3 C.L.R. 1988December12 ' . • •· [A.LOIZOU,P.,DEMETRIADES,PDCIS,PAPADOPOULOS,HADJ1TSANGARIS,CHRYSOSTOMIS,JJ.] MARIOSELIAPANAYIDESANDOTHERS, Appellants-Applicants, v. THEREPUBLICOFCYPRUS, THROUGH THEMI

Art 146leavesnodoubtastotheperemp- 2435 Panayides & Others v. Republic

(1988)tory character of itsprovisions. Infancy, which inany event, hasnever beentreatedasanincapacitatingfactorfortheinstitutionofarecourse,does notsuspend therunningoftheperiod. Appealdismissed. Noorderasto costs. _ Casesrefenedto: Moran v.TheRepublic, 1 R.S.C.C.10; Markoullis v.TheRepublic, 4R.S.C.C.7; Protoparasv.TheRepublic

(1967)3 C.L.R.411; Ploussiou v.CentralBank

(1982)3C.L.R.230; 10 Shiafkallisv. CyprusTheatricalOrganization

(1984)3C.L.R.1382; Mahdessian v. TheRepublic

(1966)3C.L.R.630; Hadjigregoriouv. TheRepublic

(1976)3C.L.R. 163; Yialousa SavingsBankLtd. v.TheRepubic

(1977)3C.L.R. 25. Appeal. AppealagainstthejudgmentofaJudgeoftheSupremeCourt of Cyrpus(Savvides ,J.) givenonthe21st October 1987(Revisional Jurisdiction Case No. 609/84)* whereby appellant's recourseagainst theorder of acquisition affecting, theirproperty wasdismissed. E.Panayides, fortheappellants. M.Tsiappa (Mrs.), for therespondents. Cur. adv. vult. * (Reported in

(1987)3 CLJt. 12S3). 2436 15 20 3C.L.R. Panayides& Othersv. Republic A.LOIZOU,P.Thejudgment of theCourtwillbedelivered byPikisJ. PIKISJ.:Theforemost issueinthisappealistheamenityof " theCourttoreviewtheactioncomplainedof, namely,anorderof 5 acquisition,inthelightofacknowledgedfailureonthepartofthe applicantstoseekitsreview withinthe75-dayperiodlaiddown inpara.

Art. 146. Thetrial

Courtdismissedtherecoursefor failure toraise itwithinthetimelimitspecified inpara3,Earlier theCourthaddetermined,inthelightofincontrovertibleevidence j0 thattheacquisitionhadcometotheknowledgeoftheapplicants soonafteritspublicationin 1978.Therecourseforthereviewof theaction complained of wasmounted in 1984,some sixyears after theapplicantshadgainedknowledgeofthedecisiontoacquiretheirpropertycompulsorily. 15 Counselfortheappellants,whowemaynoticeincidentally is theirfather, submittedthatfailuretochallengethedecisionwithin theperiod envisaged bupara.

Art. 146i

sexcusable onaccountofthefactthattheywereunderageatthetimeoftheaquisition.Twoof theapplicants,co-owners of theproperty,are still 2Q minors,whereastheremainingtwohavesincebecomeofage.In support of his submission counselreferred ustotheprovisions ofs. 19of theGuardianshipofInfants andProdigalsLaw,Cap. 277, arid the limitations imposed thereby to therightsof the guardianofthepropertyofminors tomakedispositionsoftheir property withouttheorderof acompetent civilCourt. Further25 more,heargued,itwouldbeaviolationofthehumanrightsof theminorstoexpectthemtoexercisearighttolitigatebeforeattainingmaturity.Counselfortherespondentssupportedthedecisionof thetrialCourt. Shesubmitted thattheprovisionsof s.8 oftheLimitationofActionsLaw-Cap.15-havenoapplication 3" tothetimelimitsetbytheConstitution forthejudicialreviewof administrativeaction.Inaccordancewiththeprovisionsof s.8, Cap. 15,theperiod oflimitationdoesnotrunfor aslongasthe vesteeofarightisundertheageof 18. 35 Unlikeaprivate law^action, arecourse for thereview ofad2437 Pikis J. Panayides & Othersv.Republic

(1988)ministrativeactionis notsolelyaninstrumentfor theprotectionof therightsof theinjured party.Itisalso aimedtorestorelegality andensuresoundadministration,amatterinwhich theinterestof thepursuerandthewiderpublic coincide.As Professor Tsatsos observes inhis workonthePrinciplesApplicabletotheReview 5 of Administrative Action with aView toits Annulment (Third Edition, p.64).itwould beintolerabletoailowtheadministrative process toremaininastateoffluxfor anyperiodlongerthanitis absolutely necessary totakeactionfor itsjudicial review.It must beappreciatedthatonlyactsencompassedinthedomainofpublic 1 0 law are amenable toreviewunderArt. 146.Theirvindication is subject totheruleentrenchedinpara.

Art. 146o

f the consti tutionrequiring thatany challenge toadministrative actionmust bemadewithin 75 days. Thewording of para.

Art. 146leaves nodoubt as to the peremptorycharacterofitsprovisions.

Itiscouchedin mandatory terms andprovides Ή προσφυγήασκείται εντός 75ημερών" (arecourse shall bemadewithin75days). Moreoverthecontext in which para.3 appears,namely,thetimewithin which the re viewof administrative actionmaybesoughtreinforces thegram- 2 " maticalandetymological implicationsof itsprovisions (See, inter alia,JohnMoran v. TheRepublic, 1R.S.C.C.10;Markoullis v. Republic, 4R.S.C.C.7;AndreasProtopapas v.Republic

(1967)3 C.L.R.411;Ploussiouv.CentralBank

(1982)3C.L.R. 230; Shiafkallis v. CyprusTheatrical Organization

(1984)3 C.L.R. 25 1382).Merecontemplationoftheimplicationsofallowingorsuf fering relaxation of the75-day,period,would make onedesist from suchacourse.Certaintyintheadministrativeprocess would beseriouslyimpairedwithfarreachingconsequencesfor thesus tenanceof theruleof law andtherightsandobligationsofparties 30 affected byadministrativeaction. In Greecethe time limit for anapplication totheCouncilof State to annul administrative action is regulated by law (s.19, Law 92/61);itordainsashorterperiodstillthanthe75-dayperi odprovidedby para.

Art. 146f

ortheinstitutionoflegalpro- 35 ceedings for thereview of administrative action;and provides 2438 3C.L.R. 5 0 Panayides& Othersv.Republic PikisJ. thatarecourse totheCourtmustbemadewithin 60days.The timelimit setbythestatutefor theinitiationofproceedingshas beenheldtobemandatory,admittingofnoexceptionorrelaxation savein thecaseofforce majeure, thatis,"theoccurrenceof eventsthatputitbeyondthereachofthepartyprejudiced byadministrativeactiontoraisearecoursepersonallyorthrougharepresentative (See "Conclusions of the GreekCouncilofState (1929-1959),p.256 andTsatsos."Application for Annulment before theCouncilof State"3rdEd., p.97).Forcemajeure has beenacknowledgedinCyprustooasacausepreventingtheactivation,solongasitlasts,ofthetimelimitsetbypara.3Art.146 (Mahdesianv.Republic

(1966)3C.L.R.630:Hadjigregoriouv. Republic

(1976)3 C.L.R. 163;Yialousa Savings BankLtd.v. Republic

(1977)3C.L.R.25).Onnooccasionhasinfancy been treatedasanincapacitatingfactor fortheinstitutionofarecourse toannuladministrativeaction. Thefactsofthecasedonotrequireustodebateforce majeure as anincapacitating factor orthenatureof thefacts thatwould qualify asforce majeure. Whatwemustresolveiswhetherany validexcusehasbeenmadeforthenoninstitutionofthepresent proceedings within the75-dayperiod.Andasnonehasbeenestablished we are disposed, in agreement with the learned trial Judge,todismisstheproceedingsasuntimely. Hence the appeal is dismissed. Let there be no order as to costs. Appealdismissed. Noorderastocosts. 2439

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