(1988)1988Februaiy3 (A LOIZOU.DEMETRIADES.PIKIS,JJ) PHOEBUS CONSTANTINIDES, Appellant, v. THE POLICE, Respondent. (CriminalAppeal No. 4963). Sentence —Interference by Court of Appeal — The concept of «manifestly excessive». Sentence —Previous convictions — Whether offence of speeding similarto the offence of negligent driving—Question answered in the affirmative. 5 Sentence —Dnving without due careand attention contraryto sections 8 and 19
(1)of the Motor Vehicles and Road TrafficLaw 86/72 — Fineof£30 and disqualificationfrom drivingamotor vehiclefortwo months — Two previous convictions for speeding —Facts disclosed a rather serious case of negligence —Disqualification 10 justified. The facts of this case sufficiently appear in the hereinabove headnotes. Appeal dismissed. Casesreferred to: 15 Suleiman v. The Police
(1963)1 C.L.R. 106; Lazarou v. The Police
(1970)2C.L.R.18; Armeftis v. The Police
(1970)2C.L.R.185; Havatziav. The Police
(1980)2C.L.R.195; Louroutziatis v.Republic
(1983)2C.L.R. 125; Philippou v. The Republic
(1983)2C.L.R.245. Appeal against sentence. Appeal against sentence by Phoebus Constantinides who was 18 20 2 C.L.R. 5 Constantinides v. Police convicted on the 17th December, 1987 at the District Court of Famagusta (Criminal Case No. 1526/87) on one count of the offence of careless driving contrary to sections 8 and 19
(1)
(4)of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Law, 1972 (Law No. 86 of 1972) and sentenced by Hadjihambis, D.J. to pay £30.- fine and wasfurther disqualified from holdingorobtainingadrivinglicence for aperiod of twomonths. G.Pelaghias,for the appellant. 10 A. M. Angelides, Senior Counsel of the Republic, for the respondent. A.LOIZOU J.: The judgment of the Court willbe delivered by Pikis, J. PlKISJ.:On 17thDecember, 1987,theappellant wasconvicted on hisown plea of careless driving (contrary to s.8 and s.l9(l)
(4)15 oftheMotorVehiclesand RoadTraffic Law,86/72),andwasfined £30.- and disqualified from driving a motor vehicle for two months. The facts of the case disclosed a rather serious case of negligence;theappellantovertookavehicleatatimeitwas unsafe sotodo and inconsequence collided withan on-coming car.Asa 20 resultthetwovehicleswerebadlydamaged whilethe complainant suffered superficial injuries. 25 30 35 40 Theappeal isconfined tothatpartofthesentence entailing the disqualification of the appellant. In the submission of counsel for the appellant, the addition of disqualification to the monetary punishment rendered the sentence manifestly excessive; and he invited us to set aside the disqualification. The sentence of the Court was not, we were told, the only punishment appellant suffered for his negligent conduct. He had to bear the cost of repairing his car amounting toabout £2,000. On the other hand, the damage sustained by the complainant was made good by the insurers of the appellant. Seen in this light, we were told, the disqualification amounted to punishment disproportionate to the gravityof the offence. Moreso,asthe appellant should be treated as a first offender having no previous convictions for negligent driving. Two recent previous convictions for speeding for which he was fined £35.- and £15.- respectively, left unaltered the complexion of hisrecordastheydidnotconstituteconvictions for similar offences. The essence of hissubmission isthat chargesof negligent driving are distinguishable from charges of dangerous speeding, dissimilar in that speeding offences do not necessarily involve lack of due care. .19 Pikis J Constantinides v. Police
(1988)We are unable to agree that convictions for speeding belong to a diiteient category of offences than charges of negligent dnving Both species of offences involve a breach of traffic law and regulations, designed to ensure safety on the roads, and ultimately ierve the same purpose, to protect the public from abuse of the 5 right to drive The previous convictions of the appellant disentitle him from the mitigating element ordinarily imported by a clean record Furthermore, they indicate that monetary sentences had failed to awaken the appellant to his responsibilities to heed traffic regulations and respect the nghts of other users of the road In the 10 face of this reality a disqualification order was an obvious means of dealing with the appellant in the interest of law enforcement The facts and record of the appellant made disqualification an evident mode of punishment that the tna! Court could dppropnately consider and impose* 15 The trial Court isthe arbiter of sentence It isthe responsibility of the trial Court to correlate the sentence to the facts of the rase and i n d i v i d u a l s it in ordei that it may fit the offender as well The amenity o ' an Appellate Bench to interfere with sentence on the ground that it is manifestly excessive is confined to cases where 20 the e'einent of excess is glaring and as such objectively identifiable What the concept of «manifestly excessive sentence» connotes was discussed in Phihppou ν Republic** It was there said*** «The element of excess must be such as to provide an 25 objective basis for its ascertainment Such basis may be provided either by the facts of the case bearing no proportion to the sentence imposed or by the sentence being altogether out of range with sentences approved by the Supreme Court on previous occasions» Interference by the Supreme Court with sentence outside these limits w o u l d inevitably weaken the position of trial Courts as the arbiters of sentence and undermine the confidence of trial Judges * YusufSuleiman ν Th*· Police 11963)1 C L R 106 Sawa* Lazarou ν The Police
(1970)2C L R 18 MatheoiChi Armettis ν The Police
(1970)2 C L R 185 Havaiziav The Police |"980) 2 C L R 195 Louroutziatis ν Republic
(1933)2 C L R 125 '•(I98.il2CLR 245 •••Page250 lines20 2* 20 2 C.L.R. Constantinides v. Police Pikis J . in the exercise of their sentencing tasks. A n d the two ;ter foundation of the administration of criminal justice would be corroded. 5 In conclusion, we find no ground whatever justifying interference with the order of disqualification. The appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed. 21