clr/1988/1988_3_2181.pdf

(1)(a), 31

(2)(b)and31

(3)—The Power of theRegistrar tosuspendadriving licence—Regulation31

(1)(a)islimited to cases, where theholder of thelicence hasbeen convicted ofa criminal offence relating tohisdrivingor hasacquiredhislicencebyfalse pretenc­ es—Effect ofnon compliancewith themandatoryprovision of Regulation 31

(2)(b)toinformtheholderof thelicenceofhisright toattackthedeci­ sionbysubmittingamedicalreport. Formalities—Νon compliance withformality laid down by Law—Effect— Formprescribed by legislation—It is normallyregarded as essentialand onlyinexceptionalcasesmaybeconsideredasnon-substantial.· Recoursefor annulment—Parties—Chiefof Police, acting in his capacity as DeputyRegistrar ofinland Transport, informedapplicantbyletter, written onpaper of theMinistryofInterior, thatapplicant's licence was suspen­ ded—The recourse was rightly directed against theRepublic through the MinistryofInterior. Recoursefor annulment—Parties—Therecourse isdirected againsttheactit­ self—Thepower oftheCourt toamend, iftheparty namedas respondentis notcorrect. 2181 Tserkezos v. Republic

(1988)Thefacts of this case may bebriefly described as follows: On6.2.86 theapplicantsubmittedanapplicationforaduty freecarontheground that hewas suffering from partialbodily disablement.TheMedicalBoardcon­ cludedthat,duetohis spondyloarthritisankilopoiepica,theapplicantwas unabletodriveanycar.Onthebasisof thisreporttheSeniorTechnicalSu- 5 periηtendent of Drivers Examination Officers-required the applicant to presenthimself for are-examinationof hisdriving ability. Followingsuch examination, theSeniorTechnicalSuperintendent, reportedthatthedriving by theapplicantof any typeof Motor Vehicle constituteadanger for the publicsafety. 10 Onthebasisof thelastreporttheChief ofPolicesuspended thedriving licence of theapplicant and informed thelatter of his decision by letter, writtenonpaperof theMinistryof Interior.Theapplicantfeltaggrievedand requestedreconsideration of hiscase,expressing hiswillingnesstounder­ go anew medicalexamination.Inanswer tothislettertheChief of Police 15 informed theapplicantthathisdecision wasbased onthereportof the Sen­ iorTechnical Superintendent. As aresulttheapplicantfiled thepresentrecourse. TheCourt,havingdismissed thepreliminary objection,thattherecourse was wrongly directedagainst theRepublic "throughtheMinistry of Interi- 20 or",annulledthesubjudicedecision,onthe following grounds: (a)Regulation 31

(1)(a),whichhasbeeninvolved by therespondent, is notapplicable,asitislimitedtocases,wherethe holderofthelicenceeither hasbeenconvictedof acriminaloffence relating tohisdriving orhasac­ quiredhislicenceby falsepretences. (b)Regulation 31

(3)empowers theRegistrar torequire theholderofa driving licencetoundergoanew testinrespectof hisability todriveand, in themeantime,tosuspend thevalidity of suchlicence.However,thelicence inthiscasewas notsuspended underthisregulation. (c)Regulation 31

(2)(b)empowers theRegistrar tocancelorsuspend 30 thevalidity of adriving licenceif theconditionof theholderhasdeteriorrated orif theholderof thelicencesuffers afresh orwithbodily disabilities thatmayrenderhisdriving dangerous for thepublicsafety.However,this regulationprovides thattheRegistrarshall inform theholderof thelicence of hisrighttoattackthedecisionbysubmittingamedicalreport. Theholder 35 of thelicencemay,also,demandtobemedically examined,concerninghis ability todrive. 2182 25 3 C.L.R. Tserkezos v. Republic InthiscasetheDeputyRegistrarnotonly did notinform theapplicantof his right to attack thedecision, but expressly refused a medical examination. ' ' 5 (d) Non compliance with formalities laid down by law lead to annulment of the subjudice act, unless such formalities are not of an essential character. AForm prescribed by lawisessential,saveinexceptional cases. Inthiscasethenon -complianceof theDeputy Registrarwith themandatory provisions of Regulation 31

(2)(b) should lead toannulment of the sub judicedecision. 1" Subjudice decisionannulled. No orderas tocosts. ' Casesreferredto: Christodoulou v.Republic, 1R.S.C.C. 1; Minister ofFinance v.PublicServiceCommission

(1968)3C.L.R. 691; 15 Hadjipapasymeou v.TheRepublic

(1984)3C.L.R. 1182; Horaitisv. Republic

(1984)3C.L.R. 1067; M.D. M.Estates v.Republic

(1980)3C.L.R.54; Papadopoulos v. TheRepublic

(1985)3C.L.R. 154; Alvanis v. CYTA

(1985)3C.L.R.2695. 20 Recourse. Recourse against thedecision of therespondent wherebyapplicant'sdrivinglicencewassuspended. N.Clerides, fortheapplicant. CI.Theodoulou, SeniorCounsel of theRepublic, for therespondent. 25 Cur. adv.vult. 2183 Tserkezos v. Republic

(1988)BOYADJIS J.read thefollowingjudgment. Bythepresentrecourse theapplicant prays for adeclaration of theCourt that "the actand/ordecision of theChiefofPolicewhich wascommunicated totheapplicant by letterdated 14.7.1986whereby theChief of Police suspended thedriving licence of theapplicant, isnull and g void andof noeffect whatsoever". Thehistoryof theevents thatledtothetakingof the sub-judice decision is briefly this:The applicant, arefugee from Asomatos village,is acarpenter presentlyresiding in Limassol.Forthe last 20 yearspreceding thesub-judicedecision hehadbeen theholder JQ of adriving licenceNo. 135823whichentitled him todrivemotor vehicles of categories DHIJ. On 672/1986theapplicant submitted an application for thepurchase byhimof aduty free caron theground thathewas sufferingfrompartial bodily disablement.In thecourseof theexamina- 15 tion of his aforesaid application by the Ministry of Finance, the applicant was examined on 18 April 1986 by a medical board consisting of three government doctors of the Nicosia General Hospital who issued their report on the same day expressing therein their unanimous opinion that,due tohisspondylarthritis ^o ankylopoietica, he presents since 1976lack of spinal movements from the cervical region to the sacral region of the spine. They addedthatthe applicant presents slightKyphosisandtheposition of the skull remainspermanently on aslight flexion. The doctors concluded bystatingthat theapplicant'sdisablement isof anature that renders him unable todrive any kind of motor vehicle since heisbasically unabletomakethemovementsof thecervical spine andinparticular themovementsofthehead totherightandtothe left which are required to be made by a driver in the course of drivingof anyvehicle. 30 On 13June 1986 the Director of theDepartment of Customs andExcise wrote alettertotheSeniorTechnical Superintendent, Drivers Examination Office, to which he attached copy of the aforesaid report of themedical board, askingwhetherthedriving licenceoftheapplicant would besuspendedor not,given thefact 35 2184 3 C.L.R. Tserkezos v.Republic Boyadjis J. thathewas notfit todrive anyordinary typeof motorvehicle. 10 Therelevant correspondence was transmittedtotheChief of Policesothathemaydealwith thematterinhiscapacityofDepu­ ty Registrar of InlandTransport.Thelatter wrote a letter tothe applicantdated 19June 1986requiring himtopresenthimself be­ fore theSenior Technical Superintendent,Drivers Examination Office, for thepurpose of his undergoing are-examination of his driving ability. IntheOpposition thisletteris alleged tohavebeen sentpursuanttoRegulation 31

(3)of theMotorVehiclesand Road Traffic Regulations of 1984. 15 Incompliancetotheaforesaid lettertheapplicant was exami­ nedon5July 1986 by theSeniorTechnical Superintendent, Dri­ versExaminationOffice, whofound andreported thatthe driving by theapplicantof alltypes of motorvehicles constitutesadanger for thepublic safety. 5 20 25 ΛΛ Acting onthelastaforesaidfindingof theSeniorTechnicalSu­ perintendent, Drivers Examination Office, the Chief of Police wrote alettertotheapplicant dated 14July 1986 informing him that his driving licence No. 135823is being suspended andrequiring him to surrender it to the police. The Chief of Police wrote this letter in his capacity of Deputy Registrar of Inland Transport.Thefull text of this letter, which constitutes thesubjudice decision,is setout hereinafter. Incompliancetotheaforementioned lettertheapplicantsurrendered his driving licence on 29 July 1986.'Three days later, i.e. on 1August 1986 theapplicant wrotealettertotheChief of Po­ liceprotesting against what hedescribed asanunorthodox man­ nerinwhich hisdriving licence was suspended andrequesting a reconsideration of hiscase expressingatthesame timehiswillingness toundergoanew medicalexamination for thepurposeof restoring thevalidity of hisdriving licence.Inanswer tothisletter theChiefof Policeinformed the applicantby letterdated7August 1986 thatthesuspension of hisdriving licencewas notbasedon any medical report;thatitwas based onthereportof theSenior 2185 Boyadjis J. Tserkezos v. Republic

(1988)Technical Superintendent,DriversExaminationOffice; thatheis unable torefer applicants case tothemedical authoritiesfor ex­ amination; and thathe was willing tomake arrangements for a new driving examinationof theapplicantby thesameofficer, if theapplicantsowishes.Theapplicantfailed torespondtothisof- 5 fer andallcommunicationsbetween thepartiesended there. Feeling aggrievedwith theaforementioneddecision of the re­ spondentdated 14July 1986, theapplicant seeks tohave itan­ nulledthroughthe presentrecoursefiledon3September 1986on thefollowing threegrounds,namely,(i)thatit is contrary tothe ^Q MotorVehicleandTraffic Regulations:(ii)thatthesuspension of theapplicant'slicencewas wrongly andillegally based onthe re­ portof theSeniorTechnicalSuperintendent,DriversExamination Office, insteadof upon the results of amedical examination bya proper board;and (iii) thatthesub-judice decision amountstoa flagrant violation of Article 29oftheConstitutioninthatitisnot duly reasoned. In answer totheabove, the respondentalleges inhis Opposi­ tion thatthesub-judice decision was correctly andlawfully taken by theChiefof PoliceinhiscapacityofDeputyRegistrar ofMo­ torVehiclesinaccordance withtheConstitution andtheprinciples of administrative law,pursuanttotheMotorVehiclesand Traffic Laws andRegulations, theLandTransport (Transfer of Compe­ tence)Law, 1975, theΚΛ.Π. 166/76andtheΑ.Δ.Π. 1033/76, after aproperenquiry,andthatit is correctly,lawfully andade- ^5 quately reasoned underthecircumstances and/orby reference to thecontentsof therelevant file. Before examining theaforementionedgroundsupon whichthe Application isbased,itisconvenienttorefer toanddispose ofthe preliminary objection,albeit belatedly raised for thefirsttimein ^0 thewritten addressof counselfor the respondent, whichconcerns an allegation that"therespondenthas nolocus standiinthe re­ course". Counsel for therespondent has argued in this respect thatthepresentApplication was wronglyfiled against the Repub­ lic throughtheMinisterof Interiorinas muchasthelattercould 35 2186 3 C.L.R. Tserkezos v. Republic Boyadjis J. notand has"nottaken any partin themaking of thesub-judice de­ cision and was, therefore, wrongly named as the respondent in theApplication. " ' '. * It is true that,in taking the sub-judice decision,sthe Chief of 5 Police,did notactin hispolice capacity in thestrict sense. Hadhe done so the.recourse could only be filed against the Republic through theMinisterof the Interiorwho is theMinister responsi­ ble for thePolice.Heactedinhis capacity of Deputy Registrar of Inland Transport* appointed by theRegistrar, i.e. theMinister of 20 Communcations and Works. His aforesaid appointment was madepursuant to section 3

(2)of theLandTransport (Transfer of Competence) Law 1975 (Law 27 of 1975) in respect of certain specified matterswhich include thecancellation,suspension e.t.c. of drivinglicences underRegulation 30of theMotorVehiclesand ,t- RoadTraffic Regulations 1973, now Regulation 31 of theMotor Vehicles andRoad Traffic Regulations of

1. See the.Official Gazette dated 23 December 1976, Supplement No. 3, Part II (Α.Δ.Π.1033, paragraph (a) (hi)). 2Q 30 Be thatas itmay, thefact remains that,looking attheletterdated 14 July 1986, containing the sub-judice decision, one^can see thatitis written onpaper of theMinistry of Interior,'PoliceHead-. quarters. Itis not surprising, therefore, thattherecourse was filed against theRepublic through the Ministerof Interior. Itcould, of course,be filed against theRepublic through theChief of Police orthrough theDeputy Registrar of InlandTransportor theDepu­ ty Registrar of Road Transport. Iam of theview thatthere is no defect in thetitleof theApplication. If Ithoughtthattherecourse was wrongly filed against the Republic through the Minister of Interior I would have exercised my discretion in ordering or allowing theadditionof a second respondent,namely, theChief of Police. Such amendmentat this stagewould notprejudice either the parties concerned or the interest of justice: See Miltiades TheInlandTransportDepartmenthas beenre-namedRoadTransportDepartmentby virtueof Law17/
2. 2187 Boyadjis J. Tserkezos v.Republic

(1988)Christodoulou v. TheRepublic, throughthe Collector ofCus­ toms (1R.S.C.C. 1)Thedefect would have been amere formal defect. InMinister of Financev. PublicService Commission

(1968)3C.L.R. 691 it was held thatin administrative law are­ course is notregarded as aimed attheorgan responsible for the 5 sub-judice decision, butitisregarded as aimed atthe particular decision concernedwith aviewof bringing it underjudicial re­ view,andthat, oncethedecision is before theCourt,theexactti­ tleof theproceedings which is asecondary consideration,does not frustrate the process of judicial review. See also in this re- *Q spect thedecisioninTheophanoHadjipapasymeou v.TheRepub­ lic

(1984)3C.L.R.

1. In thelight of theabove, thepreliminary objection raised by counselfor therespondentfails. I shall now proceed toexamine themerits of thegrounds of Law setoutintheApplication. 15 Itispertinentatthisjuncturetorecitethewords of therespon­ dent'slettertotheapplicantdated 14July 1986 which is the subjudicedecision.Itreadsasfollows: "ΚύριοΜάρκοΤσιερκέζο, Δημόνακτοςαρ.6, Κάψαλος, Λεμεσός. 20 Κύριε, Άδεια οδηγήσεως αρ. 135823 Κατόπιν αναφοράςτουΑνώτερουΤεχνικούΕπιθεωρη­ τήΕξεταστώνΟδηγώνπουσαςεξέτασε την5.7.86ότιτο οδήγημασαςαποτελείκίνδυνο γιατηδημοσία ασφάλεια, λυπούμαι νασαςπληροφορήσωότι είμαιυποχρεωμένος, μέσασταπλαίσιατωννομικώνμουεξουσιών,νααναστεί- 30 λωκαι μετηνπαρούσαμουεπιστολήαναστέλλωτηνισχύ 2188 25 3 C.L.R. Tserkezos v. Republic Boyadjis J. της αδείας οδηγήσεωςσαςυπ' αρ. 135823, τηνοποία οφεί­ λετε ναπαραδώσετεαμέσωςστην Αστυνομία τηςπεριοχής σας. 5
2. θ α είμαι ευτυχής να επαναξετάσωτην περίπτωση σας όταν σημειωθεί βελτίωση στην κατάσταση τηςυγείας σας,πράγμα το οποίοεύχομαι. Με τιμή, (ΦΡ. ΠΑΓΚΟΥ) Αρχηγός Αστυνομίας, Αναπλ. Έφορος Χερσαίων Μεταφορών." 10 Translated inEnglish theletterreads: 15 "Mr.Marcos Tsierkezos, Demonahktos No. 6 Kapsalos, Limassol , Sir, Driving licence No. 135823 2Q 25 Following areport by theSenior Technical Superintedent, Drivers Examination Office, who tested your driving on 6.7.86,totheeffect thatsameconstitutes adanger for thepub­ lic safety, Iregret toinform you thatIamcompelled, in exer­ cise of my legal powers, to suspend and through my present letter I do suspend the validity of your driving licence No. 135823, which you must surrender forthwith to thepolice of your area.
3. I shall be happy to reconsider your case when an im­ provement is madein thecondition of your health, something 2189 Boyadjis J. Tserkezos v.Republic.

(1988)which Iwishthatwouldhappen. Respectfully, (FR.YANGOU) ChiefofPolice, Deputy Registrar of InlandTransport" 5 Thefirst groundof law relied uponby theapplicantis that the sub-judice decision is contrary totheMotorVehicles andRoad Traffic Regulations.Thisis thegrounduponwhich the applicant mainly relies anduponwhich hiscounsellaidparticularemphasis in hisoralarguments before me. 10 Letusfirstseeonwhich Regulations the Chief ofPolicerelies tojustify his decision to suspend applicant'sdriving licence. In hisletterdated 14July 1986,hedoesnotspecifically refer toany particularlaw orregulation underwhich hehadactedinthecase of thepresentapplicant.Inpara.7of theOppositionitis alleged 15 that,intaking thesub-judice decision,theChief ofPoliceacted in hiscapacityof DeputyDirectorofInlandTransportunderRegula­ tions 3l

(2)(b) and31

(3)of theMotorVehicles andRoad Traffic Regulations of 1984-1986.Inpara.Γ

(1)of thewritten addressof counselfor therespondentitis alleged that,actinginhiscapacity 20 of Deputy Registrar of InlandTransport,theChief of Policesus­ pendedtheapplicant'sdriving licenceunderRegulation 31(l)(a) (b)and31

(3)of theMotorVehiclesandRoadTraffic Regulations 1984-1986. However, in para.Γ

(3)of the same written address counsel allegesthattheDeputyRegistrar actedunderRegulation 25 31

(3)which confers uponhimthepower totake the sub-judice decision.Finally,inheroral arguments madebefore mecounsel for respondentsubmitted thattheChief of Police,inhis aforesaid capacity,is empowered totakethesub-judice decision by virtue of thecombinedeffect of Regulations 31

(3),31

(2)(b) and31

(1)3 Q (a). 2190 3 C.L.R. TserkezosV. Republic Boyadjis J. Imust say-attheoutset thatRegulation 31(l)(a)* has noappli­ cation to the facts of the present case and cannot, therefore, be calledin aid of therespondent. Thepowergiventothe"Registrar underpara.

(1)of Regulation 31 tocancel orsuspendadrivingli­ cence isexpresslylimited tocaseswheretheholder of the licence eitherhasbeen convicted of acriminal offence relatingtohisdriv­ ing orhas acquired his licence by false pretences. Noneof these pre-requisitesexistsinthepresent case. Para.

(3)of Regulation 31reads as follows: "31

(3)Εφ'όσον οΈφοροςέχει λόγους ναπιστεύει ότι ο κάτοχος αδείαςοδηγήσεως θα έδει να υποβληθή εις νέαν ' εξέτασιν περίτην ικανότητααυτού'εις τηνοδήγησιν, ούτος δύναταικατάτοδοκούν ναάναστείλη την ισχύν τηςτοιαύ­ της αδείας και να υποχρέωση τον κάτοχον αυτής όπως υποβληθήεις νέαν,ατελώς διεξαχθησομένην, εξέτασιν." *31-

(1)Ό Έφορος,ενασκών διακριτικήν εξουσίαν δύναται,τηρουμένων των διατάξεωντηςπαραγράφου

(2)δι'επίτούτωαποφάσεως αυτού• (α)ναακύρωσηήάναστείλη την ισχύν οιασδήποτεαδείαςοδηγήσεως,αδείας μαθητευομένουήπροσωρινής τοιαύτης"ή (β) : εφ' όσον ο αιτούμενος την έχδοσιν αυτήςκατεδικάσθηυπό δικαστηρίου δι' οιονδήποτεαδίκημασχετικόν προςτην'οδήγησιν μηχανοκινήτουοχήματος,υπό περιστάσεις, οι οποίοι κατάτηνγνώμητου Εφόρου,δεικνύουν ότι ούτος είναι' ακατάλληλοςδι'οδήγησιν μηχανοκινήτου οχήματος,ήεφ* όσον ο Έφοροςήθε1 λεν πεισθή ότι άδειαπροηγουμένως κατεχόμενη υπό του αιτητού ελήφθη διά ψευδών παραστάσεων,ήότι ηχορήγησις τηςτοιαύτης αδείαςθαήτοεπικίνδυ­ νος διάτηνδημόσιονασφάλειαν, .Διάτουςσκοπούςτηςπαρούσηςυποπαραγράφου,οόρος 'δικαστήριον1περιλαμ­ βάνεικαι στρατοδικείον ήοιανδήποτε πειθαρχικήνδιαδικασίανεφαρμοστέαν επί μελών των ενόπλων δυνάμεων ήτων δυνάμεων ασφαλείαςτης Δημοκρα­ τίας." 2191 Boyadjis J. Tserkezos v. Republic

(1988)Translated inEnglish Regulation 31

(3)reads was follows: "31

(3)Oncethe Registrar has reasons tobelieve thatthe holderof adriving licence should undergoanew testconcern­ ing his ability todrive, he may at his discretion suspend the validity of such licence and tocompel the holder thereof to 5 submit tosuch testwhich shall beconductedfree of charge." Thisis theRegulation thatempowered the DeputyRegistrar to write totheapplicanttheletterdated 19June 1986,requiring him to submit on a specified day toanew test regarding his driving ability, towhich Imadereference when summarizing thefacts. 10 The supension of thelicence,however, which followed the con­ ducting of thenew driving test,was notmadeunderRegulation 31

(3). Infact itcould nothave been madeunderthis Regulation. The suspension of thedriving licence envisaged by Regulation 31

(3)is aconservative measureofdefinite interimdurationandit j ^ is subject only totheexistence inthemindof theRegistrar ofrea­ sons causing him tobelievethattheholderof thelicence should undergo a new driving test. The suspension expires when the driving testtakesplace. In thepresent case where thereport of theSenior Technical 20 Superintendent, Drivers Examination Office, onthenew driving test which theapplicantwas compelled toundergounderRegula­ tion31

(3)andthereportof themedical board,bothreports being totheeffect that,owingtotheconditionof hishealth,applicant's drivingendangered thesafety of thepublic,werebefore the De­ puty Registrar, thelatter hadpower tosuspend applicant's driv­ ing licenceonly undersub-para, (b)of para.

(2)of Regulation 31 which reads as follows: "31

(2)(β)Ανεξαρτήτως τωνειςτηνυποπαράγραφον (α) διαλαμβανομένων,ο Έφορος δύναται αμέσωςναακύρω­ ση ήάναστείλη την ισχύν αδείας οδηγήσεωςεπί τω λόγω ότι επεδεινώθη η κατάστασις της υγείας του κατόχου αυτήςήεπίτωότιούτοςπάσχειεκνέουήεκφυσικήςανα­ πηρίας δυνάμενης νακαταστήσητηνοδήγησιναυτούεπι2192 3 C.L.R. Tserkezos v.Republic Boyadjis J. κίνδυνον διάτηνδημοσίανασφάλειαν. Ειςπάσαν τοιαύ­ την περίπτωσινο Έφορος οφείλει όπωςαμελλητίκοινο­ ποίησηεγγράφωςτηνεπίτούτωαπόφασίντουειςτονκάτοχον της αδείας καιγνωρίση εις αυτόνότι κέκτηταιτο δικαίωμα να προσβάλητην τοιαύτηναπόφασίνδιάτης προσκομίσεως ιατρικούπιστοποιητικού εμφαίνοντος ότι ούτος είναι ικανόςπρος ασφαλήοδήγησιν επί τούτωο κάτοχοςτηςαδείας δύναται,πληντωνπεριπτώσεων των νόσων και φυσικών αναπηριών, των καθοριζομένωνεις την παράγραφον

(4)του Κανονισμού 29, νααπαίτηση όπωςυποβληθήεις ιατρικήνεξέτασινπερίτηνικανότητα ήτηνκαταλληλότητααυτούειςτηνοδήγησινμηχανοκινή­ του οχήματος,εφ'όσον δε ήθελεν υποστή επιτυχώςτην τοιαύτην εξέτασιν, τω αποδίδεται και η ακυρωθείσαή ανασταλείσα άδεια." Translated inEnglish Regulation 31

(2)(b) reads: 20 25 30 35 "31

(2)(b) Notwithstanding what is provided in sub-para. (a)above, theRegistrar may forthwith cancel or suspend the validity ofadriving licenceonthegroundthattheconditionof the health of the holder thereof has deteriorated or on the ground thathe suffers afresh or with bodily disabilites that mayrenderhisdriving dangerous for the publicsafety. Ineve­ rysuchcase theRegistrar mustindispensably communicate his decision onthemattertotheholderof thelicence andinform himthathehastherighttoattack suchdecision by submitting amedicalreportcertifying thatheiscapable todrive safely;for thispurpose,except inthecase of thediseasesand disabilities set outin para.

(4)of Regulation 29,theholderof thelicence may demandtobe medically examined concerning his ability orfitnesstodrive amotorvehicle, andprovided he successful­ ly undergoes suchexamination,thedriving licence whichhad beencancelledorsuspended is restored to him." Regarding now the letter dated 14 July 1986 containingthe sub-judice decision,recitedhereinbefore, itis obvious that(i) the Deputy Registrar did notcomply with themandatory provisions 2193 Boyadjis J. Tserkezos v.Republic

(1988)ofRegulation 31

(2)(b),and (ii)therewasaconfusion inthemind of the Deputy Registrar concerning the nature and extent of his powers under Regulation 31

(2)(b), on the one hand, and his powersunderRegulation 31

(3)on theother hand.Thelatterview which I now express is based rather on aconsideration of what 5 preceded and what followed the sub-judice decision, i.e. respondent's letters dated 19 June 1986 and 7 August 1986, the latter beingin answertoapplicant's letterdated 1.8.86. Even if I ignore for the moment the omission of the Deputy Registrar, in communicating his decision to the applicant, toin- ^Q form him of his right, inter alia, todemand a medical examination, andeven ifI attribute such omission not toany misconceptionon hispart of the contents andeffect of Regulation 31

(2)(b), buttohisbelief thatthecommunication of suchinformation tothe applicant wasamereformality with which heneed notcomply, it ,<isagain difficult for me tounderstand howor why,had theDeputyRegistrar applied after correctconception Regulation 31

(2)(b), he turned down applicant's request tobe medically re-examined for the purpose of restoration to him of his suspended licence, something which is expressly provided in Regulation 31

(2)(b). I 2 ^ refer totherefusal to befound in the Deputy Registrar's letter to theapplicantdated7 August 1986. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the Deputy Registrar failed tocommunicate tothe applicant together with his decision the information expressly required to be communicated by the • " very provision under which heissaid tohave acted intaking the sub-judice decision.This being so,thequestion thatposes fordetermination iswhat istheimpactof theaforesaid failure of theDeputy Registrar upon the legality of the sub-judice decision. Isthe decision rendered thereby illegal and liabletobeannulled orisit 30 not? Therelevant principlesof administrative lawapplicablein the presentinstancearesetoutin anumberofdecisionsof thisCourt which adopt the opinion expressed in their textbooks by several eminent Greek authors, including Kyriakopoulos on Greek AdI 2194 35 3 C.L.R. 5 10 25 30 35 Tserkezos v. Republic Boyadjis J. ministrative Law (Κυριακοπούλου, Ελληνικό Διοικητικό Δίκαιο),4thEd.', vol Β,pp.391-394, Manualof Administrative Law by Spiliotbpoulos (Σπηλιωτοπούλου, Εγχειρίδιο Διοικητικού Αικαίου) 1977, ΡΡ·405-406, para.443 and also theConclusionsfrom Case-Law of theCouncil ofStatein Greece (Πορίσματα Νομολογίας τουΣυμβουλίουτης Επικρατείας, 1929-1959, pp. 266-267). The basic principle may be briefly statedasfollows: If, inreachingthesub-judice decision,the ad­ ministrativeorganfailed tocomply with essential formalities, its decision isrenderedanullity onaccount of suchfailure. If,on the otherhand,thenon-complianceconcernsamereasdistinctfrom anessential formality, theactis not renderedliable to annulment. Seefor example Horaitis v.Republic

(1984)3 C.L.R. 1067and ΜΏ.Μ.Estates v.Republic

(1980)3C.L.R.54. Thedistinctionbetween essential formalities ontheone hand andmereornon-essentialformalities ontheotherhandis not al­ ways easy to draw: Papadopoulosv. The Republic

(1985)3 C.L.R. 154.As ageneral rule, however, theomission to comply with aprescribed form inadministrative law amountsto contra­ ventionof anessential formality resulting totheannulmentofthe administrativeact: Law ofAdministrative Actsby Stasinopoulos, 1951 Edn.p. 229 adopted in M.D.M. Estatesv.Republic (su­ pra). InAdministrative Law by PapaHadjis, 5th Edn. 1976,at pp. 476-477 it is stated thatevery form which is prescribed by administrative legislation is considered as essential andonlyin exceptional cases theadministrativejudgemay considercertain forms prescribed by legislation asnon-substantive.Iwould final­ ly liketorefertoAlvanis v.CYTA

(1985)3C.L.R. 2695,where itwas reiteratedthat formalities prescribed by law mustbecomplied with andthat,unless theformality ignoredis of aninessen­ tial character,thedecision is taintedwith invalidity. Applyingtheabove principles tothecircumstancesof the in­ stantcase,Iconsidercompliancewith theformalities prescribed in Regulation 31

(2)(b) as indispensable for the validity of the sub-judice decision.I havereachedthisconclusionbecauseofthe very explicit andmandatorymannerinwhich theformalitiesre2195 Boyadjis J. Tserkezos v.Republic

(1988)ferred toarelaiddown in theRegulation andoftheessential principle which they aim toserve.TheDeputy Registrar had ignored in thiscasean essential formality andhisdecisionis,therefore, liable tobe annulled. In theresult, the first ground upon which thepresent Applica- 5 tion isbased succeeds.The sub-judice decision, beingcontrary to the law,has to beannulled. Ineed not,in thecircumstances, examine the second and third grounds (supra) relied upon by applicant. I do not, however, intend to make any order as to costs, given the fact that the Chief of Police had acted throughout in JQ good faith, his only motive being the safety of the public. It is now up to the appropriate administrative authority to take and communicate to'theapplicantitsdecision on thematterincompliancetotherelevant Regulations. Sub-judicedecisionannulled. 15 No orderas to costs. 1 2196