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3 C.L.R. 19K7 September 14 [A LOIZOU.SAWIDES LORIS.STYLIANIDES KOURR1S JJ) XENIS LARKOS, Appellant•Applicant, ν THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, THROUGH THE MINISTRY OF FINANCEANDOTHERS, Respondents (Revistona

Article 2

9 of the Constitution, addressed to the administrative authonty which had taken the 1."» decision in question, inviting such authority to consider its initial decision. either suspends the running of time or entirely eliminates the time which h a d already r u n before submission of the request

  1. b)It is settled that when there is provision under the law for a hierarchical recourse or review by a reviewing authority and the applicant exercises his 20 nght i n this respect the administrative process is considered as continuing till a decision is taken by the hierarchically superior organ or by the reviewing authority.
  2. c)The provisions of Articles 2 9 a n d 146 of our Constitution are clear e n o u g h a n d they d o not e m b o d y any provision as to the suspension of the 25 prescribed time for the filing of a recourse The only exception, as already m e n t i o n e d , is where the law provides for either a hierarchical recourse to a hierarchically superior organ or a review by the same or another authority which makes the process a continuous process till the final decision is taken
  3. d)In this case the letter of 2 5 7.69 is not a hierarchical recourse because it 30 is n o t addressed to a hierarchically supenor organ, and it cannot be treated as an application for review as it is not based on a statutory provision
  4. e)O u r Constitution gives sufficient time to any person aggrieved by a decision to either submit an application for a new inquiry as explained hereinabove, a n d if n o decision is given within 3 0 days, he still has sufficient 35 time to file a recourse within the time limits fixed by the Constitution or challenge the decision without availing himself of Article 29. 0 T h e v i e w that a request or complaint against a decision suspends the running of time is inconsistent with the well established rule that if the new decision is confirmatory of the previous one, it is not of an executory nature a n d the p e r i o d for filing a recourse is treatedas having c o m m e n c e d from the time w h e n the original decision was taken. 2190 40 L a r k o s v. R e p u b l i c L.R. C) Per Lons <J (
  5. a)The person aggneved by an administrative decision may before filing a recourse under Article 146 address wntten complaints to the administrative organ from which the decision in question emanates
  6. b)In case of a negative decision and if such negative decision of the administrative organ concerned, is merely confirmatory (and that w o u l d be the Cii*.t ii no new. material facts were contained in the wntten complaint forwarded to it)of itsonginal decision,the rune limit envisaged oy Article 146 3 i f i c - p i t•. J ' -hi- initi.il iidimniMratii t' decision should be aflected b t the subsequent wntten complaint of the person aggneved provided of course rli.tt --ucli ,i request w,,i-submitted to the administrative organ concerned pnor in i h i ' I'xpiMtinn or the 7 r i ilavs

Article 146

3

  1. c)A n application under Art 2 9 of the Constitution does not extinguish the time that has elapsed in the meantime, but it only suspends it temporanly. that is for a penod of 3 0 days or if a reply was given before the expiration of the period of 3 0 days, for such lesser penod
  2. d)In this case time began l o run once again u p o n expiration of 30 days as from 2 5 7 6 9 Considenng the penod that elapsed from such day until the filing of the recourse (73 days) and adding to it the p e n o d that had already run until 2 5 7 6 9 the conclusion is that the recourse was out of time D) Per Stylianides J (a)The view that only executory actsor decisions, and not also, confirmatory acts or decisions, can be challenged by means of a recourse under Article 146 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n has been adopted and reiterated repeatedly in our Case - Law
  3. b)A n act is confirmatory of a previous act if the following elements are present (ι) Identity of the issuing authonty (
  4. it)Identity of the person or persons to w h o m it relates (in)Identity of the procedure (
  5. iv)Identityof the reasoning, and Μ Identity of the order
  6. c)If a new inquiry is earned into the matter the act which contains a confirmation of an earlier one. may be made the subject to a recourse
  7. d)In this case the reply to 2 0 9 6 9 was clearly confirmatory of the letter of 1 7 69
  8. e)In numerous decisions this Court has said, from the early dates of the introduction in this Country of the administrative jurisdiction by Article 146 of the Constitution that Article 146 should be interpreted and applied 2191 Larkosv. Republic in accordance with

(1987)the inlerpetation ot analogous provisions liv administrative mhun<ils in ci number o l Europe, it ι countneS six. 11 . ι - ί ' m<«• G r e e t i ' r t i i d Ιι.ιΙν ht<ill u V s e c o u n l r v s a petition forn'dicss , Ι Ι Μ Ι · » ) · m-*• - I •• petition safeguarded in Article 29 of the Constitution affects the computation of the p e n o d within which a recourse m a ybe made 5
  1. f)The citizen has a constitutional right, bo .· ,^-ΙΙΙΙΟΜ ro ibp authorities and have η written reply within 3 0 days f a i l u r e l o rake m i o consider.mon ihe said 30 driys penod in theioiiiput<nion o l rhe lime tot rhe filing ofa recourse, would discourage thecitizen toexercise hisconstitutional 10 nght a n dw o u l d limit b y 30 days the.75 days
  2. g)A written pennon for review to the competenl iiulhonty Suspends 'he period of 75 days for 30 days -the p e n o d provided m the Article 2C>ot ihe Constitution forreplying to an applicant-or lorsucli^ 1 ·· »'• p. r o d i l i h e u - p l y - -κ lually given earlier.
  3. h)T h e recourse in this case isoutof time. 15 Appeal dismissed No order asto costs. Cases referredt o : Zivlas v. Municipality of Paphos
(1975)3 C.L R.3 6 9 . Liasidou ν Municipality toannouv ofFamagusta 20
(1972)3 C L.R 2 7 8 . / ? e p u b / ; c ( l 9 8 2 ) 3 C . L . R . 1002, Spyrou v. Republic
(1983)3 C.L.R.3 5 4 ; Goulielmos Pierisv v. 77ie Republic
(1983)3 C L R,8 8 3 , The Republic Μ 983) 3 C L R 1054: Phylaktides 25 v. The Republic
(1984)3 C L.R. 1328; Evangelou v. EJectncity Authority of Cyprus
(1979)3 C.L.R Mikrommatis v. Thn Republic, 2 R S C C.125. Economides v. The Republic
(1980)3 C.L.R 2 1 9 ; PelehcoLtd v. The Republic
(1985)3 C.L R.1582, Knrjitos v. The Republic
(1985)3 C.L.R. 2 3 6 8 . Kolokassides v. The Republic
(1965)3 C.L.R. 5 4 2 ; Kyprianidesv. 77ie/?epub//c
(1982)3C.L.R.
  1. 2192 i59; 30 3 C.L.R. Larltos v. Republic Appeal. Appeal against the judgment of the President of the Supreme Court of Cyprus>(Triantaryllides. P.) given on the 30th August, 1983 (Revisional Jurisdiction Case No. 342/69)* whereby his 5 recourse against the refusal of the respondents to increase appellant'sfinancialassistancegrantedtohimduringtheperiodof hisscholarshipwas dismissed. K.MichaeHdes, forthe appellant. M. Kyprianou, Senior Counsel of tfie RepubMc, for the 10 respondents. Cur.adv. vult. The following judgments were read: A. LOIZOU J.: The appellant who at all material times was serving as a Principal Assessor in the Department of Inland 15 Revenue was given a scholarship by the Government of the United Kingdom, in order to attend a sixmonths' training course in Income Taxation matters. Upon submitting an application for financial assistancetotheDirectorofPersonnelhewasgrantedC£ 135 per month as such assistance, in addition to the scholarship 20 allowance granted to him by the United Kingdom Government. While he was away from Cyprus attending the aforementioned trainingcoursetheapplicant applied totherespondent by means of a letter dated 5th February 1969, asking for an increase of the financial assistance, which had been granted to him, as due to 25 other commitments of his he had to borrow about C£50.- per month inordertomeet hisexpenses. Inreplythe department ofPersonnel informed theappellantby means of a letter dated the 1st July, 1969 that it had not been possible to accede to his request for the increase of the financial 30 assistancegranted tohim.Theapplicant,however, revertedtothe same matter by means of a letter dated the 25th July, 1969 and applied for a reconsideration of hiscase.The respondent replied by means of a letter dated the 20th September 1969 and stated that there wasnothing to be added to hisletter dated the 1stJuly 35
  2. As a result the applicant filed a recourse on the 6th November
  3. *Reported in
(1983)3CLR 1160 2193 A.LoizouJ. Larkos v.Republic
(1987)The learned tnal Judge who tned the recourse upon being satisfied that the last act in the relevant «administrative process which could conceivably be found to be an executory one is the refusal to increase the financial assistance to the applicant which has been communicated to him by means of the letter dated the 5 1st July 1969 in relation to which the present recourse is clearly outof timeunderArticle 146
(3)of theConstitution» dismissed the recourse as being outof time He,also, held thatthe further reply given to the applicant on the 20th September 1969 in response to his continuing insistence for an increase of the financial JO assistance granted tohim,«isclearly only confirmatory of what has been stated in the letter of the 1st July, 1969 and it could not be challenged underArticle 146 of the Constitution» As against the dismissal of the recourse the appellart took the present appeal on the following grounds 15 (
  1. a)The judgment of the tnal Court to the effect that the sub judice act is confirmatory is wrong in law and in fact and violated the pnnciples of good administration (b)Inany case even if itwere tobe proved thatitis confirmatory the express and categoncal provisions of Article 146 of the 20 Constitution donotexclude itfrom theannullingcontroland/orits attack by recourse underArticle 146 (
  2. c)The tnal Court erroneously ignored the omission of the respondent to inquire intothematenalsubmitted by applicant by means of his letterdated 25thJuly, 1969 andreply within amonth 25 as provided by Article 29 of theConstitution (
  3. d)Further the tnal Court erroneously decided that the sub judice act was confirmatory andtherecourse outof timeinviewof the fact that the respondent purposely replied to the applicant's application for reconsideration of the facts of the case after the 30 lapse of seventy -five days from the 1st July 1969 Nowitiswell-settled thataconfirmatory actcannotbe madethe subject of a recourse underArticle 146 of the Constitution unless such decision has been taken «after a new inquiry» intothematter (see, inter aha, Zivlas ν Municipality of Paphos
(1975)3 C LR 35 349, Liasidou ν Municipality ofFamagusta
(1972)3 C LR 278 loannou ν Republic
(1982)3 C L R 1002, Spyrou ν The Republic
(1983)3 C L R 354, Gouheimosv TheRepublic
(1983)3 C LR 883, Piens ν The Republic
(1983)3 C LR 1054, Phylaktidesv The Republic
(1984)3 C LR 1328 40 2194 3 C.L.R. Larkosv. Republic A.LolzouJ. Astowhen a new inquiry existsvery instructive isthe following passage from Stassinopoulos «Law of Administrative Disputes» which Ihave adopted in the case of Liasidou (supra) at pp. 286278). 5 «When does a new inquiry exist, is a question of fact: In general, it isconsidered to be a new enquiry the taking into consideration of new substantive legal or real material, and the new material ismeticulously considered, for he who has been out of time in attacking an executory act, should not 10 circumvent such a time limit by the creation of a new act. which it was issued nominally after a new enquiry but ir. substance on the basisof thesame material. 15 20 Especially there doesexistanewenquirywhere,before the issueofthesubsequent act,theretakesplaceconsiderationof newlyproduced material orpre-existing butunknown, which are now taken into consideration inaddition, but for the first time.Similarly,itconstitutesanew enquirythecarryingoutof a localinspectionorthecollectionofadditionalinformation in the matter under consideration.» On the facts of the present case as appearing in the aforesaid two letters of the appellant, there has not been, and to my mind there ought not to be a new inquiry, because in the subsequent lettertherewere nonew factsatall.Bythesubjudicedecision the 25 administrationwasinsistingonitsviewnottoaccedetotherequest of the applicant to increase his financial assistance, reiterating thereby itspreviousdecision. Andinthisrespect I candono more than repeat what I said inLiasidou (supra atpp. 287-288). «Both decisions were based on the same reasoning as 3C neither the factual nor the legal position had changed in the meantime. The second decision, therefore, is of a confirmatory nature. Itcannot be considered as an omission to perform what the administration is alleged to have been legallybound toperform, inasmuchasthe express repetition 35 of a previous refusal, clearly declared, constitutes a confirmatory act,subjecttowhathasbeenhereinabove stated regarding the absence of new material facts or change in the legal position. A similar approach was made by the Greek Council of State in Decision 1796/58 where it dealt with 40 almostsimilar facts tothose of the present case...» Foralltheabovereasonsthelearned trialJudgerightlydecided that the only executory decision isthe one contained inthe lettei 2195 A.Loixo«J. Larko«v.R*pubBc
(1987)ofthe 1stJuly, 1969.inrelation towhichthepresent recoursewa*> clearlyout of time;and that the decision contained inthe letterot the 20th September 1969 was clearly only confirmatory of what had been stated in the letter of 1stJuly 1969 and itcould not be challenged under Article 146of the Constitution. 5 Before concluding Iwould liketorefertothecaseof Evangehu v. The Electricity Authority of Cyprus
(1979)3 C.L.R. 159, in which TriantafyHides P., after finding as a matter of fact and concluding that the application in that case was out of time as having beenfiledafter thelapseofseventy-five daysfrom theday 10 thattheapplicant cametoknowofthesubjudice decision wenton tosayatp. 166; «So, even assuming that the applicant received the said letterbyOctober31,1974,atthelatest,therelevantperiodof seventy-five daysexpired onJanuary 14, 1975,and hisletter 15 dated January 29, 1975, cannot be treated asan application foradministrativereviewofthedecision totreathisservicesas havingbeen terminated,whichwasmadewithintheperiodof seventy-five days prescribed by Article 146.3 of the Constitution, and which had itbeen so made it would have 20 had the effect of suspending therunning of time inrelation to such period, pending either a reply to the letter of the applicant dated January 29, 1975, or until the expiry of the period of thirty days prescribed under Article 29 of the Constitution, whichever of the two happenings would occur 25 earlier.» And then went on tosay: «Even if, however, I were to assume that the applicant received the letter of the respondent dated October 1,1974, so belatedly that his application for an administrative review 30 ofthesubjudicedecisionoftherespondent, whichhehadput forward bymeansofhisletterofJanuary 29,1975,was made within a period of seventy-five days after he had come to know ofsuch decision,withtheresultthatthetime prescribed underArticle 146.3oftheConstitution ceased runningagainst 35 him». Itisclearthattheaforesaid wasnotpartoftheratiodecidendiof the case. But even ifitwasIwould respectfully disagree with the view that an application for administrative review affects the runningoftimeunderArticle146.3oftheConstitution,whichisso 40 2196 3 C.L.R. Larkos v.Republic A.Loizou J . "xplinl. that leaves no room for introducing into our system of administrative Law the approach which appears to have been ollowed inGreece. For all the above reasons Iwould dismissthe appeal but in the 5 circumstances there would be no order as tocosts. SAWIDES J.: Iagree with the reasons given by my brother Judge A.Loizou inhisjudgment which hasjustbeen delivered.I alsoagree with the resultastotheoutcome ofthepresent appeal. Notwithstanding the fact that thisappeal fails in any event on the 10 ground that the recourse of the appellant wasfiledout of time, I consideritnecessary toadd afewwordsof myown toexplain the reasons of adopting the view expressed by A. Loizou, J. in his judgment. Aquestion which poses forconsideration inthepresent appeal 15 is whether a written request,

Article 29

of the Constitution, addressed tothe administrative authority which had taken the decision in question, inviting such authority to reconsider itsinitial decision, either suspends the running of time or entirely eliminates the time which had already run before the 20 submission ofthe request. Counsel for the appellant submitted that if prior to the expiration of 75days forthe filing of arecourse a request ismade by virtue of Article 29 of the Constitution addressed to the administrative authoritywhich had takenthedecision inquestion, 25 invitingsuchauthoritytoreconsideritsinitialdecision,the running ofthe 75daystime beginsto run afresh from the daya decision is taken on such request and if no such decision istaken within 30 daysthenitbeginstorunafter theexpirationof30days.Insupport ofhiscase counsel for appellant sought to relyon the decision of 30 this Court in Evangelou v. ElectricityAuthority

(1979)3 C.L.R. 159, Mikrommatis v. The Republic, 2 R.S.C.C. 125 and Economides v. The Republic
(1980)3 C.L.R. 219; also on Stassinopoulos «TheLawof Administrative Disputes»4th Edition, pp. 208, 209 and the case law of the Greek Council of State as 35 expounded therein. Article 146.3of the Constitution providesthatarecourse under Article 146.1 «shall be made within seventy-five days of the date when thedecision oract waspublishedor, ifnotpublished andin the case of an omission, when it came to the knowledge of the 40 person making the recourse.» 2197 Sawide J . Larkos v. Republic
(1987)Article29 of the Constitution providesas follows «1 Every person has the nght individually or jointly with others to address wntten requests or complaints to any competent publicauthonty and tohavethem attended toand decided expeditiously, an immediate notice of any such 5 decision taken duly reasoned shall be given to the person making the request or complaint and in any event within a penod not exceeding thirty days 2 Where any interested person isaggneved by any such decision or where nosuch decision isnotified tosuch person 10 within the penod specified inparagraph 1ofthisArticle,such person mayhave recourse toacompetent court inthe matter of such request or complaint» The provisions of Articles29 and 146of the Constitution leave no room for doubt as to their clear meaning and effect When a 15 person has a complaint against a public authonty or has made a request ina matter concerning him, such person isentitled under Article29 1to addresshiscomplaint or request tothe competent publicauthonty which hastoconsider and decidesame within 30 days and notify itsdecision, which hastobeduly reasoned, tothe 20 person concerned The only remedy afforded to any interested person aggrieved by such decision is expressly provided by paragraph 2ofArticle29andis«tohavearecoursetoa competent Court inthe matter of such request or complaint» Article 146 embodies provisions as to the competent Court 25 having exclusivejunsdictiontoadjudicate finallyonarecourse,by whom a recourse can be made, the t*me limits within which a recourse is to be filed and the effect of a decision given m a recourse Itiswellsettledbyourcaselawthatwhenarequestorcomplaint 30 is made to a public authonty and no decision is taken within a month then theapplicant isentitledtofilearecourse forthe failure of the organ to take a decision on the complaint or request Heis also entitled to treat such failure as amounting to a negative decision tohisrequest and filearecourse eitheragainstthefailure 35 totake a decision oragainst the negative decision Alsothat when a decision istaken bya publicauthonty and the person aggneved appliesforreconsideration, provided thatthere isnew substantial legal or real matenal for reconsideration of the decisionandthepublicauthontyconcerned issatisfied thatindeed 40 2198 1C L R Larkos v. Republic Savvides J . such matenal necessitates a new inquiry into the matter, it may revoke its previous decision and take a new decision after meticulously considering such materialand making a new inquiry in thematter 5 It is further established that when an application is made for reconsideration of the case and a decision is given based on the same factual and legal basis confirming the previous one, such new decision is merely a confirmatory one and as such it can neither be thesubject matterof arecourse norinany way suspend 10 or revive the 75 days time for challenging the onginal decision (see, inter alia Zivlas ν Municipality of Paphos
(1975)3 C L R 349, loannou ν Republic
(1982)3 C LR 1002, Peletico Ltd ν Republic
(1985)3 C L R 1582, Knhkos ν Republic
(1985)3 C LR. 2638) 15 Itisalso settled thatwhen there isprovision underthe law for a hierarchical recourse or review by a reviewing authonty and the applicant exercises his nght in this respect, the administrative process is considered as continuing till a decision is taken by the hierarchically supenor organ or by thereviewingauthonty 20 25 30 35 40 Inthe case of Evangelou ν TheElectncityAuthonty (supra)on which counsel for appellants sought to rely, Tnantafyllides, Ρ , held at ρ 165, the following «Itis a well settled pnncipleof law thatif a person affected by an administrative decision does not make at once a recourse against this decision, but seeks from the administrative organ which hasreacheditareconsiderationof the matter,this amounts toan exercise of his nght to address a wntten request to the competent public authonty—which nght is safeguarded under our Constitution by means of Article 29—and, as a result, thetime within which a recourse may be made against the decision complained of ceases to run The application, however, for reconsideration has to be made before the expiry of thepenodwithin which a recourse may be made against the decision concerned, and the time within which a recourse can be made commences to run afresh as from when either a reply is received or as from the expiry of the time—which under Article 29 is thirty days— withinwhich areply oughttohave beengiven,incasenosuch reply is actually given (see Stasinopoulos on the Law of the 2199 S a w i d e » J. Larkos v. Republic
(1987)Administrative Disputes—Στασινόπουλου, «Δίκαιον των Διοικητικοί Διαφορών» (1%4), pp.
  1. 209)». The above opinion finds support in Stassinopoulos on theLaw of Administrative Disputes,
  2. where at p. 208, it reads as follows: 5 «Διακοπή της προθεσμίας.—Συνήθως ο διοικούμενος, όταν ανακοινωθή εις αυτόν μίαπράξις δυσμενής, θίγουσα τα συμφέροντα τ ο υ , δεν ασκεί αμέσως αίτησιν ακυρώσεως ενώπιον του Συμβουλίου της Επικρατείας, αλλά υποβάλλει π ρ ο ς τ ο διοικητικόν 10 όργανον, το οποίον εξέδωκε την πράξιν, μίαν α ν α φ ο ρ ά ν π α ρ α π ό ν ω ν , την οποίαν ονομάζομεν αίτησιν θεραπείας, ή π ρ ο ς το ιεραρχικώς πμοιοταμίνον όργανον μίαν αίτησιν, την οποίαν ονομάζομιν ιεραρχικήν προσφυγήν, επειδή σκοπός αυτής είναι να 15 θέση εις κίνησιν τον ιεραρχικόν έλεγχον, περί του οποίου ήδη ωμιλήσαμεν. Η υποβολή τοιούτων αιτήσεων είναι δικαίωμα τουδιοικούμενου, το οποίον το Σύνταγμα ονομάζει «δικαίωμα του αναφέρεσθαιεις τας αρχάς» και το οποίον ρυθμίζεται και υ π ό του 20 Συντάγματος και υπό του ειδικού νόμου του 1914, όστις ορίζει ότι αι αρχαί υποχρεούνται ν' απαντούν εντός μηνός εις τ α ς τοιαύτας αναφοράς, έχει δε ω ς συνέπειαν, ότι διακόπτει την προθεσμίαν της «αιτήσεως ακυρώσεως», ηοποία ήδη έχει αρχίσει. Διά 25 να έχη όμως τοιούτον αποτέλεσμα διακοπής, η υποβολή αιτήσεως θεραπείας ή ιεραρχικής π ρ ο σ φ υ γ ή ς , δέον να λάβη χώραν πριν εξαντληθή η εξηκονθήμερος προθεσμία της αιτήσεως ακυρώσεως. Τότε, νέα εξηκονθήμερος προθεσμία αρχίζει εκ νέου 30 μετά παρέλευσιν μηνός α π ό της υττόβολής της αιτήσεως θεραπείας ή ιεραρχικής προσφυγής.» («Interruption of time: Usually the subject, when an unfavourable decision is communicated to him,does not imriiediately file a recourse to the Council of State, but 35 submits totheadministrative organ, which issued the act, a complaint, which we call petition for redress, or to the hierachically superior organ an application, which we call hierarchical recourse, becauseitsobject istoputinmotion the hierarchical control towhich wehavealready referred to.The 40 subject has arighttosubmit such applications, which is named by the Constitution asa right to refer to the authorities and is 2200 3 C.L.R. Larkos v. Republic SawlJe* J. governed bothby theConstitution andaspecial law of 1914, which ordains thata reply should be given to the subject by the organ concerned within 30 days. The exercise of such right entails the interruption of the time within which a 5 recourse canbe made.Butsucharesultoccursonlywhenthe complaint or the hierarchical recourse was submitted before the expiration of theperiodof60days withinwhicharecourse can be filed. In such a case time begins to run afresh upon expiration of one month from the submission of thepetition 10 for redress or of thehierarchical recourse.»). The view of Stassinopoulos is based on the decisions of the Council of State in Greecein Cases 106267 and 177S69 which favour the view that written applications to the administrative organ concerned for reconsideration of its initial decision, 15 extinguish thetimethathas elapsed priortothesubmission of an application and cause the time to run afresh as from the date a reply is given by theadministrative organ inquestion,orfrom the expiration of the time within which a reply ought to have been given. 20 The above opinion is criticized by Professor Tsatsos in his treatiseRecoursefor Annulment,3rdEdition,paragraph43,atpp. 90 - 92,where heexpresses hisdisagreement totheviewsheld by the Greek Council of State and Stassinopoulos. Professor's Tsatsos view is thatsuch an application should notextinguish the 25 time that has elapsed prior to its submission but should only suspend same for the period of 30 days orsuch lesser period if a reply is actually given earlier. The reasons for his disagreement appear in the footnote at p.92, which reads as follows: «
(1)To Συμβούλιον της Επικρατείας παγίως την αντίθετον 30 δεξάμενον εκδοχήν, καθ'ην ηπροθεσμία των εξήκοντα ημερών άρχεται και αύθις υπολογιζόμενη από της παρόδου τουτριακονθημέρσυ, μη συνυπολογιζομένου και του προ της υποβολής της αιτήσεως θεραπείας διαρρεύσαντος χρόνου, αντιφάσκειπροςτα υπ' αυτού 35 ορθώς δεκτά γενόμενα ως προς τας βεβαιωτικός πράξεις και το ατταράδεκτόν της προσβολής αυτών. Βλ. Και Μιχ. Στασινόπουλου, σελ. 208,Δ.Δ. Διαφορών. Ακόμη και η χρησιμοποιούμενη ορολογία εν ταις αποφάσεσι του Συμβουλίου της Επικρατείας εμφανίζει 40 σΰγχυσιν. Ούτως αφ' ενός η αίτησις θεραπείας σύχνάκις ταυτίζεταιπρος την χαριστικήν προσφυγήν. Ορθήν χρήσιν της ορολογίας βλ. εν 21/38, και 1881/38. 2201 SawldesJ. Larkos v.Republic
(1987)Βλ όμως και ιτπλιν την αιτηοιν Οιμαπιιας ανιιιτα ματιθεμίνην κμος την ιερπρχικην ττμοοφυγην >\ 89838, 68039, 95639, ως και τ ο Συμπλήρωμα Νομολογίας (Ζαχαροπούλου), Ι, σελ 95, αριθ. 2343, 2347 Α φ ' ετέρου οι όροι αναστολή και διακοπή της 5 προθεσμίας συγχέονται. Βλ. 2138,82838, 82938, ^45, 14645, 23239, 85939, 55545, εν αις γίνεται λόγος περί αναστολής αντί του ορθού, ήτοι περί διακοπής. Το Conseil d'Etatεδέχθη (βλ την απόφασιν της26Απριλίου 1944, Chambre syndicale des agents gen£raux d'Assurances iO des Ardennes), ότι εάν η ιεραρχική προσφυγή απορριφθή δι' αποφάσεως αποκλειστικώς επικυρωτικής (purementconfirmative)τηςπράξεως, καθ' ης η ιεραρχική προσφυγή, δενεπέρχεται διακοιτη ιη*, προθεσμίας Το ζήτημα έχει λεπτομερώς αναλύσει ο 15 Wahne ενR D P.LXVIII σελ 487,κ ε.Παρ' ημιν η αίτησις θεραπείας διακόπτει την εξηκονθημεμον προθεσμιαν, εαν συντρεχιοοιν αι κατά νομονπροϋποθέσεις ασχέτως προς το βεβαιωτικον η επΊκυρωτικον περιεχόμενοντης απαντήσεως η καιτηςσιωπής εισέτι της αρχήςπρος ην 20 απευθύνεται αυτή » («The view that has been persistently adopted by the Council of States that the period of time begins to run afresh after the expiration of the penod of 30 days, without taking into account the penod that had already run until the 25 submission of the petition for redress is inconsistent with the rightly accepted by the Council pnnciple thata confirmatory act cannot be made the subject of the recourse See Μ Stassinopoulou, Law ofAdministrative Disputes ρ 208 Even the terminology used by the Council of State reveals 30 confusion So on many occasions the peiition for redress is confused with a gratis recourse Correct use of the terminology, see in cases 21/38 and 1881/38 But see the petition of redress n juxtaposition with the hierarchical recourse in cases 898/38, 680/39, 956/39, as 35 well as Simphroma Nomologias (Zacharopoulou) 1, ρ 95 Nos. 2343, 2347 On the other hand the terms 'inter­ ruption' and 'suspension' instead of the correct one of 'interruption' is used The Council d' Etat accepted (See the decision 26 44 44, Chambre syndicale des 40 agents generaux d' Assurance des Ardennes) that if the hierarchical recourse is dismissed by a purely confirmatory 2202 3 C.L.R. 5 Larkos v.Republic S a w i d e sJ . deceit>n (putementconfirmative) of theact.against which the iPCouiM' luui been buhmitted. there does not follow an interruption of the period of time. The matter has been analysed in detail by Waline. R.D.P.. LXV1II. p.487 etseq.In Gieece ihe?pennon lo redress interrupts the60 days period if the it*gal prerequisites are satisfied, irrespective of the confirmatory nature of the answer or even the silence of the .uithontv towhich the petition h-..'!-<·<Ί <n!dressed.»). From what emanates from the above comment of Tsatsos and also from othertextbook writers in Greece,relevant applications are divided into several categories by textbook wnters. A very elucidating exposition on this matter was made by Loris, J. in Gouiieimosv.TheRepublic
(1983)3C.L.R.883 atpp. 889,
  1. The othercase on which counsel for appellant sought torely, is 15 the case of Micrommatis v. TheRepublic (supra). Micrommatis case lends no support to the argument of counsel for appellant. There, the gist of the case was whether resort to the review and revision procedure undersection 42 against an assessment under section 37 of the IncomeTax Law, Cap.323, would notoperate 20 as an estoppel to a recourse tothis courtand whether the period of 75daysprescribed byArticle 146.3 shouldoperatefromtheday on which the result of the review on revision came to the knowledge of the person concerned. Itwas held in that case as follows atpp. 128,129: 10 25 30 35 40 «The Court is of the opinion that the review and revision procedure under section 42 is notcontrary to, orinconsistent with, any provision of the Constitution. Such procedure merely enables theperson assessed toseek areconsideration of the original assessment by the Commissioner and, if resorted to.such procedure amounts to nothingmore thana continuation or completion of the process of assessment in the particular case. It was also contended in this Case by counsel for the Respondentthatthisrecourse couldnotbe entertainedby this Court because it had not been made within the period prescribed by paragraph 3 of Article
  2. As the Court has held,forthe reasons givenabove, thatthereviewand revision undersection42 of CAP323oftheoriginal assessment under section 37 of that Law must be regarded as a continuationor 2203 Sawlde·J. Larkos v.Republic
(1987)completion of the process of assessment, it follows that the relevant dateinthisCasefrom whichtheperiodprescribedby paragraph 3 of Article 146 of the Constitution must be reckoned, >s the date on which the result of the review and revision under section 42 came to the knowledge of the 5 Applicant. In this case the Applicant was informed by the Respondent of such result by letter dated the 22nd March, 1961. The Court is, therefore, of the opinion that this recourse, the Application inrespect of which wasfiled on the 15th April, 1961,has been made within the time prescribed 10 by paragraph 3 of Article 146.» The above opinion has been constantly followed by this Court and itiswellestablished thatwhen thereisaprovision inalaw for a reviewand revision procedure,andaperson takesadvantageof such procedure, tillitsdetermination theprocedure istreated asa 15 continuation orcompletion oftheactand thetimedoesnotbegin to run tilla final decision istaken bythe reviewing authority. I find myself unable to share the opinion expressed in Evangelou case (supra). As mentioned earlier, the provisions of Articles29and 146ofourConstitution,areclearenoughandthey 20 do not embody any provision as to the suspension of the prescribed time for the filingofarecourse.Theonlyexception, as already mentioned, is where the law provides for either a hierarchicalrecourse toahierarchicallysuperiororgan orareview by the same or another authority, which makes the process a 25 continuous process till the final decision istaken. In the present case the letter of the applicant of 25th July, 1969, isclearly not a hierarchical recourse under the law, as it is not addressed to a hierarchically superior organ. On the other hand it can not be treated asanapplication forreviewasitisnotbased onastatutory 30 provision for a review of such decision. Therefore, it could not have the effect of eithersuspending orinterruptingthe runningof time. OurConsitution givessufficient timetoanypersonaggrievedby a decision to either submit an application for a new inquiry as explained hereinabove,and ifnodecision isgivenwithin30days, he stilt has sufficient time to file a recourse within the time limits fixed by the Constitution or challenge the decision without availing himself of Article 29; and if in the course of the proceedings new material emanates which is relevant and 40 substantive to require a new inquiry, the recourse may, on the undertaking ofsuch authoritytocarryouta new inquiryeither be 2204 3 C.L.R. Larkos v. Republic SawldesJ. discountinued or be kept in abeyance pending the result of such new inquiry. If I was to agree with the view that a request or complaint against a decision suspends the running of time then such viewwould have been inconsistent withthe wellestablished 5 rule that ifthe newdecision isconfirmatory ofthepreviousone,it isnotofan executory natureand theperiod for filinga recourseis treated as having commenced from the time when the original decision wastaken. Theappeal istherefore dismissedbutwith no orderforcosts. 10 LORIS.J.:The main question which posesfordetermination in the present appeal iswhether the timeenvisaged byArticle 146.3 of our Constitution, for the filing of a recourse impugning an administrative decision, isaffected bya writtenrequest

Article 29

of the Constitution, addressed to the administrative 15 authority which has taken the decision inquestion, inviting same to reconsider itsinitial decision. Article 146.3ofourConstitution providesthatarecourse under Article 146.1 «shall be made within seventy-five days of the date when the decision oractwaspublished or, ifnotpublished andin 20 the case of an omission, when it came to the knowledge of the person makingthe recourse.» The «75-days time limit»

Article 146

.3 of the Constitution isaffected, inthesense thatitisbeingsuspended, in atleasttwo established occasions as follows: 25 A. Certain Laws provide that a decision of an administrative organ can be impugned before a hierarchicallysuperior organ by means of a hierarchical recourse, viz. Law 9/82 as amended by Law 84/84. In such a case the initial decision of the Licensing Authority does not become executory until after the lapse of 20 30 days from itspublication, (vides.4of Law9/82 and s.4Aof Law 84/84) so that the person aggrieved may file a hierarchical recourse; and the time of 75 daysstarts running after the lapseof 20 days, if a hierarchical recourse is not filed, or after the publication of the decision inthe hierarchical recourse. 35 B.There areinstanceswhereaLaw,althoughnot envisaging a hierarchical recourse, provides a review and a revision procedure of the initialdecision bythesameadministrative organ whohasgiventheinitialdecision,viz.s.42oftheIncomeTaxLaw Cap.323.ItwasheldbythethenSupremeConstitutional Courtin 2205 Loris J. Larkos v. Republic

(1987)thecase ofMikrommatis ν TheRepubhc 2 R S C C 125atp 129 that as «The review and revision undersection 42 of Cap 323 of the original assessment under section 37 of that Law must be regarded as a continuation or completion of the process of 5 assessment it follows thai the relevant dare in this case from which the period piesinbed by parayuiph 4 ot Article 146 ol ihe Constirution must be reckoned ibihe date on which the result of the reviewdnd revision undersection 42 came to the knowledge of theApplicant » 10 Now. when express provisions ina law (vide A above) or even provisions ina law by necessary implication (vide Β above) affect the time limit of 75 days in the ways above stated, shouldn't the provisions of Article 29 of the Constitution a fortion affect the aforesaid timelimit,taking intoconsiderationthattheConstitution 15 is theSupreme law of theLand"3 Unhesitatingly I am answenng thisquestion inthe affirmative Article 29 of theConstitutionreads «1 Every person has the right individually or jointly with others to address written requests or complaints to any 20 competent public authorityandtohave themattendedtoand decided expeditiously an immediate notice of any such decision taken duly reasoned shall be given to the person making the request or complaint and in any event within a period notexceeding thirty days » 25 The person aggrieved by an administrative decision may, before filing a recourse under Article 146, address wntten complaints tothe administrative organ from which thedecisionin question emanates, placing before it any new matenal which might convince theadministrative organ inquestion toreconsider 30 its initialdecision,inwhich case litigation isavoided and expenses incidental theretosaved in case the said administrative organ is not satisfied with thematenalforwarded toit,itwillturn downthe wntten complaint,informing theperson aggneved, expeditiously and in any event within a period not exceeding 30 days, of its 35 adherence toits initial decision In the circumstances if the negative decision of the administrative organ concerned,is merely confirmatory (andthat would be the case if no new matenal facts were containedinthe 2206 3 C.L.R. Larkos v. Republic Loris J . writtencomplaint forwarded toit)ofitsoriginaldecision. Iholdthe viewthatthetimelimitenvisagedbyArticle 146.3inrespectofthe initial administrative decision should be affected by the subsequent written complaint of the person aggrieved, provided 5 of course that such a request was submitted to the administrative organ concerned pnor to the expiration of the 75days

Article 146.3.

The above principle has been set out by the learned President of this Court in the case of Evangelou v. Electncity Authority 10 (l q 79)3 C L R . 159at p. 165as follows- 15 20 «Itiswellsettled principle oflawthat ifaperson affected byan administrative decision does not make at once a recourse against thisdecision, but seeks from the administrative organ which has reached it a reconsideration of the matter, this amountstoanexerciseofhisrighttoaddressawritten request tothe competent publicauthority - whichrightissafeguarded under our Constitution by means of Article 29 - and, as a result, the time within which a recourse maybe made against the decision complained of ceases to run.» Having heldthattheprovisionsofArticle29ofour Constitution should have a bearing on the time-limit of 75 days in the wa·1 abovestated, Ishallproceed toconsidertheextentofsuchbearir j on the time limit aforesaid. The learned President of thisCourt in Evangelou case (Supr), 25 relying mainly on Greek Authors (Stasinopoulos on the Law cf Administrative Disputes, 1964,pp 208-209) and the Decisionsof the Council of State in Greece in cases 1062/1967 and 1775/ 1969) held that «the time within which a recourse can be made commences torun afresh as from when, either a replyisreceived 30 or asfrom the expiry ofthe time -which underArticle29 isthirty days -within which a reply ought to have been given, incase no such reply isactually given.» Article 10.1 of tl e Greek Constitution 1975/1986, confers on every citizen of the Greek State a right - similar to the one 35 conferred byArticle 29 of our Constitution -toapply individually orjointlywith otherstopublicauthorities. Itistrue that the majority ofthe Decisionsofthe Greek Council of State favour the view that such written applications to the administrative organ concerned for reconsideration of its initial 2207 Loris J . Larkos v. Republic

(1987)decision, extinguish the time(for filing arecourse ofannulmentof the initial administrative decision) that has elapsed prior to their submission and cause the time to run afresh as from the date a reply was given by the administrative organ in question or from expiration of the time of30 daysi.e.the timewithin which a reply 5 ought tohave been given. Professor Th. Tsatsos in his treatise «Recourse of Annulment» 3rd Ed., paragraph 43atpages90-92 expresseshis disagreement to the said views held by the Greek Council of State, giving his reasons thereof; Prof. Tsatsos maintains that such an application 10 should not extinguish the time (for filinga recourse of annulment) thathaselapsed priortotheirsubmissionbutshouldonly suspend same for the period of 30 days or such lesser period if a reply is actually given earlier. Havinggiventothemattermybestconsideration Iholdtheview 15 that we should adopt the opinion of Prof. Tsatsos set out above, bearing inmind inparticular the fact thatthetime limit

our Constitution is 75 days whilst in Greece the relevant legislative provision confines the time within which a recourse of annulmentriiaybe filed, to60days. 20 Asa consequence, Ihold theviewthatEvangelou case (Supra) should be read subject to the modification that the time within which a recourse can be made issuspended by a written request or complaint

Art. 29

of our Constitution to the extend above mentioned, and thus the time forfilinga recourse 25 should not«commence torunafresh» asfrom when, eitherareply isreceived or as from the expiry of the time within which a reply ought to have been given, incase no such reply isactually given. Havirig adopted the views of Prof. Tsatsos as above, Imay as welladdthatwritten applicationsofthisnature(writtenrequestsor 30 complaints

Art.29

of our Constitution) will have a bearing on the time limit

Article 146

.3 as above, provided they aresubmitted only once after the initial decisionof the administrative organ in question. (In this connection it must be borne in mind that in Greece 35 relevant applications are divided into several categories by textbook writers, who differ in naming them - vide Goulielmos v. Republic

(1983)3 C.L.R. 883atpp 899 -900). 2208 3 C.L.R. Larkos v. Republic Loris J . In the case under consideration, the appellant applied to the respondent by a letter dated 5th February 1969, asking for an increaseofthefinancial assistancewhichwasbeinggrantedtohim by the respondent, stating that he had to borrow £50 per month 5 m order to meet his expenses. The respondent considered his appliciitiun and rejected bame on the 1st July. 19blJ The applicant reverted to the matter by a letter addressed t<> the respondent on the 25th July, 1969, applying for reconsideration of his case and again on the 20th September. 10 1969,therespondent rejected thesecond requestaswell,without a newinquryasitisobviousfrom therecordbefore us. Therefore, in the case under consideration, the executory administrative decision of the respondent is that of the 1st July,
  1. The application of the appellant dated 25th July, 1969 which was a 15 written request to the same administrative organ, amounts obviously to a written request made under Article 29 of the Constitution.Tothisapplication, therewasnoreplywithin30days asenvisaged bytheConstitution.Thisshouldleadtheappellant to the conclusionthattheadministrative authorityinquestion didnot 20 intend to answer favourably to his application and should place him on his guard to file his application for annulment within the period left from the75dayswhichhadalreadycommencedtorun as from the 1st July, 1969 and they were suspended by the application of the 25th July. 1969.The appellant instead filed his 25 present recourse on the 6th November
  2. Itistrue that if we calculatethe period oftime runningafter theexpiration of30days from the next day of submitting hisrequest on the 25thJuly, only 73dayshaveelapsed uptothe filing ofhisrecourse. 0 ut theinitial time for filing the recourse which commenced running on the 1st 30 July wasnotextinguished altogether uptothe25thJuly,asIhave held above. Therefore, ifwe add to the 73days the initial period whichcommenced running on the 1stJulyandwassuspended on the 23th July i.e. 24 more days then definitely present recourse was filed out of time. 35 I would therefore dismiss the present appeal, but in the circumstances I would make no orderastocosts. SlYLIANlDESJ.:Thisappeal isdirected against theJudgment ofthePresidentofthisCourtwherebytherecourseoftheappellant was dismissed. 2209 Stylianides J. Larkos v. Republic
(1987)Two pointsare raised inthis appeal: (a) Whether the challenged act is a confirmatory or executna one: and (b)Whether a written request to the competeui Admini^rr*· - .' Authority for reconsideration of an initial decision affects the rime Γ> within which a recourse may be made against such decision The facts of the case, as set out in the Judgment under appeal. are as follows: The appellant at the material time was serving as a Principal Assessor inthe Departmentof InlandRevenue; ascholarship was 10 given to himby the Governmentof the UnitedKingdom toattend a six monthstraining course in IncomeTaxation matters Before leaving Cyprus hesubmitted tothe respondentDirector of Personnel an applicationforfinancial assistance. As aresult,the appellant was granted C£135 permonthasfinancial assistance, in 15 additiontothescholarship allowance grantedtohimbytheUnited Kingdom Government. The appellant on 21st May, 1969, while he was away from Cyprus attending the aforementioned training course, applied to theDirectorof theDepartmentof Personnelaskingfor anincrease 20 of the financial assistance which had been granted tohim,as, due to divers commitmentsof his, he had to borrow about C£50 per month in order to meet his expenses. The Department of Personnel informed the appellant, by a letter dated 1st July, 1969, that it had not become possible to 25 accede tohis request for a revision of the amountof the financial assistance granted to him. The appellant reverted to the same matter by means of a written request dated 25th July, 1969 and applied for reconsideration of his case. He was, eventually, informed by the Department of Personnel, by letter dated 20th 30 September,
  1. that there was nothing to be added to its previous letter of 1st July,
  2. On 6th November, 1969 the recourse was filed, whereby the following relief was sought: «Declaration that the decision of the respondents contained inthe letter of 20th September,
  3. not 35 to revise upwards by £50 the financial assistance payable to applicantduring hisscholarship attheUnitedKingdomand notto 2210 3 C.L R. Larkos v. Republic Styllanldes J . change their decision contained in the letter of 1st July, 1969, is null andvoid and of noeffect whatsoever» Counsel for the respondents reaised the preliminary objection that the afore letter of 20th September, 1969, is only an act of a S confirmatory and not ot an executory nature and therefore it could not be challenged by a recourse under Article 146 of the Constitution and thattrV recourse is out of time The learned President dismissed the recourse as the further reply given tothe appellant on 20th September, 1969, «is clearly 10 only confirmatory of what had been stated intheletterof 1st July, 1969 and it could not be challenged under Article 146 of the Constitution» In the course of hit.Judgment he said that the last act in the relevant administrative process which couldconceivably be found 15 to be an executory one is the refusal to increase the financial assistance of theappellant which hadbeen communicatedtohim by means of the letterdated 1stJuly 1969 inrelation towhich the recourse is clearly out of time under Article 146 3 of the Constitution 20 The view that only executory acts or decisions, and not. also, confirmatory acts or decisions, can be challenged by means of a recourse under Article 146 of the Constitutionhas been adopted and reiterated repeatedly in our Case-Law - Kolokasstdes ν The Republic
(1965)3 C L R 542, Kypnanides ν The Republic 25
(1982)3 C L R 611, loannou ν The Republic
(1982)3 C L R 1002,1008,1009,Spyrouv TheRepublic
(1983)3C LR 354) A confirmatory act or decision is an act or decision of the administration which repeats thecontentsof aprevious executory act and signifies the adherence of the administration to a course 30 already adopted An actisconfirmatory ofaprevious actifthefollowing elements are present (a)Identityof the issuingauthonty (b)Identityof the person or persons towhom it relates 35 (c) Identityof the procedure (d)Identityof the reasoning, and (e)Identityof the order 2211 Stytianldes J. larkos v.Republic
(1987)Ifanewinquiryiscarriedintothematter, theactwhich contains a confirmation ofanearlierone,maybesubjecttoarecourse-(see Tsatsos - Application for Annulment. 3rd Edition, pp. 132-133; Kyprianides v.Republic (supra);Goulielmos v.Republic
(1983)3 C.L.R. 883,at pp.894-896). 5 As to when a new inquiry exists, reference may be made to Spyrou v.Republic (supra)at pp.358 to
  1. In the present case the appellant by letter of 21st May, 1969, requested the revision of the allowance. The decision of such request was communicated to him by letter of 1st July,
  2. In 10 theletterof25thJuly, 1969,nonewfactsaresetout.He requested «reconsideration of his application for increased financial assistance».And the letterofthe respondents of 20th September, 1969, informed him that there was nothing to add to the letter dated 1stJuly,
  3. This reply is clearly confirmatory of the decision contained in the letter of 1st July,
  4. As such, is not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 146 of the Constitution. I turn now tothe second point which isof general interest. 20 Paragraph 3 of Article 146 of the Constitution provides that a recourse shall be made within 75 days of the date when the decision or act was published or, ifnot published and in the case of an omission, when it came to the knowledge of the person making the recourse. This, according to our jurisprudence, is a 25 provision of public policy and, therefore, mandatory. Thisperiod is shorter than anyone provided in the limitation laws for actions before the civil Courts. The objective is to have speedy determination of the legalityof the acts of the administration, for the better interests of the citizen, of the administration and of the 30 people atlarge,soasnottoleaveinabeyancethechallenge ofthe legality of the administrative acts. It is well settled that when a law provides for a hierarchical recourse, or review by a reviewing authority and an applicant exercises his right in that respect, the administrative process is 35 considered as continued tilladecision istaken bythe hierarchical and superior organ, or by a reviewing authority and the 75 days 2212 15 3 C.L.R. Larkos v. Republic StytiaAtdes J. period prescribed in paragraph
(3)of Article 146 of the Constitution iscomputed as from thislatter day. The right to address and submit written request to the competent publi^ authorities is safeguarded by Article 29 of the 5 Constitution which reads: 10 15 «
  1. Every person has the right individually or jointly with others to address written requests or complaints to any competent publicauthorityandtohavethem attended toand decided expeditiously; an immediate notice of arty such decision taken duly reasoned shall be given to the person making the request or complaint and in any event within a period not exceeding thirtydays.
  2. Where any interested person isaggrieved by any such decision or where nosuch decision isnotified tosuch person within the periodspecified inparagraph 1ofthisArticle,such person mayhaverecourse toacompetent court inthe matter of such request or complaint.» Innumerous decisionsthisCourt hassaid,from the early dates oftheintroduction inthiscountryoftheadministrative jurisdiction 20 by Article 146 of the Constitution, that Article 146 should be interpreted and applied in accordance with the interpretation of analogous provisions by administrative tribunals in a number of European countries,such asFrance,Greece and Italy.Inall these countries a petition for redress, analogous to the petition 25 safeguarded inArticle29oftheConstitution,affectsthedateofthe computation of the period within which a recourse may made.In Greece,Franceand Italythetimewithinwhicharecoursemaybe made against the decision complained of, ceases to run when a written request to the competent public authority is made, 30 provided the application for reconsideration is made before the expiryoftheperiod withinwhicharecoursemaybemade against the decision concerned; andthetimewithinwhicharecourse can be made commences to run afresh eitherasfrom the datea reply isreceived or as from the expiryof the time within which a reply 35 ought tohavebeen given,incasenosuch replyisactuallygiven(see Stassinopoulos on the Law of the Administrative Disputes
(1964),pp.208-209;Dendia Administrative Law,VolumeC , pp. 293-294; Kyriakopoulos Greek Administrative Law, Volume C , pp. 116 and 132 and Tsatsos Application for Annulment, 3rd 2213 Sryllanides 4. Larkos v. Republic
(1987)Edition, pp. 90-96). Triantafyllides, P., in Evangelou v. The Electricity Authority
(1979)3 C.L.R. 159, adoptedandapplied theaforesaid principle. At p. 165 he said: «Itis a well settled principle of law thatif a person affected 5 by an administrative decision does not make at once a recourse against this decision, but seeks from the administrative organ which hasreacheditareconsiderationof the matter,this amountsto an exercise of his right to address a written request to the competent public authority -which \Q right is safeguarded under our Constitution by means of Article 29 -and, as aresult, the time within which a recourse may be made against the decision complained of ceases to run. The application, however, for reconsideration has to be 15 made before the expiry of the periodwithin which a recourse may be made against the decision concerned; and the time within which a recourse can be made commences to run afresh as from when either a reply is received or as from the expiry of the time - which under Article 29 is thirty days - 20 within which areply oughttohave beengiven,incase nosuch reply is actually given (see Stassinopoulos on the Law of the Administrative Disputes - Στασινόπουλου,«Δίκαιον των Διοικητικών Διαφορών»
(1964), pp.208, 209). The above principles of administrative law have been ^5 applied inCyprus in,interalia, Mikrommatis v. The Republic, 2 R.S.C.C. 125, 129; and by the Decisions of the Councilof State inGreeceincases 1062/1967 and 1775/1969.» Mylearned brothersLoizouandSawides declined tofollowthe above and radically departed both from the Evangelou case and 30 from the Greek jurisprudence. A right to address the competent public authorities was safeguarded in Greeceby an ordinary statute as from
  1. This right was incorporatedinArticle 10.1 of theGreekConstitutionof
  2. ThereasonthattheGreekCouncilofStatetooktheviewset 35 out in the Evangelou case (supra) is that the exercise of a right of the citizen should not militate adversely against him in the computation of time to exercise the right of recourse to the 2214 1C1R Larkos v.Republic Stylianides J. Re\ isional C o u i i TheιnteφletatlOΓ,andapplication of paragraph3 ofArticle 146 ot our Constitution should take into consideration the provisions of Article 29 of the Constitution, the nght safeguarded thereby 5 The two provisions should be interpreted and applied together Thecitizenhas aconstitutionalnght.bothtosubmit petitiontothe authoritiesand have awritten reply within 30 days Failuretotake into consideration the said 30 days period in the computation of thetimefor thefiling ofa recourse would discourage thecitizento 10 exercise his constitutional right and would limitby 30 days the 75 days period Professor Tsatsos m his Treaties «Recourse of Annulment» expresses theviewthatapetitionshouldonlysuspend therunning of ihe penod for 30 days or such lesser penod if a reply is actually 15 given earlier Iadopt this view This is more consonant with the correct interpretation and application of the two constitutional provisions and takts cognizance of the right toaddress the public (Hithonties 1 hold therefore theopinio» • ·• written petition for reviewtothecompetentauthontysuspends theperiod of 75 days 2u for 30 days - the penou provided inArticle 29 of theConstitution for replying toanapplicant - orfor suchshorterperiod,ifthe reply isactually given earlier If the written petition of a citizen is not entertained by the administration, he may resort to the Administrative Court for the 25 annulmentof theexecutory actordecision Inthepresent case the ?xecutory decision which mightbeamenable toarecourse, isthat communicated totheappellant by the letterof 1stJuly, 1969 He elected, however to attack the contents of the letter of 20th September, 1969, a confirmatory act 30 35 Even if we assume, by giving very wide interpretation to the relief sought in the recourse, that the appellant challenges the validity of the executory act contained in the letter of 1st July, 1969, this recourse is again outof time,as the days from 1st July, 1969, until6thNovember,excluding 30 days from 25thJuly 1969 - thedatehesubmitted hiswntten request -welloutnumberthe 75 days peremptory penod On any view of the matterthis recourse isout of time For all theforegoing reasons thisappeal fails 2215 Styllanlde. J. Larkosv.Republic
(1987)Itisherebydismissed, butinallthecircumstances Iwould make no order asto costs. KOURRIS J.: I am in agreement with the Judgment of A. Loizou, J., and for thesame reasonsIdismissthe appeal. A. LOIZOU J.: In the result the appeal is dismissed with no 5 orderas tocosts. Appeal dismissed. No orderasto costs. 2216

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