clr/1988/1988_3_1529.pdf

(1983)3CXJf. 354citedwithapproval. Timewithin whichtofilearecourse underArt. 146.1 ofthe Constitution—A matterofpublicpolicythatcanberaisedbytheCourtexpropriamotu. I 15 Fees—Whatisafee—Thedistinctionbetweena "fee"anda "tax"—Thefeeis supposedtobebasedontheexpensesincurredinrendering a service— Watersupply—Therelevantratespayableareclearlyfees. 20 Water supply—Rates—Bye-taw creatingfourdifferent categories—Supply of waterto "Hotel apartments" charged under thefirst category, i.e. domesticuse,andnot under thethird categoryi.e.industrial use— Words should be given their ordinary meaning—"Domestic use" ((Ηχιαχήχρήση)is usedfor ordinarypurposesofdomestic life byoccu* 1529 Elia Hotel v. Polis Chr. M' lity

(1988)pantsofadwelling-houseorabuilding,includingpersonswhoboardand lodgetherein—Thoughhotelapartmentsarepartofthetouristindustrythey aredefinitelynotfactories (εργοστάσια)orindustrialpremises(βιομηχανι­ κάοικήματα). Construction ofstatutes—Words should begiven theirordinary meaning— 5 ReviewofAuthorities. Words andphrases—Water supplyfor "domestic use" (οιχιαχή χρήση)— Whatisnowadaysconsideredas"domesticuse"—Watersuppliedto "hotel apartments"—Rightlyconsideredassuppliedfor "domesticuse". Thefacts of thiscaseaswellastheprinciplesappliedby theCourtin 10 dismissingtherecoursearesufficiently indicatedinthehereinaboveheadnote. Recoursedismissed. Noorderastocosts. Casesreferredto: 15 Spyrou v.Republic

(1983)3C.L.R. 354; Megalemou v. TheRepublic

(1968)3 C.L.R.581; Constantinidesv.EA.C.

(1982)3C.L.R.798; Apostolou andOthersv. TheRepublic

(1984)3C.L.R. 509; LamiGrovesLtd. v.TheRepublic

(1986)3C.L.R.2378; 20 HaraHotelsv. TheRepublic

(1987)3C.L.R. 618; Loizouv.SewageBoardofNicosia

(1988)1 C.L.R.122; ΜJ.Lousides andSonsLtd.v.The Municipality ofLimassol

(1988)3 C.L.R. 1017; Pidgeonv.Great Yarmouth WaterworksCompany [1902]1K.B.310; South-WestSuburban WaterCompanyv. GuardiansofthePoorofSt.Marylebone [1904] 2 K.B.

1. 1530 yr 3C.t.R. Recourse. EliaHotel v.PolisChr.M' lity· J - Recourseagainstthedecisionoftherespondentstoimposeon applicantsfor themonthsofJuly-October, 1985wateirratesfor the supply of water to the hotel apartments'amounting to 5 -£1,080.75andtodisconnectthesupplyofwateronthe18th'November,
2. * Ph.Vali'antisforL.Papaphilippou,fortheapplicants. A. Taliadorosfor K. Chrysostomides, for therespondents: Cur. adv. vult. 10 STYLIANIDES.J. read the following judgment. Applicant No.2istheownerofhotelapartmentsatPolisChrysochous.' Applicant No. 1is managing and/or administering the said apartments, which areregistered underTheHotels andTourist (Establishment),Law, 1969:(LawNo.40/69). ' · ,c TheRespondentsareaMunicipalCorporation establishedby Law.Theysupplywater. '· Thesehotelapartmentswereconnectedwiththewatersupply of the Respondents.There is'one meterfor theconsumptionof waterforalltheseapartments.Thewaterratesarepaideverytwo 20 monthsandtheindicationof themeteroftheconsumption isrecorded by an employee of the authority bi-monthly. Theconsumption for the periods ended 9th March, 1985, 10th May, 1985and 11th'July, 1985,were47tons, 194tonsand 208'tons respectively'. ' "' * - r. * - . · . · . . · 25 ' . · · . ' •· - . -I- On 11th September,·1985, the employee of the Respondent Corporation,intheordinaryexecutionofhisduties,checkedthe meter and herecorded theconsumption of 978 tons.Therates amounted to£625.50.Onthesamedayapplicant 1 was notified topaythisamount 1531 StylianidesJ. Elia Hotelv.PolisChr.M'lity

(1988)Applicant No.2on 18th September, 1985,by letter (Exhibit 2)informed the Respondents that asfrom 22ndJuly, 1985,the apartmentsinusewereincreased bytwelveandasfrom 4thAugust, 1985,bysixmore,thatiseighteeninall.Thatthebillofthe waterrates amounting to£625.50wastoohigh andnot theex- 5 pected one.That he found out that in the apartments,after the connectionwiththewatersupplyoftheMunicipality,duetodamagetoapipebetween thefirst tenapartmentsandthenewapartments,therewasaleakage.Asthedamagewasunexpected,notwithstandingthemeasurestakenbyhim,hepleadedforleniency , Q andreadjustment ofthebill. TheRespondentsbyletterdated 17thOctober,1985,informed theapplicants that they hadtopay until25th October, 1985,the amount of £625.50, otherwise the water supply to the above apartmentswouldbedisconnected. ,c On 22nd October, 1985,anadvocate of Paphosaddressed a lettertotheRespondentsonbehalfofMarionHotel,AkamasHotel,EliaHotelApartmentsandtheCampingSite,wherebyheallegedthattheimpositionofwaterratesonhisclientsandthetreatmentof thehotelsin the samemannerasdwelling-houseswere ^o treatedwaslegally baseless andcontrarytotheBye-laws.That Bye-laws 104/85 did not provide for hotel or hotel apartments and,therefore, theBye-laws inforce before 22ndMarch,1985, the date of thepublication of Bye-laws 104/85,should beapplied.He,further, suggested thattheBye-lawsofPolisChrysochous,inrespectofwaterratesforhotels,besubstitutedbynew provisionidenticalwiththeoneinforceinPaphosMunicipality. On26thOctober, 1985,theChairmanof theMunicipalCommittee of PolisChrysochous informed the advocate that, if the waterratesappliedbythePaphosMunicipality wereadoptedby *) PolisChrysochous,thiswouldbetothedisadvantageofhisclients,asthetouristperiodintheareaofPolisChrysochouswasof limiteddurationtwoorthreemonthsperannum-butifthehoteliersdesiredtheamendmentoftherelevantBye-law,inordertoincorporate therein th*.ra;^sobt'.ui;iju i\ PaphosMunicipality,thr 35 3C.L.R. Elia Hotel v.PolisChr.M' lity StylianidesJ. MunicipalCommitteeofPoliswouldbewillingtoproceedinthat direction.. , . , - , " 5 " On 11thNovember, 1985,thesameemployeeoftheRespondentsvisitedthesehotelapartmentsoftheapplicantsandthemeter showed aconsumption of751tons.,A billfor £455.25was issuedandgivenonsameday(seeExhibit'4). Astheapplicantsfailed topay,thewatersupplytotheirapartmentswasdisconnectedon 18thNovember, 1985.Thisrecourse ensuedon30thDecember, 1985.Theapplicantsseek:« 10 15 20 • . •/ . "A.DeclarationoftheCourtthattheactand/ordecisionofthe Municibal Corporation of Polis Chrysochous to impose waterratesforthesupplyofwatertothehotelapartments oftheapplicantsforthemonthsJuly,toOctober, 1985(inclusive),£1,080.75,whichwascompletedbyletterofthe Municipalitydated26thOctober, 1985,andthedisconnectionof the supply of wateron 18th November, 1985,is nullandvoidandofnoeffect whatsoever. B.DeclarationoftheCourtthattheactand/ordecisionforthe disconnection of thewatersupply tothehotel apartments oftheapplicantsisvoidandofnolegaleffect whatsoever." The Respondents objected that the letter of 26th October, 1985,doesnotconstituteanexecutoryadministrativeactwhichis amenable tothejurisdictionofthisCourtunderArticle146ofthe Constitution.Theonlyadministrativeactsarethebillsofwater 25 consumption,dated 11thSeptember, 1985,and 11thNovember, 1985,whichwerecommunicatedtotheapplicantsonthedateof ' theirrespectiveissue.Onthesepremisestherecourseforthefirst bill/decision isoutof time,hayingregard tothedateof thebill andthedateofthefilingoftherecourse. 30 Counsel for theapplicants,on'theother hand,submitted that therecourseisnotoutoftimebecausetheletterdated26thOctober, 1985,isanexecutoryadministrativeact,inthatitisthedoc- ' StylianidesJ. Elia Hotelv.PolisChr.M' lity

(1988)umentwherebytheimpositionofthewaterrateswascompleted for theperiod July -October, 1985,following are-examination ofthecaseafter theallegationsandobjectionsoftheapplicants. Before dealingwith thesubstanceoftherecourse,Iconsider pertinenttoinquirewhethertherecoursedirectedagainsttheim- 5 positionof theratesfor theperiodended 11thSeptember,1985, isoutoftime. Therecourse though apparently directed against theletteror decisionof26thOctober 1985,itisplainfrom thefactsonwhich itisbasedandtheaddressesofcounsel thatitisdirectedagainst 10 andconteststhevalidity oftheimposition ofthewaterrates for twobi-monthly periods. In AdministrativeLaw there is awide marginfortheinterpretationoftheaimoftherecourse.Theletter of 26thOctober, 1985,towhichreference wasmadeabove,precededthewaterratebillof 11thNovember, 1985,whichindeed 15 isoneoftheactschallenged. Itiswellsettled thatonlyanexecutoryadministrativeactcan beattacked by recourse. Theletter of 26th October 1985,does notconstitutea newexecutorydecision whichcanbemadethe subject ofrecourse.InSpyrouv.Republic

(1983)3C.L.R.354, atpp.358-359itwassaid:- 20 "It isprovidedinparagraph3ofArticle 146thatarecourse underthatArticleshallbemadewithinaperiodof75daysof thedatewhen thedecision oract,whichis thesubject ofthe recourse,waspublishedor,ifnotpublished andinthecaseof 25 an omission , when it came to theknowledge of theperson making recourse.This provision is mandatory andhastobe giveneffect tointhe publicinterestinallcases.Suchviewis inaccordance withtheinterpretation ofanalogousprovisions givenbytheadministrativetribunalsinanumberofEuropean ^ countriesandisalsotheviewofauthoritativewritingsonthis subject-(JohnMoranandtheRepublic(TheAttorneyGeneral andAnother),1R.S.C.C. 10,atp. 13;TheHolySee ofKitiumandtheMunicipalCouncilofLimassol,1 R.S.C.C. 15,at 1534 3C.L.R. Elia Hotel v.PolisChr.M' lity StylianidesJ. .p.f18;Protopapas. and theRepublic,

(1967)3 C.L.R. 411; Mahdesian andTheRepiiblic,

(1966)3C.L.R, 630:;Kyp'rianides v.'fhe Republic,

(1982)3C.L.R:61l)t "* ''' ' Itiswellsettledthataconfirmatory actlacks'executorynatureand,therefore, it cannotbemadethesubject-matter ofa recourse underArticle 146oftheConstitution.Aconfirmatory . actordecisionisanactordecisionofadministrationwhich'repeatsthecontentsofapreviousexecutoryactandsignifiesthe adherenceoftheadministration'to'a'coursealreadyadopted;it isnotinitself executorybecauseitdoes notitselfdetermine thelegalpositionofanindividualcase,andthisis,thereasonit . cannotbethesubjectofarecourse. ' An act which contains a confirmation of an earlierone, may,1however, beexecutory and, therefore, subject'to arecoursefor annulment ifithasbeenmadeafter anew'inquiry into thetmatter - (Kolokassidesv. The Republic,

(1965)3 f ;*jC:L!R:;r542; 'Varnava V. Republic,

(1968)l r C.L.R. 566;Kypriqnidesy.fhe'Republic:, (supra)). --^ r .' Whendoesanewinquiryexistisaquestionoffact Ingeneral,itisconsidered tobeanewenquiry,thetakingintoconsiderationofnewsubstantivelegalorfactual elementsandthe ., usednewmaterial is strictly considered, becausehewhohas lostthetimelimitfordiepurposeofattackinganexecutoryact, shouldnotbeallowedtocircumventsucha"timelimitbythe creation of anewact,whichhasbeenissuedformally aftera new inquiry, but in substance on the basisof the sameelements.Thereisanewinquiryparticularlywhen,before theissueofthesubsequent act,aninvestigation takesplaceofnewlyemergedelementsor,although preexisting,wereunknown atthetimeandaretakenintoconsiderationinadditiontoothers forthefirsttime.Similarly,"itconstitutesnewinquirythecarryingoutofalocalinspectionorthecollectionofadditionalinformationinthematterunderconsideration. ,'• 4 Whennewsubstantivefactual elementsaretakenintocon1535 StylianidesJ. Elia Hotelv.PolisCbr.M'lity

(1988)siderationinarrivingatasubsequentdecision,theseconddecisionisnotaconfirmatory actbutanewexecutoryact The previousexecutoryactceasestobeoperative-executory-and mergesintothesecond act" Thedecision contained in thewaterbill of 11th September, 5 1985,wascommunicated totheapplicantsonthesamedayand nothinghappenedlatertopostponethedateofthecomputationof the75dayswithinwhicharecoursehastobefiled. Theprovision inparagraph 3of Article 146,that arecourse shallbemadewithin theperiodof75days,isoneofpublicpoli- 10 cyandevenif arespondent doesnotraiseinhisopposition this question, the Court is bound toconsider it, ex proprio motu (Elli Megalemou v. Republic (Public Service Commission)

(1968)3C.L.R.581). IntheviewoftheaboveIholdthattheletterof26thOctober, 1985,addressed toGeorghios Kyprianidesinreply tothiscommunicationof22ndOctober, 1985,isnotanexecutoryactwhich canbemadethesubjectofarecourse.Consequentlydierecourse againsttheactof 11th September, 1985,isoutoftimeand,ultimately,itwillbedismissed. 15 20 Theremainingpartoftherecourse,thatisthatpartwhichisdirected against the water bill/decision of 11th November, 1985, andthedecisiontodisconnectthewatersupplyon 18thNovember, 1985,havetobeconsideredbytheCourt. Counselfortheapplicantsreliedonthefollowing grounds:- 25 (a)Thewaterrates aredisproportionate totheincomeof the applicantsandconstitutedestructivetaxation. (b)Theuseof thewaterinhotelapartmentsdoesnotconstitute "domesticuse",aserroneouslydecidedbytheRespondents; theapartmentsshouldbeclassified asfallingwithin"indus- 30 trialbuildings"andtheratestobecalculatedonthatbasis. 1536 1 3 C.L.R. 5 Elia Hotelv. Polis Chr.M lity Stylianides J. (c)The imposition of these water rates was made underthe Municipal(Amendment) No.2Bye-laws,1985 (No. 104/ 85), whichcreatethree categoriesof premises andthat the hotelapartmentsoftheapplicants donotfallwithinanyof thesecategories and,therefore,astheRegulationsdo not provide forpaymentofratesby hotelapartments,the Re­ spondentscouldnotimposeanyrates. (d) Thesubjudicedecision was notreasoned. 10 25 20 The relevant Bye-Law under which the subjudice decision was takenisRegulation4oftheMunicipal(Amendment) Regula­ tions of Polis Chrysochous Municipality, 1985 (No, 104/85), published intheOfficial Gazetteof theRepublic,Supplement No. Ill, Part I, p. 295,whereby subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), (d) of paragraph 2 of Regulation 115(z) 1931 - 1958 as amended by Regulation2oftheAmendingRegulationsof theMunicipalityof Polisof 1977,weredeletedandsubstitutedby paragraph2 there­ of, thematerialpartofwhich reads:"2.Οιδιοκτήτηςήκάτοχοςοποιασδήποτεοικίαςήοική­ ματος που είναι εφοδιασμένο με νέρο θα πληρώνει τα ακόλουθαδικαιώματακαιη πληρωμήθα γίνεταικατάδι­ μηνία. (α)Γιαοικιακήχρήση: (ι) -: • (ιι) ....Ι ; : *' (ιν) (ν) (νι) 1537 Stylianides J. Elia Hotel v. Polis Chr. M'lity

(1988)(VU) (β) Για τα σχολεία, νοσοκομεία, παιδική στέγη, εφηβικό ξενώνα, στρατόπεδα Εθνοφρουράς, φιλανθρωπικάκαι άλλα ιδρύματα: (ι) 5 (ιι) (γ)Για ταεργοστάσια καιβιομηχανικά οικήματα: (ι) (ιι) (ιιι) 10 (ιν) Νοείται ότι το Συμβούλιο δύναται για μεγάλες βιομηχανικές επιχειρήσεις με αίτησητους,να καθορίζει ειδικήκλίμακα πωλήσεως νερού σε αυτές. (δ)Γιαπλοία, 15 Νοείται ότι λογαριασμοί που επιδίδονται για πληρωμή πρέπει να εξοφλούνται στα Δημοτικά Γραφεία μέσα σε 15 μέρες από την ημερομηνία της επιδόσεως τους, διαφορετικά η υδατοπρομήθεια θα διακόπτεταιχωρίς άλληπροειδοποίηση ("2. The owner or occupier of any dwelling-house or premiseswhichis suppliedwithwatershallpay thefollow­ ing fees and thepayment shallbe made bi-monthly. 1538 20 3 C.L.R. Elia Hotelv. Polis Chr.M*lity Stylianides J. (a)Fordomesticuse: ................ .(

1. b)I;or schools, hospitals, children's home,youth hos­ tedcampsof trieNationalGuard,charitable and.other institutions. , . , 5 (c)Forfactories andindustrial premises. (
2. d)For ships, etc. IQ l5 2Q 25 ( Provided thatthebills served for paymentmust bepaidoff attheoffices of theMunicipalitywithin 15 days from thedateof theirservice, otherwise the wa­ ter supply shall be'disconnected without any other v notice.") -' - It has to be decided whether the imposition for payment of these water rates under the Law and the Bye-law is " φόρος, τέλος η εισφοράοιασδήποτε φύσεως" (tax,duty orrateof any kindwhatsoever) thatcomeswithin theprovision of Article 24 of the Constitution and, if within the ambit of Article 24, then whetherthisfee isof destructive orprohibiting nature. A "fee" is generally defined tobe achargefor aspecial service rendered toindividuals by somepublic authorityandis supposed to be based on the expenses incurred in rendering the service, though in many cases thecosts arearbitrarily assessed. A "tax" is acompulsory exaction of moneyby publicauthority for public purposes enforceable by law andis nota'payment for servicesrendered. The reason for thepayment in the case of fees is the special benefit accruingtotheindividual; inthecase of tax,theparticular 1539 Stylianides J. Elia Hotel v. Polis Chr.M' lity

(1988)advantage,if itexists atall,is anincidentalresult of stateaction. (SeeAlecos Constantinides v. TheElectricityAuthorityof Cy­ prus

(1982)3 C.L.R. 798;Apostolou and Others v. The Repub­ lic

(1984)3 C.L.R. 509; Lami Groves Ltd. v. The Republic

(1986)3 C.L.R. 2378; Hara Hotels v.Republic

(1987)3 C.L.R 5 618; Meropi Michael loizou v.SewageBoard of Nicosia,

(1988)1 C.L.R. 122; ΜJ. Lo tsides &Sons Ltd. ,The Municipality of Limassol,

(1988)3 C.L.R. 1017. See, also, FritzFleiner - Ad­ ministrative Law, 8th Edition, Greektranslation by G. Stymphaliades,pp. 391-392). The water rates in this case are clearly fees and not tax.They are paid inconsideration of services rendered,thatis inconsider­ ation of the supply of water. It has notbeen shown thatthedifferential as touse is arbitrary or unreasonable. Ithas not,further, been shown thatthese water rates areof aprohibitive ordestructive natureorthattheBye-law under which they were imposed, or their imposition,are in any way repugnanttoorinconsistentwith Article 24.4 of theConsti­ tution. Under this Bye-law the owner or possessor of a dwellinghouse or premises supplied with water shall pay the prescribed fees, which aredivided in thefollowing four categories:- 15 20 (a)Fordomestic use. (

1. b)For schools, hospitals, children's home,youth hostel, camps of the NationalGuard,charitable andother institu- 25 tions. (c)Forfactories andindustrial premises. (
2. d)For ships, etc... 1540 1 0 3 C.L.R. Elia Hotel v. Polis Chr.M' lity Stylianides J. The.differential in therates is based onthe,use of the water supplied.' • 5 ,., ΙΛ , , · ^ . ' • • ' . ' * · * • • . Itis thesubmission of counselfor theapplicants that,theuseof waterinthehotelapartmentsis,not "domestic use"butfor "indus­ trialpremises". . , - -. , 1 ' '"' " ' ' What is themeaningof "domestic use" (οικιακήχρήση") and "industrial premises" ("βιομηχανικάοικήματα")? Words should be given their ordinary meaning,orcommon, orpopularsense asthey aregenerally understood,having in mind thepurposeof anenactment ' * InHalsbury 's Lawsof England,FourthEdition,Volume 44, paragraph'865 weread:- ' 15 20 25 ' "Words areprimarily tobeconstruedintheirordinary meaning or commonor popular sense, and as they woulcl have been generally understoodthedayafter thestatutewas passed,un­ lesssuch aconstructionwould'lead tomanifest andgrossab­ surdity,orunless thecontextrequires some special orpartic. ularmeaningtobegiventothewords. Nevertheless/the'time atwhich astatute is passed may notbe relevant where it is clearthatParliamentintendedawordtobegivenits meaning fromtimetotimeineveryday usage. Where thewords used arefamiliar andareincommon andgeneral useintheEnglish language, it is inappropriateto'try'to define themfurther by judicial interpretationandtolay downtheirmeaning asarule of construction,andtheonly question for acourtis whether thewords are apt tocover or'describe thecircumstances in . question inaparticularcase." InMaxwell onInterpretationof Statutes, 12thEdition,p. 199 weread:- 30 "Indeterminingeitherthegeneral object of thelegislature, or 1541 - Stylianides J. Elia Hotel v. Polis Chr. M* lity

(1988)themeaningofitslanguageinanyparticularpassage,itisobvious that theintention whichappearstobemostinaccord withconvenience,reason,justiceandlegalprinciplesshould, in all cases of doubtful significance, bepresumed to bethe trueone. 'Anintention toproduce an unreasonable resultis 5 nottobeimputed toastatuteifthereissomeotherconstructionavailable'." More than eighty years ago,inPidgeon v. Great Yarmouth WaterworksCompany[1902] 1 K.B.310,it wassaid atp.314 byLordAlverstone,C.J.:- \Q "Under ordinary circumstances 'domestic purposes.' in my opinion,includetheuseofwaterfortheordinarypurposesof domesticlifebytheinmatesofthehouse,anditisfoundasa fact, in the present case,that theonly persons whousethe water are theinmates of thehouse -including thepersons 15 whoboardandlodgeinthehouse.Althoughitistruethatthe appellant iscarrying on thebusiness of aboarding -house keeper,heisnotusingthewaterforthepurposesofhisbusiness in anyproper orjust sense,orin anyother sensethan that thewater hasbeen supplied for thedomesticuseof in- 20 matesofthehouse." In that case the occupier of adwelling-house carried on the businessofaboarding-housekeepertherein,receivingpersonsto board and lodge who used thewaterof acompany. Waterwas usedinthehousefor cleansing,cooking,drinking,and sanitary purposes. It washeld that,havingregard totheuseof thewater inthehouse,theoccupierwasentitledtodemandasupplyofwaterattheratesspecified intheActforasupplyfor"domesticpurposes." ^ InSouth-WestSuburban WaterCompanyv. Guardianso/the -,« Poor of St.Marylebone[1904]2K.B. 174thedefendants who weretheoccupiersofaschoolwithin'hedistrictsuppliedbythe plaintiffs, demanded asupplyofwaterfordomesticpurposes.It washeldthat theschool wasadwelling-housewherethedefen1542 3 C.L.R. Elia Hotelv. Polis Chr. M'lity Stylianides J. dantsmightstillbeentitledtoasupplyof waterfordomesticpur­ poses. . . *', Itwas said atp. 184by Buckley,J.:5 10 15 20 25 30 !'Ithinkthatthetrueresultof thecases is thatthewords'do• mesticpurposes'includeuser,notmerely for washing,drink­ ing,flushing closets,andthelike,,butextendtouserforwhat intheBristolWaterworks Co. v.Uren,15Q.B.D.637 were . called theamenitiesof thehouse,butthatthelimitsof such amenitiesmustbeascertainedwithdueregard towhatisreasonableandwhatistheordinaryuserinourday." I am of the opinion that the meaning of "domestic use" ("οικιακή χρήση") is use of water*for theordinary purposeof domesticlife byoccupantsof adwelling-house orabuilding, in­ cludingpersonswho board andlodge therein.Itincludes,inter alia, use of water for drinking,washing, cooking, sanitary pur­ poses, watering agarden attachedoraroundahouse,washing a carandallsuchotheramenitiesofpresentdaylife.Itseems tome thattheheatingorcooling abuilding by theuseofcirculationof water,todayis domesticuse. Thethirdcategory is "για εργοστάσιακαι βιομηχανικά οικήματα". Hotelapartmentsmay be described as part of the touristindustry,butdefinitely areneitherafactory norindustrial ,premisesinthesensethatthisexpression is usedintheBye-laws. The use madeof the water by the applicants in theirhotel apartmentsis no otherthan "για οικιακή χρήση" ("domestic use"). TheRespondentsappliedtheRegulationsproperlyandthear­ gumentthattheRegulationsdonotprovidefor paymentof rates. for watersupply tohotelapartmentsis absuraandtheCourtdoes notleantowardsabsurdities. 1543 Stylianides J. Elia Hotel v.PolisCbr.M' lity

(1988)Regardingthecontentionaboutthelackofreasoning, suffices tosaythatthenatureofthereasoningdependsuponthenatureof thedecision.Havingregardtothenatureofthedecision,Ihold thatnofurther reasoningwasrequired. Cominglastlytotheprayerforthedisconnectionof thewater 5 supply,theRespondentswere,bytheRegulations,authorizedto doso,astheapplicantsadmittedlydidnotpaythebillswithin15 daysfrom thedateof serviceonthem.Rightly,undertheRegulation,thewatersupplywasdisconnectedwithoutanyfurthernoFor the foregoing reasons, this recourse is dismissed with coststobeassessedbytheRegistrar. Recoursedismissed with costs. 1544