clr/1988/1988_1_727.pdf

(1988)Damages — General damages for personal injunes — Tetraplegia— Claimfor the value of anew house more suitabletoplaintiffs needs — Rejected for lack of evidence, such as evidence that the value of the new house would exceed the valueof plaintiff spresent house Damages — General damages for personal injunes — Tetraplegia — Claim for the value of a car — Rejected for lack of evidence as to suchparticularneed Damages — General damages for personal injunes — Tetraplegia — Future nursing expenses — Benevolence of plaintiff s family — Should not be taken into considerationin reducing damages 5 10 Damages — Interest— The CivilWrongsLaw, Cap 148,asamended bj. Law 156/85, section 58A Appellant 1 and the respondent were dnving their motor vehicle andmotorcycle respectively, along GropiusStreetwithinthetownoi Limassol The respondent was following the appellant As th 15 appellant approached the junction with Robert Kennedy Street, u side road to her nght, she moved nearer to the centre o f the road Meantime the respondent embarked ona process of overtaking her As theappellant approached theside road,she turned·harply toher right, crossing virtually diagonally intotheside street 20 As a result a collision ensued The tnal Court found that the appellant did notsignify her intention toturntothe right Moreover, theappellant admitted that untilthemomentof collision, she didnot realize the presence of the respondent on the road On the other hand, the trial Court found that m view of the movement of 25 appellant's cartowards thecentre of theroad, therespondent ought to realize the possibility of her turning tothe nght and,therefore, he ought toavoid overtaking Liability was apportioned 60% on appellam 1 and 40% o i respondent 30 By reason of the said collision the respondent a healthy man of 25, was paralysed in all four limbs and became incontinentof unne and faeces He can only contemplate life on a wheel — chair to which hehas been confined andthe experience and agonies of total dependence on others 35 In addition to £6,685 for special damages, the tnal Court made provision for the following items, ιe (a) Losses of earnings, (b) Futurenursing andcare expenses, (c) Medicalexpenses, (d)Laundry expenses, (e)Provision of bedsheets andmattresses, (0Provision for extra heating of his residence, heating expenses, (g) Drugs and 40 728 1 C.L.R. Potycarpouv.Adamou —medicines,-and-(h}~Value.oLa_wheel:Chair. In addition the Court awarded the respondent C£25,000 general damages. 5 10 The appeal and cross-appeal put in issue the apportionment of liability, the award of general damages, the award for lossof future earnings,which had been calculated onthebasisof£100 per week, the award for nursing expenses and two claims of the respondent for which die trial Court, did not make any provision on the ground of absenceofevidence,namelyanamountforthepurchaseofanewhouse suitable for the needs of the appellant and an amount for the purchase of a car, which would make it possible for his family to move him about and thereby lessen the emotional and mental hazards of confinement toa wheel-chair. Held, dismissingtheappeal andallowingt^c cross-appeal: 15 20 25 30 35 4Q (A)

(1)There isnoreason tointerferewiththefindingsoffact made bythe trial Court.

(2)Motoristmustgivefairwarningofhisintentionsand mustdesist from implementing them unless his intended course is not reasonably likelytoendanger approaching traffic. Thedutyofcareis fixed impersonally and universally in relation to other users of the roac l devolving into specific duties depending on the particular circumstances of the case. Itisthe circumstancesand the factsof the casethatdefine a motorist'sdutyinaparticularsituationand provide the basisfor the establishment of a breach of the duty of care or the absence of it.

(3)Inthiscase the appellant had noproper regard for therightsof otherusersof theroad and herself made useof theroad indisregard of thoserights.The failure tonotice thepresence of the motorcyclist on the road was her principal folly. Her action to turn right in the abrupt mannershe did isfurther evidence of the usemade byherof the road regardless of the nghts of others. On the other hand, having regard to the change made in the course followed bythe carofthe appellant, itwasfolly on hispartto attempt to overtake the vehicle of the appellant given the existence of a side road a short way ahead. As often said, contnbutory negligence consists of failure to take foreseeable precautions for one's safety. The risks inherent in the course followed by the respondent should have been obvious tohim.

(4)The apportionment of liability involves due appraisal of the blameworthiness oftheconduct ofthepartiesinvoled inan accident and theimpactoftheiractions,thecausativepotency,onthe damage 729 Potycarpouv.Adatnou

(1988)occasioned thereby The discernment of the respective blameworthiness isnot capable of precise calculation The standard isyet againthat ofthereasonable man Causativepotency depends, inter aha, on the capacity of avehicle to cause damage Ultimately apportionment is a matter of impression Beanng in 5 mind the disinclination of this Court to interfere with such apportionment, the appeal and cross-appeal as regards apportionment would be dismissed (B)

(1)Previousawardsdonotgiverisetobindingprecedent inthe sense of stare decisis but they offer guidance Foreign awards must 10 be seen subject to the realitiesinthiscountry Inthiscasetheaward of£25,000forgeneraldamagesismanifestly low Itisincreased to £55,000

(2)The plaintiff had been earning £80 per week as unskilled worker, but, atthe time oftheaccident, he had abandoned hiswork 15 and was engaged in business of his own, namely production of charcoal He allegedthat hewaseaminq£600-£700permonth The duration ofthebusinessoftherespondent wasnotsuch astoprovide a firm indication of his future earnings, whereas his weekly wages before then ceased to provide direct evidence of his earnings The 2 0 basisof £100 per week wasinthe circumstances reasonable

(3)Future nursing expenses were calculated on the basisof £100 per month The evidence showed thatthe respondent needed more than one nurse daily The basisshould havebeen £200per month Benevolence of those close to the injured party does not go to 25 mitigation

(4)Ahouse designed to meet the needs of the respondent would no doubt provide great comfort For this loss to be recoverable, it would have to be demonstrated that the value of the new house would be greater than that of the existing house of the respondent 3 0 Such evidence was wholly missing

(5)The need fortheacquisition ofacarmayinanappropnate case be sustained as a legitimate item of compensation designed to remedydepnvation ofoutdoormobility Nonetheless,theneed must be established as a positive fact and pondered in relation to 3 5 alternativemeansofsecuringoutdoormobilitysuchasrentingacar

(6)Theaward ofintereston £4,161 ofthespecialdamageswillbe left intact TheamountofgeneraldamagesawardedbythisCourtwill 730 1C.L.R· Polycarpou v.Adamou carry interestat6"'. asHon:theinstitutionofthe action" Appealdismissedwithcosts for two advocates. Cross-appeal allowedtotheaboveextent. ' 5 Casesreferredto: Constantinouv. Katsouris{\97'5) 1C.L.R.188: Charalambous and Another v. Kassapis and Another

(1988)1 C.L.R.25; Housecroftv. Burnett [1986]1 AllE.R. 332; 10 • Paraskevaides(Overseas) Ltd. v.ChristofiiWS2) 1C.L.R. 7s9 Wrightv. British RailwaysBoard[1983] 2A:i E.R. 698; Tziellasv.TheshipNatalenaΗ

(1982)1C.L.R. 807. Appeal and cross-appeal. Appeal and cross-appeal against thejudgment of the District 15 CourtofLimassol (Chrysostomis, P.D.C.)dated the8thJuly. 1987 (Action No.7082/84) whereby the defendants were ordered to pay to the plaintiff thesum of £72,606.- as damages for injuries sustained by himasaresult ofatraffic accident. G. Pelaghias,forthe appellants. 20 B. Vassiliades with G. Georghiou and C. Petrou for the respondent. Cur. adv. vult. MALACHTOS J.:Thejudgment of theCourt will be delivered byPikis,J. 25 30 PIKIS J.: This appeal turns on the liability of a motorist, the appellant, for the consequences of anaccident thatrenderedihc motorcyclist, with whom she collided, a '.?traplegic, zncl lis repercussions measured in money terms; subject always tothe inherently difficult task of putting a money value on the loss of humanjoy, mobility and the pursuits ofa healthy life.Asaresultof oftheaccident(itoccurredin 1983) therespondent,ahealthyman of 25, was paralysed inall four limbs andbecame incontinent of urineandfaeces. Hecanonlycontemplatelifeonawheel-chair to which he has been confined andthe experience and agonies of total dependence onothers.Merereflection onthevicissituda* of 731 PHdsJ. Polycarpou v. Adamou

(1988)such a life would make anyone reconcile with unhappiness. The daily experience of total incapacitation cannot but be heart rending. ThetrialCourtfoundappellant 1,thedriver,liableinnegligence and her husband, owner of the vehicle, vicariously liable for the 5 damage occasioned to the respondent; a liability reduced in proportion to the contribution of the respondent to his own injuries. Respondent wasfound tobe part authorofhisinjuries for failure to take appropriate precautions for hissafety. Liability was apportioned between theappellantsandrespondentattheratioof 10 60% to 40%. Subsequently the Court addressed the questions concerning the injuries of the respondent and their after-effects with a view to quantifying hislosi and compensating him for his sufferings. Guided by the principles establishing the legitimate itemsofspecialdamage,theassessmentandqualification offuture 15 lossand monetary compensation forpain andsuffering, the Court arrived at the overall figure of C£121,010,- damage and finally award tothe respondent C£72,606.- damages. By the notices of appeal and cross-appeal, the findings of the Court on liabilityand sequential apportionment wereputinissue. 20 Furthermore, the appellant disputed certain items of damage as excessive or unwarranted by the evidence. The disagreement of the respondent with the award, far reaching as it is, extends to nearly all the significant items of compensation. Equally so in relation to items that the Court found to be unproven or 25 unacceptable itemsfor compensation intheparticular case. The Appeal and Cross-Appeal affectingLiability Inorder toexamine the appeal and cross-appeal on the subject of liabilityinperspective, wemustfirstrecordthecircumstancesof the accident and notice the findings of the Court. The appellant 30 (hereafter we shall refer to appellant 1as «theappellant») and the respondent were driving their motor vehicle and motorcycle respectively, along Gropius Street within the town of Limassol. The respondent was following the appellant. As the appellant approached thejunction with Robert KennedyStreet, aside road 35 to herright,shemoved nearertothecentreoftheroad. Meantime the respondent embarked on a process of overtaking her. Asthe appellant approached the side road, she turned sharply to her right, crossing virtually diagonally into the side street. In his endeavour to avoid a collision, the respondent swerved his 40 732 1 C.L.R. Potycarpon v.Adamoo Pilde J. motorcycle-to-the-right—albeit-without-suceess-in-avoiding-the accident.Attheentryofthesideroad, afrontal collision occurred, a fact in itself indicative of the diagonal direction followed by the appellant in negotiating the right-hand turn. 5 The Court found the appellant guilty ofnegligence, in that she turned right without regard to the state of traffic on the road, in breach of her duty of care to the respondent. The appellant noticed the presence of the motorcyclist on the road for the first timeatthemoment ofthe collision,asindeed she acknowledged, 10 a fact indicative of the magnitude of lack of care on her part. Reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Omiros Constantinou v. Stelios Katsouris

(1975)1 C.L.R. 188, definitive of theduty ofcareofa motoristintending tocrossintoa side road, to otherusers of the road. The motorist must give fair 15 warningofherintentionsandmustdesistfrom implementing them unless her intented course is not reasonably likely to endanger approaching traffic. The duty of care is fixed impersonally and universally in relation to other users of the road devolving into specific duties depending on the particular circumstances of the 20 case. Itisthe circumstances and the facts of the case that define a notorist' sduty in a particular situation and provide the basis for theestablishment of abreach ofthedutyofcareortheabsenceof it. The Court reject the evidence of·the defendant and the witness 25 forthedefence suggestingthatshesignalledwithhertrafficator her intention to turn right. In so holding the Court relied on 'the evidence of other eye-witnesses shedding light on the state of the trafficator immediately after thecollision and theposition claimed to have been occupied bythe defence witness that had allegedly 30 enabled him to eye-witness the state of thetrafficator of thecarof the appellant before the accident. The failure of the appellant to noticethepresence ofthemotorcyclistontheroad established, as the Court found, lackof care on her part, a conclusion reinforced bythe absence of a definite warning of her intention toturn right. 35 Moreover, the manner in which she crossed to her right was also blameworthy, atvariance with the duties ofa prudent driver. The motor cyclist too was found liable for contributory negligence stemming from failure on his part to foresee the likelihood of the car ahead swerving into the side road. The motorist should have 4Q taken stock of this possibility in view of the direction of the car ahead, especially the movement of the carnearer tothe centreof 733 PllrfsJ . Polycarpou v. Adamou

(1988)the road, a fact that ordinanly betraysinclination toget inpositiJI to turn nght His attempt to overtake the car ahead in those circumstances constituted failure on his part to take necessary precautionsforhissafety andguard againstaforeseeable nsk And asitturned out,failuretotakethoseprecautionsexposed hissafety 5 tograveconsequencesthatwillbediscussedlaterinthisjudgment The appellant challenged the findings of the Court respecting thesignification orabsence ofitofherintention toturn nght Inthe submission of counsel for the appellant the version of the defendant and that of her eye-witness was in conformity with the 10 physical movement of her car to the middle of the road For his part counsel for the respondent supported the finding as reasonably open to the Court reinforced by the evidence of an expert witness who testified that having regard to the position of the trafficator after the accident and its mechanics, the trafficator 15 could nothave been inaction pnortotheaccident Furthermore, counsel for the appellant disputed the apportionment of liability made by the tnal Court as unsustainable on due ponderation of the respective blameworthiness ofthepartiesbe itasfound bythe trial Court In his submission a fair apportionment would have 20 been one third (appellant), twothirds (respondent) Counsel for the respondent was also cnhcal of the apportionment of liability Theexercise, inhissubmission, should not haveresultedintheattribution ofliabilitytotherespondent for no more than 10% First, with regard to the findings of the Ccurt 25 there isabsolutely no room forinterference Inacareful judgment the Court noted conflicting testimony associated with the exhibition of the trafficator and concluded largely byreference to the credibility of the witnesses that no such signal had been given - a view strengthened by the expert testimony before the Court 30 On the other hand, the inferences drawn by the tnal Court concerning the circumstances of the accident, were not only warranted but inevitable The appellant had no proper regard for the rights of other users of the road and herself made use of the road indisregard ofthosenghts Thefailure tonoticethepresence 35 of the motorcyclist on the road was herpnncipal folly Her action toturn nght intheabrupt mannershedidisfurther evidenceofthe use made byher of the road regardlessof the rightsofothers The findings of the Court affecting the circumstances of the accident cannot but be sustained 40 734 1 C.L.R. Polycarpou v. Adamoa Pllda J. Equally sustainable is the finding that respondent drove his motorcycle in a manner exposing his safety to foreseeable risks. Having regard to the change made inthe course followed by the car of the appellant, itwas folly on hispart to attempt to overtake 5 the vehicle of the appellant given the existence of a side road a shortwayahead.Asoften said,contributorynegligenceconsistsof failure to take foreseeable precautions tor one's safety. Therisks inherent in the course followed by the respondent should have been obvioustoa motoristproperly concerned with hissafety.A 10 littlepatience on hispart would have avoided the risk. . The apportionment of liability involves due appraisal of the blameworthiness of the conduct of the parties involved in an accidentand theimpactoftheiractions,thecausativepotency, on the damage occasioned thereby. The discernment •of the 15 respective blameworthiness is not amenable to precise calculation. The standards are again those of the reasonable man credited with the knowledge deriving from ordinary experience and the reflections of the logical faculties. The evaluation of the causative potency is susceptible to a nicer calculation. In 20 Charalambous andAnother v.KassapisandAnother (Decided on 8th January. 1988, to be published in

(1988)1 C.L.R.)*. we noticed that the causative potency of one's negligence is, inter alia, dependent on the capacity of the vehicle under his control tocausedamage.Thebiggerandtheheavieravehicleis.themore 25 damage itislikelytocause.Ultimatelyapportionment ofliabilityis a matter of impression and no doubt in this, as in other areas of conflict, the impessions of the trial Court are more vivid. This coupled with ourdisinclination tointerfere with the findings of the Court, makes us reluctant to interfere with the apportionment 30 made by thetrialCourt; though we must record that had we been concerned toapportion liability, we would beinclined to attribute a greaterpercentage of liabilitytothe appellant. DAMAGES Inthejudgment of the trial Court detailed reference ismade to 35 the injuries of the plaintiff and sequential needs in order to keep body and soul together and maintain the degree of comfort necessary to enable him to function as an organic entity. The condition of the respondent requires constant care and attention •Reportedin

(1988)1C.L.R.25. 735 PUdsJ. Polycarpou v.Adamou

(1988)byothersforeveryfunction otherthan merely contemplative ones including medical care periodically and the supply of medicine. The principle is that provision must be made by way of compensation for thesupplyof every comfort and facility thatwill lessen the loss of natural faculties and restore a quality of life as 5 proximate as possible to the life the injured party could be expected to enjoy but for hisincapacitation. The Court awarded an amount of C£6,685.-by way of special damages for losses of earnings and other items of damage that accrued and could be quantified by the date of trial. By way of 10 future lossand necessary expense, the Court made provision for the following items:(a)Losses of earnings (b)Future nursing and care expenses. (c)Medical expenses. (d)Laundry expenses. (e)Provision of bedsheets and mattresses. (f)Provision forextraheatingofhisresidence,heating expenses (g)Drugs and medicines, and (h)Value of a wheel-chair. In addition the Court awarded the respondent C£25,000.- as general damages. As can be gathered from the findings of the Court, the condition of the appellant accords with the classic situation of a tetraplegic involving loss of movement in all four limbs, associated with awareness of hiscondition, butfortunately 25 unaccompanied bypain, except occasionally. The appellant challenged the sum awarded by way of gen'eral damages as unjustifiably high. In his submission, an award of C£15,000.-wastheproperfigureunderthisheadofdamage.Also hecontested thefindingoftheCourtrespectingtheearningsofthe 30 respondent. C£100.- per week and sequentially thereto the forecast offuture loss.Counselfortherespondentalsochallenged the award of general damages on the ground that it was inordinately low. The case of Housecroft v. Burnett [1986] 1All E.R. 332, establishes a conventional award for quadriplegia at 35 75,000.-poundsterling.Theaward fortherespondentinthiscase should have been for no lesser amount considering that he forfeited virtually all his faculties at the prime of his life. The provision made by way of nursing expenses was criticized as wholly inadequate. More than one nurse, very possibly three 40 736· 15 20 1 C.L.R. Polycarpou v.Adamoa Pilds J. nursesaday,mustbeemployed tolookafter therespondent. The evidence established, in the submission of counsel, that the monthly salary of a nurse was inthe region of C£140 to C£160.and possibly C£180.5 Animportant aspect of the appeal isthat concerningthe refusal of the Court to make: (a)Provision forthe acquisition ofa new house forthe familyof therespondentsuchaswouldfacilitatehismovementabout, and, (b)Provision forthepurchase ofacar,anassetthatwould make 10 itpossibleforhisfamily tomovehimabout and thereby lessen the emotional and mental hazards of confinement toa wheel-chair. The trial Court rejected the claim for the acquisition of a car in the absence of evidence revealing the cost of renting a car from time to time for outdoor movement. No separate provision was 15 made for this item of damage, save that the Court indicated that lack of amenity to move outside the house would be taken into consideration in the assessment of general damages; acknowledging that lack of such amenity cannot but exacerbate the melancholy state of the respondent, the Court remained 20 unpersuaded of the need for anew house and, inthe absence of satisfactory evidence respecting the cost necessary for the adaptation of the family house to meet the needs of the respondent, made no provision by way of damages on thisscore either. 25 We have carefully considered the arguments raised by both counsel with keen awareness of the sense of deprivation experienced by the respondent on the one hand and the need to ensurethat the award isintrinsically fair, free from any elementof overlapping.The multiplierschosen bythe Courtare not inissue. 30 Amultiplier of 12wasadopted forthe assessment of future lossof earningsandamultiplierof 15fortheassessment offuture nursing and care expenses. The choice of different multipliers for the assessment of future losses of different kinds accords with the realities of working life examined in conjunction with those 35 concerning the duration of life.The two rarely coincide; the span of lifeordinarily extendsbeyond that ofworkinglife.Damage that crystallized and could be quantified was awarded as special damage. Future losses and expense, as well as compensation for pain, suffering and loss of amenity, formed part of the award of 40 general damages. 737 PikisJ. Polycarpou v. Adamou

(1988)First we shall deal with general damages. In Paraskevaides (Overseas) Ltd. v. Christofi

(1982)1 C.L.R.

1. we noted the tendency discernible over the years to make more generous awards as compensation for pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life.Ahigher premium, itwasobserved, isplaced on 5 human pain and the agonies of disability. Asimilar tendency is noticeable elsewhere, especially in England wherefrom we often derive guidance in the assessment of damage. In the case of Housecroft v. Burnett (supra), the Court debated at length the form a proper award should take by way of general damages in 10 cases of tetraplegia. They indicated that a conventional award should be in the region of UKL.75,000.-Aconventional award,it was observed, provides for a degree of uniformity and should be favoured, subject always, to the presence of aggravating or extenuating circumstancesthatmaymilitateforahigheroralower 15 award, as the case may be. Earlier we stressed, it is well nigh impossible to put a precise value on loss of human faculties and happiness. The inflationary spiral is another consideration to which the Courtshould pay heed, though notnecessarily indirect sequence to the movement of the curve of inflation, as Lord 20 Diplock noticed in Wright v. BritishRailways Board [1983] 2All E.R. 698,699,
2. Previous awards do not give rise to binding precedent in the sense ofstare decisisaspointedoutin Tziellasv.Theship«Natalena H»

(1982)1 C.L.R. 807, 820. They offer guidance, especially 25 awards made byCourts of the Republic that reflect the realitiesof the country and the purchasing power of the Cyprus pound. Foreign awards must be seen and evaluated subject tothisreality. The purchasingpower ofthecurrencyisrelevantasthe instrument of satisfying needs that may mend the ruptured comfort and 30 provide for amenities otherwise denied by the condition of the injured party. AnAppellate Court can interfere withan award ifitismanifestly low or manifestly high or when the direction affecting damages is fraught with an error of principle. An award ismanifestly high or 35 low, asthe case may be, ifthe element of excess or shortfall isso glaring as to provide an objective basis for itsassessment. Where conventional awards have been established they provide, no doubt, a solid basis for comparison. Inassessing the sufficiency of the award in this case, we must not overlook that it was meant, 40 738 1 C.L.R. 5 10 15 20 25 Polycarpou v.Adatnou Plkis J. interalia,toprovidecr-nfort torlossofoutdoormobility,albeitnot preciselyarticulated-for-lack-of-evidence-proving-the-annual-cost ofrentingacarforsatisfying thisneed.Theneedfortheacquisition of a car may in an appropriate case be sustained as a legimate item of compensation designed toremedy deprivation of outdoor mobility. Nonetheless, the need must be established asa positive fact and pondered in relation to alternative means of securing outdoor mobility such as renting a car. We fell disinclined to interfere withthefinding oftheCourtbeitreluctantlyonthisissue. However, in defining the magnitude of loss of amenities, deprivation of outdoor mobility will be duly taken into consideration. The award of C£25,000.- iswholly inadequate to compensate the respondent for the wreckage of his life. Visualization of life on a wheel-chair, coupled with dependence on others and occasional complications of his condition, plus awareness ofhiscondition, paint apicture ofpain,gloom and loss of virtually every comfort and amenity in life. The amount awarded bythe trialCourtbywayofgeneral damages issetaside. It is wholly inadequate to compensate the injured party for his sufferings and deprivation of thefaculties for self-reliance leading toconfinement toawheel-chair. Of course,no amount of money isasubstitute for ahealthy life ofwhichhe hasbeen deprived. On the other hand, the amount must be such as to be sufficiently commensurate as far as money can do with his gra^e and irreversible condition. The award of C£25,000.- is set aside as manifestly low. In our judgment an award of C£55,000.- is fair compensation for this aspect of general damages and we so approve. EARNINGS 30 Therespondent wasanunskilledlabourer whowasforaperiod of a year prior to his accident engaged in the business of production of charcoal. He maintained that hisearningswere in the region of C£600.- to C£700.- a month, evidence that went virtually uncontradicted in the submission of the respondent. 35 Counsel for the appellant maintained that his monthly earnings should be estimated at no more than C£80.- per month which reflected thevalueofthelabourofanunskilledworkerinthe open market and coincided with hishisearningsbefore embarking ona venture ofhisown.Theduration ofthebusinessofthe respondent 40 wasnotsuch astoprovide afirm indication ofhisfuture earnings, whereas his weekly wages before then ceased to provide direct evidence of hisearnings.The eventual assessment ofthe Courtat 739 Pikis J. Polycarpou v. Adamou

(1988)CY£100.- per week was fairand inany event notsuch asto leave room for this Court to interfere. Hence both the appeal and counter appeal, so far as directed against the pertinent finding of the Court, are dismissed. Next the claim for a new house.The Court refused to make an 5 award for this item for an estimated amount in the region of C£23,000.- on the ground that its necessity had not been established; and no award was made for repairs that may be necessary to make adjustments to his house to conform to his needs, forlack ofevidence. Hadsuchevidence been forthcoming, 10 the Court indicated, it would be prepared to make appropriate provision. But as its assessment was a matter of guess work, tht Court refused it. A house designed to meet the needs of the respondent would no doubt providegreat comfort. Forthislossto be recoverable, itwould havetobedemonstrated thatthevalueof 15 the new house would be greater than that ofthe existinghouseof the respondent. Such evidence was wholly missing.Thus we are driven to sustain the judgment of the trial Court on this point as well.Andasthecostofadjustment oftheexistingpremiseswasnot dulysubstantiated and not proven, we feel unjustified to interfere 20 with that part of judgment. Lastly, nursing expenses. In the case of Housecroft it was pointed out that the benevolence of those close to the injured partycannot gotomitigation.Theincapacitated personisentitled to be compensated for loss of the amenity to look after himself 25 taking the form of the cost necessary to be properly looked after. The evidence established that more than one nurse should be in attendance on a dailybasis.Thesum awarded bywayof monthly provision, C£100.- was, in the light of the evidence wholly inadequate although the sum suggested by counsel for the 30 respondent was grossly excessive. Afair provision forthisitem of damage should be C£200.- per month. We shall, tht/efore, double the award for future nursing expenses increasing it from C£18,000.-toC£36,000.35 INTEREST Section58AoftheCivilWrongsLaw-Cap. 148-(addedby s.5 of Law 156/85) confers discretion on the Court of trial to award interest for the whole orpart of thejudgment for damages from a date prior to the date of its pronouncement. By the terms of this enactment discretion is vested in the Court to award.interest on 40 740 1 C.L.R. 5 Polycarpou v. Adamou Pilds J. thewhole orpartoftheaward of damages from anydate following thegenesis ofthecause ofaction Thepnmary object ofthelawis toafford power totheCourttodojustice totheinjured party asthe intrinsic ments ofhis claim may warrant and secondly, minimize the effects of delay on anaward of damages In exercise of this power, the tnalCourt (a)Awarded interest on partofthe amountofspecial damages, namely, an amountofC£4,161 -for apenod of23 months,and (b) Coupled theaward of general damages with the interest 10 from thedateof theaccrualofthecause of action,thatis, from 4th August, 1983 We shall leave intact the award of interest made inrelationto special damage Ontheotherhand,theaward of general damages for pain, suffenng and loss ofamenities has to beset aside. The 15 sum awarded on this accountbythis Court,notably, C£33,000(after deductionofthe contnbutionofthe respondent)shall carry interest atthe rate of 6% ρa from the date of institution of the action, thatis, 19 101984 In theresult theappeal is dismissed with costs Thecross20 appeal isallowed inpart,asindicated inthisjudgment, with costs In the interest of certainty and subject tothe correctness of our anthmehc, judgment shall beentered forthe respondent forthe following amounts (a)C£4,161 - (special damages) with 6% interestaccruing from 25 86 1985 (b)C£33,000 - (general damages, for pain, suffenng andlossof amenities), plus interest accruing at therate of 6% ρa from 19 10 1984 (c) The remaining part of the award of general damages of 30 C£61,515 -(60% ofC£102,525 -)*shall cany legalinterestatthe rateof6% ρa from thedateofjudgment of thetnalCourt,thatis, from 87 1987 • CC62 400 futurelossofearnings C£36 000 futurenursmq andcaree)tpenses C£900 • futureurologist'sfees C£1800 laundry expenses C€ I 425 bedsheets andmattresses 741 Pilds J. Polycarpou v.Adamoo

(1988)Likethe trialCourtweapprove costsfor twoadvocates, subject to the following directions: One set of costs willbe recovered for appearances for the hearing ofthe appeal and cross appeal. Order accordingly. Appeal dismissed. Crossappeal allowed inpart. Orderforcostsas above. 742 5