the Law had no application atthattime.Itcame intoforce on 23/4/1981 20 Therefore thisground, also, fails. In the circumstances of this case, in my judgment, it was reasonably open tothe respondentstoreject applicant'sclaim for exemption from immovable property tax under paragraph (f) of s.18 of the Law. their decision is duly reasoned and was reached 25 after a due enquiry and a correct ascertainment of the relevant facts. Therefore the recourse is dismissed but with no order for costs. Recourse dismissed. No order as to costs. 175