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(1988)1988October 15 [STYUANIDES, J.] INTHEMATTEROFARTICLE 146OFTHECONSTITUTION GEORGEP.CACOYIANN1SINHIS CAPACITY AS: 1.ADMINISTRATOR OFTHEESTATEOFTHELATECOSTASΑ.ΡΑΤΊKIS,
  1. DULY AUTHORIZEDREPRESENTATIVEOFTHEGENERALPAR­ TNERSHIP A. G.PATIKIS &CO.UNDERLIQUIDATION ANDOF EACHONETHEGENERALPARTNERS THEREOF,
  2. DULY AUTHORIZEDREPRESENTATIVE OFANNAANAGNOSTOPOULOU(NOW MALAVAKI), ANDGEORGHIA ANAGNOSTOPOULOU(NOWCHRISTODOULOPOULOU), Applicant, v. THEREPUBLICOFCYPRUS,THROUGHTHEDIRECTOROFTHEDE­ PARTMENTOFLANDSANDSURVEYS, Respondents. (CaseNo. 799/85). Legitimateinterest—Transferofpropertybyadministratorofanestate tolega­ tees of thedeceased under thewill—Registrationfeespaidunder theDe­ partmentofLandsandSurveys(FeesandCharges)Law, Cap.219,section 7 andSchedule tosection3,Chapter3,para, (e),asamendedbysections3 and5 of Law31176—As under the aforesaidprovisions thefees arepay­ able by thelegatees, theonlypersonspossessinglegitimateinteresttochal­ lenge therelevantdecision arethelegatees. Fees—Distinctionbetweenfees andcharges. Taxation—Fees—Distinction betweenfees and charges—Immovableproper­ ty—Registrationfees—TheDepartment of LandsandSurveys (Fees and Charges) Law, Cap. 219,section 7and Schedule to section 3 Chapter3, para.fe), as amended by sections3 and5 of Law31176—The "fees"pay­ able thereunderarenotfeesstrictosensu, butaformoftaxation. 1860 3 C.L.R. Cacoyiannis v. Republic WordsandPhrases—"Heir"inthe WillsandSuccessionLaw,Cap.
  3. Wordsandphrases: "Heir"intheAdministrationofEstatesLaw,Cap.
  4. 5 WillsandSuccession—The WillsandSuccessionLaw, Cap. 195,sections46 and49andFirstSchedule—-Intestacy—Thepersonsbelonging tothesecondclass—Descendantsofthebrothersandsistersofthedeceased—They areentitledtoinheritonlyiftheirancestors,beingthebrotherorsisterof thedeceased,predeceasedthedeceased. WillsandSuccession—Will—Whatisthenatureofawillandwhenittakeseffect. 10 15 20 25 30 WillsandSuccession—Immovablepropertyofdeceased—Vestsinhispersonalrepresentatives, who, however, holditintrustfor the beneficiaries—It vests inthe beneficiaries upon actual transfer tothem—Any registration feespayableinrespectofsuch transfer underCap. 219, asamended, are notleviedfor theacquisitionofthebeneficialtitle,butfortheregistrationofthe title—Therefore, the lawgoverningsuchfeesisthe lawinforceat the time ofsuchtransfer, andnotthat inforce atthetime ofthe deceased's death. immovableproperty—Registrationfees—TheDepartmentofLandsandSurveys(FeesandCharges)Law, Cap.219,section 7andschedule tosection 3,Chapter3,para,(e),asamendedbysections3and5 ofLaw31176— Legateesunderthedeceased'swill, whoarenotamong thelawfulheirsof thedeceased,shouldpayregistrationfeescalculatedonthemarketvalueof the landatthetimeofthedeceased'sdeath—Thelawgoverning thefeesis thelawinforceatthetimeofthetransfer—Thefactthatifthegifthadbeen madeintervivos,thefees wouldhavebeencalculatedonadifferentbasis, becausethelegateeswerethedeceased'snieces,isirrelevant—Inthiscase thelegateescouldnotbeconsideredasheirs,becauseatthetimeofthetestator'sdeath,hissisteri.e. themotherofthelegateeswasstillalive. ConstitutionalLaw—Equality—ConstitutionArt. 28—Taxation—The Stateis allowedtochooseobjects,persons, methodsandratesoftaxation—Giftof immovable property inter vivosand legacyof immovable property— Registrationfees—Differentfeespaybleinthefirstcasefromthosepayable inthesecond—Differentiationreasonable. Thefactsofthiscasearebrieflyasfollows: 35 Applicants3arelegateesunderthewillofCostasPaulas.Theyarethe daughtersofhissister.Whenthetestatorpassed awayon 16.1.74,hissisterwasstillliving.The immovablepropertiescomprised inthelegacies 1861 Cacoyiannis v. Republic
(1988)were transferred in the name of applicants 3on 16.10.84.The Director of theDepartmentofLandsdemanded £4,165by wayoftransfer fees. Section 7of Cap.219radically amended by Law 31/76.At the limeof thetransfer, itread: "7. No fee islevied or taken on thebasisof Chapter 3of the Schedulefor theregistrationof immovableproperty 5 (a)acquired by alawful heirof adeceased person,eitherby intestate succession or by testamentary succession;" Chapter 3of theSchedule tosection 3wasamended by Law 31/76by the addition of anew paragraph (
  1. e)to theeffect that incase of transfer by 10 reason of awillthefee is 5percenton thevalueof theland asassessed by theDirector. Para, (
  2. e)wasamended by Law66/79 and 2/82,which provided that the5percent will be calculated on themarket value of theland on the dateof thetestator's death assuch valuewillbeassessed by theRegistrar. 15 Having analysed the aforesaid provisions of theWills and Succession Law,Cap. 195 the Court concluded that the legatees were notamong the lawful heirsof thedeceased, because,atthetime,of thelatter'sdeath,their mother (the sisier of the deceased) was still alive. The fact that she died prior to the timeof the said transfers did not transform theapplicants into 20 heirsof thedeceased. Astheproperty of thedeceased vests in his personal representatives and notin thebeneficiaries of thewill andas theregistration fees under Cap.219,as amended,are notlevied for theacquisistion of the beneficial titleupon thedeath of thedeceased,butfor theactual registration of theproperty in the legatee's name,thelaw applicable isthat in force at 25 the timeof the transfer. Had thesameproperty been gifted inter vivos,the fees for theregistrauon would havebeen governed by section 3(b)(iii) asa gift from arelative toa relative within thethirddegreeof kindred. Section 3(b)(iii),however, isnot applicalbe in thiscase,because thedistinction between a gift inter vivos and a legacy isclear. Moreover, thedifference be- 30 tween the fees payable in the first case from those payable in the second caseisreasonableand,therefore,doesnotinfringe theprincipleof equality. In thelightof the abovetheCourtdismissed therecourseof applicants 3. Applicants 1 and 2 were not considered as having a legitimate interest. Thereason issufficiently indicated inthehereinaboveheadnote. 35 Recourse dismissed. No orderas tocosts. 1862 3 C.L.R. Cacoyiannis v. Republic Casesreferredto: EliaHotelApartments Ltd. andAnother v.TheMunicipality ofPolis Chrysochou
(1988)3 C.L.R. 1529; Constantinides v.EA.C.
(1982)3 C.L.R. 798; ApostolouandOthers v.TheRepublic
(1984)3C.L.R.509; Lami GrovesLtd.v. TheRepublic
(1986)3 CL.R. 2378: HaraHotels v.TheRepublic
(1987)3C.L.R.618; Loizou v.Sewage Board ofNicosia
(1988)1C.L.R.122; ΜJ. Louisides and Sons Ltd. v. TheMinicipality of Limassol
(1988)3 C.L.R. 1017; Lanitis andAnother v.Republic
(1985)3 C.L.R/2541; Beddington andAnother v. BaumanandAnother [1903]A.C. 13;., •Llanover (Baroness)In re: Herbert v.Fresffield, 72LJ.Ch.729; . Whiteheadv. Taylor [1839] 10 A.andE.210,E.R.(K.B.)p.81; Mitlington-Wardv. Roubina
(1970)1C.L.R. 88; Mikrommatis v.TheRepublic, 2 R.S.C.C. 125; ,, Republic v.ArakianandOthers
(1972)3CL.R. 294; Papaxenophontos andOthers v. TheRepublic
(1982)3C.L.R. 1037; Antoniades and Others v.TheRepublic
(1979)3 C.L.R. 641. ' . · ' J - 1863 > J' I- Cacoyiannisv.Republic
(1988)Recourse. Recourseagainstthedecisionoftherespondentstochargeand collectfromapplicant thesumof£4,165bywayoftransfer fees for thetransfer andregistration oftheimmovablepropertiespreviouslyregisteredinthenamesofA.G.Patikis&Co.andthelate 5 CostasA.Patikisintothenamesofthelegatees. G. Cacoyiannis,for theapplicant. A. Evangelou,SeniorCounseloftheRepublic,fortherespondents. Cur.adv.vult. 10 STYLIANIDES J. read the following judgment. The applicantsbymeansofthisrecourseseek: "A.DeclarationthattheactordecisionoftheRespondentto chargeandcollectfrom theApplicantonbehalfofAnnaAnagnostopoulou (nowMalavaki)andGeorghiaAnagnostopoulou " (now Christodoulopoulou) both of Athens, (who are sisters andarehereinafter called thelegatees)CY£4,165(CY£4,150 on 6.8.1985) and CY£15 on 10.8.1985) by way of transfer feesforthetransfer andregistrationoftheimmovablepropertiespreviously registered inthenamesofA.G.Patikis&Co. 20 and the late Costas A. Patikis (hereinafter called 'the deceased')untothenamesofthelegateesaspartofthedivision, distribution, transfer and registration unto the names of the personsentitled theretoofalltheimmovablepropertiesregistered in the said partnership A.G.Patikis &Co.and thedeceased,isnullandvoidandofnoeffect whatsoever." 25 Thefacts of the case,overwhich thereis nodispute, are as follows: Costas A. Patikis, Greek national of Cyprus residence and domicile, hereinafter referred "the deceased", passed away on 30
  1. 3C.L.R. Cacoyiannisv.Republic StylianidesJ. 16thJanuary, 1974,leavinghissister Styliani Anagnostopoulou (neePatiki)andthesonofhispredeceasedbrotherTakisPatikisAthosT.Patikis-ashislawful heirs. 5 Hedisposedhispropertybywill,dated 16thDecember,
  2. Bythesaidwillhedevisedandbequeathedthewholeofhisestate inCyprus-after deductiontherefrom ofasmalllegacy,towhich Ineednotrefer, thecostsoftheadministration, theestateduty, etc.-tothefollowingpersons: , (a) To his niece Anna Anagnostopoulou (b) To his niece Georghia Anagnostopoulou (c) To his nephew Athos T. Patikis 10 35% 35% 30% AnnaandGeorghiaAnagnostopoulou arethedaughtersofhis sisterStylianiAnagnostopoulou. 1 ,e Henominated thereinSirPanayiotisL.Cacoyiannisexecutor andincaseofhisdemise,orincapacity for anyreason,orcause GeorgeP.Cacoyannis-(seeWill-Exhibit"D"). » The named executor, SirP.L. Cacoyiannis, applied for probateofthewillintheDistrictCourtofLimassol. 20 AthosT.Patikiscontested thevalidityof saidwillbyAction No.834A
  3. "' - - ' • ... . On5th April, 1974,SirP.L.Cacoyannis wasappointedexecutorofthewillpendentelite,undertheprovisionslof section20 oftheAdministrationofEstatesLaw,Cap.
  4. ' " On 19th September, 1974-the saidexecutor addressed tothe 25 • LandRegistryOffice theappropriatenoticeundertheprovisions of section7ofCap.
  5. On28thMay,*1975,sisterStylianiAnagnostopouloudied. On30thDecember;1977,followingthedeterminationofAc' 1865 \_< Stylianides J. Cacoyiannis v. Republic
(1988)tion No. 834/74, the said will of the deceased was proved and probate thereof was granted by theDistrict Court of Limassol to SirPanayiotis L.Cacoyiannis, who,however, before completing theadministration, died on9th December, 1980.On 21st March, 1981 theadministration oftheproperty wasgranted toGeorgeP. 5 Cacoyiannis. . Upon hisdeath, the deceased was theowner in his ownright and/or asonehalf partnerinA.G.Patikis&Co.under liquidation of considerable immovable property in theareaof Limassol. On 16th October, 1984, G.P. Cacoyiannis in his capacity as 10 administrator of theestateofthedeceased and asattorneyofAnna Anagnostopoulou (Malavaki), Georghia Anagnostopoulou (Christodoulopoulou), both of Athens, and the partners of A.G. Patikis & Co. - Georghios V. Patikis, Stergios V. Patikis and Marika V.Patiki of Athens-applied that theimmovable property 1^5 of the dissolved partnership A.G. Patikis and the immovable property which isregistered inthe nameof those entitled thereto and thelegatees/heirs accordingtothepartnershipsharesand their rights by succession and legacy.The shares are set out with particularity therein and all necessary documents and therespective 20 titledeeds were attached. The shares sought by that application to be registered in the name of Anna Anagnostopoulou, Georghia Anagnostopoulou, andAthosT.Patikisareaspertheabovereferred will. With regard totheregistration fees heattached anopinion of a 25 legal consultant totheeffect that nofees should bepaid; inorder to avoid delay he expressed his willingness topay any fees the Director might decide under protest and with full reservation of therelevantrightsof theinterested partiestochallenge thelegality ofpaymentof suchfees beforetheappropriate Court ™ The Director took the subjudice decision, under the Department of Lands and Surveys (Fees and Charges) Law, Cap. 219, section 7 and Scheduleto section 3,Chapter 3,paragraph (e),as 1866 3 C.L.R. Cacoyiannis v. Republic Stylianides J., amended by sections 3 and 5respectively of the Department of Lands and Surveys (Fees and Charges) (Amendment) Law of 1976, (Law No. 31/76). , i There was no quarrel with regard to the market value of the immovable property in question on 16thJanuary, 1974. Nofees weredemanded,orcollected for theregistration in the. name of the other legatee - Athos T. Patikis as he was a lawful sheirof thedeceased testator; thelegatees -nieceswere notconsidered heirsof thedeceased, as their mother was alive atthe time ofthedeath of thede cujus. Theamount waspaid.Theregistrations wereeffected.. , Hence thisrecourse. Thisrecoursewastaken by: 1.TheadministratoroftheestateofthelateCostasA.Patikis. 2.Thegeneral partnership A.G.Patikis &Co.,under liquidation andofeach oneof thegeneralpartnersthereof;and 3. Anna Anagnostopoulou (now Malavaki) and Georghia ' Anagnostopoulou (now.Christodoulopoulou). The act challenged refers only to applicants No.3,the sisters Anna Anagnostopoulou andGeorghia Anagnostopoulou, thelegateesof thewillof thelateCostasA.Patikis. The Law under which the decision was taken provides expressly thatthefees forregistration arepayablebythepersonsin whosenametheregistration istobe effected. The duty of the administrator of theestate istocarry out the provisions of the will according tolaw and consequently to take thenecessary stepsfor theregistration of theproperty inthename 1867 Stylianides J. Cacoyiannis v. Republic
(1988)of thelegatees, butthepaymentof theregistration fees is not in­ cluded inthepayments heis boundtodoundertheAdministra­ tion ofEstates Law, Cap.189andinthepresentcase, havingre­ gard tothecontentsof thewill,nosuch obligation existsunder thewill. 5 Therefore, applicants 1 and2 have nolegitimate interest to raise thisrecourseandhave nolocusstandi. Thefees inthiscase arenot"fees" strictosenso butaform of • taxation. A "fee" isgenerally defined tobea chargefor aspecial service 10 renderedtoindividuals by somepublic authorityandis supposed to be based on theexpenses incurred in rendering the service, thoughinmanycases thecosts arearbitrarily assessed. A "tax" is acompulsory exactionof moneybypublicauthority for public purpose enforceable by law andis notapaymentfor 15 services rendered. Thereason for the paymentin thecase of fees is the special benefit accruingtotheindividual; inthecaseoftax,the particular advantage,if itexistsatall,is anincidentalresultof state action. (SeeEliaHotelApartmentsLtd. andAnother v.The Munici- 20 pality ofPolis Chrysochou,
(1988)3CL.R. 1529;Alecos Constantinides v. The Electricity Authority of Cyprus
(1982)3 CL.R. 798; Apostolou and Othersv. The Republic
(1984)3 CL.R. 509;LamiGrovesLtd. v.TheRepublic
(1986)3C.L.R. 2378;HaraHotels v.Republic
(1987)3C.L.R. 618;MeropiMi- IS chael Loizou v. Sewage Board ofNicosia
(1988)1C.L.R. 122; ΜJ. Louisides & Sons Ltd., v. TheMunicipality ofLimassol,
(1988)3C.L.R. 1017. See,also,FritzFleiner- Administrative Law, 8th Edition, Greektranslation by G. Stymphaliades, pp. 391-392). 30 1868 3 C.L.R. Cacoyiannis v.Republic Stylianides J. InLanitis &Another v.Republic
(1985)3C.L.R.2541', MalachtosJ.,atp.2546 said: 5 20 15 20 "As statedinsection3of theDepartmentofLandsand Sur­ veys (FeesandCharges) Law, Cap.219, fees are chargedin respect of thevarious matters set out in the Schedule tothe Law. Inparagraph 3(b)(v) of the Schedule, as amended by section2ofLaw66of 1979,itisprovided thatfees for regis­ tration of titleby transfer payable by theperson tobe regis­ tered upongift otherthanby parenttochildor by relative to relative, uptothethirddegree,or by spouse tospouse;asin thepresentcase, thefeereckonedonthemarketvaluetobede­ terminedbytheDirector. It can reasonably be inferred from the wording of the Schedule thatthe fee payable in thecase in handcannotbe considered as being charged for services rendered butit is a kindof taxpayable totherevenueof the State." Thematteroffees andcharges for thetransfer"andregistration of property,interalia,aregoverned by theDepartmentofLands and Surveys (FeesandCharges) Law, Cap.219, which was enactedon 17thFebruary, 1954.Section7thereofranas follows: "7. Nofee or annualcharge shall be levied ortaken upon theregistration of atitletoimmovable propertyacquiredbyin­ heritance." 25 30 On 13th November, 1970, the aforesaid section 7 was.repealedandsubstitutedby section6of theAmendingLaw No. 81/ 1970.Thenew statutoryprovision reads: "7. Εν περιπτώσεικτήσεως ακινήτουιδιοκτησίας διά κληρονομικής διαδοχήςουδέν τέλος επιβάλλεταιή ει­ σπράττεταιεπίτηβάσειτουπαρόντοςΝόμουπληντουτέλουςαιτήσεωςκαιτουτέλουςπιστοποιητικούεγγραφής." ("7. Nofee shall levied ortakenonthebasisof thepresent 1869 Stylianides J. Cacoyiannis v. Republic
(1988)Law in thecase of acquisition of immovable property by suc­ cession except fee for theapplication andfee for the certificate or registration.") It is pertinent to state at this point that the expression "κληρονομική διαδοχή" includes both testate and intestate suecession. 5 Section 4 of theWills and Succession Law, Cap. 195 provides that succession to anestate may be either by will or by theopera­ tion of law orby will and by theoperationof law. The Amending Law, Law No. 31/76, brought two radical changes: 10 (
  1. a)Section 7 of thebasic Law was repealed and substituted by section 3,thematerial partof which reads: "7. Ουδέν τέλος επιβάλλεταιή εισπράττεταιβάσει του Κεφαλαίου 3 του Πίνακος διάτην εγγραφή τίτλου ακινήτουιδιοκτησίας. 15 (α) κτηθείσης υπό νομίμου κληρονόμουαποθανόντος προσώπου, είτε δι* εξ αδιαθέτου διαδοχής είτε δι 1 εκ δια­ θήκης τοιαύτης·" ("7. Nofee is levied or taken on thebasis of Chapter 3 of theSchedule for theregistration of immovable property ^0 (a)acquired by alawful heirof adeceased person,either by intestate succession orby testamentary succession, (b)Chapter3 of theSchedule tosection 3was amended by the additionof new paragraph (
  2. e)as follows: "(ε)δυνάμειεκ διαθήκης διαδοχής,τουτέλους υπολογι­ ζόμενου επί της αγοραίας αξίαςως αύτηήθελεν εκτιμηθή υπό τουΔιευθυντού:5 επίτοιςεκατόν: 1870 25 3 C.L.R. 5 Cacoyiannis v.Republic Stylianides J. Νοείται ότι ηυπότουΔιευθυντούούτως εκτιμηθείσα αγοραία αξία κοινοποιείται προς τον κληροδόχον ο οποίοςκέκτηται δικαίωμαεφέσεωςασκούμενης, τηρουμέ­ νων των αναλογιών, κατά τον αυτόντρόπονως εάνήτο έφεσιςβάσειτουάρθρου80τουπερίΑκινήτουΙδιοκτησίας (Διακατοχή,ΕγγραφήκαιΕκτίμησις)Νόμου" By Law 66/79,which cameintooperationon 13thJuly, 1979, thewhole Scheduletosection 3was repealed andreplaced bya newone.Paragraph(e)toChapter3 of thenewSchedulereads: 10 15 20 25 "(ε) δυνάμειεκ διαθήκης του τέλουςυπολογιζόμενου επί τηςαγοραίας αξίας ως αύτηήθελεν εκτιμηθή υπό του ΔιευθυντούβάσειτηςεντωΚεφαλαίο 17Κλίμακος." Thisparagraph was amendedby section4of Law 2/82 bythe additionof thewords" onthedateof thedeathof thetestator" after the words "on the market value". That.is, the market value shall be assessed as on thedate of death of the testator. This, however,has abearing onthereckoning of thefee payable and notthe obligation topay. Law 15of 1980 added anew Chapter3A tothe Scheduleto section 3of theLaw. This sets outthefees payable for registra­ tionof leases,underPartIV of theImmovableProperty (Tenure, Registration and Valuation) Law as it had been amended.It is noteworthy that for registration of transfer of real right (εμπράγματο δικαίωμα) acquired by lease or sub-leaseparagraph (στ)provides: "(στ) Δι' εκ διαθήκης διαδοχής προς μη κληρονόμον, του τέλους υπολογιζόμενουεπί της αγοραίας αξίας ως αύτηήθελενεκτιμηθή υπό τουΔιευθυντού,5επίτοις εκα­ τόν:" 30 Counselfor theapplicantscontendedthatundersection7,as amendedby Law 31/1976, theregistration oftideof immovable propertyacquired by alawful heirof adeceased person*eitherab 1871 StylianidesJ. Cacoyiannisv.Republic
(1988)intestato or by will, is exempted from payment of fees. Asthe sisterofthedeceased andmotheroftheapplicantswhowaslivingatthedateofdeath- 16thJanuary, 1974-passedawayonthe 28thMay, 1975,asfrom thatdate,herchildren,theapplicantsAnnaandGeorghia Anagnostopoulou -becamethelawful heirs 5 of the deceased Costa A. Patikis.Thus on 2nd July, 1976,the dateofthecomingintooperationofLaw31/1976,theywerelawful heirsof thedecujus CostasA.Patikisandastheimmovable property wasacquired by testamentary succession, nofee islevied or taken underCap.219andtheAmendingLaws31/1976 ,Q and66/1979for theregistrationoftideintheirname.(Seep.6of thelegalopinionofthelegalconsultant-Exhibit"GG"-whichis integralpartoftherecourseandtheaddressofcounsel.) Succession isthetransfer ofthelegalrelationsofdefunctus to theheirorthecomingintooperationoftheambulatorydocument ,ofthelastwillofadeceased. Succession isanextensionoftherightofownershipofphysicalperson uponhisdeath. TheState,for theprotectionofanumberofpersonscloselyrelatedtothedeceased,hasregulatedtheclassofpersons,therela- 20 tionship andtheportion eachoneisentitled toreceivefrom the estate,if thedeceased has notduring hislifetime exercised the powerofdisposingofhispropertybywill.Awillisaninstument whereby hecontrolstheposthumousdisposition ofhisproperty. Thewillofatestatorofhiskindredinblood.Successionrefersto «s deadpersons-thematerialtimebeingtheendofhislife-andnot tolivingpersons-hereditasviventisnondatur. Ifadeceased persondoesnotexerciseduringhislifetime the powerofdispositionofhispropertybywill,theundisposedpor"tionand the statutory portiondevolveon hisheirs according to ™ theprovisionsoftheLawinoperation. Heir is defined in both theWills and Succession Law,Cap. 195andtheAdministration ofEstatesLaw,Cap. 189tomeana 1872 3 C.L.R. Cacoyiannis v. Republic Stylianides J. person who by operation of law succeeds to an estate. The succession of the kindred is governed by section 46 of Cap. 195and the first Schedule to the Law. It may be convenient tosetbut this section and section 49: 10 "
  1. Subject tothe provisions of thisLaw as to the incapacity of persons to succeed to an estate and subject to the share of a surviving wife or husband of the deceased, the class of person or persons who on the death of the deceased shall become entided to the statutory portion, and the undisposed portion if any, and the shares in which they shall be so entitled, if more than one, shall be as set out in the several columns of the First Schedule to this Law: Provided that persons of one class shall exclude persons of a ' subsequent class." 15 20 "FIRST SCHEDULE ' Succession of the Kindred Class " Personsentitled' Shares
  2. First Class 1.(a)Legitimatechildrenofthe deceased livingathisdeath; andfb)descendants,livingat thedeathof thedeceased,of any of the deceased's legitimatechildren whodied inhislifetime. 1.(a)Inequalshares 2.SecondClass
  3. (a) Father, mother of the - deceased living at hisdeath (or ifnotlivingathisdeath, thenearestancestorlivingat his death) and brothers and „,sisters of the full and half 'bloodof thedeceasedliving athisdeath;and (b)descendants,livingatthe deathofthedeceased,ofany ofthedeceased'sbrothersor sisters who died in his lifetime.''
  4. fa) All in equal snaresexcept that brothersanasisters of the half blood takehalftheshare . of a brother or sister of the full ' blood; (b)inequalshares per^tirpes. 25 30 35 1873 (b)inequalshares perstirpes. Stylianides J. Cacoyiannis v. Republic
(1988)"49.Where in thisLaw it isprovided that anyclass of persons shall become entitled tothestatutory portion and theundisposed portion per stirpes,itmeansthatthechildof anypersonof the defined class who shall have died in the lifetime of thedeceased andwho,ifhehadsurvived thedeceased, would 5 havebecomeentitled on thedeathof thedeceased toasharein thestatutory portion, and the.undisposed portion if any, shall becomeentitledonly tothesharewhich theparent would have takenifhehad survived thedeceased." These sections in plain unambiguous language enact that one JQ class ofpersons, if living,excludes thelowerclass. Thefirst Schedule referred toabove isunder theheading "Succession of the Kindred"; and is framed in three columns. The first, under the heading "Class" divides the persons entitled to succeed to the estate of thedeceased, intofour classes. The sec- 15 ond, under the heading "Persons entitled", places the heirs entitled tosucceed, into those four classes,according totheir degree of proximity of their relationship to the deceased. And the third column, under the heading "Shares",setsout the shares inwhich theheirs ineachof thefour classes,areentitled tosucceed tothe 20 estate. Thesecond classcontains thefather, mother, brothersand sisters of thedeceased, and likewise,makes adistinction between the heirs living at the time of the deceased's death, and the descendantsofbrothersand sisterswhodiedinhislifetime. 25 In construing the statutory provisions applicable tothe matter in hand,wemust look for theintention of the legislator. Reading section 46 in its context in the statute, together with therelevant Schedule, Ihavenodoubt thatthelegislatorintended that therespectiverightsof inheritance should begoverned bythe 39 provisions in the First Schedule, depending on the class where each heircan beplaced. 1874 3 C.L.R. 5 Cacoyiannis v. Republic Stylianides J. Itis,Ithink,equallyclearthatthelegislatorintended thatthose falling inthesecond classofthesameScheduleshouldbeentitled toinherit; that thedescendants of hispredeceased brothersorsisters (falling in the second class of the same Schedule) should be entitled toinherit, per stirpes, the share of their predeceased ancestor. * Thedescendantsof thedeceased brotherandsistersareentitledL toinheritonlyiftheirancestordiedinthelifetime of thepersonto beinherited,thedeceased.Theyareentitledtoinheritonly iftheir IQ ancestorspredeceaseclaridiftheirancestor survived thedeceased, he is the heir, he is the person entitled on the death of the de.ceased toinherit. 15 The applicants in the present case, as their mother -''sisterof thedeceased -survived thedeceased, havingdied morethan sixteen monthsafter hisdeath, werenot and arenot heirs of Costas A.Patikis.Upon thedeathof their mother they acquired thequalityofherheirs,but theyarenot andcould notbetheheirsof the cujus. Legatees arenotheirs inthesenseof theLaw. 20 Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Volume 3, 3rd Edition, at p. 2148,states: 25 "PER STIRPES.
(1)I
(2)'Where a distribution of property amongst a CLASS embracingdescendants istobeperstirpes,theprincipleofrepresentation will be applied through all degrees,children never takingconcurremly with theirparents..." The language of section 46 and section 49is soplain thatexcludesanyother interpretation. 30 In view of the above, if the Law applicable is Law 31/1976, which is identical with Law 66/1979, the applicants are not exemptedfrom paymentoffees, asthey werenotlawful heirsof the deceased. 1875 StylianidesJ. Cacoyiannisv.Republic
(1988)Itwas,further, contended thattheLawapplicableistheLaw inoperation onthedateofdeathofthedecujus,thatisthebasic LawasamendedbyLaw81 of
  1. Onthedeathofapersonhisestateshallpassasawholetoone orseveral otherpersons -(seesections 3and4of theWillsand 5 SuccessionLaw). Thequestionwasraisedwhentheimmovablepropertywasacquiredbytheapplicants.Thepropertywasacquiredbytestamentary succession. It is useful to refer on this point to section 36of Cap. 195, 10 whichreadsasfollows: "36.Everywillshallbeconstrued,withreference totheestatecomprised init,tospeakandtakeeffect asifithadbeen executedimmediately before thedeathofthetestator,unlessa contraryintention shallappearbythewill." 15 Thisisareplicaofsection24oftheEnglishWillsAct
  2. A willisanambulatorydocumenthavingnoforceoreffect, whatsoever,untilthedeathofthegentlemanwhomadeawill.Itoperatesnothingandcanoperatenothinguntilitbecomesconsummated by thedeath of the testator. (SeeBedington andanother v. 20 Baumannandanother[1903]A.C.13;Llanover(Baroness)Inre; Herbertv.Freshfield, 72L.J.Ch.729.) Thewillhastobeprobated.Fromandafter thegrantofprobatetherightsandliabilitiesattachingtotheestateofthedeceased (includingthestatutoryportionandtheundisposedportion)shall 25 bedeemedtohavevestedinthepersonalrepresentativefromthe dateonwhichthedeceaseddied-(section25oftheAdministrationofEstatesLaw,Cap.189). Anexecutorderivestitlefromthewill,andtheprobaterelates backtothemomentofthetestator'sdeath.Theassetsoftheestate 30 vest inanexecutorfromthatmoment Though theexecutorde1876 3 C.L.R. Cacoyiannis v. Republic Stylianides J. riveshistitlefrom thewilland notfrom theprobate, yetprobate istheauthenticated evidenceof theexecutor's title- (Whitehead v.Taylor [1839] 10A. & E. 210, 113E.R. (K.B.) p.81). 5 Theexecutor asfrom thetestator'sdeath holdsthe immovable (andother) property of thedeceased in trust for th'e'beneficiaries andnot personally - (AspasiaMillington-Ward v.ChloiRoubina
(1970)1C.L.R. 88). Itisthedutyof theexecutortoproceed andcarry outtheprovisionsof thewill -section41of Cap.
  1. 10 The question for thedetermination is not when thetwo legatees- applicants -became beneficially interested in the said immovabledevised tothem,buttheLaw applicablefor thelevyand paymentoffees for theregistration. Thematerialpartof section 3speaksthattheacquisition ofthe 15 • beneficial interest by will the legatees - applicants, but a fee for theregistration of titleof immovableproperty bytheDepartment of Lands and Surveys. 20 Theproposition that theLaw applicable should be theLawin operation ason thedate that the will spokeand thelegatees -applicants became beneficially interested in theimmovables isuntenable. * Therequest for theregistration totheLands Department was made in August
  2. The Law in operation'on that date is the Lawapplicable. 25 30 Alternatively totheabove,itwascontendedthat sincethelegacyunder thesaid1willtothelegateeswasalegacybyanuncle(the deceased) tohistwonieces,itamounted toagift (notintervivos butagift takingeffect upon thedeathof thedeceased) from arelative toarelative within thethird degreeof kindred and the fees payable should have been calculated at 8% of the."value" asdefinedin section 2
(1)of theLaw, thevalueregistered or recorded 1877 Stylianides J. Cacoyiannis v.Republic
(1988)inthebooksof theDistrictLands Office. The Law makes definite expressed distinct provision for gift intervivos and forregistration of property acquired bywill.Paragraph 3(b)(iii) of the Schedule to section 3 prescribes the fees payable by theperson toberegistered by virtueof declaration of 5 transfer by gift, byrelative torelative uptoand includingthethird degree of kindred. The intention of the legislator isclear. The applicants are not donees within theambit of3(b)(iii). Further, it was submitted that the differentiation between the 10 fees payable for the registration upon declaration of transfer by gift (inter vivos) and theprovision for thefees for registration by virtue of succession isdiscriminatory, and infringes the principle of equality safeguarded byArticle28of theConstitution. Theprincipleof equality,enunciated and safeguarded by Arti- 15 cle 28 of the Constitution, wasjudicially considered the first in Mikrommatis case, 2 R.S.C.C. 125,a case concerning income tax;itwassaid: "In theopinion of the Court theterm 'equalbefore the law' inparagraph 1 of Article 28doesnot convey thenotion ofex- 20 actarithmetical equality butit safeguards onlyagainst arbitrary differentiations and does not exclude reasonable distinctions which have to be made in view of the intrinsic nature of things. Likewise, the term 'discrimination' in paragraph 2 of Articles 28does not exclude reasonable distinctions asafore- 25 • said." The principle of equality was considered, ever since, in numerous cases including The Republic (Ministry of Finance) v. Nishan Arakianand Others
(1972)3C.L.R. 294;Papaxenophontosand Others v.Republic
(1982)3 CL.R. 1037. 30 In social and economic legislation the legislature is allowed 1878 3 C.L.R. 5 Cacoyiannis v.Republic Stylianides J. greatlatitudeinmakingclassifications. Moreover, absoluteequalityintaxationcannot beobtainedandisnotreally requiredbythe principle of equality.The State isallowed tochooseobjects, persons, methods andeven ratesof taxation -(Serghios Antoniades and Others v.TheRepublic
(1979)3C.L.R. 641;Apostolouand Others v.Republic
(1984)3C.L.R.509). Agift intervivosand legacyareintrinsicallydifferent matters. Thedistinction between gift intervivosand legacy isareasonable one. 10 Thedifferentation inthefeespayableisnotbeyond thepermissiblemargin ofreasonable differentiation. The applicants have not satisfied theCourt thatthis partofthe Lawisbeyond reasonable doubt,contrary to,or inconsistent with theprovisionsof Article 28of the Constitution. 15 Foralltheaforesaid reasons,therecoursefails.Thesubjudice decision is confirmed under Article 146.4(a), but, in all the circumstances, Imake noorder astocosts. Recoursedismissed. No orderastocosts. 1879

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