clr/1988/1988_1_411.pdf

(1987)1 CLR 336 distinguishedon itsfacts— Oncetherequirements ofthesection are satisfied,thereisnoroom fordiscretion — Thefactthatupon issuing the building permit part of the land becomes part of the street is irrelevant Rent Control —The Rent Control Law 23/83, section ll(l)(h)(in) Buildingpermit — Whetheropen toCourt toexamineitsvalidity—It being anadministrativeact,its validity ispresumed untilitiseither annulledunderArt 146 1of the Constitution or revoked Rent Control — The Rent Control Law 23/S3 — bschon 12 ~ Compensation in case of ejectment undei inter aim section H(h)— Increasedonappeal toanamount equivalent to 18 months' rent Rent Control— The Rent Control Law 23/S3 section 1 l(l)(h)(iti)— Constitutes aradicaldeparture from previous legislation 20 2S The respondents (landlords)are theownersof a big groundfloor housein Limassol,used by thetenant as a cafe restaurant andfor housingthe LimassolbranchofAnorthosisClub The firstfloorof the House isintheownership of a third person The respondents prepared plansfor alterations Thesealterations involved the demolition of twelve toilets standing in the yard fourteen walls, internal and external, the erection of ten new walls 411 Poyiatzisv.PUavalds&Another

(1988)ano tl\e building, which is separated internally into a number of rooms, willbe converted into three shops and stores.The entrance which opens ontheone streetwillbebuiltupand theshopswillface and open on the other street. This is an appeal from the judgment of the Rent Control Court, whereby an order of ejectment was issued against the tenant (appellant) undersection ll(l)(h)(iii) of Law 23/83. 5 Itiscommon ground that at the time ofthe hearing the landlords had the necessarybuildingpermit,butcounselforthetenant invited the Court tosay that the Municipality has no power torenew itand 10 that, therefore, there wasnovalid permit atthe time of the hearing, asthe renewal wasvoid. Held. Pikis, J. dissenting.

(1)For a landlord to succeed under section 1l(l)(h)(iii)ofLaw23/83,'hehastosatisfy theCourtthat;a)-He has given the four months' notice in writing to the tenant; b)he has 15 obtained, where necessary, the permit for such alterations;

1. c)The premises are reasonably required by the landlord for effecting the alterations; and
2. d)(
3. i)the alterations are substantial and radical (
4. ii)Theyare intended for the purposes ofdevelopment ofthepremises; (iii)They result in radical andtotal change ofthe premises. 20

(2)The circumstances relevant to thisclaim, including the obtaining ofthe permit, are those existing atthe date when the caseisheard.

(3)The notion of «reasonable requirement», in a case of a claim for possession on this ground, is linked only to whether or not it is reasonable for the landlord toobtain possession forthe purpose of 2 5 thealterationsand itisunrelated toany other factor.

(4)The alterations must be substantial and radical. They must be madeforthepurposeofdevelopmentofthebuildingandmustresultto radical and total change of it. The interpretation of this paragraph should not be approached with a dictionary. The teleological or 3 0 purposive interpretation coupled with the ordinary and pragmatic meaningofthewordsshouldbeemployed. Noexhaustive definition can be given. Itis a question of degree depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, .havinqregardtothetotalityofthework proposed tobe done. 35

(5)Ifthe Court isconvinced thatthe requirements ofthe section are satisfied, there isno room for any discretion.

(6)Inthiscase the requirements were satisfied.

(7)The fact that a good partofthe yard willbe ceded tothe road, in compliance with the StreetWideningScheme, cannotbetaken into 4 0 consideration. 412 1 C.L.R. Poyiatzisv. PUavakls&Another

(8)The usue of a building permit is an administrative act An administrative actisandcontinuestobevalid, unless annulledbythe SupremeCourt— orrevoked by theissuing authonty Neitherofthe two happened and,therefore, thepermitwas a valid one 5 10 15 20 25

(9)A party mustknow the reasons for the failure of his case The reasonsarefurther necessary toenableapartytodecidewhetherand on what grounds an appeal should be lodged As theadministration t of justice is a public function, the public in general are entitled to know the reasons of the judicial decisions What is considered sufficient «reasoning» depends largely on the circumstances of each prirticulai case Intheinstantcase though thedrafting of thejudgment may notbe the best desirable, nevertheless the reasoning of it is clear and it sufficiently conveys the reasons on which the Ejectment Order was made

(10)In virtue of section 12 of Law 23/83 the Court awarded as compensation an amount equal to ten months of the current rent Having regard to the length of the tenancy and all circumstances pertaining to the case this Court increases the compensation to eighteen monthsrent le £1980

(11)The execution of the ejectment order is stayed for a further penod of 3 monthsas from to-day Appeal partlyallowed N o o r d e r a s t o c o s t s Casesreferredto Kontou ν Solomou

(1978)1CL R 425, Michaelides ν lacovides

(1978)1CL R 123, Murude Mehmet Ah ν Hassan Remzi Shenikh, 20 Part, IICL R 68 Yerasimou ν Rousoudhiou (1974 1C LR 107, 30 Kontou ν Solomou

(1978)1C L R 425 Demetnou and Others ν loannides

(1982)1C L R 16, Lamarco Ltd, ν Kranos

(1987)1CL R 336, Archangel Domain Ltd ν Van %evelt Condnan and Co

(1988)1 C L R 51, 35 Panagiv Police{1968)2 C 1 R 124, Ioannidou ν Dikeos

(1969)1C L R 235, Pioneer Candy Ltd andAnotherv 1 C LR 540, Stelios Tryfon and Sons

(1981)413 Poyiatzis v. Pilavakis &Another

(1988)Papageorghiou v. HjiPieras

(1981)1 C.L.R.560; HambouandOthersv. MichaelandAnother

(1981)1 C.L.R.618; Chnstou andAnotherv. AngelidouandAnother

(1984)1C.L.R. 492; ReCharalambous

(1987)1 C.L.R.427; 5 PsarasandAnotherv.Republic

(1987)2C.L.R.132; Neophytouv. Police

(1981)2C.L.R.195. Appeals. Appeals by respondent against the judgment of the Rent Control Court of Limassol dated the 7th July, 1986 Appl. No. E. 10 56/84whereby an ejectment order was made against him. Fr. Saveriades, for the appellant. St. McBride, for the respondent. A. LOIZOU P.: H.H. Justice Stylianides will deliver his Judgment first. ^ STYLIANIDES J.: These appeals are directed against the Judgment of the Rent Control Court sitting at Limassol, whereby Ejectment Order was made against the appellant (tenant). Thesalientfactsofthecaseoverwhichthereisnodisputeareas ™ follows: The respondents (landlords) are the ownersinequal undivided shares of immovable situate in Limassol town, Plot 4/1, Sheet/ Plan LIV/58.3.II. It consists of a big old ground floor house standing onthecorner oftwomajor streets—Kaningosand Griva Dhigenis — between the Public Gardens and the Court House. 25 The house on the first floor isthe ownership ofa third person. The tenant, a displaced person from Famagusta, was in occupation ofthesubject premisessince 1975.Hehoused therein a cafe—restaurant and the Limassol branch ofAnorthosis Club.It waspartly used as a gambling place. ^ The landlords applied to the Rent Control Court sitting at Limassol for ejectment of the tenant and recovery of possession, on the ground that they reasonably require itfor substantial and radicalalterationsresultingtotheradicaland totalchange ofit,for the purposes oi aevelopment, under section ll(l)(h)(iii) of the 35 Rent Control Law, 1983 (Law No.23/83). 414 1 C.L.R. Poyiatzis v. PUavakls & Another Stylianides J. Itis common ground thatthe landlords have given the required statutory notice. The necessary building permit, issued by the appropriate authority — The Municipality of Limassol — with the drawings attached to it,were produced. 5 The Court granted the relief prayed by the landlords. Itgave a stay of execution for six months and ordered the landlords to pay tothetenantstenmonthly rentsas compensation, obviously under section 12 of the same legislation. The tenant beingaggrieved took this appeal. 10 Counsel for the tenant argued the following grounds: (a)That the alterations for which the premises are required do notsatisfy the requirements of the Law; (b) That the building permit was illegal and should not have been acted upon by the Court; 15 (c)That the Judgment is not duly reasoned; and (d) That the amount of compensation awarded is not sufficient in the circumstances of the case. Section ll(l)(h)(iii) reads as follows: 20 25 30 35 «11.-

(1)Ουδεμία α π ό φ α σ ι ς και ουδέν διάταγμα εκδίδεται δια την ονάκτηοιν της κατοχής οιασδήποτε κατοικίας ή καταστήματος, διά το οποίον ισχύει ο π α ρ ώ ν Νόμος, ή διά την εκ τούτου έξωσιν θεσμίου ενοικιαστού, πλην των ακολούθων περιπτώσεων: (η) εις περίπτωσιν καθ ην το ακίνητον απαιτείται λογικώς υπό του ιδιοκτήτου (0 00 (ιιι) δι ουσιαστικός και ριζικός αλλαγάς συνεπαγομένας την ριζικήν και ολικήν ρετατροπήν τούτου διά σκοπούς αξιοποιήσεως του, Και το Δίκαστήριον είναι πεπεισμένον ότι ο ιδιοκτήτης εξησφάλισε διά τα ανωτέρω οσάκις ήτο επάναγκες την αναγκαίαν π ρ ο ς τούτο άδειαν και ότι ο ιδιοκτήτης δεν δύναται λογικώς να προβή εις τα εν ταις υ π ο π α ρ α γ ρ ά φοις (ι), 00 και (ιιι) διαλαμβανόμενα άνευ ανακτήσεως 415 Styllamdes J. Poyiatzisv. PUavakis & Another

(1988)της κατοχής τ ο υ ακινήτουκαινοουμένουότι παρέσχεν ουχί βραχυτέραν των τεσσάρων μηνών έγγραφον προειδοποίησιν εις τον ενοικιαστήν να εκκένωση το ακίνητον, ή» (English version): 5 «11. -

(1)No judgment or order for the recovery of possession of any dwelling—house or business premises, to which this Law applies, or for the ejectment of a statutory tenant therefrom, shall be given or made except in the following cases: 10 (

1. h)Where the immovable is reasonably required by the landlord 0) 00 (iii) Forsubstantial and radical alterations resulting in the 15 radical and total change of it for purposes of its development. And the Court is satisfied that the landlord has, where necessary, the necessary permit and thatthe landlord cannot reasonably execute the aforementioned in paragraphs (i), (
2. ii)20 and (iii)without recovery ofpossession of the immovable and has given to the tenant not less than four months' notice in writing tovacate the immovable; or» Corresponding provision isfound inalltheRentControl Laws as from 1942 - (see The Increase of Rent (Restriction) Law, 1942, 25 section 8(l)(d); The Rent (Control)Law, 1954, Cap. 86, section 16

(1)0) as amended by the Rent Control (Amendment) Law, 1968, (Law No.8/68); TheRentControl (Business Premises) Law, 1961 (Law No. 17/61), section 10(l)(h). The Rent Control Law, 1975 (Law No. 36/75), was a comprehensive legislation which 30 was enacted after the catastrophe caused by theTurkish invasion and the plight of more than one third of the population of the country, who were uprooted from thenorth. Section l o (1/ih)of Law 36/75 reads as follows: «16 -

(1)No judgment or order for the recovery of 35 possession of anydwelling -house orshop,towhich this Law applies, or for the ejectment of a tenant therefrom, shall be given or made except in the following cases: 416 1 C.L.R. 5 Poyiatzis v. Pilavalris &Another Stylianldes J. (ii) Where the dwelling - house or shop is reasonably required by the landlord for the substantial alteration or reconstruction thereof insuch a wayas toaffect the premises orforthedemolitionthereof, and theCourt issatisfied thatthe landlord has.wherenecessary,obtained the necessary permit forsuchalteration, reconstruction ordemolitionandhasgiven to the tenant not lessthan three months' notice in writing to vacate the premises:or» This was judicially considered in Anastassia S. Kontou v. 10 Antonis Solomou

(1978)1 C.L.R. 425 and in Yiangos Michaelides, v.Andreas lacovides

(1978)1C.L.R. 123. The interpretation given in the last case by the Court to «substantial alterations» entitling a landlord torecover possession o f thepremisesundertheprovisionsofsection 16(l)(h)ofthe Rent 15 Control Law, 1975, opened the door to landlords to evict their tenants, thus contravening the intention of the legislature, which wastogivesecurityoftenure tothetenant.Thelegislator, in order to remedy this mischief, departed radically from the provisionsof the previous legislation when enacting the Rent Control Law, 20 1983.Amere glance atthe wording of the two sections supports thisview. Forlandlord tosucceed, under thisground, hehastosatisfy the Court;(a)That he has given the four months' notice in writing to the 25 tenant; (b)That he has obtained, where necessary, the permit for such alterations; (c)Thatthepremisesarereasonably required bythelandlord for effecting the alterations; and 30 (d)That: (i)The alterations aresubstantial and radical; (ii) They are intended for the purpose of development of the premises; (iii)They result in radical and total change of the premises. 35 Thecircumstancesrelevanttothisclaim,includingthe obtaining of the permit are those existing atthe date when the case isheard -(MuwdeMehmetAIiv. HassanRemziShenikli; 20,PartII,C.L.R. 68). 417 Stylianides J . Poyiatzis v.Pilavakis &Another

(1988)The notion of «reasonable requirement» imports objective criterion. The objective evaluation of the demand for recoveryof possession must be examined from a broad common sense view point inthe same wayas men of the world transact their affairs of daily life. The notion of «reasonable requirement», in a case of a -5 claim for possession on thisground, is linked only to whether or not it is reasonable for the landlord to obtain possession for the purpose of the alterations and itisunrelated toany other factor. The Court, if convinced that the requirements laid down in section ll(l)(h) were satisfied, then there is no room for the 10 exercise ofanydiscretion onitspartinrelation tothemakingofan order for possession (Andreas Yeiasimou v. Andrpas Rousoudhiou

(1974)1 C.L.R. 107;Anastassis Kontou vAntonis Solomou

(1978)1C.L.R. 425; ChrystallaDemetriou and Others v.Sawas toannides

(1982)1 C.L.R. 16). 15 The legislator in 1983 made a radical departure from the provisions of the previous legislation.The legislator designed this ground insuch awayastotighten theprerequisitesforrecoveryof possession for the purpose of alterations to a building. This paragraph ofsection 11wasjudiciallyconsidered inLamarco Ltd. 20 v. HeraclisG.Kranos,

(1987)1C.L.R.

1. The alterations must be substantial and radical. They must be made fpr purpose ofdevelopment of thebuilding and mustresult to radical and total change of it. The interpretation of this paragraph should not be approached with a dictionary. The 25 teleological orpurposive interpretation coupled withthe ordinary and pragmatic meaning of thewordsshould be employed. Changes to qualify assubstantial and radical must be extensive and fundamental incharacter. Theymustbemadeforpurposesof development. If the general structural character of the building 30 remains unchanged, they fallshort of satisfying this requirement. Noexhaustive definition can be given, itisaquestion of degree depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, having regard tothetotality ofthe workproposed tobe done. In the present case the building isan old house, which was let 35 and used asbusinesspremises.Theproposed changesinclude,as it appears from the drawings before us,the demolition of twelve 418 1 C.L.R. Poyiatzis v. Pilavakis &Another StyHanides J. toilets standing in the yard, fourteen walls, internal and external, the erection often newwallsandthebuilding,which isseparated internally into a number of rooms, will be converted into three shops and stores. The entrance, which opens on the one street. 5 will be built up and the shops will face and open on the other street. The fact that agood part of theyard willbe ceded to the road, incompliance withthe StreetWideningScheme, cannot be taken into consideration. 10 The expert of the landlords testified that, having regard to the fact that the upper storey belonged to a third person, thiswas the only way for the development of thisbuilding. The expert of the tenant admitted that this was one of the modes of development, though there might be others. Itiscommon of the expertsof both 15 sides that the proposed alterations are intended for the development ofthe building. The Judge isentitled tolook at the totality of what is proposed tobe done and asmatteroffactand common sense toaskhimself the question whether these alterations satisfy the requirementsof 20 'he Law. The Judge on the evidence before him has to reach a conclusion of fact. Inthe present case the trial Court, having regard tothe primary facts before him, which he.meticulously stated in his Judgment, issued the Order for Ejectment. 25 We subscribe to his view. The intended alterations are both substantial and radical. They are intended for the purpose of development of the building and consequentially the structural character of thebuilding willbetotallyand radically changed. ThechangesintheLamarcocase, whichwerefound tofallshort 30 ofsatisfying the Law/were completely different. Each case hasto be decided on itsown facts. The building permit was duly issued by the Municipality of . Limassol as from 3rd October,
2. It was renewed thereafter andtherewasavalidpermitatthetimeofthehearingofthecase. 35 Mr. Saveriades argued that, as the work has not commenced, the Municipality was not empowered to renew the building permit. 419 Styllanides J. Poyiatzis v.Pilavakis &Another

(1988)The issue of a building permit is an administrative act. An administrative act isand continuesto be valid, unlessannulled by the appropriate Court - the Supreme Court - or revoked by the issuingauthority. Neitherofthetwohappened and, therefore, the permit was a valid one. 5 Thefactthatthetenantlongafterthefilingofthecasebefore the Rent Control Court instituted a recourse before the Supreme Court, N. 295/86, does not in any way affect the validity of the permit. ItistheconstitutionalobligationanddutyofJudgesdetermining 10 the civilrightsand obligationsof aperson togivereasons for their decisions. Thenotion of «fairtrial»requiresreasonstobe givenbya Court for itsdecision and this applies both to civil as well as to criminal proceedings. Aparty must know the reasons for the failure of his case. The reasons are further necessary toenable a party todecide whether and on what grounds an appeal should be lodged. As the administration of justice isa public function, the publicin general are entitled to know the reasons of the judicial decisions. 20 Adequatejudicialreasoninganditssoundness upholdsfaith inthe Law and strengthens confidence inthe judiciary. The mandatory provision of paragraph 2 of Article 30 of the Constitution has been judicially considered by this Court in a number of cases. (See interaliaArchangehs Domain Ltd., v. Van 25 Nievelt Condrian & Co's., Civil Appeal No. 6842, Judgment delivered on 29th January, 1988, not yet reported*; Anastassis Panayi v. The Police

(1968)2C.L.R. 124; Theodora Ioannidou v. Charilaos Dikeos

(1969)1 C.L.R. 235; Pioneer Candy Ltd. and Another v. Stelios Tryfon and Sons Ltd..

(1981)1 C.L.R. 540; 30 Papageorghiou v. Hjipieras

(1981)1 C.L.R. 560; AndrouHa Georghiou Hambou and Others v.MariaCharalambous Michael and Another

(1981)1C.L.R. 618;Michael Christouand Another v.MariaAngelidou andAnother

(1984)1 C.L.R.492;Inthe matter ofEleftheria Charalambous

(1987)1 C.L.R. 427 and Psarasand 35 Another v. The Republic

(1987)2 C.L.R. 132. What is considered sufficient «reasoning» depends largely on the circumstances of each particular case. 'ReportedIn

(1988)1C.L.R. 51. 420 15 I C.L.R. Poyiatzisv.Pilavakis&Another Styllanldes J. Inthe insiantcase,though thedrafting ofthejudgment may not be of the best desirable, nevertheless the reasoning of itsisclear and it sufficiently conveys the reasons on which the Ejectment Order wasmade. 5 .In virtue of section 12, the Court issuing judgment under paragraphs(f), (g)and (h)ofsection 11,hasadiscretionary power toordertheapplicant-landlord topaytothetenant compensation, which in the case ofshops should not exceed anamount equal to current rentfor eighteen months. 10 The Court in this case awarded £1,100.-, an amount equal to ten months' ofthecurrentrent. Havingregardtothelength ofthe tenancy and allcircumstances pertaining tothe case, we increase thecompensation to eighteen months' rent, i.e. £1980.-. Forthe foregoing reasonstheappeals failonthemain grounds. 15 Wevaryonly the order for compensation. . ThetrialCourt stayed the execution of the Ejectment Order for six months. Having regard to the time that elapsed, we stay the execution of the Judgment for a period of three months from today, provided that the tenant paysthe rent lawfully due. 20 In the circumstances appeals are partly allowed as above with no order asto costs. A. LOIZOU, P.: Iagree with the Judgment of Stylianides, J., which hasjustbeen delivered and I have nothing useful to add. PIKISJ.:The appeal turnson the interpretation of s.ll(l)(h)(iii) 25 of the Rent Control Law 1983 (23/83), and itsapplication to the factsofthecase.TheLimassol RentControl Courtmadean order of recovery of possession on the application of the owners entailingthe eviction oftheappellant, the tenantof the premises. The facts relevant to the determination of this appeal can be 30 recounted as follows: The building, subject matter of the lease, consists of a ground floor enclosing a good number of rooms, surrounded by a large yardthatencompasses 12lavatories.Seemingly, indayspast, the premises were used as a school. The premises belonged to 35 Respondent 1who let them to the appellant for use as business premises.Theyareused asacafe-restaurant andasalobbyfor the congregation of the supporters of the Famagusta football club «ANORTHOSIS».Ontopofthepremisesthereisanother building used as a residence; theproperty of a third party. Part of the yard 421 PikisJ. Poyiatzis v. Pilavakis &Another

(1988)is the property of that party As acknowledged, the appellant qualifies as a statutory tenant under the provisions of the Rent Control Law 1983. Respondent 2 aspired to acquire the building as a whole (the ground and upper storey) with a view to its demolition and 5 reconstruction;butitwasnottobe. Hisplanswerefrustratedbythe unwillingness of the owner ofthefirst storeytosell.He succeeded only in acquiring the ground floor of which he became registered as part-owner. To minimise hislosses he submitted plans for the development of the ground floor entailing the demolition of the 10 toilettesand the conversion ofthe house intothree modern shops with appurtenant stores. To make feasible this development a largearea of8,800sq. ft.willhavetobeceded for street-widening in accordance with a street-alignment scheme in force. The implementation of the project envisages demolition of a number 15 of internal and external walls. But the structure of the building remains unaffected, including support for the building above. In effect, the plansprovide for theconversion ofthisroomy business premises into three modern shops, a development set within the framework of the existing structure of the building. 20 The Rent Control Court did, as acknowledged by counsel for the appellants, properly direct itself in law, drawing attention, in the process, to the introduction of a more stringent test by the 1983legislation for therecovery bythe owner of premisesfor the purpose of effecting alterations to the building. Not only the 25 changes contemplated must be in themselves substantial and radical, but must also entail sequentially thereto the radical and total transformation of the building effected for purposes of developments. Evidently, the legislature intended, in the spiritof the new legislation, tocurtail therightofrecovery ofpossession at 30 the instance of the landlord to cases boidering on dv. lolition and reconstruction. The effect and implications of the new legislation were the subject of examination in Lamarco Limited v. Kranos*, that founded the decision of the Coui ;n that case. The following 35 passage from the judgment in the above case, serves to elicit the •

(1987)1CLR 33b 422 1 CX.R. Poyiatzis v. Pilavakis & Another Plkls J. first huiKxlii ihattheowner mustovercome inordertopave the way for an order of recovery of possession: 5 «Toqualify assubstantial andradical,thefirsthurdlethatthe owner mustovercome, itmustbeestablished thatthe changes are consequential to the character of the building and sufficiently fundamental toqualify as radical.'The antonymof 'substantial' in the context of this provision of the law is 'superficial'.» The second requirement is that the changes, substantial and 10 radical as they must be, must entail not only the radical but the transformation of the building in its entirety. The word «ριζική» (radical) in both Greek and English connotes, in the context of changes, fundamental alterationsgoingtotherootof theobject of change.The word «ολική» (whole),in thecontext of changes toa 15 building, signifiesfundamental alterationstransforming, asthe law indeed says,the characterof the building. The trial Court failed, as counsel for the respondents indirectly conceded, toponderwhethertheplannedchanges tothe building entail its radical and whole transformation.The Courtconfined its 2o inquiry to the reasonableness of the request for recovery of possession and the need for assumption by the respondents of possession of thepremises inorder to carry outthe changes. The vacuum inthe findings of the Courtinthis crucial area of the fact­ finding process is nowhere bridged. On the contrary, there are 25 passages in the judgment that do indicate thatthe Courtdid take into account irrelevant considerations in deciding the issue. One affected 'the demolition of the lavatories, a matter wholly unconnected with the structure of the main building. The other was theattachmentof importancetothe fact thatthestreet would, 30 as a result of the planned alterations, have noticeable effects on the width and character of the street; a wholly irrelevant consideration tothematterat issue. The primary facts of the case, those affecting the planned alterations, make itfeasible for the Courtof Appeal tofill the gap 35 in thejudgment of the Court.This Courtis in essence required to apply the law to known facts and decide whether they bring the case of the respondents, for recovery of possession, within the provisions of s.ll(l)(h)(iii) of the Rent Control Law 1983. The answer, as in the case of Lamarco Ltd., supra, is in the negative. 423 Pikis J. Poyiatzis v. Pilavakis & Another

(1988)The proposed changeswillleave thestructureandcharacterofthe building unaffected. What isplannedisthesub-division of existing business premises into three shops within the framework of the existing structure.Though thechanges may qualify as substantial and radical in thatthey alter the interior of the building, they will 5 notproduceradicalandtotaltransformation ofthebuilding.Inmy judgment the dismissal of the application for recovery of possession was inevitable on thefacts notedby thetrialCourt. Before leaving this appeal, a word ortwo aboutthecomplaint of counsel thatthejudgment isnotreasoned intheway ordained 10 by para. 2 of article 30 of the Constitution; an additional ground for setting aside thejudgment of thetnalCourt. The attributes of a duly reasoned judgment (the entrenched right of every litigant underarticle30.2 of the Constitution), were the subject of judicial decision in a great number of cases*. In 15 pressing this ground counsel for the appellantappeared to me to equate faulty reasoning with theabsence of reasoning. Gaps oromissions intheprocess of reasoning of ajudgmentdo notsap thejudgmentof reasoning,butmakeitvulnerable tobese\ aside for logical inconsistency, provided the inconsistency is 20 material tothedeliberations of the Court, or errorin law. I would, for the above reasons, allow the appeal. That being my decision it is unnecessary to,probe the other issue raised on appeal, affecting the compensation that should be paid to the tenant sequentially todispossession of thepremises. 25 Appeal partly allowed No order as to costs. I * (See, inter alia, loanmdou ν Dikeos

(1969)1 CLR 235, Pioneer Candy Ltd ν Stelios Tryfon &Sons Ltd

(1981)1CLR 540. 541,AndroullaGeorghiouHambou and Othersν ManaCharalambousMichd<>landAnother

(1981)lCLR 618 Ncphytouv Fol'ce(l981) 2 CLR 195. and Charalambos Tilemachou Psaras of Limas*. ana Anuti>erν The Republic

(1937)2 CLR 132 424