3 C.L.R. 1988Februaiy 11 [PIKIS. J.] INTHEMATTER OFARTICLE 146OFTHE CONSTITUTION ANDREAS CHINAS, Applicant. v. l.THEMINISTER OFFINANCE,AND 2.THEDIRECTOR OFCUSTOMS AUTHORITY, Respondents. (CaseNo. 522/
theConstitutiondoesnotempowertheCourttoaward anyadditionalremediestothosespecified inpara.4ofthesameArticleof theConstitution; it isa substantive enactmentdefining thecompassand 25 range of application ofjudgments given under Art. 146,and serves to identify the duties of all those to whom it is directly addressed. It is interwovenwiththeprovisionsofArt 150oftheConstitutionempowering theCourttopunish for contemptofitself.Theinference isthateveryone comingunderadutytogiveeffect tothejudgmentisliableforcontempt,if 30 hefailstocarryouttheobligationsimposedbypara.
Art.146
. There is no power to add any qualification or superimpose any additionalcondition totheactivation ofthedutyunderpara.5.HenceOrd. 42Aisinapplicablebeingincompatiblewiththenatureofthejurisdiction under Art. 146and the specific obligations imposed by para.5 of that 35 ArticleoftheConstitution.
(3)Adecision voiding action of the administration casts upon the 242 3 C.L.R. 5 Chinas v. Minister of Finance administration in virtue of Art. 146.5a duty toobliterate thedecision and takeallnecessary stepstorestorethelegalitytotheextent ithadbeen upset bythedecision thatwasannulled.Jurisdiction isconferred toimposepenal sanctions foranydeliberateflouting oftheorderof iheCourtby Art 150of theConstitution. Casesreferredto: Republic v.Nissiotou
(1985)3C.L.R. 1335; Kyriacouand Others v. Republic
(1986)3C.L.R.300. Application. 10 Application for the imprisonment and/or punishment of the Directorof Customs forcontempt of Court. P.Angelides, for the applicants. G.Frangou (Mrs), for therespondents. 15 20 25 _» Cur. adv. vult. PIKIS J. read the following judgment. Andreas Chinas challenged the decision of the Director of Customs refusing his application for the importation of a duty free car. On the 11th April, 1986, the Supreme Court annulled, in the exercise of its originaljurisdiction,thedecision of theDirector.Annulment was orderedpursuant totheprovisions ofpara.4(b)of Art. 146ofthe Constitution. On 25th February, 1987, Andreas Chinas applied for the imprisonment and/or punishment of theDirector of Customs for contempt ofcourt.Itisthecase for theapplicant thattheDirector deliberatelydisobeyed theorderoftheCourt and for thatheought tobepunished for contempt.The application wasopposed on the ground, inter alia, thatthecopy of theorderof theCourt served upon theDirector was notendorsed asprovided byOrd.42A,r.l, of the Civil Procedure Rules, made applicable by R. 18of the 243 PikisJ. Chinasv. Minister ofFinance
(1988)SupremeConstitutional Court Rules 1962.The Registrarof the Supreme Court, we were told, refused an application for the endorsement ofthejudgmentof theCourt,seeminglytakingthe viewthat Ord. 42A has noapplication tojudgments or orders made under Art. 146 of the Constitution. Because of the importanceoftheissueandtherepercussionsofthedecisionof the Court on the administration of justice, the matter was set down for determination preliminarily to the hearing of the substanceof theapplication.Alsoif itisfound thatOrd.42Ais applicable,thismaysealtheoutcomeoftheproceeding. \Q Rival submissions were advanced with regard to the applicabilityofOrd.42A.Fortheapplicantitwassubmittedthat theRegistrar wasrightin hisrefusal toendorse thedecisionof the Supreme Court arguing that it has no application to declaratoryjudgmentsoftheSupremeCourt intheexerciseofits originaljurisdiction.Anobligationtoactinobediencetoanorder 15 made underArt. 146.4(b)iscastbytheensuingprovisionpara.5 of Art. 146of the Constitution. That provides: "Any decision given underpara.4 of this article shall bebindingon allcourts andallorgans or authoritiesin theRepublic and shallbegiven effect to and acted upon by the organ or authority or person 20 concerned". Forherpartcounselfor therespondentssubmitted thatOrd. 42Aisapplicable and should unfailingly becomplied withasa conditionprecedent topunishmentforcontempt;becauseofthe penalconsequencesandimplicationsofcontempt. TheRulesof theSupremeConstitutionalCourt 1962*provide in R.18 that the Civil Procedure Rules shall apply mutatis mutandis in all proceedings before a Court of revisional jurisdiction,sofarascircumstancespermit. Therules were made in exercise of the rule making power 30 vested inthe Supreme Court byArt. 135of theConstitution to regulateproceedingsbeforeit.TherideraddedtoR.18respecting the applicability of the Civil Procedure Rules respecting the *Made applicable by s. 17 ofLaw 33/64. 244 25 3 C.L.R. 5 10 25 30 35 Chinas v. Minister of Finance Pikis J. applicability of the Civil Procedure Rules reflects the inherent differences between theexercise of revisionaljurisdiction andthe exercise of the civil jurisdiction of the High Court and Courts subordinate thereto. Proceedings under Art. 146 are of an inquisitorial character, whereascivil proceedings aremodelled on the adversarial system of justice evolved under English Law. Consequently, in applying the Civil Procedure Rules/the Court must have regard to this reality and apply them only in so far as they are compatible with the inquisitorial nature of proceedings underArt.146.Furthermore, their application isdependent onthe circumstances of a particular case and the issues that call for resolution. The first question we must determine is whether the Constitution itself makes provision for the applicability of judgments and orders made under Art. 146 and if so, whether any further room is left for regulation of the subject. InRepublic v. Nissiotou*, it was decided that para. 5 of Art. 146 is not an adjectival enactment and does not empower the Court to award any additional remedies to those specified in para.4of thesame article ofthe Constitution. It isa substantive enactment defining thecompass and range of application ofjudgments given under Art. 146.Furthermore, it serves to identify theduties of all those to whom it is directly addressed. It is interwoven with the provisions of Art. 150of theConstitution empowering theCourt topunish for contempt of itself. The inference is that everyone coming under a duty to give effect to thejudgment is liable for contempt if hefails tocarry out theobligations imposed bypara.5 of Art. 146.Itisworthy of notice that para.
Art. 146d
oesnot stipulateanyothercondition fortheactivation oftheduty toheed and give effect to ajudgment given under para. 4 of Art.
- That being the case, there was no power to add any qualification or superimpose any additional condition to the activation of the duty under para.
- Anyone coming under a duty to give effect to the judgment must carry out that duty as a matter of constitutional obligation. Hence Ord. 42A is
(1985)3 C.L.R.1335. 245 Pikis J. Chinasv.Minister of Finance
(1988)inapplicablebeing incompatiblewiththenatureofthejurisdiction underArt. 146 andthespecific obligation imposed by para.
thatarticleof theConstitution. In the context of the examination of the issue hereunder consideration,we may with profit make brief reference tothe nature andimplications of adecision given underpara.4(b)of Art. 146voidingadministrative action.Adeclarationof voidance underpara.4(b)entails theobliterationof thedecisioninlaw.A decisionvoidingaction of theAdministrationoperatesergaomnes ΙΟ and is addressed toeveryone responsible for therestoration of legality upset by the impugned administrative action.* The implications stemming from a declaration of annulment are discussed by Mr. Kourousopoulos, President of the Greek CouncilofState,inanilluminatingarticleonthenatureandeffect j 5 of thejurisdiction of the Greek Councilof State**. A decision annullingadministrativeactionerases theactioninitsentirety and for allpurposes.Itbindseveryone toheedthejudicialdeclaration intheinterestof theefficacy ofjudicialreviewandthe sustenance of therule of law. ThereupontheAdministration comesunder duty to obliterate the decision and take all necessary steps to restorethelegality totheextentithadbeenupsetby the decision that was annulled.Default on thepartof anyoneunderduty to eradicate a decision and restore legality is penally and disciplinarily punished in Greece by virtue of the express 25 provisions of theorganic law providing for theestablishment of the Greek Council of State***. A similar duty is cast on the Administration in Cyprus to restore legality by virtue of the provisions of para.
Art. 146, andjurisdiction is conferred to imposepenalsanctionsfor anydeliberateflouting of theorderof 30 the
Courtby Art. 150oftheConstitution. This,Ibelieve,has been recognized tobe thecase by thedecision inNissiotou (supra). 5 *CounclusionsoftheGreekCouncilofState1929-1959p.
- **SeelecturetotheNicosiaBarAssociation1984,p.
- ***Sees. 54— 3713/
- 246 3 C.L.R. Chinas v. Minister of Finance Pikis J. I have purposely avoided discussion of the decision in Kyriacou ά Others v. Republic
(1986)3 C.L.R. 300 for the obvious reason that it has a bearing on the substantive issues raised by theseproceedings;namely,amenitytofoundcontempt proceedings for breach of a decision of the Supreme Court 5 voiding administrative action. Moreover, the decision in the above case is subject toappealR. A. 563inwhichjudgmentwill be given on 6th April, 1988. Nonetheless,to the extent thatit suggests that Ord. 42, r.l, applies, I differ, with very great respect, from the view taken by my learned brother Judge A, Loizou. In conclusion I hold that Ord. 42A, r.l, is inapplicable to contempt proceedings founded on Art. 146.4 (b) andpara.
thesamearticleandArt. 150of the Constitution. A date will be given for consideration of the merits of the 15 application. Orderaccordingly. 247