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clr/1988/1988_1_152.pdf

(1988)1988March 28 (TRIANTAFYLUDES,Ρ,LORIS,KOURRIS,JJ) ELLICONSTANTOURIKAPSOU, Appellant(Plaintiff), ν MIDDLE EASTAIRLINES AIRLIBAN, Respondents (Defendants), (CivilAppeal No 6931). Wrongful dismissal — Damages for — Junsdichon — Employment for less than 26 weeks — Damages claimed did not exceed two years emoluments — DistrictCourtshave nojunsdiction to entertain such an action — The Termination of Employment Law 24/67, section 30,as amended bysection 3 ofLaw 6/73 ^ Termination of Employment — The Termination of Employment Law 24/67, as amended by Law 6/73 — Sections 3 and 30 Industnal Disputes Court — Junsdichon — The Termination of Employment Law 24/67, sechon 30, as amended by sechon 3 of Law 6/73 The action of the appellant (plaintiff) against the respondent (defendant) fordamagesforwrongful dismissalwas dismissedbythe tnal District Court on the ground of lack of junsdiction The employment had lasted for a penodof less than 26 weeks andthe damages claimeddid notexceedtwoyears emoluments 1 0 ^ Held, dismissing the appeal, Koums, J dissenting
(1)Under section3 of Law24/67 anemployeewhose services areterminated after an employmentof less than twenty-six weeks has no nghtto claim compensation under the provisionsofLaw 24/67
(2)Exceptina case of a claimfordamagesforwrongful dismissal 2 0 exceeding twoyears emoluments, theIndustnal Disputes Courthas, invirtueofsection30ofLaw24/67,asamendedbysection3 ofLaw 6/73 exclusive Junsdiction todecideonallindustnaldisputesansing out of the operation of Law 24/67 or any Regulations made thereunder including any incidental or ancillary to such dispute 2 5 matter 152 1C.LR. Kapsouv.Airtiban
(3)Wh^n a claim cannot succeed before the Industrial Disputes Court on the strength of the statutoryrightunder section 3, the exclusiveundersection30jurisdictioncannotbecircumventedbyan actionbefore aDistrictCourt. Appealdismissed. Noorderastocosts. Appeal. Appeal by plaintiff against thejudgment of the DistrictCourtof Nicosia (Kramvis, D. J.) dated the 3rd May, 1985 (Action No. 10 5134/84) dismissingher action for wrongful dismissal. G. Korfiotis, forthe appellant. M.Spanos,forthe respondent. Cur.adv. vult. The following judgments were read. 15 TRIANTAFYLLIDES P.:Thisjudgment isa majority judgment of my brother Judge LorisJ. and myself and my brother Judge KourrisJ. willgivea separate dissenting judgment. The appellant has appealed against the judgment of a District Judge oftheDistrictCourtofNicosiabymeansofwhichtherewas 20 dismissed her action for wrongful dismissal against the respondents. The action was dismissed because the trial Judge, in determining a preliminary legal issue, held that the District Court ofNicosia had nojurisdiction toentertain it. 25 It is undisputed that the appellant was employed by the respondents from 25 January 1982 till 11 July 1982 when her services were terminated and that, therefore, her employment lasted for lessthan twenty-six weeks. Moreoveritis,likewise,undisputed thatinthiscasetherearenot 30 being claimed damages in excess of the appellant's emoluments for two years and, therefore, her claim does not exceed the amount of damages which the Industrial Disputes Court is empowered toawardundertheTermination ofEmployment Law, 1967 (Law24/67). 35 Undersection3of Law24/67 an employee whose servicesare terminated after an employment of lessthan twenty-sixweeks has 153 TriantafyUides P. Kapsou v.Afarllban
(1988)no right to claim compensation under the provisions of Law 24/ 67 Byvirtueof section 30 of Law24/67,asreenacted bymeansof section 3 of the Termination of Employment (Amendment) Law, 1973 (Law 6/73), the Industrial Disputes Court is granted 5 exclusivejurisdictiontodecideon allindustnal disputesarisingout of the operation of Law 24/67 or any Regulations made thereunder including any incidental or ancillary to such dispute matter, except that an employee has the right, in relation to the termination of hisemployment, tofileanaction before theDistnct 10 Court of the Distnct where hewasemployed atthetimewhen the dispute arose if his claim for damages exceeds the amount of damages which the Industnal Disputes Court is empowered to award Inthe lightofalltheforegoing itisclearthatthepresent instance jg isnot one of those cases in which the appellant isentitled under section 30 of Law 24/67, as amended by Law 6/73, to file an action in a Distnct Court and it is a case coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Industnal Disputes Court, but the appellant cannot claim compensation under Law 24/67 because 20 she was employed for less than twenty-six weeks pnor to the termination of her services Counsel for the appellant has argued that notwithstanding the provisions of section 30 of Law24/67 the appellant could claim, by virtue of a common law right, damages for wrongful dismissal 25 by means of her action before the District Court The learned trialJudge, agreeinginthisrespectwith counsel for the respondents, found that hehad nojurisdiction toentertain the action of the appellant because of the provisions of section 30of Law 24/67 In our opinion section 3 of Law 24/67 has created a new statutory nght regarding compensation for wrongful dismissal in substitution of the common law right and consequently when a claim cannot succeed before the Industnal Disputes Court on the strength ofsuch statutory right,asinthiscase,the exclusive under 35 section 30 of Law 24/67 junsdiction of the Industnal Disputes Court cannot be circumvented by an action before a Distnct Court, such asthe present one which wasrightlydismissedbythe trialJudge for lackof junsdiction 154 30 1C.L.R. Kapsonv.Airiiban Triantafyffidea P. Intheresult thisappeal failsand itisdismissedbutwith noorder as to its costs. KOURRISJ.:This isan appeal from theRuling of aJudge of the District Court of Nicosia whereby he dismissed Action No. 5134/ 5 84 for want of jurisdiction. By the said action the plaintiff/appellant claimed against the defendants/respondents the sum of £727 being damages for wrongful dismissal. The defendants/respondents by paragraph 1 of their defence alleged that the Industrial Disputes Court had 10 exclusivejurisdiction totry theaction and thatthe District Courtof Nicosia had no jurisdiction. 15 When the action came up for hearing on 29.1.85, both parties applied to the Court to hear and decide the issue raised by the defendants/respondents in paragraph 1 of their defence as the Court's decision of such point might dispose of the whole action. The learned trial Judge heard arguments by both sides and concluded that the claim of the plaintiff/appellant fell within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Disputes Court and that the District Courthad nojurisdiction, whereupon he dismissed the action. 20 25 30 35 This appeal turns on the construction of ss. 3 & 30 of the Termination of Employment Law, 1967 (Law 24/67)as amended by Law 6/73 and it is pertinent at this stage to set out the said sections. Section 30 of theTermination of Employment Law 1967 (Law 24/67) -(as amended by s.3 of the Termination of Employment (Amendment) Law, 1973 Law 6/73) reads as follows: «30.-
(1)To Δικαστήριον Εργατικών Διαφορών κέκτηται αποκλειστικήν αρμοδιότητα να α π ο φ α σ ί ζ η επί α π α σ ώ ν των εργατικών διαφορών των αναφυομένων συνεπεία της εφαρμογής του π α ρ ό ν τ ο ς Νόμου ή οιωνδήποτε Κανονισμών εκδοθέντων δυνάμει αυτού ή αμφοτέρων, περιλαμβανομένου και π α ν τ ό ς π α ρ ε μ π ί π τ ο ν τ ο ς ή συμπληρωματικού π ρ ο ς τοιαύτας διαφοράς θέματος.
(2)Ουδέν των εν τ ω παρόντι ά ρ θ ρ ω ερμηνεύεται ως επηρεάζον τ ο δικαίωμα εργοδοτουμένου ό π ω ς , αναφορικώς π ρ ο ς τερματισμόν απασχολήσεως, π ρ ο σ φ υ γ ή εις το Επαρχιακόν Δικαστήριον της Επαρχίας εν ηο εργοδοτούμενος ηργοδοτείτο κατά τον 155 Komris J. Kapvouv. Abfiban
(1988)χρόνον κ θ' ov ανέκυψεν η διαφορά εις περίπτωσιν καθ* ην η αξίωσις αυτού είναι δι' αποζημιώσεκ υπερβαίνουσας τας διά του παρόντος Νόμου δυναμένας να διεκδικηθώσι: Νοείται ότι ο εργοδοτούμενος δεν δύναται να 5 προσφυγή εις το Επαρχιακόν Δικαστήριον εάνέχη υποβάλει αίτησιν εις το Δικαστήριον Εργατικών Διαφορών δυνάμει τουπαρόντος Νόμου καιότι, εάν ούτος προσφυγή ειςτο ΕπαρχιακόνΔικαστήριον,δεν δικαιούται να υποβάλη αίτησιν εις το Δικαστήριον 10 Εργατικών Διαφορών δυνάμει του παρόντος Νόμου.» («30.-
(1)The Industrial Disputes Courtshallhaveexclusive jurisdiction toadjudicate onallindustrial disputes arisingasa result oftheoperation ofthepresent Law orany Regulations made thereunder orboth,including any incident orancillary 15 tothose disputes matter.
(2)Nothing in this section contained shallbeconstruedas affecting therightofanemployee, inrespect ofatermination of employment, tohaverecourse tothe District Courtofthe Districtinwhich the employee wasemployed atthetimethe 20 dispute arose incasehisclaimisfor damages exceedingthose which may be claimed underthepresent Law: Provided thatthe employee may nothave recourse tothe District Court if hehasfiled an application tothe Industrial Disputes Court under this Law and that, in case he has 25 recourse tothe District Court, he is notentitled tofilean application totheIndustrial Disputes Courtunderthe present Law»). And section 3reads asfollows: «Οταν κατά ήμετά την ορισθείσα ημέρα ο εργοδότης 30 τερματίζη δι οιονδήποτε λόγον άλλον ή των εντω άρθρω 5 εκτιθεμένων λόγων την απασχόληοιν εργοδοτουμένου ο οποίος έχει απασχοληθή συνεχώς υπ' αυτού επί εικοσιέξ τουλάχιστον εβδομάδας ο εργοδοτούμενος κέκτηταιτοδικαίωμαειςαποζημίωσιν 35 156 1C.L.R. καταβαλλομένην Kapsoav. Abflban υπό του KocmisJ. εργοδότου του και υπολογιζόμενην συμφώνως προς τον Πρώτον Πίνα­ κα». 5 1 0 («
  1. Where, on or after the appointed day, an employer terminatesfor any reason otherthanthoseset outinsection 5 the employmentof anemployee who has been continuously employed by him for not less than twenty-six weeks, the employee shall have a right tocompensation payable by his employer and calculated in accordance with the First Schedule»). Counsel for the appellant argued thatinview of the provisions of s.3 of Law24/67 theclaimoftheplaintiff doesnotfallwithinthe jurisdiction of the Industrial Disputes Court because she had worked with heremployer for a period of lessthan26 weeksand, 15 consequently, her claim falls within thejurisdiction of theDistrict Court and that any other construction given to s.3 would be contrary toArticle 30 of the Constitution. Counsel for therespondentargued thatinview of theclearand . unambiguous wording of s.30, the appellant's claim cannot be 20 maintainedbefore the DistrictCourtunderany circumstancesin thatherclaimfor damages didnotexceed theamountof damages which the Industrial Disputes Court could award to her. It was evident, he said from the writ of summons-that the appellant's claim does not exceed the sum of £1,000 while her annual 25 earnings, as they appear in the statement of claim, exceed that amount and under the relevant law the IndustrialDisputesCourt could award to her as damages up to 2 years' emoluments.He contended thatthe fact thats.3 of Law 24/67 does notcreate for an employee a statutory right for compensation unless he has 30 continually served the same employer for at least 26 weeks does not justify the invoking of the jurisdiction of the District Court because suchjurisdiction was expresslytakenaway from itby s.30 of Law 24/67, as amendedby s.3 of Law 6/
  2. Hesubmittedthat the Industrial Disputes Court is given exclusive jurisdiction to 35 adjudicate, inter alia on all claims for compensation for wrongful dismissal arising outof theoperationof Law 24/67 andthe District -Court isgivenjurisdiction toentertainan actionfor damages only where the employee's claim is for an amountwhich exceeds the amount of compensationwhich may be awarded underLaw 24/ 157 KowrtsJ. Kapeouv.AiiHbati
(1988)
  1. He also invited the Court to hold that an employee who had worked with hisemployerfora period oflessthan 26 weeks and has been wrongfully dismissed cannot have the benefit of resorting to the Industrial Disputes Court and that the District Court hasnoJurisdiction toentertain hisclaim. 5 From the wording of s.30 {asamended), itbecomes clear that the Industrial Disputes Court was given exclusive jurisdiction to decide on allindustrial disputesarisingoutoftheoperation ofthe law, or any regulation made thereunder, or both of them, including any matters incidental or ancillary fo those disputes, if 10 the claim for damages does not exceed the amount which the Industrial Disputes Court is empowered to award under the Termination of Employment Law 1967, (24/67) which are the emoluments of up totwoyears.Ifaclaimexceedsan employee's two years emoluments then the District Court has exclusive 15 jurisdiction. I do not agree with the contention that the District Court has jurisdiction only in cases where the employee's claim is for an amount which exceeds the amount of compensation which may be awarded under Law 24/
  2. Inmyjudgment an employee has 20 no statutory right for compensation byvirtue of s.3 of Law 24/6/ unlesshe hascontinuallyservedthesameemployerforatleast 26 weeks; but, if he is wrongfully dismissed before the lapse of 26 weeks he may resorttothe DistrictCourt for hisclaim.IfIwere to hold that an employee cannot resort to the District Court for his 25 claim then s.3 of the law would be contrary to Article 30 of the Constitution which providesthatnoperson shallbedenied access tothe Court assigned tohimbyor under the Constitution. The Court havingjurisdiction incivilcasesinthefirstinstanceis the District Court. (See s.22 of the Courts of Justice Law, I960, 30 (Law 14/60), and a law may take away from itsjurisdiction that which is expressly provided in the said law and the residual jurisdiction remains inthe District Court. Inview of the above, the true construction to be given tos.3of Law 24/67 is that the Industrial Disputes Court has jurisdiction 35 where anemployee hascontinuallyservedthesameemployer for atleast26weeksand wheretheserviceofanemployeeislessthan 26 weeks and he is wrongfully dismissed and he has a claim against hisemployer he may resort tothe DistrictCourtwhich has jurisdiction to entertain his claim. The contention that an 40 158 1CUR. Kapsonv.Atriiban KonrrisJ. employee cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the District Court is untenablebecauseinsuchcircumstancesacitizenoftheRepublic will be prevented from having access to the Courts which is contrarytotheexpressprovisionsofArticle30oftheConstitution. 5 Inthese circumstances Iwouldallowtheappealand setaside therulingoftheCourtbelow. Appeal dismissed by majority. No order astocosts. 159

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