(1988)1988November30 [CHRYSOSTOMIS,J.J INTHEMATTEROFARTICLE146OFTHECONSTITUTION MELOUNDADEVELOPMENTLTDANDOTHERS, Applicants, v. THEREPUBLICOFCYPRUS,THROUGH 1.THEIMPROVEMENTBOARDOFPISSOURI, 2.THECOUNCILOFMINISTERS, Respondents. (CasesNos. 404/86. 405/86,406/86). Legitimateinterest—The StreetsandBuildingsRegulationLaw,Cap. 96— Zonesimposedundersection 14
(1)increasedthebuildingratiopermitted underthereplacedzones,butimposedotherbuildingrestrictions—inthe absenceofexpertevidencethatsuchrestrictionsareneutralizedbytheincreaseinthebuildingratio,theCourtcannotmakeafindingthattheapplicantswillnotbenefitfromtheannulment, Legitimateinterest—Theapplicantshavenosuchinterest,iftheannulmentwill notbenefit them—Sawiaes v.P.S.C.
(1983)3 CM.R. 1749. Constitutional Law—Righttoproperty—Constitution, Art. 23.2 and Art. 23.3—-Deprivation, restrictions—The StreetsandBuildingsRegulation Law,Cap. 96,section14
(1)—Zones—In thecircumstances of this case theyamountedtomererestrictionsoftherighttoproperty—Preferenceto caselawofthisCourt. NaturalJustice—Righttobeheard—Whetheritexistsincaseandpriortothe impositionofazoneundersection14
(1)oftheStreetsandBuildingsRegulationLaw,Cap.96—Questiondeterminedinthenegative. Thefactsofthiscasesufficiently appearinihejudgmentoftheCourt. Recoursesdismissed. Noorderastocosts. 2364 3 C.L.R. .. Melounda Development v. Republic Casereferredto: Sawides v.P.S.C.
(1985)3C.L.R. 1749; ManglisandOthersv.TheRepublic
(1984)3CJL.R.351; Simonis&Anotherv.TheImprovementBoardofLatsia
(1984)3C.l«R. 109; 5 BluewaveProjectsLtd. v.TheRepublic
(1985)3CLA.2522; DemetriouandAnotherv.DistrictOfficerPaphos
(1985)3CI-.R.2530; HadjiLoucav.TheRepublic
(1969)3CX.R.570; Constananouv. TheRepublic
(1972)3GL.R. 116; 10 The Cooperative Store FamagustaLtd. v.TheRepublic
(1974)3CLA. 295; Papoutsosv. TheMunicipalityofLimassol
(1982)3C.L.R.
- Recourses. 15 Recoursesagainstthedecisionof therespondentstoamendthe zonesdefined in 1980inrespectofPissourivillage. Th. Ioannides, for theapplicants. _ Y.Potamitis, for respondent
- N. Charalambous, Senior Counsel of the Republic, for respondent
- 20 „ Cur. adv. vult. CHRYSOSTOMIS J. read thefollowing judgment The applicants by means of thepresent recourses, which were heard to2365 Cbrysostomis J. Melounda Development v. Republic
(1988)gether as they present commonquestions of Law and fact and theyattackthesameadministrativeact,seek adeclarationthatNo tification No.89/86published insupplementΠΙ(I)tothe Official GazetteNo.2133 of 11thApril 1986,underSection 14
(1)ofthe Streets andBuildings Regulation Law Cap.96 (as amended by 5 Laws 14/59,67/63,6/64, 65/64, 12/69,38/69, 13/74,28/74,24/ 78, 25/79, 80/82and 15/83),is null andvoid andof nolegal ef fect whatsoever. The applicants are the owners and/orco-owners and/orthe persons entitled to be registered as owners, of various plots of JQ landofatotalextentof morethan 150donumssituatedatPissourivillagewithin thearea of theImprovementBoard of Pissouri, respondents 1.More details asregards theseplotsof landare referrred tointhe oppositionofeverycase,aswellasinthecertifi catesof searchattachedthereto(scheduleC). 1,Respondents 1wereappointedpursuanttothesecond proviso of Section 3
(2)(b)of the Streets andBuildings Regulation Law Cap.96(asamended),astheappropriateauthorityauthorisedun derSection 14
(1)todefine planningzoneswithin theareaofthe Improvement Board of Pissouri. Such zones were initially de- ~o fined in 1980andthesaid propertyof theapplicantswasincluded inthosezones. J Following thesaid zoning,respondents 1,inexercising their powers, granted to them by Section 14, sub-section
(1)of the Streets andBuildings Regulation Law, on 21.1.86, decided the 25 amendmentof thesaid zones, pursuanttotherelevantplansofthe Town Planning and Housing Departmentand authorised the chairmanof theBoard tosendtherelevantplansfor approval by theCouncil of Ministersandsubsequent publicationof the,subju3 0 diceNotificationintheOfficial Gazette. Thereasonsfor suchanamendmentwerethe protection ofthe environment, thepreservation of thecharacterandcolourof the villageand of the scenery, theregulation of future development andthepromotionoftourism. 2366 r. 3 C.L.R. 5 10 15 2^ Melounda Development v. Republic Cbrysostomts J. Itis further stated in theopposition,thatrespondents 1,with theirsubjudicedecision,improved the buildingratioof theprevi ous zones Γ
(1)andΖfrom0.15:1 and 0.05:1, respectively,to 0.20:1asregards thenew zoneΓ
(2)andto0.08:1asregardsthe zoneZ(l),respectively.Theyalsoincreasedthebuilding ratioof zonesΔ
(1)andΔ
(2)from0.05:1to0.08:1. Itispertinenttosay atthisstage,thatthepropertyof thepeti tioners in Recourse No. 704/86was previously within zone Ζ whereas nowwithin zoneΓ
(1).Thepropertyof theapplicants in Recourse No.405/86 was previously within zone Ζ whereas now withinzoneZ(l). Asregardstheproperty of theapplicants in Recourse No. 406/86,only two plots are affected, thatis, plots6/1 and468,which werepreviouslywithinzoneΖ whereas now they arewithin zoneZ(l). Theotherthreeplotsremain in zoneA
(2). As aresult of thesubjudice notification, theapplicants filed thepresentrecourses and theycomplainthatthe restrictionsim posed by thenew zonesamounttoadeprivation of theirrightof property,contrarytoArticle23.2of theConstitutionandthat the valueof theirproperty has substantially diminished.They, fur ther, complainthattherespondentsfailed totakeinto considera tion thesaidpropertyasawholeandthatthe applicantsintended todevelop itasawholefor touristandhousingpurposes and thus theyincludedsameindifferent zones. 25 Thegroundsof Law,onwhich theserecourses arebased, can besummarised asfollows:
(1)Thesubjudicenotificationis nottheactofrespondents1 and atanyratetherelevantdecision was takeninthe absenceand with noknowledgeof theBoard. 30
(2)Therespondentsactedincontraventionoftherulesofnatural justice,inthattheyfailed tocall theapplicantstobeheardor togivethemthechancetodefend their rights. 2367 Chrysostomis J. Melounda Development v. Republic
(1988)
(3)Therespondentsactedunderamisconceptionof fact.
(4)Thesubjudice notification contravenes anditisultraviresAr ticle23of theConstitution.
(5)Thesubjudice notificationisbasedonadefective reasoning.
(6)Therespondentsexercised theirdiscretionwrongly. 5 On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection was raised totheeffect thattheapplicantshavenolegitimate interestin that if they succeed andthesubjudice notification is annulled, they will notbe benefited from such anannulmentas,in sucha case,theprevious zoneswillcomeintoforce,which provide for 10 alower building ratiothanthatof thenewzones.Relevantonthis issue is the case of Savvides v. P.S.C.
(1985)3 C.L.R. 1749, where atp. 1754 thefollowingwas said: "Intheconclusions from theCaseLaw of theGreek Coun cil of State(1929-1959) itis stated,atp.260 (e)thatthereis 15 nolegitimate interest if theannulmentof the actin question willnotbenefit theapplicant. Thesameviewis also adopted by Dactoglou 'General Administrative Law', vol. C,p. 228, whereitis statedthatanapplicanthasnolegitimate interestin cases where themattersinissueareonly of theoreticalsignifi- 20 cance,thatis,where,even if theclaimof theapplicantis ac cepted,theinterest which heis relying oncannotbe satisfied, orhispositionwillnotbeimproved." Learnedcounselfor theapplicants,ontheotherhand,argued, inter alia, thatas regards zoneF(l), although thebuilding ratio 25 was increased, nevertheless otherbuildingrestrictionswereim posed which relate to thearea tobe covered andthenumberof storeys,thenetresult being thatthevalue oftheirlandinviewof these restrictions, has substantially increased in value. He also argued thatthesubjudicedecision is unconstitutional. 30Ϊ hadtheopportunity tocomparetherestrictions imposed by 2368 3 C.L.R. Melounda Development v. Republic Chrysostomis J. 5 10 Λc theprevious zonesandthosebythenewzonesanditisafactthat althoughthenewzoneΓ
(1)increases thebuildingratio, neverthe less it imposes other-restrcictionsramongwhich thosecited by learnedcounsel for theapplicants,which were notimposed by theprevious zoneΓ.Thesamecanbesaidfor thenewzoneZ(l) comparedwith theprevious zoneΖ Plots291,74/2and74/3of the applicants,in Recourse No.-406/86,remained"in the same zoneΔ
(2). Inthelight of theaforementioneddiffentiation inbuildingrestrictionsimposedby thenew zones, Ifindmyselfunable,in the absenceof expert evidence,tomakeafinding thattheincreased building ratiointroducedby thenewzones,is asufficient factor neutralizing theotherrestrictionsimposedandthattheapplicants willnotbebenefitedfromsuchanannulment Forthesereasons, Ihave arrived attheconclusionthatthepreliminary objection of therespondentscannot stand. Proceeding tothesubstance of thecases andhaving consid ered all thecontentionsof learned counsel for theapplicants, I findnomerit in any of them. As Ihave already stated, respon2Q dents 1, pursuanttotheprovisions of Section3
(2)(b)ofCap.96, asamended, aretheappropriateauthorityhaving thepowerspro videdby Section 14
(1)of thesameLaw.Thuswiththeapproval of theCouncilof Ministersthey areempowered todefine zones withinwhichtoimposebuildingrestrictionsspecified by the said Law. Therestrictionsimposed by the said zones as abovede scribed, are,therefore,permissible by thesaidLaw and Article 23.3of theConstitutionandtheydidnotdeprive theapplicantsof theirproperty, contrarytoArticle 23.2of the Constitution. TheFullBenchof thisCourthadtheopportunitytodeal with ' thebuildingrestrictionsimposedby thedefinition of zonesbyapx r -propriateauthoritiesunderSection 14
(1)of theLaw inthecaseof \ Manglis andOthersv. TheRepublic
(1984)3C.L.R.351. Triantafyllides P.,delivered thejudgmentof theCourt,HadjianastassiouJ.dissenting, andhehadthistosay atpp.360-361: 2369 Cbrysostomis J. Melounda Development v.Republic
(1988)"AsregardstheissueoftheconstitutionalityofNotices116 and 117,whichwerepublishedundersection 14,above,there shouldbestressed,mainly,thefollowing:(a)They involverestrictionsorlimitationsof theexecriseof the right of property, imposed by law, in the interest of 5 town and country planning and for thedevelopment and utilizationofpropertiestothepromotionofthepublicbenefit, in the sense of Article 23.3of theConstitution (see, also,theLoizianacase,supra) (b)They makedetailed provisions for putting intoeffect re- 10 strictionsorlimitations oftherightofproperty withinthe framework laiddownbyaLaw-inthisinstancesection14 of Cap. 96 - and they are,therefore, within the requirementsofconstitutionality whichwereexpoundedinPolice v. Hondrou,3 R.S.C.C.82,85-
- 15 (c)Therestrictionsorlimitationsimposedbymeansofthetwo Noticesinquestionarenotsopatentlyunreasonableorarbitraryastobetreatedashavingexceededthelimitsofthe relevantdiscretionary powers;and,oncethisisso,itisnot withinthecompetenceofthisCourttoembarkonanevalu- 20 ationofthecorrectnessofsuchNoticesfrom the scientific pointofview. (d)Thesanctityoftherightofproperty,totheextenttowhich suchrightisconstitutionallyprotectedbymeansofArticle 23of theConstitution, isnotviolated bythesaidNotices 25 because:(i) In any individual case inwhich therestrictions orlimitationsimposed bythemmaterially decrease theeconomic valueoftheaffected propertytheownerofsuchpropertyis entitledtocompensationunderArticle23.
- (ii)Inanyindividualcaseinwhichthesaidrestrictionsorlimitationsentailsuchdrasticconsequencesthattheyamountin 2370 30 3 C.L.R. Melounda Development v. Republic 5 10 Ic 20 25 30 35 Chrysostomis J. effect to 'deprivation', in the senseof paragraphs
(2)and
(4)of Article 23,thentheoperation,tothatextent,of the subjudice Notices 116 and 117 has tobe treated as being unconstitutional (see,interalia,inthisconnection,thecase of TheHolySee of Kitiumv. TheMunicipal Council of Limassol,1R.S.C.C. 15,28)." Thematterofrestrictionsandlimitations was alsoanalysed by Pikis J., in thecase of Simonis &Another v. TheImprovement BoardofLatsia
(1984)3 C.L.R. 109, where it was found thatit was within thepowers of theappropriate authority tosuggestal terations for the creation of a satisfactory net-work of roads, when theowners applied for apermitfor thedivision of theirland into building sites. Furthermore,the appropriate authority was found tobeentilted toconditionthegrantof such apermiton the cession ofpartof thelandtothepublic for environmental purpos es. Inbothcases the act of the appropriate authority was consi derednottobe anactof deprivation andthatitamountedtoimpo sition of conditions for thedevelopment of the land. At pp. 115 and 116,Pikis J., hadthisto say: "...Todeprive means totakeaway arightorthing,where as tolimit means tocurtail orcutdown arightorthing.Ifthe curtailmentis soextensiveastovirtuallyobliterate therightor thing,itcanproperly beregarded as anactofdeprivation;oth erwise it is a limitation. The two concepts were seen in this light by theSupremeConstitutional Courtinthecase oiHoly See of Kitium ν The Municipal Council of Limassoly1 R.S.C.C.15. Whether a given restriction or limitation tothe useof property is soextensiveastoamounttoanactof depri vation isamatterof fact anddegree. Ifitconstitutes anactof deprivation itcannotbeimposedin any way other than by compulsorily acquiring the property. Equally clearisthatlimitations maybeimposed totheuseand enjoyment of property without resort tocompulsory acquisi tion.Inthecaseof limitation ofrightstheremedyof theown er,provided hesuffers loss,is onefor damages. 1 |2371 I ι Chrysostomis J. Melounda Development v.Republic
(1988)Inmyjudgmenttheimpositionofconditionsforthedevelopmentoflandinvolvingcessionoflandtothepublicforenvironmentalpurposesisnotanactofdeprivation.Itcouldonly beregardedasanactofdeprivationiftheowneroflandhadan 5 unrestricted vestedrightfor itsusein anymannerhechose, taking theform in thiscase,of arighttodevelop it intothe biggestpossiblenumberofbuildingsites.Nosuchrightvests in the ownersof land. If that werethecase,thecreation of properenvironmentalconditionswouldbelefttothediscretion JQ oftheownersofland.SofarasIknow,thisisnotthecasein anycivilizedcountry.AndArticle23.3specifically envisages restrictions orlimitationsintheinterestsoftownandcountry planning.Thedevelopmentofanarea,urban aswellasrural, isverymuchacorporate matterthatconcernsthecommunity ,* asawhole.Itaffects thequalityoflifeofeveryoneusingthe areaaswell asthe amenityof all thoseresiding therein.Acknowledgement of a vested right to developing immovable property attheoption oftheownerwouldbecatastrophic for townandcountryplanning.Thematterofrestrictionsandlimitations was approached in asimilar vein as in Kirzis in two subsequentdecisionsoftheSupremeCourt,namely, ThymopoullosandOthersv.MunicipalCommitteeofNicosia,
(1967)3 C.L.R.588,and Sofroniou and Othersv.Municipality of NicosiaandOthers,
(1976)3C.L.R.124." 25 The same course was followed by A. Loizou J. as he then was, in the case of Bluewave Projects Ltd v. TheRepublic
(1985)3C.L.R.2522andinDemetriou andAnotherv.District OfficerPaphos
(1985)3C.L.R.
- In those cases zonerestrictions wereimposed such asthose ^0 limiting the number of storeys up to two,the building ratio to 0.05:1or0.08:1,theheight to27feet andevenfurther theyexcludedtheerectionofcertainkindsofbuildings.Such restrictions were found not to amount to thedeprivation of the applicants' right toproperty,contrary toArticle23.2oftheConstitutionand 35 2372 3 C.L.R. Melounda Development v.Republic Chrysostomis J. thatthesaidrestrictionswerejustifiedunderArticle23.
- Inthelightoftheabovedecisions,whichIadopt,Ihaveconsideredtherestrictionsimposedbythenewzonesandthe facts andcircumstancesofthecasesunderconsiderationandIhavear5 rived attheconclusion thattheserestrictions aresimilartothose thatwereconsidered intheaforementioned cases.Ihave,therefore,nodifficulty inarrivingattheconclusionthat,asregardsthe presentrecourses,therestrictionsimposeddonotamounttodeprivation buttoalimitationorrestrictionwithintheambitofArticle 10 23.
- The applicantshavealsofailed toestablish misconceptionof fact.Therespondents inarrivingattheirdecision todefine new zones,havetakenintoconsideration thefactors aforementioned whicharespecified bythesaidLaw,Cap.96,asamended.Fur15 thermore,itisstatedintheoppositionthatrespondents 1,deemed propertoexpandthehousingzonesoastooffer tomoreinhabitans of theircommunity, thepossibility to solve their personal and family housing problems. At the same time they deemed propertoimprovethepossibilitiesofuseofadditionallandforin2Q vestmentpurposes andtoimprovethebuildingratioofexisting zones.Therefore, therespondents haveconsidered all relevant factors andtheirdecisionandthesubsequentsubjudice notificationistheresultofaproperexerciseoftheirdiscretion.Obviously,theplansforthedevelopmentofanarea,urbanaswellasrural,thatconcernsthecommunityasawhole,cannotbealteredat theinstanceof anownerfor thepurposeof safeguarding hisinterest.Therefore,thecontentionsoftheapplicantsthattheirfuture plansfordevelopmentshouldhavebeentakenintoconsideration cannotstand. ™ 35 Alsothecontentionoftheapplicantstotheeffect thatthesub judicenotification isnottheresultofthedecisionofrespondents 1isuntenable,asfromthematerialbeforeme,towhichIhavealreadyreferred,itisabundantlyclearthatrespondents 1,astheappropriate authority and nobody else,decided todefine thenew zonesandtoproceedwiththepublicationofthesubjudicenotifi2373 Chrysostomis J. Melounda Development v.Republic
(1988)cation.(VideinparticularappendixAtotheoppositionofevery case.) Lastly, thecomplaint of theapplicants,that therespondents actedincontravention oftherulesofnaturaljustice,astheyfailed tocallthemtobeheardbeforetakingtheirdecision,againitisun- 5 tenable,asinviewofthenatureofthedecisiontakenandthesubsequent subjudice notification, suchacourse in theabsenceof anylegislativeprovision forthepurpose,wasnotnecessarytobe followed. (Vide HadjiLoucav.TheRepublic
(1969)3C.L.R. 570 at pp. 574, 575; Constantinouv. The Republic
(1972)3 j 0 C.L.R. 116atpp. 125, 126;TheCooperative Store Famagusta Ltdv.TheRepublic
(1974)3C.L.R.295atp.302;Papoutsos v. TheMunicipalityofLimassol
(1982)3C.L.R.893atp.903). For all the above reasons Ifindthat thedecision ofrespondents 1 andtheconsequentsubjudicenotification arevalidandin j ^ accordance with the Constitution. Therecourses, therefore, fail andareherebydismissed.Therewillbenoorderastocosts. Recoursesdismissed. Noorderastocosts. 2374