(1988)1988July12 [SAVVIDES,J.] INTHEMATTEROFARTICLE146OFTHECONSTITUTION CHARALAMBOS VAYIANOSANDANOTHER, Applicants, " v. THEMUNICIPALITYOFLARNACA, ' ' Respondent. (CasesNos.84/87and91/87). CompulsoryAcquisition—Revocationof—The CompulsoryAcquisitionLaw, 1962 (Law15/62),section 7
(1)—Offerfor compensation (£5.- persq. foot) acceptedbyapplicants with reservation ofrighls--Acceptancefollowedbyreferencesfor assessingcompensation—Decisionassessingcompensationat£7.-persq.foot—Revocationofacquisitionafterlapseof7 monthsfromsuchdecisionongroundofchangedcircumstances—Changes invokedasjustificationfor therevocationbecameapparentyearsbeforethe • offerfor compensation—Subjudicerevocationcontrarytotheprinciplesof goodadministration—Annulled—Michaelides v. The Republic
(1984)3 CXJ?. 1596 distinguished. Generalprinciplesofadministrativelaw—Goodadministration-SeeCompulsoryAcquisition—Revocationof Thesubjudicerevocationwasissuedyearsafter thecompulsoryacquisitionrevokedthereby.Inthemeantimetherespondentsoffered compensationwhichtheapplicantsaccepted,albeitwithreservationoftheirrights,as theywereentitledtodosoinvirtueoftheCompulsoryAcquisitionofProperty (Amending) Law, 1983.Following such acceptance, theapplicants filed referencesforthefinalassessmentofthecompensation.TheCourtassessed thecompensation at£7persq.footof thelandunderacquisition, i.e.£2.-morethanthepriceofferedbytherespondents. Theacquisition wasoriginally ordered for thepurpose of creatinga 1386 3 C.L.R. Vayianos v. Larnaca M'lity parking space. Seven monthsafter thedecision assessing compensation, butbefore paymentof thecompensationoranypartthereof,respondents revoked thedecisiononthegroundthatinthelightofchangedcircumstanc estheparking spacewas nolongerneeded. However,thechangesinvoked (Buildingpermitsgrantedafter theorder of acquisition)hadbecomeapparentyearsbefore theoffer forcompensa tionandtheinitiationsoftheCourtproceedingsregardingcompensation. Held, annulling thesubjudicedecision:
(1)Thiscaseisclearly distin guishablefrom thecaseofMichaelides v.The Republic
(1984)3C.L.R. 1596.
(2)Therespondentconductinrevokingtheorderofacquisition is, in thecircumstancesofthiscase,contrarytothe principlesofgoodadminis tration. Subjudicedecisionannulled. Costsinfavourofapplicants. . • , - ι i Casesreferredto: Michaelides v.TheRepublic
(1984)3C.L.R.
- Recourses. Recourses against the decision of the respondents to revoke the orderof compulsory acquisition of applicant's property. K. Michaelides,for theapplicants. ' G.M.Nicolaides,.'fortherespondent., Cur. adv. villi. SAVVIDES J. read thefollowing judgment.^Applicants by these recourses challenge theliecision of therespondent to revoke the order of compulsory acquisition of applicants' property pub-' lished in Supplement No. 3',Part Πto theofficial Gazette No. 2190 of 28th November, 1986, .under Notification
- Both 1-387- Savvides J. Vayianos v. Larnaca M' lity
(1988)theserecourses wereheardtogetheraspresenting commonques tionsof law andfact. Theissuewhichposes for considerationinthepresentcasesis whetheracompulsory acquisitionordercanberevoked bythe ac quiringauthorityafter all steps for theassessment of thecompen- 5 sarionpayable have been completed. Thefacts of thecaseareasfollows: Applicant inCase No.84/87 is theownerof ahouseandyard situated within themunicipallimitsof Larnaca,underregistration No. D159,plot 161 of sheet/plan ΧΧΠ/57.Ι.ΙΠ, block Dof an 10 extentof£4,965sq.feet. Healsoowns half shareof ahouse and yard adjoining the aforesaid plot underregistration No.D158, plot 160 of the same sheet plan andblock of an extentof2,425 sq. feet,the otherhalf of which belongs toapplicantinCaseNo. 91/
- By a noticeof compulsory acquisition published in Supple ment No. 3,PanII,totheofficial Gazette No. 1640 of 24thOc tober, 1980,under Notification No. 1158,thedecision of the re spondent of intended compulsory acquisition of the aforesaid properties was publicized, for the purpose of public benefit de- 20 scribed therein which was the creation of a municipal parking space.Applicants objected totheintendedcompulsory acquisition withinthetimeprescribed insuch notice. TheDistrictOfficer of Larnacabyletterdated 10thNovember, 1981 informed theapplicants thatthecouncilof Ministers atits 25 meeting of 10th September, 1981, consideredapplicants'objec tions against thecompulsory acquisition of theirpropertiesand decided toreject same. ConsequentlyanOrderof compulsoryac quisition was madefor theaforesaid properties which waspub lished inSupplementNo.3,PartΠ of theofficial Gazette of the 39 Republic No. 1719 of 25th September,
- Inthecourseof negotiationsforthepaymentofcompensation 1388 15 3 C.L.R. 5 Vayianos v. Larnaca M' lity '* Savvides J. theChairmanof theMunicipalCommittee whowas thenhandling' theaffairs oftheMunicipality undertheprovisions of thelaw, by lettersdated 15thNovember, 1983 offered toapplicant l'thesum of £30,800.- andtoapplicant2 thesum of £6,000.-ascorhpensation for theacquisition of theirproperties which theapplicants didnot accept By lettersdated4thFebruary, 1984,theChairmanof the Mu nicipalCommitteeoffered toapplicantsthesameamountsandin formed themthattheycould acceptthemwith reservation oftheir ΙΟ rights to take steps for the transfer of their properties tothere spondent and resort to the Court for the determination of the amountsof compensationpayable inrespect thereof.' Applicants' acceptedsuchoffer andthroughtheircounselrepeatedlyaskedto bepaidtheaforesaid sumswhich therespondent,however, failed \z Φpay though.bound todo so undertheprovisions of the Com pulsory Acquisition,Law..In themeantimeapplicantsfiledrefer ences21/84 arid22/84.intheDistrictCourtofLarnacafor thede terminationof thecompensationpayable tothemforthe aforesaid properties: Respondentoffered £
- - per sq. foot buttheDistrict Court of Larnaca by its decision dated 12th April, 1986 found triattriecompensationpayable^wa's tobeassessedcm thebasis1of ' ^ £7.-persq.foot'and madeanaward accordingly for suchamount plusinterest'as provided'by Law 25/83.Applicants asked repeat edly.tobepaid theadjudged sums butrespondentrjajd the costs awarded intheproceedings andfailed^to pay thecompensation 25 found by theCourt.Applicants'counsel byjetters dated'4th Au gust; 1986, 12th'September,' 1986 and-9thDecember! 1986,re-' peated their,previous demandfor thepayment of the,adjudged compensation. Inreply tosuch letters the'Mayof of Larnaca by 30 his letterdated 18thDecember, 1986 informed applicants'counsel thatrespondentpublished anorderof revocationof the'order of compulsory acquisition. In fact' Such revocation'order was published in theofficial Gazette of theRepublic No/2190,Sup plement No. 3,PahΠ,"under Notification
- Therevocation 35 was madeiallegedly,as theacquisition was nolonger necessary for thepurposes for which it has.been madel As aresult applicantsfiledthepresent recourse challenging thesubjudice deci1389 Savvides J. Vayianos v. Larnaca M' lity
(1988)sion. The legal grounds on which therecourses are based arethe following: Thattherevocation was notmadeinaccordancewith the prin ciplesof goodadministrationandiscontrarybothtothespiritand 5 thegeneral principlesof law; therevocationwas madeinabuseor excess of respondent's power as same was made for themere purposeof avoiding paymentofthecompensationawarded bythe Court;respondentdidnottakeintoconsiderationthat the purpos es for which the acquisition was madeareattainableand/ordesir- 10 able butitactedinanunreasonableandarbitrary manner; respon dentfailed totakeorconsiderthehardshipimposedonapplicants ortheirinterests. In expounding on his grounds of law counsel for applicants contended thattherespondentindeciding sobelatedly torevoke 15 theorderof compulsory acquisitionwas notguidedbycriteriaas tothe suitability of applicants'landfor thecreationof aparking space butactedsoinanattempttoevadethejudgmentoftheDis trictCourtdeterminingthe compensationpayable toapplicants at £
- -per sq. foot plus interest which was muchhigher thanthe 20 oneassessedby theLandsandSurveysDepartmentactingonbe half of therespondentandthussuchactis merely aneffort to de prive the applicants of the fruit of their successful litigation. Counselmadereference todecidedcasesconcerningthe princi plesof administrative law governingtherevocationof arjministra- j * tiveactsandparticularly revocationofcompulsory acquisitionun ders.7 of theCompulsory Acquisition Law No. 15/
- Counselfurther added thatthe object of theacquisition never ceased toexist,thatinthepresentcasetherewas adjudication of the amountof compensation payable andas aresult therespon- ^Λ dent could nothave lawfully revoked theactof acquisition.In consequence therespondent by sodoing acted underamiscon ception of fact andlaw, arbitrarily andinabuse of itspowers.It was counsel's submission thattherewas nochangeinthefactual 1390 -: •" ί • 3 C.L.R. • • . · . . ' .: Vayianos v. Larnaca M' lity Savvides J. situation asitexistedatthe'timeof theacquisition andthe,time of therevocationandheconcludedby submitting thattherevocation was madestrictly forfinancialreasons. • -. . ."• : • · : * if . .." ' .· '.- •• J · ' '- - ' , ' . ' • ' Counselfor therespondent, on theotherhand,submittedthat '5 , I 1 (a)The'legal prerequisites"on which"therespondentrelied for themaking of theacquisition orderceased toexisfdue'to change ofcircumstances andthisistheonlyreason of therevocation; .- -.' (|,' ι ' ί '·. . . *J ». •. ' ' " •'. '-( L>I -j i . - ' . t · π • · * .1 · ι ( Ί 11·»'r ] - *". t* , ' ' * ' " ' ; ' , ' Ί | ( , ' " , t · rt.\ • Τ ι ' .(b)Therevocation was not madeforfinancialreasons; IU (c)Before therespondenttookthesubjiiHicedecision itobviously took intoconsideration theprotests andcomplaints of.the applicants and.particularly theirrequest for therevocation ofthe compulsory acquisition.. , " , ,. , ' , w l ">-' 15 =V'\ vrrr. W;.' (d)Therespondentproceeded totherevocation,within a.reasonable time arid assoon"as"itrealized thatVbtwithstanding its goodwillanddesire toservethecitizens.theobject of acquisition couldnotbeaccomplished. "" Themainreasonwhich was advanced by counsel for respondentas tothechange of circumstances was thaton 5thNovember, 1980, theMunicipality hadtoissue,a.b.uilding permitin;re20 spect of plot 525 which was oneof the plots mentioned in the Μ original notice of acquisition onwhich a building was erected with theresult thatoneof theexitstothe properties.underacquisitionvwhich existedoverplot431was blocked and.alsotheextent of thewhole area was reduced.This,,according tothe allegation 25 of therespondent,was ascertained by thetechnicalserviceof the Municipality of Larnacasometimeafter theorderof acquisition i.; was published.,In fact theMunicipalEngineeron 19th February, 1983,submitted,areportexplaining the'situatibn.arid suggesting therevocation of theacquisitionorderTAs aresultthe.respondent 30 after considering thereportdecided,toauthorizetheChairmanof theMunicipalCommitteetomakearioffer totheowners of plot 525 for purchase by theMunicipality ofpartof itwith the object 1391 Savvides J. Vayianos v. Larnaca M' lity
(1988)ofextendingtheparkingplaceandcreating asecondexit.Inthe meantimethebuildingdevelopmentinthearea,betweentheyears 1983- 1986turned thepropertyunderacquisition intoanenclosurebyhighbuildingssothatineffect itlostitsmaincharacteristicasaparkingplace. Furthermorein 1985theMunicipalitymadepavementscovering a large part of the square leading to the intended parking place,which wasturned intoatouristareamostlycoveredwith tiles,benchesandparkingwasprohibited.Theresultofthesedevelopments wasthat theonlyaccesstotheproperty inquestion IQ becameuseless.AsaresulttheSeniorTechnicalAssistantofthe MunicipalitybyhisreporttotheMayorofLarnacadated28thAugust, 1986,afterearmarkingthedifficulties recommendedthereexaminationofthesubject.Hisrecommendation wasacceptedby theMunicipal Council which byitsdecisionof 11thSeptember, ,<1986,decidedtotakethesubjudicedecision.Itshouldbenoted that muchearlieri.e.onthe 14thFebruary, 1985,therespondent rejected asubmission made byitsInternal Auditortothe effect that theoperation of theparkingplaceinquestion would notbe beneficial totheMunicipality. Counsel further mentioned thattheapplicantsrepeatedlyhad askedtherevocationoftheacquisitionorderunlesscompensation on the basisof £11.50 per sq. foot was paid to them against which the Court awarded £7.-per sq.foot instead of £5.- offered bytherespondent. Theallegationsastothefactswhichhaveledtothechangeof circumstancesfrom thedateoftheacquisitiontillthedateofthe revocation weresupported bytheevidenceofPolyviosLoizides, aMunicipalemployeeinchargeofthedepartmentofissueofpermitsandthecontroloftownplanningoftheMunicipalityofLarnaca. Inhisevidenceincross-examination headmittedthatthe MayorofLarnacaonthe23rdJuly,1986,wrotealettertotheapplicants inwhich hementioned thatoneof thetenantswhowas carryingonthebusinessofatailorinaruinousconditionedroom ofthesaidpropertywasrefusing toleave.buthenevermentioned 35 1392 5 3 C.L.R. Vayianos v. Larnaca M* lity SavvidesJ. inthesaidletterthattherewas anyproblem astothe unsuitability of theproperty as aparking placedueeither tothecreation ofa square ortotheblockageof oneof theexitstothesaid parking space. 10 j5 20 2 5 •2Q Theorderof revocation complained of is stated tohave been madeunder s.7 of theCompulsory Acquisition of Property Law, 1962 (Law 15/62) andthereasoning for suchrevocationwasthat theacquisition was nolonger necessary for thepurpose for which ithadbeen made.Sub-section
(1)of s.7 underwhich thepower of revocation was exercisedreadsasfollows: " 7. -
(1)Καθοιονδήποτεχρόνον μετάτηνδημοσίευσιν γνωστοποιήσεωςαπαλλοτριώσεωςκαίπροτηςπληρωμήςή καταθέσεωςτηςαποζημιώσεωςωςπροβλέπεταιεντωπαρόντι Νόμω,ηαπαλλοτριούσααρχήδύναταιδια διάτάγματοςδημοσιευομένουεντηεπισήμωεφημερίδιτηςΔήμο-. κρατίας, ν'ανάκαλέσητην τοιαύτηνγνώστοποίησιν καί παν δημοσιευθέν σχετικόν διάταγμα,είτε γενικώς είτε ει δικώςαναφορικώςπροςτηνεντούτωαναφερομένηνιδιοκτησίαν ή μέρος ιδιοκτησίας* επί τούτω"η επομένη της τοιαύτηςγνωστοποιήσεωςήδιατάγματοςαπαλλοτριώσεως διαδικασία ατονεί, καΐ η απολλοτρίωσις λογίζεται ώς εγκαταλέιφθείσα είτε γενικώς είτε αναλόγως της περι πτώσεως, αναφορικώςπροςτηντοιαύτηνειδικήν ιδιοκτησίανήμέρος ώισκτηοΐοίς. 'AndtheEnglish translation reads: ("At anytimeafter thepublication of anoticeof acquisition andbefore thepayment orthedeposit of compensation asin thisLaw provided, the acquiring authority may,,by anorder published intheofficial Gazetteof theRepublic ,revokesuch noticeandanyrelative orderof.acquisition thatmay havebeen published, eithergenerally orinrespect of any'particularprop erty orpartof propertyreferred'to.thereiri;thereuponallpro ceedings consequential tosuch noticeororderof acquisition shall abate and theacquisition shall beJdeeme<ltohave been ,1393 SavvidesJ. Vayianos v.LarnacaM'lity
(1988)abandoned either generally or in respect of such particular properlyorpartofproperty,asthecasemaybe.") Theconstructionofs.7
(1)andthepowersvestedinanacquiringauthoritytorevokeanacquisitionpreviouslymadebyithave beendealtwithbytheFullBenchof thisCourtinthecaseofMi- 5 chaelidesv. TheRepublic
(1984)3 C.L.R. 1596, the facts of whichareasfollows: The appellants were ownersofthreepiecesofland, situated within theareaofAyiosSergiosvillageintheDistrictofFamagusta, which were compulsorily acquired in June, 1972 for a 10 public benefit purpose,namelyfor thepurposeofpreservation, enhancementanddevelopmentoftheancientmonumentsofSalamisanditssurroundings.Theareawheretheabovepropertywas situatedhadbeen,since1974,undertheoccupationoftheTurkish invasionforcesandinaccessibletotheStateandappellants'were 15 unabletoresumepossessionofit. Theappellants,institutedproceedingsinJune 1975forassessmentofthecompensationpayableforthecompulsoryacquisition oftheiraboveproperties.InJuly,1976andwhilsttheseproceedingswerestillpending,theacquiringauthority,actingundersec- 20 tion7oftheCompulsoryAcquisitionofPropertyLaw, 1962,revokedthecompulsoryacquisitionorderaffecting appellants'said propertiesonthegroundthatthepurposeforwhichtheorderof acquisitionwasissuedcouldnotbeattainedonaccountofthesituationcreatedafter theTurkishInvasion,andonthegroundthat 25 theacquiredpropertyhadnotasyetbeentransferred inthename of the Government. The trial Judge dismissed appellant's recourseagainstthevalidityoftheaboverevocationorderasaresultofwhichanappealwas filed. AfterreviewoftheGreekCaseLawandtheGreekauthorities ™ onthematterandparticularlyKyriakopoulosonGreekAdministrativeLaw,4thed.,vol.Catpp.268and388theprinciplewas formulated thattheconstructionwhichshouldbeplacedons.7is thattheonlyprerequisite for therevocation of anacquisition is 1394 3C.L.R. Vayianosv.Larnaca M' lity SavvidesJ. thattherevocation shouldbemadebefore thepaymentorthedepositofthecompensation,placinganyother specific conditions withinthediscretionoftheadministrativeauthorityconcerned. Thejudgmentreadsatpp.1609-1610asfollows: 5 "TheprinciplesoftheGreekAdministrativeLawconcerningtheannulment of an acquisition, areuseful inconstruing section 7of theCompulsory Acquisition Law,No. 15/62. In Kyriacopoullos, Greek Administrative'Law, 4th Edition, Vol.Catp.388,we read: 10 'Alsorevocationisnotallowedafter thecompletionofthe proceduresofacquisitionbysettlementbecausebythisalegal situationofsubjectiverightsiscreatedprecludingfurtherunilateralactoftheadministration solongasthisisnotbasedona termorreasonintheorderofacquisition.' 15 This is inline with theprovisions of sub- section
(1)of section7ofourLaw,thatarevocationcanonlytakeplacebeforethepaymentordepositofcompensationasprovidedinthe Law. 20 Thispositiondoesnotarise,asthe'paymentof compensatiohhasneverbeenagreedorfinallydeterminedbyadecision oftheCourt.Theactofannulmenttookplaceintheprocessof thehearingofareference forthedeterminationofcompensation." ' -. 1 Andfurther atp.1611itreadsasfollows: 25 30 "Wefindit unnecessary toembark atlength on thetwo cases (800/i931l-and 108/1972)referred toinKyriacopoulos, andtheprinciplesunderlying them,asthelearned'trialJudge hasexplicitly donesoinhisjudgment.It suffices heretosay briefly thatfromboththese'cases'itemanatesthatthoughunder therelevantstatutoryprovisionsinGreece,whicharesimilar tosection7ofourCompulsory Acquisition ofPropertyLaw, 1395 SavvidesJ. Vayianosv.Larnaca M'lity
(1988)1962,adecision for acquisition can,atanytime,uptothe finaldetermination bytheCourtofthecompensationtobepaid, be revoked by the Acquiring Authority, nevertheless, such powerisnotanabsolutepowerbutadiscretionaryonewhich cannotbeexercised arbitrarilybutinapropermannerbearing 5 in mind thespiritof thelaw andtheconditionslaiddownby thegeneralprinciplesofadministrativelaw.Also,thattherevocationofanacquisition withtheexclusiveobject ofserving thefinancialinterestoftheStateonly,withoutatthesametime takingintoconsiderationtheinterestoftheowneramountstoa <( wrongexerciseofdiscretion." Weconcludedinthatcasethatbearinginmindallthecircumstancesofthecasetheacquiringauthorityintakingthesubjudice decisiondidnotactarbitrarilyorinabuseofpowerbutexercised itsdiscretion intheproperwayandwithoutviolatingtheprinci- + piesof goodadministration and weaffirmed thedecision ofthe trialJudgethattherespondent "acted within thespiritofthelaw andthelimitsofgoodadministration intheexerciseofitsdiscretionarypowers." Bearinginmindtheprinciplesemanatingfrom thecaseofMichaelides (supra)Ireverttothefactsofthepresentcase.Asallegedbytherespondent thefact thattherewereproblemsforthe creation of the parking space for which the acquisition orders were issued became apparent since the 5th November,1980,a fewdaysafter thenoticeofacquisitionwaspublishedintheofficialGazetteoftheRepublic. On the5th November, 1980,therespondent was wellaware thattheissueofabuildingpermitforpartofplot525wouldhave affected oneoftheexitsofthepropertyunderacquisitionandalso restrictconsiderablytheparkingspace.Notwithstandingthatfact whichnowisraisedinsupportoftherespondent'sallegationthat therewasachangeofcircumstancesandnotwithstandingtheobjectionsraisedbytheownersagainst theacquisition the respondentproceeded withtheacquisitionof thepropertyandtheorder ofacquisition waspublishedon25thSeptember, 1981. 3 1396 3 C.L.R. Vayianos v. Larnaca M'lily SavvidesJ. ' Ithasbeenfurther allegedthatinFebruary, 1983,the Munici palEngineer submitted areportsuggestingtherevocation of the acquisition as in his opinion theproperty inquestion couldnot satisfactorily be used as a parking place. Notwithstanding such 5 information therespodentinsteadofrevokingtheacquisitionau-' thorized its Chairmanto negotiate with theowners of plot 525 with the intentionof enlarging theparking space andcreating a second exit.Sucheffort didnot'materialize andinthe meantime the Municipality was granting'permits for theerection ofconJQ sanctionswhich accordingtotheirallegations turnedtheparking 1 placeintoanenclosurewhich'was unsuitable asa parking place.' ' Itis thecontention'of therespondent thatduetoachangeof circumstancestheobject of theacquisition couldnotbeachieved, a fact which became apparent tothemsince 1983.Insteadofre., voking theacquisition ordertherespondent'proceeded'tothede 15 velopment of thesquareoppositethe'entranceleading tothesaid' parking placeby turningitintoatouristcentrewithout,'however, having everdecided that theparking place ih question was not' necessary. When theapplicantsfiledtheirreferences'for assess•! mentof compensation in 1986 therespondent again instead ofproceeding toarevocation of theacquisition ordertheythought fit tooffer compensationtotheapplicantscalculated at£5.-per sq. foot and fought the two references in aneffort topersuade the Courtthatthecompensationpayable shouldbe'theoneoffered by , it.'The decision of the Court was delivered on the 21st April,' 2 ^ 1986, awarding £7V- per sq. foot as reasonable compensation' ; plusinterest andcosts'.'' ;|* '" '" • ' ,r;: |p ' ·>·•, ' _ C' •' ι• ' ' •• ' ·*>"ν· • . · ' ν Therespohdentafter suctf references weredeterminedpaidto theapplicants thecosts of theactionsandafter repeated requests onbehalf of counsel for applicantcontainedinnumerousletters 3 0 for thepayment of thecompensation awarded by theCourt, the MayorofLarnacaactingonbehalf of therespohderit,onthe23rd July,' 1986, informed applicants' counsel'that atailor occupying partof thepremises refused toevacuate sameandrequestedthem todosomething aboutit.Though asallegedbyrtherespondentit 35 hadfound outthattheproperty inquestion was notsuitable for 1397 SavvidesJ. Vayianosv.Larnaca M'lity
(1988)thepurposesoftheacquisitionduetothechangeofcircumstances since 1983,neverthelessnothingwasmentionedtotheapplicants asto suchintention andit wasonlyuntilDecember, 1986,after thedecision torevoke theacquisitionorder wastaken thatsuch decisionwasmentionedinreplytotheclaimsoftheapplicantsfor 5 compensation. The facts of the present cases are materially different from those in Michaelides case(supra).In thecase of Michaelides when areference was made to the Court for theassessmentof compensation therespondentsproceeded withtherevocation of JQ the acquisition order before the amount of compensation was agreeduponorbeforeanydecisionoftheCourtfixingsuchcompensation wastaken. Inthepresent casethe revocation was effected after areference wasmadetotheCourt,whichwasfought by the respondent whose contention was that thevalue of the ,c property wasonly£5.-persq.foot, withoutraisingthequestion of substantial changesof circumstanceswhich accordingtothe evidencebeforemewasamatterascertainedby itlongbeforethe references weremadeanditwasafter thelapseofsevenmonths from thedatewhen the Courtfound thatthecompensation payablewas£7. -persq.foot that therespondent cameforward to revoketheacquisition. Furthermore inMichaelidescaseitbecameapparent thatthe object for which theacquisition wasmadebecame unattainable duetoconsiderable changein thefactual situation between the 2 ^ timeoftheacquisitionandthetimeoftherevocationasaresultof theTurkishinvasion andoccupation ofpropertybytheTurkish forces whichmadethepurposeoftheacquisitioncompletelyunaccomplishable. Thedistinction betweenthetwocasesisclearlyindicatedby 3 0 thereference madeinMichaelides(case)toKyriacopoulostothe effect thatarevocationisnotallowedafter thecompletionofthe proceedingsofacquisitionbysettlementbecauseofthelegalsituationofcreationof subjectiverightsprecludinganyunilateralact oftheadministration todisturbthesituationsolongasthisisnot 35 1398 3 CL.R. Vayianos v. Larnaca M' lity Savvides J. based on a termorreason in theorder of acquisition. Inthatcase a situation similar to thatof thepresent case did not arise as the payment of compensation had never been agreed orfinallydeter mined by adecision of the Court. 5 ΙΟ ,<- 20 Bearing inmind thecircumstances of the case Ihave notbeenpersuaded that the reason stated in the order of revocation that there was a substantial change of circumstances which madethe acquisition unattainablehas been substantiated in thepresent cas es. Thewhole conductof therespondentclearly indicates thanin all thecircumstances of thepresent case though aware as alleged by itof the fact thattheproperty in question became unsuitable as a parking place nevertheless it waited tiU thecompensation was assessed by theCourt which was Higher thanit'soffer and consid erable time after the judgment of theCourt it came forward with the contention that the objects of the acquisition could not be achieved. In my view inthepresent case-the.respondent failed to exercise its discretion within thelimits of-good administration. It is clearly a case of wrong exercise of discretion which,amounts" hvsubstancetoaviolation of the law. In the circumstances the sub judice decision has to be and is hereby annulled with costs infavour of the.applicants. ,,. ,« ( vt f; .••. • - r· ·- • Sub judice decision annulled -'" Λ ι " '*"*•·' '"> ·' ·-'3 - withcostsinfavour of applicants. ,1 , ; . ( · . v., ' - *, χ . » . - . ' .·/ . t t f 1399 ; . · } ' : „•· y'." v.'- V. ι .