3 CX.R. 1988 September29 [CHRYSOSTOMIS,AG.J.] INTHE MATTER OF ARTICLE 146OFTHECONSTITUTION j · .• _, , ,,*. , , TOMSFOODSLIMITED, Applicants, v.. THEREPUBLICOFCYPRUS,THROUGH THEREGISTRAROFTHETRADEMARKS, W - '. Respondent. ' (CaseNo.73174), ' ' Trademarks—The TradeMarksLaw,Cap.268—Registrability—Judicialcontrot;—Principles applicable—"FIZZA" for beverages—Refusalonground thatithasadirectreferencetothequalityofthegoodsandthatitmaycause confusion—Reasonablyopentothe respondent. i· . · ·. • • Recoursefor annulment-^-factsrelieduponbyAdministration—Nocomplaint concerningthemmadebyapplicant—Presumption thattheywerecorrectly ascertained—Courtwillnotraiseexproprio motuanissueconcerningtheir correctness. Thefacts of thiscaseneed notbesummarised. " ' Recoursedismissed. No orderasto costs. - Cases'referredto: Eastman Photographic MaterialsCo. v.'Comptroller-General of Patents, • Designs andTrade'Marks [1898]A.C.571H.L.;' ΐ. Λ . '. •' · ' . . i t HjiMichaelandOthersv!TheRepublic (1*972)3CLR. 246; 1803 j Toms Foods Ltd. v. Republic
(1988)IacovidesEnterprises v. TheRepublic
(1986)3 C.L.R.2101; Merck v.TheRepublicandanother
(1972)3C.L.R.548; WhiteHorse DistillersLtd. v.ElGreco Distillers Ltd.
(1987)3 C.L.R. 531. Recourse. Recourse againsi therefusal of therespondent toregister in Class 32of PartAof the Register ofTrade Marks of thetrade mark "FIZZA"inrespectofbeverages. L. Christodoulides (Miss),for L.Papaphilippou, fortheappliS. Georghiades, Senior Counsel of the Republic, forthere spondent. Cur. adv. vult. CHRYSOSTOMIS Ag. J.read thefollowing judgment.The Applicants areacompanyoflimitedliabilityregistered inCyprus j ^ andtheyareintheindustry ofdriednuts,vegetablesandprepara tionsofsame. On 17/11/73theApplicants applied totheRespondent Regis trarofTradeMarksfortheregistration inclass32ofpartAofdie Register of thetrade mark "FIZZA" in respect of beverages 20 (σιρόπια). TheRespondentRegistrar acting throughtheAssistantRegis trarofTradeMarksbyhis letterdated 17/12/73 informed theAp plicants of hisobjections, towit, thaton thebasisof the provi sions ofparagraph (d)of s. 11
(1)oftheTradeMarks Law, Cap. 25 268, the application could not beentertained because thepro posed trademarkhasdirectreference tothecharacterorquality of the goods and that itis not distinctive under s.ll(l)(e). There 1804 3-CiL.R. 5 JQ J Toms Foods Ltd. v: Republic was also objection oh the basis'of s.13 of the Law; Furthermore^ in the'said letterit isstated thattheword "FIZZA"isaminor vari ation ofthe word "FIZZ"· which "is defined in J Webster's Diction ary as"an effervescent beverage, specifically a drink'variously made of spirituous liquor carbonated water and lemon juice". ^ Ό η ^ 1/12/73the ApplicantsHhrough their advocate filed acon sidered'reply pursuant to'the provision's-of Rule 32of the Trade Marks Rules'1951-i Bytheir reply theApplicant submitted thattrie word "FIZZA"has no direct reference to the'charactefor quality of the goods and they exclusively referred to Halsbury's-Laws of England, 3rdEdn., Vol. 38, p. 521, paras. 864 and
- Para. 864 readsas follows- " ; : — -: '"**v. J> ' ' rtr* *'••' / i ' i ,: ' V . . i . r i . ' V . . . ' i f ! ^ Γ Γ •.'.'*. 15 2Q 30 Chrysostomis
- ;. t L,· · ' i· - · . ; * v k • • tC* ·.,· " "Words having ho direct reference.The introductionof the Λ *word 'direct' in'the* description'of 1 registrable-words''shows thatthemere'fact ofwords having some reference'to'the goods' does notrender them incapable ofregistration, and was intend,: edto correct the tendency to'find some commendatory or de•'scriptive reference in any wbrdthat might be proposed, ahcfto make tfclear thata'descriptive wbrd'may'at thesame tirnebe distinctive. Itallows^the'registration o f a^number of words' really fitted to form the nameofgoods although they may sug gest some object or quality'of such goods.1 Whether a' word has such adirect reference islargely aquestion offact in each 1 ' case.'In deciding thisquestion trie tribunal Has'to examine the *' 'rriark'riot initsstrict grammatical significance but as'it'would -•'represent'itself-td thepublic at'large who aretd looka'tit and to ' form aviev/as to what itconnotes':'A mark having an indirect reference toaquality of the*goods is not necessarily deceptive because the owner might apply itto goods not having such ; ! ; ( : quality:''· · "• ' ^ ' '» ' *' ' Para. 865 refers to examples ofwords held to'Kave'ho direct reference tothe character and quality ofthe goods. From these examples;'learned 'counsel forthe Applicants referred to the *" words "Dustic" for adhesives, "Buster" for"animal food; "Moto35 rine" forlubricating oils and "Rosette"forface powder, and said 1805 ChrysostomisJ. TomsFoodsLtd.v.Republic
(1988)thatthesewordswerefound nottohave"direct"reference tothe character andquality of thegoods in spiteof thefacts thatthey had"some"reference tothegoods,ifthelastsyllablewasomitted from thosewords. Asregards the issueof "distinctiveness", theApplicantsre- 5 ferred toanotherextract from Halsbury'sLawsof England,3rd Edn.,Vol.38,para.861,p.520,totheeffect thatthetelescoping of twodictionary wordswhicharedescriptivecanproduceaninvented word, and for this purpose they referred to the word 'Whiskeur"whichisreferred toatfootnote "c"ofthatpage. \Q TheRespondent Registrar through hisAssistant byhisletter dated 11/1/74,informed theApplicantsthat hereconsidered the application on the basis of themattersreferred toin theconsideredreply,butitwasnotmadepossiblefortheapplication tobe entertainedand,consequently,hisobjection stillstands. J5 TheRespondent wasnotrequiredbytheApplicantstostatein writing thegroundsof hisdecisionandthematerial usedbyhim inarrivingthereat.Instead,asaresultoftheRespondent'sreply, theApplicantsfiledthepresentRecourse. ThegroundsonwhichtheRecourseisbasedareasfollows:
(1)TheRespondent waswrongand/oractedunderamisconception as regards the construction of the Trade Marks Law,Cap.268,and,inparticular,asregardsthemeaning ofthephrase"...directreference tothecharacterorquality of thegoods..."referred toin s.ll(l)(d). 20 25
(2)TheRespondent waswronginfindingthattheproposed trademarkhaddirectreferencetothecharacterorqualityof thegoods.
(3)The Respondent wronglydecided thattheproposed trade marklacksdistinctiveness. 1806 30 3 C.L.R. TomsFoods Ltd.v.Republic Chrysostomis J: •
(4)TheRespondent wronglydecided thattheproposed trade ' ' ' markisriotaninventedword. ' ' . ' Vi 5 By his written address learned counsel'for the Applicants reliedonhisconsidered replyandhesubmitted thatthecontents thereof correctly sumupthelawapplicable tothiscase.Healso saidthatthe"article,thesubjectoftheseproceedings,is"apowder known in theisland as'FIZZA'which,with theaddition ofwater,becomeseffervescent, andisdrankasarefreshment". • . . . • . < ^ > — / · , . · , . . ; * •: '* Learnedcounselfor'the Respondentreferred tothediscretion 10 theRegistrarhasgotandcitedHalsbu'ry's'LawsofEngland;3rd Edn.*;Vol.38,p:518,'para'.'859.Healsosubmitted that theproposedtrademarkisriotaninvented wordaridhVcitedEastman PhotographicMaterials Co.v.Comptroller-GeneralofPatents, , : DesignsandTrade'Marks [1898]A.C.571H:L.Hefurther siat15 ed'thatthe*proposedtrademarkhas^directreferencetothecharacterofthegobdsrthafit ishkely to'deceiveor cause'confu'sionand thatit'isriotdistinctive.·Asregardstheuseof theword."FIZZA" inCyprus,hesaidthatthiswordiswidelyusedhere,todenotea refreshment in'the(form'of aneffervescerit'powder'also knownas "Afroza". • ' - ^ ·" · "'*•-·- J 20 •'•AlthoughbothCounselreferredtotheuse'andtheunderstandingof theproposed trademark in Cyprus,neverthelessthe^Respondent in his letter dated 17/12/73 (Exh. 1)did not refer to such'usebutheonlyconfined himselftothemeaningoftheword 2'e, asdefined in'Webster's Dictionary^Ofcourse,theCourtwas riot afforded'the opportunity toseeastatementofthegroundsofthe subjudicedecision,astheApplicantsdid notinvoketheprocedureunders.19
(4). yc "Bethatasitmay,'theApplicantsdonotcomplain thattheRespondentfailed totakethis'factorintoconsideration intakingthe subjudicedecisionorthatitwasnotopentohimtoreachhissub judicedecisionasheHadnotcarriedoutadueinquiry.Inthecircumstances,theCourtcannotconsiderthisaspectonitsownmotion,' as1the Applicants neverraised it, andthusit must bepre1807 Chrysostomis J. Toms Foods Ltd. v. Republic
(1988)sumed thattheadministrative Authority madeacorrectascertain mentof thefacts aboutwhich thereis nocomplaintand evaluated same correctly. Such apresuption,of course,is rebuttable but as I said, in this case this issue was not raised. (Vide Koumis Hji Michaeland others v. TheRepublic
(1972)3 C.L.R. 246 at p. 5 252). Also,useful reference may bemade toMichael Dendiason Administrative Law 1965, Vol. 3,atp.329 where thefollowing is tobe found: "Β1Απόδειξις τηςπερίτα πράγματαπλάνης. Ηπερίτα πράγματα πλάνη δεν ελέγχεται υπό του δικαστού αυτέ- JQ παγγέλτως,αλλά μόνο εφ'όσον επικαλείταιτην ύπαρξιν αυτής ο προσφεύγων κατά τεκμήριον δηλ. το ενήργησαν διοικητικόν όργανονθεωρείται,ότι εξηκρίβωσε τα πραγ ματικά περιστατικάκαι εξετίμησεν αυτά ορθώς. Ούτω ο δικαστής δεν εισέρχεται εις έρευναν τυχόν υφισταμένης 1 5 πλάνης περίταπράγματα, εάνοπροσφεύγωνδεν προβά λει ταύτην, ότε ούτος μεν βαρείται διά της αποδείξεως αυτής, ο δε δικαστής ελέγχει εις εκάστην συγκεκριμένην περίπτωσιν την 'υλικότητα'(mat6rialit6) τωνεπικαλουμέ νων υπότου προσφεύγονος προς κατάδειξιντηςπλάνης γεγονότων ήκαταστάσεων." (Also, vide Μ. Stasinopoulos on theLaw of Administrative Acts 1951,p.306). As regards theissueof administrative discretion,auseful refe rence may be made tothe case of lacovides Enterprises v. The Republic
(1986)3 C.L.R. 2101, where Stylianides, J. said atp. 2106: jc "Theevaluation of thefacts is within thediscretionary pow erof theadministrative Authority. An administrative Courtcan only interfere if thereexistsanimproperuseof thediscretion- ,Λ ary power oramisconception concerning thefactual situation orthenon-taking intoaccountof material factors." Also,inthecase ofMerckv. TheRepublicandanother
(1972)1808 3 C.L.R. ., Toms FoodsLtd.v. Republic Chrysostomis J. 3 C.L.R. 548, A. Loizou, J. (as.he then was ) referred tothe discretionof theRegistrar ofTradeMarksandsaid atp.564the following: 10 "Tomy,mind,;the,Registrarinexercisingihis discretion,is notlimited(toany.particular.typeof consideration.Hemustex erciseitjudicially onreasonablegrounds whicharecapableof .being clearly stated. Hehas to examinerthe possible confu sions ordifficulties which might arise inconsequenceofthe •.registration of the;trademarkorthepossible impairment ofthe rights ofothertraderstodothatwhich,apartfrom theregistra tion,might be theirordinary modeof carrying ontheirbusi,. ness. ι. , 15 20 ,L . ,, t \ L ι ,jr ι ι «, • ·» Thepoint,therefore,thatarises for consideration,is theex. (tenttowhich this.Courtwillinterfere with theexercise of-adminsitrative discretion.Thismatterhasbeenthesubject ofju dicial pronouncementin a number of cases (See,inter alia, Jacovos Jacovides v. The Republic
(1969)3 C.L.R. page 212,ImpalexAgencies Ltd. v. TheRepublic
(1970)3C.L.R. 361, andPsaras v.The Ministry of Commerce andIndustry
(1971)3C.L.R. 151).This Courtwill notinterfere with such adiscretionif dueweight hasbeengiventoallmaterialfacts,it has notbeen based onamisconception of law or fact andit was notexercised inexcessorabuseof power." Inthecaseof WhiteHorseDistillersLtd. v.ElGrecoDistillers Ltd.
(1987)3C.L.R.531,theapproachof ourSupremeCourtas towhentheCourtshouldinterferewithanadministrativedecision regarding registrability of atrademark,wasreviewedby the Full BenchandTriantafyllides, P.hadthistosay atp. 534: "Itis thewellestablished approachof ourSupreme Court, onthebasisof theprinciples governing theexercise of itsju risdiction asanadministrativeCourtinthefirst instanceand on appeal,thatitdoesnotinterferewithanadministrativedecision regarding theregistrability of atrademarkif suchdecision was reasonably opentotheRegistrar ofTradeMarksanddoes not 1809. ChrysostomisJ. TomsFoodsLtd. v.Republic
(1988)substituteitsownevaluationintheplaceofthatoftheRegistrar." Theburden ofproving theaforementioned groundsonwhich thisRecourseisbased,liesontheApplicants.Ihaveconsidered the material before me,thegroundsofobjection oftheRespon- 5 dent,theargumentsadvancedandtheaforementioned legalposition.TheApplicants havefailed topersuademethatthesubjudice decision was erroneous and I hold the view that all the objections of the Respondent werereasonably open to himand thatheexercisedhisdiscretionproperlyinthecircumstances.The IQ word "FIZZA"isnot distinctivenoraninventedword,andithas directreference tothecharacterofthegoodsandislikely tolead todeceptionor confusion. Intheresult, thisRecoursefails andisherebydismissedwith noorderastocosts. ' Recoursedismissed. Noorderasto costs. 1810 15