(1987)1987 November 28 [A LOIZOUJ } INTHE MATTER OFARTICLE 146OFTHECONSTITUTION ANDREASFLORIDES, Applicant, ν THEREPUBLICOF CYPRUS, THROUGH THEMINISTEROFFINANCE, Respondent (CaseNo 769/86) Customs and Excise Duties — Motor vehicles, duty free importation of by incapacitatedpersons — Whethertespondent enbtledtoobtaintheviewsof the Senior TechnicalExaminerofthe Office ofExaminers forDriven— Question answered inthe affirmative —Markidesν TheRepublic
(1985)3 CLR 1393and Toouhsν TheRepubhc
(1985)3CLR 2478 cited with approval 5 Customs andExcise Duties — Motor vehicles, duty free importation of by incapacitatedpersons— Thereliefisnotgrantedinrespect ofthe importation ofany car, butonlyinrespect oftheimportation ofcarsspeciallyadaptedfor the needs ofincapacitatedpersons —Miitiadous ν TheRepublic
(1983)3 1 0 CLR 590approved Thefactsof thiscasesufficiently appear from thejudgment of the Court Recoursedismissed Noorderastocosts 15 Cases referredto Kalliν Republic
(1984)3CLR 443, loannouv TheRepublic
(1985)3 C LR 31, Marhdesv TheRepublic
(1985)3C L R1393 Tooulisv TheRepublic
(1985)3C L R 2478, Miitiadousν TheRepubhc
(1983)3C L R590 Recourse. 20 Recourse against the decisior of the respondent to reject applicant's application for the duty free importation of a carfor disabledpersons. L.Clerides,fortheapplicant. 1770 SCLR. Florid*·v.Republic S. Georghiades, Senior Counsel of the Republic, for the respondent. Cur.adv. vult. A. LOIZOU J. read the following judgment. By the present 5 recourse the applicant seeks a declaration of the Court that the decision of the respondent to reject his application for the duty free importation of a carfordisabled persons isnulland void and of nolegal effect whatsoever. The applicant on the 25th March, 1985, applied for an 10 exemption from thepaymentofimportdutyinrelationtoamotorcarfordisabled personsunder theprovisionsofclass01/09ofthe Fourth Schedule to the Customs Duties and Excise Laws
- Hiscase wasaccordingly referred tothe Medical Board on the 7th April 1986, which examined the applicant and submitted 15 itsrelevant report tothe respondent on the 13th June
- The views of the Senior Technical Examiner of the Office of ExaminersforDriverswerealsoobtainedtotheeffect thatfromhis examination of the applicant on the 13th June 1986, he concluded thattheapplicantwasabletodriveanordinaryvehicle 20 without anyspecial adaptation. The respondent informed the applicant on the 2nd.October 1986, that in the light of the report of the Medical Board his physical condition did notjustify the use of a specially converted car for invalids and his application was therefore rejected. Asa 25 resultthe applicant filed the present recourse. Themainargument on hisbehalf isthatthematterwaswrongly and contrary to law referred tothe SeniorTechnical Examiner as theonlycompetentorgantodecideonthematterwastheMedical Board. Moreover, itwassubmitted, the respondent acted undera 30 misconception of fact inthat thereport of the Medical Board was not property evaluated and/or taken intoaccount, as therein the physical condition of the applicant was described as such that wouldjustify the use byhimof thekindofvehicle in question. The question of legality of seeking the opinion of the Senior 35 Technical Examiner hasbeen considered bytheCourton several occasionsinthepastandthegeneralconclusionisthattheMedical Board is the only competent Authority to decide on a person's disability and itsextent and that itwould be wrong to rely on the 1771 « A.LolzouJ . Floride·v.Republic
(1987)opinion of another body. (See:Kalli v. Republic
(1984)3 C.L.R. 443; loannou v.Republic
(1985)3 C.L.R.31.) This Court had the opportunity to consider the matter in the case of Markides v. TheRepublic
(1985)3 C.L.R. 1393,whereit wasstated at page 1393: 5 «Whatever the legal position is where there is no interference withtheexerciseofadministrativediscretionbya person or organ having no competence in the matter under the relevant legislation,there is,under theGeneral Principles of Administrative Law, no objection tothe administration on 10 itsownfree willtosubject itsadministrativediscretiontoforms and limitations,notimposedandnotprovided forbytheLaw, as a choice of meanstoform an opinion. Insuch acase what itcannot do thereafter istoignore arbitrarilysuch opinions as same would constituteproof ofinconsistent and arbitraryand 15 therefore wrong exercise of discretionary power. The competent administrative organ may, however, do so by givingreasons for that. Though it may be said that in the present case there was nothing to suggest clearly that the respondent Minister was 20 binding himself toacceptthe opinion oftheSenior Technical Examiner etc.,yetitwasintheform offurther opinion and as part of thewiderinquirycarried out byhim inthe matter. Itis obvious thatthe ascertainment of the extend ofi"..validityofa person is not enough. It has to be correlated to the 25 interference with safe driving and the requirement of any adaptation that a vehicle may need to meet same (see Miltiadou case (supra)). · Such self-binding of the administration, is not contrary to the General Principles of Administrative Law. (See Stassinopoulos, the Law of 30 Administrative Acts, 1951p.333,Conclusions from the Case law of the Greek Council of State, 1929-1959, p. 193 and DecisionsoftheGreekCouncilofState738/1933,934/1933, 1062/1951.» Thesame approach was alsoadopted inthe case of Tooulisv. 35 TheRepublic
(1985)3C.L.R.2478,whereitwasstatedatp.2490: «I fullyendorse what wassaid byA.Loizou,J. inMarkides case (supra)' that under the general principles of Administrative Law, there is no objection to the administration, on its own free will, to subject its 40 1772 3C.L.R. 5 Florid·· r.Republic A. LolxouJ. administrative discretion to forms and limitations, not imposed but prohibited bylaw as a choice of means-to form an opinion. (Useful reference may be made inthisrespect to Stassinopoulos Law of Administrative Acts 1951 at p.333. See, also, EfstathiosKyriacou &Sons Ltd. and others v. The Republic
(1970)3 C.L.R. 106).» On the facts, however, itwasfound therein at p.2491 that«... the Minister of Finance in reaching hisdecision has given undue weight totheopinion oftheSeniorTechnicalExaminerasagainst 10 that of the Medical Board, which materially affected his decision and that he wrongly construed the contents of the report of the Medical Board as suggesting that the applicant did not require a carfor invalid person.» Inthe present case,on the facts, I cannot reach aconclusion,as 15 suggested by applicant, that the respondent was unduly influenced in reaching his decision by the report of the Senior Technical Examiner,sinceitisclearfrom therespondent'sletterto theapplicant that the subjudice decision wasreached solely«on the basisof the report of the appropriate Medical Board».Such a 20 decision was therefore properly reached and in accordance with the law. Before concluding I wishtopoint outthattheapplicant applied for the exemption from import duty in respect of, as he specified in his application, of an automatic car with hydraulic steering, 25 whichhasnotbeen established tobeaspeciallyconverted car for use byan invalid person. Asstated inMiitiadousv. TheRepublic
(1983)3 C.L.R.590,at p. 592, it was not the intention of the law to afford relief from import duty todisabled personsfortheimportation of anycarbut 30 only tothose who import vehicles specially adapted tothe needs of incapacitated persons. For the reasons stated above this recourse fails and is hereby dismissed with no orderas tocosts. Recoursedismissed. Noorderastocosts. 35 1773