(1988)1988July18 (A.LOBOU, P.,SAWtDES,KOURRB,JJ.) MUNICIPALITYOFNICOSIA, Appellant, v. CHARALAITOOSCLEOVOULOU, Respondent (CriminalAppeal No. 4936). Munidpai Corporations — TheMunidpaiCorporationsLaw IJ1/85, as amended sections 92, 93 and94 —Nuisance— The proceedings under subsection 93
(1)(b)—Nature of—Not criminal—Rules governing such proceedings — The Municipal Corporation (Nuisances)Rules —Continuedto beinforceinvirtueofsection 11 5 oftheInterpretationLaw, Cap. 1. Gvil procedure— Contravention of rules— If detect fundamental, proceedings areanullify, whilstifcontraventionamereirregularity, the matter can be remedied under0.64 R.l ofthe Gvil Procedure Rules— The Municipal Corporations (Nuisances) Rules— 10 ContraventionofRule4inthatsummons wasnotsealed by theseal of the Court orsigned by theJudge —Summons a nullify, but the applicationitselfand theinterimordergrantedarenotaffected. Municipal Corporations — The Munidpai Corporations (Nuisances) Rules—See Municipal Corporations, ante; and Civil Procedure, 15 ante. Theappellantsservedinaccordancewithsection92ofLaw111/ 85 on the respondent a notice calling upon him to abate a pubttc nuisance. As the respondent failed to comply the appellants began legal 2 0 proceedings by filing an application under Rule3 oftheMunicipal Corporations (Nuisances) Rules.Asa resultasummonswas issued callingtherespondenttoappearbeforetheCourtonaspecifiedday. However, incontravention ofRule4, thesummonswasnotsealed bythesealoftheCourtorsignedbyaJudge. 25 100 1CL.R. FT«UMfttyv.deowwlow On the same day with thefiling of theaforesaid application,the appellants obtained upon ex parte application an interim order, restraining the respondent from continuing the alleged nuisance. Thisorderwas madereturnableonthesamedayasthesummons. 5 10 The trial Judge found that the word «charge· (κατηγορία) in $.93
(2)indicatesthattheproceedings arecriminalproceedings.Asa result,heconcluded that,notwithstanding s.l 1of the Interpretation Law, Cap.l, the said rules are inconsistent with the new law and, therefore,arenotapplicable. Heconsideredtheproceedigs anullity and, consequently, dismissed the application and discharged the interimorder. Hencethisappeal. Held:
(1)Sub-section 93(2} should be read in conjunction with subsections 93(1Kb)and93
(4). 15 20 25 30 35 The use of the word «charge» in sub-section
(2)cannot be interpreted as meaningthatsuch proceedings areproceedings of a criminal nature. No criminal offence is created under section 93 entailing punishment.What theCourtisempowered todoistoissue anorderdirecting a person,who hasfoiledtocomply with anotice served on him under $.92, toabate the nuisance and if hefailsto comply with such order then an offence is committed under sub section
(4)of s.93 subjecting the offender to the sentence contemplatedthereunderandalsoundersection 96.
(2)The object of Rules 3 and 4 of the Municipal Corporations (Nuisances)Rulesistogiveeffect totheprovisions ofs.93(l)and
(2)for presenting a person causing nuisancebefore theCourtwiththe object of securing an abatement of the nuisance. Then such proceedings cometoanendwiththeissueofanorder.
(3)There is no doubt that under the provisions of the law any violation of the provisions of the law rendersalsoaperson liableto purecriminalproceedings.Thisishoweveranalternative procedure tothatcontemplatedby sections 92 and93of theLaw andRules 3 and4oftheMunicipalCorporations(Nuisances)Rules.
(4)The question now is whether in this case the particular contraventionofRule4amountstoafundamental defect ortomere irregularity remediable under0.64R.l oftheCivilProcedureRules.
(5)Inthelightoftheauthorities,andofthemandatorylanguageof theRule,thedefect isafundamental one. 101 N*sia M'lity v. Cleovoulou
(1988)
(6)However, such defect affects only the summons. Itdoesnot affect theapplication;moreover,itdoesnotaffect theinterimorder Appeal allowedto the above extent. Directionsaccordingly. 5 Casesreferredto RePritchard(deceased) [196311 All E.R.873; Spyropoulosv.Transavia
(1979)1C.L.R.421; DemetriouandOthersv.Prodromou
(1983)1C.L.R.300; Attorney-Generalv. Kouppi, 1R.S.C.C.115; Demetriou ν TheRepublic, 1R.S.C.C. 99; 10 President of the Republic v. House of Representatives
(1985)3 C.L.R.
- Appeal. Appeal by theMunicipality of Nicosiaagainst thedecision of the District Court of Nicosia (Photiou, Ag. D.J.) given on the 20th 15 October, 1987 dismissing an application on behalf of the appellants calling upon therespondents toshow cause for having failed to abate the nuisance caused as a result of the operation of his business premises at Nicosia and also discharging an interim order restraining the respondent from continuing the alleged 20 nuisance. E.Odysseos withL. Georghiadou (Mrs.), for the appellants. M.Constantinides, for the respondents." Cur. adv. vult A. LOIZOUP.:Thejudgmentof the Courtwillbe delivered by 25 ' Mr.Justice Sawides. ' SAWIDES J.: This is an appeal,against the decision of a Judge of the District Court of Nicosia whereby he dismissed an application on behalf of the appellants against the respondent calling upon him to show cause for having failed to abate the 30 nuisance caused as a result of the operation on his business premises at Nicosia and also discharged an Interim Order restraining the respondent from continuing thealleged nuisance. The proceedings in the case which led to the present appeal were instituted under the provisions of the Municipal 35 Corporations Law No. 111/85 and the Municipal Corporations 102 2CL.R. N**UMlltyv.Oeovoukra SawtdesJ. (Nuisances)Rules,publishedinvolIIoftheSubsidiaryLegislation ofCyprus,atp.
- Thefactsofthecasearebrieflyasfollows: TherespondentoperatesaworkshopatFlorinisstreet,Nicosia 5 fortherepairofmotorcycles.Theoperationofthesaidworkshop causedcomplaintsagainsttherespondentforexcessivenoiseand for causing the accumulation of filth in Promitheas street. Asa result the appellants upon receipt of information to the above effect and havingbeen satisfied thattheabove complaints were 10 wellfounded servedupontherespondentanoticeinaccordance withtheprovisionsofs.92ofLaw111/85askinghimtostop: (a)causingnoisebytherepairandoperationofmotorcycles. (b)accumulating filth on the public pavement at Promitheas street. 15 (c)operatingaworkshopfortherepairofmotorcycles;and (d)Toremovesuchfactoryandcleantheareafromanyfilthas the above acts of the respondent were the cause of a public nuisance. Therespondentfailedtocomplyandasaresultappellantsfiled 20 an application under Rule 3 of the Municipal Corporations (Nuisances)RulestotheDistrictCourtofNicosiafortheissueofa summonstotherespondentorderinghimtoabatethenuisance, specifyingthereinthenatureofthenuisancesoughttobeabated. A summons was issued in accordance with the terms of the 25 applicationwhichwasdraftedbycounselforappellantscallingon therespondenttoappearbeforetheCourtonaspecifieddatefor the purpose of the proceedings to be had. Such summons however instead of being sealed with the seal of the Court or signedbyaJudgeasprovidedbyrule4itwassignedbycounsel 30 forappellants. Atthesametimecounselfor appellantsapplied foraninterim Order restraining the respondent from causing the alleged nuisance which was granted by the Court and was made returnableon29thJune, 1987,onwhichdatethesummonswas 35 also fixed. On such date counsel appearing for the respondent raisedapreliminaryobjectionthatthesummonsserveduponhim waswronglyissuedasitwasnotincompliancewiththeprovisions oftherules,inthatitwasneithersealedbytheRegistrarnorsigned 103 I S a w i d e s J. N'sla M'Htyv.Cleovoulou
(1988)by a Judge and that itshould be dismissed and the interim order discharged. Counsel further submitted that the proceedings were wrongly commenced by a civil action describing the parties as plaintiffs and defendant respectively. The creation of a public nuisance, counsel submitted, is a criminal offence punishable as 5 provided by law and such proceedings could not have been institutedinanyotherwaythanbyfilingacriminalcharge.Though under the Municipal Corporations Law provision is made that «Legal proceedings may be instituted» the law clearly speaks about an offence, and the prosecution of an offence can only 10 commence bythe filing of acriminal charge. The learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that though in the Municipal CorporationsLaw, 1985,(Law 111/85),thereisno provision thattheruleswhichexistedpriortoitsenactment should continue tobe inforce neverthelessbyvirtue oftheInterpretation 15 Law such rules continue to remain in force till repealed but he went further and found that there was conflict between the rules andtheprovisionsofthelawand,therefore, tosuchextentthelaw prevails.He found thats.93
(2)expresslyprovidesfor proceedings tobetaken fortheabatementofanuisance,whichbearinginmind 20 the mention of the word «charge» in sub-section
(3)of s.93 and also in s.94 and the fact that the sentence provided has been increased and in addition to a fine, imprisonment has also been provided, the procedure contemplated by the Municipal Corporations (Nuisances) Rules cannot be utilized as being 25 contrary to the provisions of the law. He went further and found that even assuming that the rules continue to be applicable the application should be dismissed on the ground that there was no compliancewiththerelevantrulesinthatthesummonsissued and served on the defendant was not in compliance with rule 3 as it 30 wassigned by counsel for appellants and not sealed bythe Court or signed by a Judge thereof, a mandatory provision under the rules. He considered the said irregularity as a material one rendering the proceedings a nullity. As a result he dismissed the application on thebasisof hisfindings and he alsodischarged the 35 interim order issued. Counsel for the appellants raised the following grounds of appeal: (a)That the trialJudge waswrong infindingthat the Municipal Corporations (Nuisances) Rules are inconsistent with . the 40 provisions of the Municipal Corporations Law, 111/85, as 104 2 C.L.R. N'sia M'lity v. Cleovoulou Savvides J. amended by Laws 1/86 - 165/87 and that they have no application inthe case (
- b)He wrong'y concluded that s 11 of the InterpretationLaw. Cap 1cannotsave thesaid rules 5 (c)Hewrongly found thats 143 ot theaforesaid law, No 111/ 85, does notsave the said rules (
- d)He wrongly concluded that s 93 of the aforesaid law. No 111/85, introduced a new procedure regulating matters of nuisance provided by the law 10 (
- e)He wrongly found that the summons served on the defendant is null and void and not in accordancewith the rules and (f)Hewrongly dismissed themte.imOrderissued by himonthe basis of s 93 of the Municipal Corporations Law, as a result of τ r wrong interpretation TheMunicipalCorporations (Nuisances)Rulespublished in the Subsidiary Legislation, Vol II,ρ 519 were onginally published in the official Gazetteof theRepublic 1930, SupplementNo 3 and were made under the provisions of the-MunicipalCorporations 20 Law, 1930 (Law 26 of 1930) which with all the subsequent amendmentstill 1949 were incorporated intheRevised Edition of the Laws of 1949 as Cap 252 The subsidiary legislation was reenacted undertheprovisions of theRevised Edition(Subsidiary Legislation) Law, 1954 By Law 64/64 the Municipal 25 Corporations Law, Cap 240 which became ineffective underthe provisions of the Constitutionwas revived and regained its force till it was repealed and replaced by Law 111/85 No new regulations were made under Law 111/85 but by virtue of the provisions of s 11 of the Interpretation Law, Cap 1 read in 3C conjunctionwiths2 of thesame law continued tobe inforce S 11 of Cap 1provides as follows 35 «11 Whenever any Law hasalready beenorshall hereafter be repealed and other provisions are substituted by the repealingLawallpublicinstruments,formsandappointments made or issued under the repealed Law, and in force at the time of such repeal,shall, untilrevoked of replaced, continue good and valid inso far as they are not inconsistentwith the substitutedprovisions » and the definition of «public instrument»unders 2 includes rules 105 Sawtdea J. tTmUM*Btyv. Cteovoaloa
(1988)orby-lawsmade orissuedunder theauthority ofanylaw. S.93of the Municipal Corporations Law, 1985, onwhich the learned trial Judge relied in reachinghisconclusion providesas follows: «93.-
(1)Εάντο πρόσωπον ειςτοοποίον επεδόθη ειδοποίησις δυνάμει των διατάξεων του άρθρου 92 παρά λειψη νασυμμορφωθή προς οιανδήποτε των απαιτή σεων αυτήςεντός της καθοριζομένης εις αυτήν προθε σμίας, ή εάν η οχληρία είναι ενδεχόμενον, κατά την 10 γνώμην του συμβουλίου ήτου δημάρχου,ναεπαναληφθή εις τα ίδια υποστατικά,το συμβούλιον: (α) δύναταινα άρη την οχληρίαν και οιοσδήποτε των υπαλλήλων ήεργατών του συμβουλίου δύνα ται ναεισέρχεται ειςτα υποστατικά, ειςταοποία 15 υφίσταται η οχληρία καιναεκτέλεση εκεί οιανδή ποτε πράξιν, η οποία ήθελε κριθή αναγκαία προς άρσιν της οχληρίας, καιτοσυμβούλιον δύναται να ανακτά δΓ αγωγής τα υπ'αυτού γενόμενα έξοδα αno το ενπαραλείψει πρόσωπον 20 (β) δύναται ναπροβή ειςτην λήψιν δικαστικών μέτρων προς εξασφάλισιν διατάγματος διάτου οποίουνα υποχρεούται τοενπαραλείψει πρόσωπον να άρητην οχληρίαν.
(2)Το δικαστήριον ενώπιον του οποίου εκδικάζεται 25 κατηγορία προσαφθείσα εναντίον προσώπου τινός, ως ειςτηνπαράγραφον (β) ανωτέρω προνοείται,δύνα ται κατόπιναιτήσεων άνευειδοποιήσεως προς τον έτε ρον διάδικον (ex parte) να διάταξη το εν παραλείψει πρόσωπον να λάβη αμέσως τοιαύτα μέτρα, καθσριζό- 30 μένα ειςτο διάταγμα,οίαήθελον κριθή αναγκαία διά την άρσιν ήαναστολήν της οχληρίας ήδιάτην παρεμποδισιν δημιουργίας ή επαναλήψεως της, μέχρι της τελικής εκδικάσεως της υποθέσεως αναφορικώς προς ηνπροσήφθη ηκατηγορίαεναντίον τουτοιούτου προ- 35 σώπου: Νοείται ότι η έκδοσις του τοιούτου διατάγματος υπόκειται ειςτας διατάξειςτου περί Πολιτικής Δικονο μίας Νόμου,του περίΔικαστηρίων Νόμου καιτων περί 106 5 2 C.L.R. N'sia M'llty v.Cleovoutou SawtdesJ . Πολιτικής Δικονομίας ΔιαδικαστικώνΚανονισμών. 5 10 15 20
(3)Εάν οιονδήποτεπρόσωπον εναντίοντ ο υ οποίου εξεδόθη διάταγμα δυνάμει των διατάξεων τ ο υ εδαφίου
(2)παραλείπη ή αμελή να συμμορφωθή προς τ οτ ο ι ούτο διάταγμα εντός της καθορισθείσης εντ ω διατάγματι προθεσμίας, είναι νόμιμον διά τ ο συμβούλιον να εκτέλεση τ ο τ ο ι ο ύ τ ο διάταγμα και τ α γενόμενα έξοδα διά την εκτέλεσιν τ ο ύ τ ο υ καταβάλλονται ειςτ ο συμβού λιον υπό τ ο υπροσώπου εναντίον τ ο υ οποίου εξεδόθη τ ο διάταγμα, και τ ατ ο ι α ύ τ α έξοδα λογίζονται ως ποινή εντός τηςεννοίας τ ο υπερί Ποινικής Δικονομίας Νόμου και η καταβολή τούτων ενσυνεχεία επιβάλλεται.
(4)Οιονδήποτε πρόσωπον εναντίον τ ο υ οποίου εξε δόθη διάταγμα δυνάμει τ ο υ εδαφίου
(2), τ ο οποίον παρακούει ήπαραλείπει να συμμορφωθή προς τ ο τοι ούτο διάταγμα, ανεξαρτήτως τ ο υ εαν τ ο συμβούλιον προέβη εις την εκτέλεσιν ή εξετέλεσετ οτοιούτο διάταγ μα, είναι ένοχον αδικήματος και υπόκειται εις ποινήν φυλακίσεως μη υπερβαίνουσαντους έξ μήνας ή ειςχρηματικήν ποινήν μη υπερβαίνουσαν τ α ς τριακοσίας λίρας, ή εις αμφοτέρας τ α ς ποινάς ταύτας.» The translation inEnglish reads as follows: 25 30 35 («93.-
(1)If the person on whom a notice was served in accordance with the provisions of section 92 fails to comply with any of its requirements within the period prescribed therein, or if there is a possibility, in the opinion of the corporation or the mayor, thatthenuisance may be repeated • on the same premises, the corporation: (a) may abate thenuisance andany ofthe corporation's employees or workers may enter the premises in which the nuisance takes place and therein proceed to any act which may be deemed necessary for theabatementof the nuisance andthecorporation may recover by action from the person indefault the expenses incurred by it; (b)may proceed to the institution of legal proceedings for the securement of any order by which the person in default willbe compelled toabate the nuisance.
(2)The Court before which a charge preferred against a person istried,asprovided inparagraph (b)above, may upon 107 S a w i d e s J. N'sia M'lity v. Cleovoulou
(1988)an ex parte application order the defaulting person to take such measures, defined in the order, which may be deemed necessary for the abatement orsuspension of the nuisance or the prevention of its creation or repetition, until final determination of the case in which the charge was preferred 5 against such person: Provided that the issue of such an order is subject to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Law, the Courts of Justice Law and the Civil Procedure Rules.
(3)Ifany person against whom an order was issued on the 10 basis of the provisions of sub-section
(2)omits or neglects to comply with such orderwithin the timespecified intheorder, it is lawful for the corporation to execute such order and the expenses incurredfor itsexecution arepaidtothecorporation by the person against whom the order was issued and such 15 expenses are considered as asentence withinthemeaningof the Criminal ProcedureLaw andtheirpaymentbecomes then imperative.
(4)Any person against whom an order was issued on the basis of sub-section
(2),who disobeys or fails to comply with 20 such order, irrespective of whether the corporation has proceeded to the execution or executed such order, is guilty of an offence and subject to a sentence of imprisonmentnot exceeding six monthsortoafine notexceeding threehundred pounds, or toboth such sentences.») 25 The learned trial Judge considered the word «charge» (κατηγορία) mentioned in sub-section
(2)as implying a criminal charge which has to be commenced by criminal proceedings. Sub-section
(2)however should be read in conjunction with s.93
(1)(b)which provides forthetakingofjudicial proceedings and 30 sub-section
(4)which specifically makes itan offence if a person failstocomply with anorderissued by theCourtunder sub-section
(2). Also s.94 provides for a fine not exceeding £300.- or imprisonment or both and s.96 provides for an additional sentence for contravention of the order of the Court. 35 A careful perusal of the contents of the above sections read together cannotlead toaconstructionthattherelevant provisions in the rules are repugnant to the law. S.93(l)(b) clearly speaks of judicial proceedings to be taken. The use of the word «charge»in sub-section
(2)cannot be interpreted as meaning that such 40 108 2 C.L.R. 5 N'sia M'lity v. Cleovoulou S a w i d e s J. proceedings are proceedings of a cnminal nature No cnminal offence is created under section 93 entailing punishment What the Court is empowered to do is to issue an order directing a person, who has failed to comply with a notice served on him unders s92 to abate the nuisance and if he fails to comply with such order then an offence iscommitted under sub-section
(4)of s 93 subjecting the offender to the sentence contemplated thereunder and also under section 96 The object of Rules 3 and 4 of the Municipal Corporations 10 (Nuisances) Rules istogive eftect tothe provisions of s93
(1)and
(2)forpresenting aperson causingnuisance before theCourtwith the object of secunng an abatement of the nuisance Then such proceedings come toan end with the issueofan order and failure to comply with such an order renders the person non-complying 15 guilty of a cnminal offence for disobeying the urder of the Court Thereisnodoubtundertheprovisionsofthelawthatanyviolation of the provisions of the law renders also a person liable to pure under the Cnminal Procedure Law in which case all the prerequisites ofacriminal prosecution and the rulesregaiding the 20 burden ofproof and e\idencehave tc be applied Thisishowever an alternative procedure tothat contemplated bysections92 and 93 of the Law and Rules 3 and 4 of the Municipal Corporations (Nuisances) Rules 25 Inthe resultthe finding of the learned tna!Judge that the Rules can have no application inthe present case iswrong We come now to consider the question as to whether noncompliance bythe appellants with the provisions of Rule4 of the MunicipalCorporations (Nuisances) Rulesand Form No2set out 30 intheAppendixtothesaidRulesamountstoamereirregulanty or a fundamental defect nullifying the proceedings Under Rule3 of the said Rules proceedings inthe Court for an ordertoabate a nuisanceshallbe commenced bysummonstobe issued on an application on behalf of the Municipality desinng to 35 commence such proceedings Rule 4provides as follows. «Uponreceiptofanapplication asaforesaid, theCourtshall 109 »<iwtdes J. N'sia M'lity v. Cleovoulou
(1988)issue a summons in accordance with the terms of the application, calling on the defendant to appear before the Courtonaspecified dayforthepurpose oftheproceedingsto be had. The summons shallbe sealed withthe seal of theCourt or, inlieuofbeingsealed,itmaybesignedbyoneofthejudges.» 5 FormNo.2intheAppendixprescribestheform ofthe summons to be issued which embodies a command directed to the defendant to appear before the Court on a fixed date on the hearing of the proceedings for the obtaining of an order 10 compelling such person to abate the nuisance described in the summons. At the end of such form it is prescribed that the summons shall be sealed withthesealof the Court orsignedbya Judge. From the wording of such Rule itappears tobemandatory that 15 such summons should be issued by the Court and itshould bear the seal of the Court or the signature of one of the Judges. Obviously the reason is because, as mentioned earlier, it embodies a command directing the defendant to appear before the Court. The question which poses for consideration is whether noncompliance with Rule 4 and the Form set out in the Appendix amounts toan irregularitywhich does notrender the proceedings void under Order 64
(1)of the Civil Procedure Rules or to a fundamental defect in the proceedings which will nullify the 25 proceedings. 0.64, r.l of the Civil Procedure Rulesprovides as follows: «Non-compliance withanyoftheserules,orwithanyruleof practice for the time being in force, shall not render any proceedingsvoidunlesstheCourtorJudgeshallsodirect,but 30 such proceedings maybe setaside eitherwholly or inpart as irregular, oramended, orotherwisedealtwithinsuch manner and upon such terms asthe Court orJudge shall think fit.» Itcorresponds to the oldEnglish 0.70, r.l (seeAnnual Practice 1960, p. 1986). In the notes to the said Rules in the Annual 35 Practiceadistinction isdrawnbetween proceedingswhicharenull and void, and proceedingswhicharemerelyirregularinthe sense that they involve non-compliance with any of the R.S.C. or with anyruleofpractice.Inthefirstclassofcasesthepar*yisentided ex 110 20 2C.L.R. N*«UM11ty*.aeovoalo« SawMesJ. debito jusrjtiae to have the proceedings set aside without conditions,fortheyareanullity,whereasinthesecondcasesthe proceedings are valid though irregular and the Court has an unlimited discretion as to what order it will make in the 5 circumstances. InthecaseofRePritchard(deceased)(196311AllE.R.873,the applicationoftherulewasexplained. InthatcaseUpjohn, LJ.at p.881saidthefollowing: 10 «Iamnotsosurematitissodifficult todrawalinebetween irregularities,bywhichImeandefectsinprocedurewhichfall withinR.S.C.,Ord.70,andtruenullities,thoughIagreethatno precisedefinition ofeitherispossible.» Andatp.883: 15 20 «The authorities do establish one or two classesof nullity such as the following. There may be others, though formy partIwouldbereluctanttoseemuchextensionoftheclasses. (i) Proceedings which ought to have been served but have nevercometothenoticeofthedefendant atall (ii)Proceedingswhichhaveneverstartedatallowingtosome fundamental defect in issuing the proceedings; (iii) Proceedings which appear to be duly issued, but fail to complywithastatutoryrequirement ». The decision in the above case and the explanation asto the application of0.70,r.l hasbeen adopted inanumberofcasesof 25 this Court. (See, interalia, Spyropoullosv. Transavia,
(1979)1 C.L.R. 421 and Demetriou& others v. Prodromou
(1983)1 CL.R.300). The decision in Re Pritchardwas constantly followed alsoin Englandand asaresult of the construction of theapplicationof 30 0.70,r.1inthatcase,in1966itwasfoundnecessarythattheRules oftheSupremeCourtinEnglandshouldbeamendedand,infact, theywereamendedin1966byrepealing0.70,r.landsubstituting same by 0.2, r.l (see Annual Practice 1982) which reads as follows: 35 «l.-
(1)Where, in beginning or purporting to begin any proceedingsoratanystageinthecourseoforinconnection withanyproceedings,therehas,byreasonofanythingdone orleftundone,beenafailuretocomplywiththerequirements 111 S a w i d e s J. N'sia M'lity v. Cleovoulou
(1988)oftheserules,whether inrespectoftime,place,manner, form or content or in any other respect, the failure shall be treated asan irregularity and shallnot nullify theproceedings,anystep taken in the proceedings, or any document, judgment or order therein.
(2)
(3)The Court shallnot wholly setaside anyproceedingsor the writ or other originating process by which they were begun on the ground that the proceedings were required by 10 any of these rulestobebegunbyanoriginatingprocess other than the one employed.» Ithasbeen the practiceofourSupreme Courtintheexerciseof its jurisdiction as Supreme Constitutional Court in proceedings under Article 140oftheConstitution orinadministrative casesnot 15 toallow formal defects toprevent itfrom doingjusticeinacaseon itssubstance especially when there are involved matters of great public interest and for the purpose of serving the interests of justice. Insodoing itisexercisingitspower inaccordance with the Supreme Constitutional CourtRules (seeinthisrespectAttorney- 20 Generalv. Kouppi, 1R.S.C.C. 115,Demetriou v. TheRepublic, 1 R.S.C.C. 99 and President of the Republic v. House of Representatives
(1985)3 C.L.R. 872). In the last case Triantafyllides, P., in drawing the distinction of proceedings contemplated by 0.64 of the Civil Procedure Rules and 25 proceedings to which the Supreme Constitutional Court Rules apply, had thisto sayat pp.888-889«In concluding I should observe that Ihave not thought fii, in dealing with the matter of the irregularity of the commencemem of the proceedings in this case, to resort to 30 Order 64 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which are rendered applicable, mutatis mutandis, to proceedings to which the Supreme Constitutional Court Rulesapply, byvirtue of Rule 18ofsuch Rules,because Iam inclined totreatthesaidOrder 64 as not being fully consonant with the nature of thejudicial 35 competence tobe exercised bythisCourtunderArticle140of the Constitution in a matter involving the constitutionality of legislation (and see. inter alia, by way of useful analogy, the cases of The President of the Republic v. Louca,
(1984)3 112 2 C.L.R. N'sia M'lity v. Cleovoulou Sawides J C L R 241 and Rousos ν TheRepublic inwhich judgment was delivered on the8th February 1985 and has notyet been reported) 5 10 15 20 Styhanides,J inhisjudgment mthesame case atρ 895 hadthis to say «If I were toapply 0 64of theCivil ProcedureRules, 1 would declare thisreference as a nullity thatcould notbe remedied Both the majority judgment in Re Pritchard (Deceased) [19631 1 All ΕR 873 that was adopted and applied by this Court inSpyropoullos ν Transavia
(1979)1C L R 421 and Andieas Demetriou and Othersν George Prodromou
(1983)1 C LR 301, leave no room for desenbing the defect inthe commencement of these proceedings otherwise than a nullity » Beanng in mind the above authorities we have reached the conclusion that non-compliance with rule 4 concerning the issue and service of a summons calling upon the respondent lo appear before the Court, in that such summons was not sealed bv the Court or signed by a Judge of the Court but it was issued and signed by counsel for the appellants amounts to a fundamental defect in the proceedings which renders the issue of such summons a nullity The summons, therefore, which was issued and served on the defendant has to be set aside Though the learned tnal Judge nghtly came to the conclusion 25 thatthenon-compliancewith nile4was afundamental irregulanty nevertheless thiswas notaground for setting aside theapplication filed by theappellants for theissue of such summons especially in view of his finding for the descnption of the proceedings as «action» and the parties as «plaintiffs» and «defendants» are still 30 irregulanties which could be cured by amending the application Inviewof our findings as above we conclude thatthe issueand service of the summons is set aside but the application may proceed for heanng after a summons is properly issued and served on the defendant As tothe intenmorder, beanng in mind 35 that it was issued on the basis of the application under the provisions of s 93
(2)the discharge of such intenm order for the reasons given by thetnalJudge was wrong andhastobe set aside inview of our finding thattheapplication can proceed 1Π Sawide·J. !**·!·M'Htyv.Oeovouloa
(1988)In the result the appeal succeeds to the above extent. The interim order remains in forceandshouldbemade returnable on adatetobefixedby theJudge who will behandlingthecase. In the circumstances wemake noorder forcosts. Appeal partly allowed. No order astocosts. 114 5