(1988)1988July, 14 [MALACHTOS.DEMETRIADES,SAVVIDES,PIKIS,JJ.J PETROSMATSAS, Appellant-Applicant, v. THEREPUBLICOFCYPRUS,THROUGH THEPUBLICSERVICECOMMISSION, Respondents. (RevisionalJurisdictionAppealNo.674). Disciplinaryproceedings—Whetheritisprohibitedbyanyruleoflawtofound disciplinaryproceedingson conduct amounting toa criminaloffence— Questiondeterminedinthenegative—Constitution,Articles12_5and30.
- ConstitutionalLaw—Disciplinaryproceedings—Constitution,Articles 12.5 and30.2—Conductamounting tocriminaloffence—Disciplinarycharges broughtbefore the Public Service Commission—No violation ofthe said articlesoftheConstitution. ConstitutionalLaw—Righttofair trial—Constitution,Article12.5—itapplies totheconductofdisciplinaryproceedings. ConstitutionalLaw—Thedelayinprosecutinganoffence—Constitution,Article30.2—The delayisnotequivalenttoafindingofinnocence—Neither thepardoningnortheprescriptionofacriminaloffenceprecludesthepressingofdisciplinarychargesbasedonthesameconduct. Disciplinaryproceedings—Delayininitiating them—Effect—No ruleofadministrative lawprohibiting theinstitutionofsuchproceedingsafter the lapseofanyspecificperiod—Constitution,Article 30—itappliesto civil andcriminalproceedings. Disciplinary proceedings—Evidence—Evaluation—Judicial control— Principlesapplicable—-interferenceisonlypermissible,ifthefindingswere notreasonablyopentotheadministrativeorgan. 1448 3 C.L.R. 5 \0 ic .Matsas v. Republic Evidence—Corroboration—Warningwheneverthechargesinvolvesexualmisconduct—Thecorroboratingevidencemustcomefromasourceotherthan theoneitpurportsto corroborate—Previouscomplaintsofthecomplainant donotamounttocorroboration, unlesstheyqualifyasfirstcomplaintsin thesenseofsection 10oftheEvidenceLaw, Cap.
- Evidence—Joinder of offences—Six countsrelating to sexuals offences— Testimonyofonecomplainantinrespectofonecountcannotbetreatedas corroborating evidenceof another complainant in respectofanother count—Thejoinderofoffencesdoesnotmakeevidence,admissibleonone count,admissibleoneveryothercount^Theserulesareapplicabletodisciplinaryproceedingsagainstpublicofficers(section3ofschedule3to the PublicServiceLaw,33/67). Disciplinaryproceedings—Evidence—Oralevidencecontradictorywithletter sent bythe complainant tothe President oftheRepublic—Failure ofthe PSCtocallfor theproductionoftheletter—Groundofannulment. . Theappellantwasconvictedonsixcountsinvolvingtheindecentassault andinonecaseindecentapproachtofemaleemployeesofhisdepartment. Therecourseagainsttheconvictionwasdismissed.Hencethisappeal. ^" 25 30 35 Thematterswhichwereraisedbefore theCourtduringthehearingof theappeal,appearsufficiently from thehereinaboveheadnotes.TheCourt, inallowingtheappeal,didnotacceptthecontentionthatconductamounting toacriminaloffence cannot found a disciplinary charge.Neitherdidthe Courtacceptthecontentionthatdelayinprosecutingamounts,invirtueof Article30oftheConstitution,toapositivefindingofinnocence.TheCourt pointed thatthereisnoruleofadministrativelawprohibitingtheinitiation ofdisciplinaryproceedingsafter thelapseofanyspecificperiodoftime. Finally, however, theCourt annulled the subjudice decision on the groundofmisconceptionrelatingtotheevidencebroughtbeforethePublic Service Commission;and, because of the failure of the Public Service Commissiontocallfortheproductionofaletterbyoneofthecomplainants tothePresidentoftheRepublic,onceitwasprovedthattheoralevidence ofthesamecomplainantwasnotinaccordwiththesaidletter.Theprinciple oflaw,whichtheCourtexpoundedinreachingtheconclusion thatthesub judice decision isfraught which nisc'onception of therelevantevidential rules,appearinthelastthreeofthehereinaboveheadnotesandneednotbe repeated. "• -, · Appealallowed. Subjudicedecisionannulled. 1449 Matsas v. Republic Casesreferredto: Christodoulouv.DisciplinaryBoard
(1983)1 GLA. 999; Republic v.Mithillos
(1983)3CLA. 36; //ατοίv.Republic.4 RSCC39; Morsisv.Republic,4 RSCC133; Menetaou v.AqwMic
(1980)3C.LA. 467; Pfi/rowv.Republic
(1980)3C.LA. 203; Papacleovoulou v.Republic
(1982)3C.L.R. 187; R v.Barrington [1981] 1 All E.R 1135; R v.Scarro/[1978]1All E.R 672; R v.Doughty [1965] 1All E.R. 560; Boardman v.DP/»[1974]3All EA. 887; Λv.Johannson [1977] 63Cr.App.R 101; R v.Novae, 63 Cr.App. Rep. 112; Bellv.DPP ofJamaica [1985] 2AllE.R.585; Paporisv.NationalBank
(1986)1 CX.R. 578; 0K«ji v.Republic
(1987)2C.L.R.49; Enotiadesv.AepuMfc
(1971)3C.L.R.409; 1450 3 C.L.R. Matsas v. Republic Papachrysostomou v.Police
(1988)2GLA.55; Christofides v. CYTA
(1979)3C L A .99; " ' ' ... - , ·, . '. .»,,.·. Su/ron v. TteKing (No. 1). 14G L A . 160. Appeal. " i Γ Γ .' "If. r „ _ ; v ' >I ', *, * • • >'< . * ,. « . • ! . '» * .' . · '* Appeal against the judgment of aJudge of the SupremeCourt of Cyprus (A. Loizou, J.) given on the 11th October, 198ζ(Revisional Jurisdiction'Case No.43/84)* whereby appellant's re course against thedecision of the respondenttopunish appellant with demotionafter having fount! him guilty of disciplinary of fences was dismissed. E.EfsiathiouwithΜ.Tsangarides, for thcappellant. R. Gavrielides, Senior Counsel of the Republicf for the re; spondent., , Cur. adv. vult. . > I J " > •I . . ' ' ι • ' MALACHTOS J. :Thejudgment of the Courtwill be deli vered by Pikis J. PIKIS.J . : The appeal turnsontheconfirmation by theCourt of first instanceof the disciplinary convictionof the appellanton six countsinvolving theindecentassault andinonecaseindecent approachestofemale employees of the Departmentof Psychiatric Services, namely, Maria Antoniadou, Chloi Kimisi and Xenia Poyadji. Following his conviction,theappellantiwas demotedto the post of medical specialist, psychiatric,services. Before sen tence andatall times materialfor the purposes of the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant held the post of DirectorPsychiatric Services. ·.,. .,:. . · t *ReporUdin
(1986)3CLJt.l731. j . y'.t τ: 1451 *. .· r- - . , "τ t v PikisJ. Matsasv.Republic
(1988)ThelearnedJudgewhotriedthecaseinanelaborateandwell reasonedjudgmentdismissedthesubmissionoftheappellantthat theinstitutionofthedisciplinaryproceedingsandtheconviction itself involved breachesof theconstitutional rightsof theapplicantsafeguarded byArticles 12,13and30oftheConstitution.At 5 therootofthesubmissionoftheappellantliedthesuggestionthat the mounting of disciplinary proceedings founded on conduct amountingtoacriminaloffence, namely,indecentassault,violatedtherightoftheapplicantofaccesstoaCourtassignedtohim by law, that is,a Court exercisingcriminaljurisdiction, a right « 0 safeguarded by An. 30.1 of theConstitution. Interwoven, with this breach was another violation of constitutional rights,those guaranteed by Art. 12.5oftheConstitution ,the minimumdefence rights conferred on every person accused of crime.The complaint isthat appellant wasdenied theforum and the rights " guaranteedinthatforum ofprotestinghisinnocence. TherelevanceofArt. 13,guaranteeingfreedom ofmovement, wasatnostageexplained norisitapparenttous.Inthedecision ofthelearnedtrialJudgetherewasnoobstacleinlawtofashioningdisciplinary chargesonconductamounting toacriminal of- 2 ^ fence. Norwasanyotherrightof theappellant breached bythe coursefollowed.TheproceedingsweremodelledonthedisciplinarycodeapplicabletopublicemployeesembodiedinthePublic ServiceLaw, 33/67,aimed tosustain andenforce standardsof conductbefitting thecivilservice. 25 TheSubjective evaluation,ontheotherhand,oftheevidence by members of theDisciplinary Committee (thePublic Service Commission)wasnotassuchopentoreview,excepttotheextent that its findings might not bereasonably open to themon considerationoftheevidenceinitstotality. 30 ThepointspressedbeforethetrialCourtwererepeated before usasfoundingvalidgroundsjustifying theannulmentoftheconviction and thepunishment incidental thereto.It must benoted that theconclusion of thedisciphnaryproceedingsoccurredtwo dayspriortotheretirementoftheappellant 35 1452 3'C.L.R. Matsas v.Republic wt Pikis J. To appreciate theargumentsraised in thecorrect context itis 'necessarytomakebriefreference totheeventsthatledtodisciplinary action andthefacts supporting thedisciplinary charges.On 20th January, 1983, an investigation was ordered into comp5 laintsnmadebyfourmembersof thefemale staff of thepsychiatric services', thecomplainants. KlavdiosAndoniaHes, Senior CounseloftheRepublic,wasappointedtoinvestigatetheallegationsof misconduct.'The investigation wasconcludedon 5th ApriU1983, recommending theinstitution of disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. On the basis of this report nine charges were prelft ferred against the appellant, that is, six charges upon which the appellant wasultimately convicted*and'triree other charges likewiseinvolvingallegationsofindecentassaultrestingontheaccusasionsofTheodosiaPapakyriacou,thefourth complainant:'After alengthytrialinvolving thehearingofagood numberofwitness:; es,including thecomplainants andtheappellant, thePublic Service Commission convicted the appellant on six counts and acquittedriimontheremaining threefor inadequacyorweaknessof theevidence supporting them.Before theordering of theinvesti20 gatioh, Maria Antoniadou'had made a written complaint to the President of theRepublic encouraged', it seemV,by afellow em\ . ployee of the psychiatric department. The* union of public en> ployeestoo,tookaninterestintrieinvestigation of thecomplaints ofJits memDers'.'The reference to the background'of the case 25 would be'inadequate without'specific mention of the history of thecomplaints+bf thefirst complainant,'namely, Maria Antonia- dbu.Hercomplaintsreferred toactsofindecentassaultthatalleg: edly occurredonthreeseparate1occasionsinOctober 1977.Inher allegations theappellant without anydisguising of his intentions 30 assaultedher indecentlyonthreeseparateoccasion's-inthecourse of meetings incidental to"the exercise of her duties. She complained tothePolicebutthenchanged hermind anddidnotpress ( her'complaints^to avoid,"as she'saii personal embarrassment. ThePolicemade1noattempt toprosecute theappellant, confront 35 ofquestionriiminconnection withtheallegationsofthecomplainant. There the matter ended, until 1982 when sherepeated her complaints in a letter to the President of the Republic. A strong pointmaaVby'counsel for theappellantisthatthedelay toprose1453 PikisJ. Matsasv. Republic
(1988)cutedeprived theappellantofaneffective opportunitytodefend himself.Thecomplaintsoftheremainingcomplainantsrelatedto eventsthatallegedlyoccurredin1982. Inadditiontotheabovegrounds,counselfortheappellantalso challenged thedisciplinary conviction for misconception of the 5 lawandtheevidenceinvolvingseriousmisdirectionsthatmade theconviction unsustainable,liabletobesetaside.Thispointof thecasefor theappellant wasnot,asfar aswewereabletodiscern,articulated before thetrial Courtinthemannerinwhichit wasraised and argued before us.Priortoexamining thisaspect JQ oftheappeal,weshalldwellonthesubmissionsrevolvingonallegedbreachesoftheconstitutionalrightsoftheapplicantguaranteedbyArticles30and 12andthesuggestionthatitwasanabuse ofpoweronthepartoftheinvestigatingofficer torecommendthe institutionofdisciplinaryproceedings. ,* InagreementwiththelearnedtrialJudgeweholdthereisno rule of lawprohibiting thefounding of disciplinary chargeson conduct amountingtoacrimilaloffence.Thematterwasconclusively settledbythedecisionoftheFullBenchinChristodoulou v. DisciplinaryBoard
(1983)1C.L.R. 999. Disciplinary and ^Q criminalproceedings,itwasobserved,aredesignedtoservedifferentpurposes.Theformer toensuredisciplineinthepublicserviceandthelattertoestablishcriminalliabilityunderthegeneral law. The following passage from thejudgment of the Court makesitexplicitthatmereisnoobstacleinlawtofoundingdisciplinaryproceedingsonconductamountingtocrime: "Inourjudgment,thereisnoobjection inprincipleorpractice to fashioning disciplinary charges on the provisionsof criminal statutes so long as the object they are designed to serveispurelydisciplinary associated withthesustainanceor preordained standardsintherelevantbranchofthepublicserviceand,inthecaseofNationalGuardintendedtosustaindisciplineintheForce".(Page1005). In thecaseof Christodoulou(supra)itisnotedasin agood 1454 3 C.L.R. 10 15 20 Matsasv.Republic PikisJ. "'numberof earliercases'{Haros v.Republic, 4RSCC39; Morsis >'•'Republic, 4 RSCC 133; Menelaou v. Republic
(1980)3 C.L.R/4'67;1Petrouv.Republic
(1980)3C.L.R.203; PapacleoK voulouv. Republic
(1982)3 C.L.R. 187) thatthe rights safe guardedby Art. 12.5of theConstitution,'thefundamental rights n of theaccused in acriminalcase,are applicable to disciplinary • proceedings as well.,There is nothingonrecord tosuggest that the rights safeguarded by Art. 12.5 onanyone of them were breached bythe institutionandconduct of thedisciplinarypro ceedings. ' ·· .. ·* On consideration of theprinciple enshrined in thecase of . Christodoulou, itisapparentthatappellantwas notdeniedaccess toaCourtassigned tohimbyorundertheConstitution.The Pub licService Cbmmissionintheexerciseofitsdisciplinarycompetence^overpublic servants,is notaCourtinthesense of Art. 30 butadisciplinary committeechargedwiththesustenanceofstan dardsofconductinthepublicservice .Noneof therightsofthe ,appellantsafeguarded.by Art.30wereviolatedby thefoundingof disciplinary chargesof facts amounting toa criminaloffence as ,y> t ( j r l(1 -,, Fwell..,,, lt ^ lL>,. Arguments were raised onbehalf of the,appellant tendingto suggestthatfailure toprosecuteonbehalfofthePoliceauthorities 1 should be assimilated to a positive.finding of innocenceby a Courtexercising criminaljurisdiction. Thereisnosupportforthis 25 proposition. Therelevanceof thefindingsof acriminal.Court,to disciplinary proceedings^was canvassedtand-probed indepthby 'theFullBenchinRepublicv.Mithillos
(1983)3C.L.R.36. The "following passagefrom thejudgmentinMithillos casts.hghton therelevance of thefindings of acriminalCourttodisciplinary 30 proceedings:' "
(1)Theoutcomeofdisciplinary proceedingsisnotnecessari~LJ · ly dependenton the outcomeof criminal proceedings, !!A- evenincaseswherethefactual backgroundisthesame. It Λ ' *- is acknowledged thatcriminalanddisciplinaryproceedoe • "-> * ings-serve different objectives and purposes.Criminal proceedings areprimarily meant toensureobedienceto 1455 Pikis J. Matsasv. Republic
(1988)thegenerallaw,whereasdisciplinaryproceedingsareintendedtosafeguard observanceoftheinternaldisciplinary code.Consequently,thesameevidence,although insufficient to ground a criminal conviction, may suffice to provedisciplinarycharges.
(2)Thefindings offact ofthecriminalCourtarebindingupon thedisciplinarytribunalprovidedtheyarepositive,based onanaffirmative declarationoftheirworthbythecriminal Court and not founded on doubts of the criminal Courtastotheirvalue"(Page39). Greekjurisprudenceestablishesthatneitherthepardoningnor theprescription ofacriminaloffence precludestheadministrative authority from pressingdisciplinarychargesbasedon thesame conduct. (Phthenakis, "SystemofPublicEmployees", 1967Ed., Vol. 3,p.231; andKyriacopoulos, "Lawof CivilEmployees", ^ 1954Ed. ,p.241). . Thisisthepositioninlaw.Thishavingbeensaidwemustnot be led to assume that failure ordelay toprosecute for criminal conductortheabandonmentofacriminalprosecutionandthereasonsfor itare mattersthat shouldbeignored bytheresponsible 20 authorityindeciding whethertoinitiatedisciplinaryproceedings. And wherethedecisiontorefrain from prosecutingisassociated withthepoorqualityoftheevidenceoritsinsufficiency, thismay beanequallypotentreasonfornotsanctioningdisciplinaryproceedings.Theunreliability ofevidenceisequallyconsequential 25 for criminalanddisciplinaryproceedings.Thetimefactor toois relevanttodecidingwhethertoraisedisciplinaryproceedings.As aruleitis undesirablein theabsenceof aproperexplanationof thedelaytorequire thedefendant toanswerforeventsseparated from thetrial byaconsiderable time.Butthereisnoruleofad- 30 ministrative law prohibiting theinstitution of disciplinary proceedingsafter thelapseofanyspecificintervaloftime.ThedecisionofthePrivyCouncilinBellv.DPPofJamaica[1985]2All E.R. 585 suggests that the concept of a fair trial (referring to criminalproceedings) safeguarded bytheConstitutionofJamaica 35 1456 5 3 C.L.R. Matsasv.Republic PikisJ. importsarighttotrialwithin areasonable time,calculatedfroma datethat wasreasonableinallthecircumstances toprosecutethe accused. Art. 30.2of the Constitution of Cyprus likewise safeguards arightoftrial within areasonable time.Therightprimari5 lyrefers, asthe Supreme Court indicated inPaporis v.National Bank,
(1986)1C.L.R. 578 to the length-of judicial proceedings; a necessary safeguard for a fair trial.The right is in.terms confined bytheprovisionsofpara.2of Art.30tocivil andcriminalproceedings.Noneed arisestoexaminein these proceedings whetherasimilarrightvestsinapersonfacingdisciplinary charg1ri es SLSJSOIincidentofthewiderconcept of naturaljustice.Forinthe instantcasethere wasnodelay on thepartofthe appropriate administrative authority to hold an inquiry into the complaints of disciplinary misconduct or put the appellant on trial following their conclusion. The time gap between the occurrence of the 15 events,subject-matter of thecomplaint of Maria Antoniadpu and thetrialoftheappellant.isafactor thataffects thereliability,of her evidence. If theappellant hadbeenputon trial before acriminal Court in 1983for charges founded on the complaints of Maria Antoniadou madetothePolicein 1977,hemight arguably have, 20 on accountof thedelay toinstitutecriminal proceedings avalid caseof breach of his rights safeguarded>by Art.30.2of theConstitution. 25 30 « The ponderation of theevidence tendered in disciplinary proceedingsisamatterfor thedisciplinary committee.Itisclearthere isnoroomforinterference byaCourtexercisingrevisionaljurisdiction under Art. 146.1 with the subjective evaluation of the facts bythebody trusted with disciplinary competence. (See,interalia,Enotiddesv.Republic
(1971)3CLR409;Christofidesv. CYTA
(1979)3 C.L.R. 99). Interference is only permissible if the findings were not on consideration of thetotality of theevidence reasonably open tothe disciplinary committee. The complainthere, and this brings us to thelast aspectof theappeal, is that the P.S.C. misconceived and consequently misapplied the/ principles orrules'of the law of evidence that they purported to apply, affecting the approach^ andtheevaluation of testimony involving sexual misconduct. Alsocomplaint is made that'they 1457 PikisJ. Matsasv.Republic
(1988)failedtokeepinperspectivetheseparatenessofthechargesjoined inthesameaccusation. In evaluating the evidence of the complainants, the respondentsacknowledgedthathavingregardtothesexualcharacterof thedisciplinary offences, corroboration shouldbelookedfor in ,thesamewaythatcorroborationissoughtinpracticebyacriminal Courttrying sexualoffences.Thus, theywarned themselves of the danger of acting on the uncorroborated evidence of the complainantsremindingthemselvesofamenitytoconvictevenin theabsenceofcorroboration provided theyweresatisfied ofthe veracity of the complainants andreliability of their testimony. Thiswasaproperdirection;forequallypotentreasonswarrantin disciplinary proceedings too, a warning as to corroboration wheneverthecharges involve sexualmisconduct.Theneed for corroborationhastodowiththenatureoftheaccusationandthe possibilityinherenttheretoofthecomplainantcolouringherevi- ** denceortellingtheCourtlessthan thewhole truth.Thetaboos affecting sexualconduct aresuchthatreadinesstotell thetruth mayrecedebefore thedesiretoconform andkeepappearances. The respondents havingrightlywarned themselves of the need 20 forcorrobation,failed tocomprehendormorepreciselyfellinto errorindiscerningthenatureoftheevidencecapableof furnishingcorroboration.Forevidencetoprovidecorroboration itmust comefrom asourceotherthantheoneitaimstocorroborate,that is, from aperson other than thecomplainant herself and must 25 tendtoestablishnotonlythatanoffence wascommittedbutthatit wascommittedbytheaccused.Forthisreasoncomplaintsmade byafemalecomplainantofsexualassaultdonotprovidecorroboration;theymerelytendtoestablishconsistencyonthepartofthe complainantOnlycomplaintsqualifyingasimmediatecomplaints 30 undertheprovisionsof s. 10of theEvidenceLawcan provide corroboration.Fortestimonyadmittedunders.10ofCap.9providesevidenceof thefacts themselves(Suttonv.TheKing (No. 1), 14 C.L.R. 160, at p. 173). Immediate complaints received unders.10providetestimonyinparimateriawithdyingdeclara- « tionsandforsimilarreasonsafford independenttestimonyofthe eventsnarratedtherein.Theconditionsstipulatedintheprovisoto 1458 3 C.L.R. Matsas v.Republic PikisJ. s. 10fortheadmission of acomplaintaredesigned toensure that thecontentof itis thespontaneousreactiontoevents thatjustoc curred. Thecomplaintmusthavebeen*madeincircumstancesthat thecomplainanthadnoopportunitytoconcoctthe story'told. * 10 15 20 25 30 The respondents assimilated, as it is clearfrompassagesin theirdecision,complaints madeby thevictim of sexualassaultto complaints admissible under s.10 of theEvidence Law. Thus, complaintsmadeby Xenia Poyadji totwounionofficials after she hadmadeawrittenreportof them,weretreatedascomplaintscapableof furnishing corroboration.Although therespondentsstate intheirdecision thattheywerepreparedtoactontheuncorfoborated.testimony of thecomplainants,itisobviousfromthe tenor of theirdecision thatinevaluating theevidence they actedundera misconception as totheexistence of corroborative evidence.In the caseof MariaAmoniadou they treatedascorroborative theev idenceoftwowitnessesthatthey hadexplicitlyacknowledged hot toqualify asimmediatecomplaintsunders.10 - Cap.9. Intheintroductorypartof thejudgment thereis apassage that suggeststhattherespondentslaboured underconsiderable confusionindeterminingtheevidence necessary tosustainthecharges. Referring to the testimony of Chloi Kimisi they say she was a classicalwitnessandeven acriminalCourtcouldrelyonhertesti mony even in the absence of corroborative evidence. Although thestandardofproofindisciplinary proceedings is notnecessarily thesameas thatobtaining in acriminal case, botha Court of law and a disciplinary tribunal must be clearly satisfied of the credibility of awitness. Thelesserstandardthatobtainsincivil proceedings becomes morestringent inproportiontothegravity of theallegation atissue. Nodoubtaccusationsof sexualmisconductdirectedagainst aseniorgovernmentofficer areof thegrav: estnaturecasting acorrespondingly highburdenofproof. n Counselfor theRepublicinvited therespondentstoaccept the evidence of onecomplainantascorroborationof thetestimonyof oneanotherontheprincipleof similar fact evidence.Thesubmis sion was wholly wrong. For.evidence tobe admissible as*evi denceof similar facts;theremustbeauniqueorstrikingsimilari tybetween theseparateincidentsandadegreeoftimeproximity between thedates of theiroccurrence.We shall notdebate this proposition further, save tomentionthattherelevant principles 1459 ή PikisJ. Matsasv.Republic
(1988)are far too well established (R.v.Doughty[1965] 1All E.R. 560, 562;Boardman v. DPP [1974]3 All E.R. 887;R. v.Johannsen[1977]63Cr.App.R. 101;R.v.Scarrott[1978] 1 All E.R. 672;R. v.Novae,63Cr.App.R. 112;R. v.Barrington [1981]1 AllE.R. 1135)bythecase-lawtorequirefurther elaboration. 5 Althoughtherespondentsdidnotultimatelytreatthetestimony ofthecomplainantsasfurnishingcorroborationofoneanother,it appearsthat they treated such evidenceasadmissibleonevery countoftheaccusation.Thiswasagraveerrorforasinthecase i n ofacriminaltrialthejoinderofoffences doesnotmakeevidence admissibleononecountadmissibleoneveryothercount.(Oueiss v. Republic
(1987)2 C.L.R.49;Papachrysostomou v.Police
(1988)2C.L.R.55),Section 3ofSchedule3tothePublicServiceLaw(37/67),providesthatdisciplinaryproceedingsarecon- 15 ductedtotheextentpossibleinthesamewayasasummarycriminaltrial;anenactmentmakingapplicabletherelevantprocedural rulesastojoinderofoffences andjoinderofoffenders.Lastly,a noticeableomissionoftherespondentsinascertainingthefactsof thecase wastheir failure torequiretheproduction of thestate- 20 ment ofthewrittencomplaintofMariaAntoniadoutothePresidentoftheRepublic,insomerespectscontradictoryorincompatiblewithpartofherevidence.Section4(b)ScheduleIIItoLaw 33/67expressly empowers theP.S.C.torequiretheproduction ofeverydocumentrelevanttothecharge.Thoughtheynotedthe 25 discrepancythatemergedinthecourseoforalevidence,theydid notconsider it necessary torequiretheproduction of thatstatement.AndtheywerecontentwiththeexplanationgivenbyMaria AntoniadouthatuponreadingthestatementtothePolicemadesix yearsearlier,sherecoveredanaccuraterecollectionoftheevents. 30 It emerges from the above that the subjudice decision is fraught with misconception of therelevant evidential rules or principlesthattherespondentsthemselvessetouttoapply,amisconceptionthatledtoamisappreciationoftheevidenceandultimatelyamisconceptionofthefactsthemselves. 35 Therefore, weshallallowtheappealandannulthesubjudice disciplinarydecision. Appealallowed. Subjudicedecisionannulled. 1460