(1988)1988December15 [SAWIDES;!] INTHEMATTEROFARTICLE146OFTHECONSTITUTION CHARALAMBOSBOYADJIS, Applicant, v. THEREPUBLICOFCYPRUS,THROUGH THEDIRECTOROFCUSTOMS, Respondent. (CaseNo.478/86). CustomsandExciseDuties—Dutyfreeimportationofgoods(Motorvehicles, importation ofbyCypriots)—Power toimpose conditionsfor theexemption—The CustomsandExciseDutiesLaw18178,sub-heading 19ofitem 01ofthe4thSchedule—Breach ofcondition thatcouldbelawfullyimposed*—Effect—Power to confiscate thegoods inquestion—The Cus- $ tomsandExciseLaw,1967(Law82/67),section158. CustomsandExciseDuties—Dutyfreeimportationofgoods(Motorvehicles, importationofbyCypriots)—Whetherfollowingconfiscationfor breachof a condition (section 158oftheCustomsandExciseLaw, 1967(Law82/ 67)thereispowertodemandthepaymentofnormalimportdutyasacon- 10 ditionofreturningthegoodstotheirowner— Questiondeterminedinthe affirmative—Herodotou v.TheRepublic
(1987)3CMJt. 874followed— Judicialcontroloftheexerciseofsuch discretionarypower-^Principlesapplicable. ActsordecisionsinthesenseofArt.146.1 ofthe Constitution—Customsand 15 ExciseDuties—Compoudingofoffences—The CustomsandExciseLaw, *Theconditioninthiscasewasthatthevehicleshallonlybeusedbytheapplicantandhisdependantsandshallnotbelent,hired,exchanged,givenaway orotherwisedisposedofintheRepublicwithoutrespondent'spriorwritten consent. 2458 3 C.L.R. Boyadjis v. Republic 1967(Law82/67),section 178—Thecompundingissocloselyinterwoven withcriminalproceedingsthatitisoutsidethe ambitofArt. 146.1 ofthe Constitution—Herodotouv.TheRepublic
(1987)3CLJi.874followed. 5 10 ιc ThefactsofthiscaseareverysimilartothoseinHerodotouv. TheRepublic
(1987)3C.L.R. 874. Thecondition imposed inthiscaseforthe duty freeimportationofamotorvehicleappearsinthefootnote.Following evidencethatthecarinquestionwas usedby applicant'ssonanddaughterin-law,therespondent ordereditsconfiscation. Later,hedecidedtocom poundtheoffence andreturnedthecaronconditionthatthenormal import dutywouldbepaid. Hencethisrecourse,whereby,theapplicantchallenged theconditionof paymentand thecompounding.Therecourse wasdis missed.Thelegalprinciplesemanatingfrom thedecisionsufficiently appear from theheadnotetothiscase. Recoursedismissed. Noorderastocosts. Casereferredto: Herodotou v.TheRepublic
(1987)3C.L.R. 874; S.Raftis Co.Ltd. v.TheMunicipalityofPaphos
(1981)3C.L.R. 497. Recourse. 20 25 Recourse against the decision of the respondent toorder appli cant to pay the impon duty of car R.R. 928 and also topay £300.= fine forcontravening the condition imposed onthepermit granted tohim toimport the said car duty free asarepatriated Cypriot. L.Georghiadou (Mrs.), for the applicant. D. Papadopoulou (Mrs.), for the respondents. Cur. adv. vult. j0 SAWTDES J.read the followingjudgment By thepresentre course the applicant challenges thedecision of therespondentDirectorof Customs andExcise communicatedtohim by letterda- 2459 SavvidesJ. Boyadjis v.Republic
(1988)\ ted 20th June, 1986,deprivinghimof the benefit topossesssa duty-free carandorderingthepaymentoftheimportdutyonthe saidcarandalsoofafineinrespectofcustomsoffences. TheapplicantisarepatriatedCypriotwhohavingsettledinthe United Statesfor a number ofyearsreturnedtoCyprusfor the 5 purposeofpermanentsettlement Under the provisions of sub-heading 19of item 0.1 of the CustomsandExciseDutiesLaw,theapplicantbeingentitled toa duty-free par upon his repatriation, was permitted toimport a Mercedes car under Registration R.R. 928freeof importduty. 10 Thepermitwasgrantedundercertainconditionswhichappearin AppendixAtotheoppositiononeofwhich,condition (d),wasas follows: "The vehicle shall only be used by you and your dependantsand shall not belent,hired,exchanged,given awayor 15 otherwisedisposedofintheRepublicwithoutthepriorwritten authorityoftheDirectorofCustoms uponyourapplication." InMay, 1986,itcametotheknowledgeoftherespondentthat the saidcarwaspossessedandusedbythesonoftie applicant and hisdaughter-in-law in breach of thecondition endorsed on 20 thepermitfor thegrantofacarfreeofimportduty.Inpursuance with theinvestigation inquestion customsofficials visited the houseofhissonandfoundthecarparkedin theparkingplaceof hishouse andconfiscated samebyvirtueoftheprovisionsofthe relevant legislation.Applicant'sdaughter-in-lawmadeastatement 25 totheeffect thatthecarwasdriven byher andherhusbandbut theyweremostlyusingitforapplicant'sbenefit. Afewdayslater applicant's sonattended thecustoms department andhanded over aletter addressed totherespondent thecontentsof which readthefollows: ^ "Iamthe owner of aMercedescar underregistration RR 928.1understand thatthepermit which wasgrantedtometo circulatethesaidcarhasbeensuspendedandIrequestthatthe 2460 3C.L.R, Boyadjis v.Republic SawidesJ. necessary arrangementsbemadefor thepaymentof theimport dutyclaimedasIamnotinapositiontodrivesuchcar." . 5 v Onthe22ndMay, 1986,theapplicantaddressedanewletter totherespondentrequestingthereturnofhiscarbecauseheneededitforthepurposessetoutinthesaidletterwhichwere: (a)Thathewasaninvalid andcouldnotdrive;and (b)Thecarwasuseddailybyhissonanddaughter-in-law for histransportationto,thedoctorforphysiotherapy,his transportationtotheclubandgenerallyforhisneeds.Thereason whythe 10 carwasparked at thehouseof hisson anddaughter-in-law accordingtohisletterwasbecause haditbeenparkednearhisown houseit would havebeen difficult for his son and daughter-inlawtouseitforservinghim. Writtenstatementsweretakenfrom theapplicantandhisson 15 (AppendicesE.F.G. totheopposition)inwhichitis admittedat thatthecarwasinthepossession ofapplicant's son anddaughter-in-lawbutitisallegedthattheywereusingitfor applicant's needs.Applicant's sontriedtothrowtheblame tothecustoms officials whograntedthepermittohisfather withouthavingex20 plainedtohimtheconditionthatthecarshouldbepossessedand usedexclusivelybytheapplicantandnotbyanyotherperson. Onthe20thJune,1986,theCustomsDepartmentinformedthe applicant andhissonthattheircontraventionsamounted tocustomsoffences whichcouldbesettledwiththepaymentof£300.25 fine eachandthatthecarwouldbereturned tothemiftheypaid theimportdutyonthesaidcaramountingto£14,027.26. Applicantbyletterofhisadvocatedated27thJune, 1986ad\ dressedtotherespondent,asked forinformation concerningthe reasonsfor theconfiscation of hiscar,particularsof thealleged 30 customsoffences andthereasonsrelieduponforreachingadecisionthattheapplicantwasnotentitledtoimportdutyreliefforhis car. 2461 SavvidesJ. Boyadjis v.Republic
(1988)By letter dated 14th July, 1986, therespondent supplied the information requested. The contents of such letter read as fol lows: "Irefer toyourletterdated27.6.86andwishtoinform you thattheaforesaid carhasbeenconfiscated asliable toconfiscation on thebasis of s. 158 of the Customs and Excise Law, 1967 because ithasbeen ascertainedthattherehasbeenavio lationof theconditionsofrelief from importduty. 5 Criminalproceedings may beinstitutedagainst CharalambosBoyadjis for contraventionof theconditionsfor the relief 10 granted tohimby virtue ofs. 192A and/orfor fraudulenteva sion of duties by virtue of s.191
(1)(b)andagainst Antonios Boyadjis for fraudulent evasion of importdutiesand/orunlaw ful possession by virtue of Article 191
(1)(a)of the aforesaid I have notdecided thatyour client is notentitled to relief from importduty butIhave ascertained thattheconditionsof item01.19 of theFourth Scheduleof theCustomsandExcise DutiesLaw, 1978 have beenviolated andthecaris subject to confiscation. χ Within themargins of asettlement,apower granted to me bys.178 of theCustomsandExcise Law, 1967,1 willbepre pared instead of taking criminalproceedings toaccept acash paymentof £300.-by eachof thesuspects andinsteadofpro ceedingtoconfiscate thecartoreturnsameafter theimportdu- 25 tiesamountingto£14,027.26 arepaid." Inreplytotheabove lettercounselfor applicantby letterdated 18th July, 1986, informed therespondent that his clients were preparedtopay thesums mentionedintheletterof the 14thJuly, 1986,with reservation of theirrightsandatthesametimedenied 30 thattheycommittedanyoffence inrespectof theforfeited car. Therespondent in theexercise of his power under s. 178 of 2462 20 3C.L.R. - Boyadjis v.Republic SavvidesJ. the Customs and Excise Law, 1967,accepted the offer, compoundedtheoffences andreturnedthecartotheapplicant.Subsequently,theapplicantfiledthepresentrecoursechallengingthe decisionoftherespondentandprayingfor: 5 (a)AdeclarationoftheCourtthatthedecisionoftherespondentDirectorofCustomsandExcisedated20thJune,1986,that theapplicantcannotpossesssuchcarwithoutthepaymentofduty isnullandvoidandofnoeffect whatsoever,(b)thatthedecision oftherespondentdated20thJune,1986, toorderthepaymentof 10 theimportdutyforcarRR928andtherelevantfineisnulland voidandofnoeffect whatsoever. Thegroundsoflawonwhichtherecourseisbasedassetout thereinare: Thatthesubjudicedecisioniscontrarytothelawandthereg15 ulations;itisarbitrary,unreasonable andoppressiveand violates thevestedrightoftheapplicantandiscontrarytotherulesofnaturaljustice;itwastakeninexcessand/orinabuseofpowers;it lacksduereasoningandwastakenbyawrongprocedure. Counselforapplicantbyherwrittenaddressexpoundedonthe 20 groundsoflawadvancedinsupportoftherecourse.Shesubmittedthatthefact thatapplicantwasaninvalidwasknown tothe respondentasatthetime ofhisarrivalinCyprusandvisittothe customs' offices he was supported by crutches and, therefore, thisfactshouldhavebeentakenintoconsiderationbytherespon25 dentinexercisinghisdiscretion toimposecondition (d)onthe permitgrantedtotheapplicant.Theapplicantauthorizedtheuse ofthecarbyhisson anddaughter-in-lawforthepurposeofdrivingitinordertoservehisownneedsinthesamewayasifhehad hiredadrivertodriveit.Underthelawarepatriatedfamilyisen3» titled toonecarandsuchcarcanbedrivenbythemembersofthe family ofthepersonimportingthecar.Therefore,theinterpretationgivenbytherespondent thatdependentpersonsmeanspersons who aredepended on theperson entitled to suchreliefis wrong.Inthecircumstances,counsel added,therewasnoalter2463 SavvidesJ. Boyadjis v.Republic
(1988)native for theapplicantwho was aninvalid buttoask his sonto drive sameonhisown accountandfor his benefit. She further contended thattheimposition of a fine andthe confiscation of thecar were illegal andthattherespondent has nevergivenanyreason for hisdecision. 5 Counselfor therespondent,ontheotherhand, contended that thedecision of therespondent dated 20th June, 1986, is notan executory administrative act and what should have been chal lenged inthiscase is thedecision of the 15thMay, 1986,for the confiscation of thecar. She further contendedthattheapplicant 10 acceptedtheadministrative actandoffered topay theimportduty in question andby his letter shortly after theconfiscation of the caracceptedtopay tax withoutanyprotestagainst thedecision of therespondenttoconfiscate thecarandwithout any reservation, thus, having deprived himself of any legitimate right hemight 15 have had. Shefinally contendedthatthesubjudicedecision was proper ly takenundertheprovisions of thelaw as theapplicant clearly contravenedtheconditionssubject towhich therelieffromimport duty was granted tohim. 20 I shall dealfirstwiththefirstprayerofapplicant. Thesubjudice confiscation was effected by virtue of the pro visionsof s. 158 of theCustomsandExcise Law, 1967 (Law 82/ 67) whichprovides as follows: "158.-
(1)Εάνδυνάμει οιασδήποτε διατάξεως τουπα- 25 ρόντοςήετέρουτινόςΝόμουήεθίμου,δι'ης (α)επιτρέπεταιόπως εμπορεύματα υποκείμεναειςτελωνειακόν δασμόν παραδοθώσιν άνευτηςπληρωμής τουαναλογούντοςαυτοίςδασμού,επίτωόρωότιταύτα δεν θαπωληθώσινήθαεπανεξαχθώσινήεπίπαρομοίω 30 τινίόρωή 2464 3 CX.R. 5 10 15 Boyadjis v. Republic Savvides J. (β)το ποσόν του πληρωτέου εφ*οιωνδήποτε εμπορευμά των δασμού ήρτηται εκ της εισαγωγής αυτών επί παρομοίω όρω, επιτροπή η παράδοσις εμπορευμάτων άνευ πληρωμήςτουαναλογούντοςαυτοίςδασμούήεπίτηπληρωμή δασμού υπόλογισθέντος συμφώνως προς την εν λόγω διάταξινή έθιμον και ο όρος δεν τηρηθή, ταεμπο ρεύματαυπόκεινται εις δήμευσιν, εκτός εάνη μητήρησις τουόρουέτυχεντηςεγκρίσεως τουΔιευθυντού.
(2)'Αι δατάξεις του παρόντος άρθρου τυγχάνούσιν εφαρμογής» ανεξαρτήτως εάνπαρεσχέθηδέσμευσις ήεγγύισης,διατηντήρησιν τουόρουήδιατηνκαταβολήντου πληρωτέουανεξαρτήτωςτηςτοιαύτηςδεσμεύσεως ή εγγυή 1 σεως δασμού,η δε δήμευσις εμπορευμάτων δυνάμει του παρόντος άρθρουουδόλως επηρεάζειτην ένοχήν του πα-. ρασχόντος τηντοιαύτηνδέσμευσανή εγγύησινπρόσωπου." andinEnglish itreads: "158.
(1)If by virtue of any provision of this or any other Law orunderany practice whereby - 20 25 30 (a)goodschargeable with aduty of customs areallowedto be delivered without payment of that duty on condition that they will not be notsoldor will be re-exported or upon any otherlikecondition;or (b) theamountof customs duty payable onany goodsde pends on their being imported on any such condition, any goodsareallowedtobedeliveredwithout payment of dutyor onpayment of duty calculated in accordance with that provi sion orpractice, andthecondition is notobserved,the goods, shall,unlessthenon-observance was sanctioned by the Direc tor, beliableto forfeiture.
(2)Theprovisionsof thissection shallapply whether ornot any undertaking orsecurity hasbeen givenfor the observance of thecondition or for thepayment of theduty payable apart 2465 SavvidesJ. Boyadjis v.Republic
(1988)therefrom, and theforfeiture of anygoods underthissection shallnot affect anyliabilityofanypersonwhohasgivenany suchundertakingorsecurity." Itisclearfrom theabovethatconfiscation mayberesortedto whentheconditions,whichareimposedfor theexemptionfrom 5 payment of import duty are notcomplied with.The questions whichariseare: (
- a)Whether the condition in question, condition (
- d)in the presentcase,couldbeimposed,and; (b)Whethertherewasabreachofsuchcondition. 10 Theaforesaid questionsand thequestionofconfiscation ofa car imported duty-free whenthereisabreachof suchcondition wererecentlyconsideredanddecided inthecaseofEleniErodotouv.TheRepublic
(1987)3C.L.R.874byA.Loizou,J.(ashe thenwas).Thefacts inthatcaseweresubstantially thesameasin 15 thepresent caseandthelawapplicablehasbeenextensivelyand lucidly statedbymybrotherJudgeA.Loizou (nowPresidentof thisCourt).Hehadthistosayinhisjudgmentatpp.879,880: "The condition in question was imposed in exercise of powers under thefirstparagraph of the4th Schedule of the 20 CustomsandExciseDutiesLaw 1978(LawNo. 18of 1978), whichprovides: 'Goods of the classes described in each of the following sub-headings,imported byoronbehalfandfor usebythe persons, bodies, authorities or organisations mentioned 25 therein.' Theexemption wasformulated on thebasisof theabove provisions but by giving a wider interpretation to the term 'persons' in that it included, besides applicant, her dependents.Buteven intheabsenceoftheabovelegislativeprovi- 30 sions.therespondentscould,byvirtueof s.l1
(1)of thesame 2466 3C.L.R. Boyadjis v.Republic SavvidesJ. lawimposeconditionsandrestrictions. Section 11
(1)reads: > < ' goodsmay beimported free of import duty for use bycertainprivileged personsundersuchconditionsas.the Director,mayimposefortheprotectionoftherevenue.' 5 Inview(oftheabovelegislativeprovisionstheDirectorwas . entitledinLawtoimposecondition(d). t- 0 Inresolving the issue whether the said condition wasinfringed needarisestoconsiderthenotionofdependent.Inthe relevantRegulatoryAdministrativeActNo. 188of 1982there isnodefinition oftheterm'dependent'though wefindsucha definition inRegulatory AdministrativeActNo.296of 1973 whichprovides: Dependentofapersonmeans:(a)Hiswifeorherhusband;and 5 (b)iIncludesanyotherpersonfully ormainly/maintainedby himorfound underhissupervisionandcare;! Q Butevenifsuchdefinition isnotapplicable.wehavetogive tothetermdependentitsordinary meaning.,Itbeinganundisputedfactthatapplicant's.daughterisaged36andisemployed onapermanentbasis,asa lecturerattheHigherTechnologicalInstitute,shecannot beconsidered astheapplicant'sdependent.And,also,itbeinganundisputedfactthatthecarwas solelyusedbyherforherownpurposeswecannotbutarrive attheconclusionthattherewasabreachofcondition. 5 Inviewofthisconclusiontherespondentwasfullyentitled inlaw,byvirtueof theaforesaid section 158toproceedwith confiscation; andhisdecisionsotodo wasreasonablyopento himonthebasisofthematerialbeforehim. 2467 / SawidesJ. Boyadjis v. Republic
(1988)Thesubmissionoflearnedcounselunder(a)aboveisclearlyuntenable.Thisissobecauseineffect itquestionsthevalidityoftheoriginaldecision whichwastakenon 1stDecember 1984.Insuchdecision condition (d)wasincludedinexpress, clearandunequivocaltermsandapplicant wasperfectly enti- 5 tiedtoquestionitwithin thetimeprescribedbytheConstitution.Andonceshefailed todosoattheappropriatetimeshe cannotclaimrelief belatedlybycontendingthatasrespondent hadknowledgeofherinabilitytodrivehecouldnotactcontroversially.Theinabilitytodrive,andtheimportationofthecar, ,, notwithstanding such inability, aswell asthe acceptanceof condition (d)areherownproblemand affair andshecannot blametheadministration.Therefore,inviewof alltheabove prayer
(1)mustfail." Ifully adopttheaboveopinionforthepurposesofthepresent case. Itisanundisputed fact inthepresentcasethatthesonofthe applicantandhisdaughter-in-lawarenotdependentontheapplicant Applicant's sonisamerchant andhelivesseparately from theapplicantwithhisfamilyconsistingofhiswifeandJhreechil- ^ dren. Applicant's son owned a Mercedes car which he sold in 1985thesameyearin which applicant wasgranteda permitto importthecarinquestionduty-free.Bynostretchofimagination, in the circumstancesof thepresentcase,canapplicant's sonbe considered asadependentoftheapplicantwithinthemeaningof theLaw. In the circumstances of the case there has been clearly a breachoftheconditionimposedandtherespondentwasfullyentitled,intheexerciseofhispowersunders. 158oftheCustoms andExciseLaw,1967,toconfiscate thecar. What theapplicant however,ischallenging by thisprayeris not the confiscation of the car which waseffected on the 15th May, 1986,but thedecision oftherespondent thatapplicant is notentitledtoaduty-free car. 2468 Z 3C.L.R. 5 Q 5 Boyadjisv.Republic SavvidesJ. Oncetheactof confiscation, which asIhavealready found waslawfully taken,has not been challenged, it waswithin the powersof therespondent unders.158toimposeconditions for thereturnofthecarandclaimthepaymentoftheimportdutydue onsuchcar.Thematterwasoneofexercisebyhimofhisdiscretion anditiswellsettledthatthisCourtcannotinterferewithsuch discretionifdueweighthasbeengiventoallmaterialfactsandit hasnotbeenbasedonamisconceptionoflaworfact.(See,inter alia,Merckv.TheRepublic
(1972)3CLJt. 548, etc) Theonlyquestion whichremains,from thesecondprayer,to beconsidered,isthequestionoftheimpositionofthefinetothe applicant.Itisclearthatthedecisionoftherespondenttoimpose afineof£300.-onhissonisnotbeingchallenged ashissonhas notfiledarecourseinrespectthereof. InS.Raftis Co.Ltd.v.TheMunicipalityofPaphos
(1981)3 C.L.R!497atpp.501,502itwasdecidedasfollows: "TherevisionaljurisdictionofthisCourtunderArticle146 of theConstitution,isconfined todecisionsandactsoromissionsofanyorgan,authorityorpersonexercising anyexecuQ tive or administrative authority anddoes notextend toother actsthatdonotcomewithinthiscategory.InthecaseofPhediasKyriakides andTheRepublic,1R.S.C.C.p.66,itwas heldthatactsofthepolicemanifestly necessary tolead upto and closely interwoven with prospective criminal proceed<ings,didnotconstituteanexerciseof'executiveoradministrative authority'withinthemeaningofArticle 146oftheConstitution. • * « AfortioripunishmentsimposedbyCourtsintheexerciseof their criminaljurisdictionandtheir executiondonotconstitute anexerciseof'executiveoradministrativeauthority'withinthe meaningofthesaidArticle. AlsointhecaseofCharilaosXenophontosandTheRepublic,2R.S.C.C.p.89it washeld that theexercise of theau2469 SavvidesJ. Boyadjis v.Republic
(1988)thority of theAttorney-Generaltoinstitutecriminal proceed ingswas notwithintheambitof Article 146.1of the Constitu tion asbeingclosely relatedtojudicial proceedingsin criminal cases andtherefore thisCourthadnojurisdictioninthematter. In the case of ModestosPistillos v. Elias Aristodemou 5
(1969)3 C.L.R. p. 226, Hadjianastassiou, J. at p. 230 had thisto say:With regard tothetrueconstructionof paragraph 1 of Arti cle 146,it becomes very clear,inmy view,fromwhatI havealready said,thatthejurisdictionof thisCourtiscon- 10 fined only andexclusively tomattersconcerningadeci sion, act or omission of any organ, authority orperson exercising executive oraa^ninistrariveauthorityandhas no jurisdictionorcompetencetodealwith thedecisionofthe Appeal Court, complainedofinthisrecourse, becauseitis 15 ajudicial decision and,therefore,cannotbemadethe sub ject of arecoursetothisCourtunderthesaid Article 146 of the Constitution.' Nodoubt theproceedings andthejudgments of civiland criminal Courts andthesentences imposed incriminal cases 20 arejudicial acts anddonot comewithin theambitof Article 146of theConstitution.Likewisetheexecutionof suchjudg ments andtheenforcementof punishments areacorollary of thejudicial process andinany event aresocloselyconnected withjudicial actsthatdonotcomewithintheambitof thesaid 25 Article. SeeWhiteHillsLtd. v.TheRepublic
(1970)3C.L.R. 132 p. 134 and where reference is made also toXenofontos and The Republic, 2 R.S.C.C. 89." Section 178of Law 82/67 provides asfollows: "178.-
(1)Εξαιρουμένηςτηςπεριπτώσεως αδικημάτων 30 δυνάμειτωνάρθρων9και 10, οΔιευθυντήςκαιπαςεπί τούτωεξουσιοδοτημένοςυπότουΥπουργικούΣυμβου λίου δύνανται νασυμβιβάζωσινοιονδήποτεαδίκημαή 2470 \ 3 C.L.R. 10 Boyadjis v. Republic Savvides J. πράξιν,ήτιςήθελε διαπραχθήήδι'ηνυπάρχει εύλογος υποψία ότι διεπράχθηυπό τινός προσώπου κατάπα ρέκκλιση ήπαράβασιν των διατάξεωνοιουδήποτε των' περίΤελωνείων ήΦόρωνΚαταναλώσεωςΝόμων, υπό όρους-καθοριζόμενους υπ'αυτώνκατά το-δοκούν,κέ. κτηνται δε πλήρη εξουσίαν, όπως άποδέχώνται εκ του προσώπουτούτουχρηματικήνπλήρωμήν, μη υπερβαίνουσαν την ανώτατηνχρηματικήνποινήντην προβλεπομένην υπότινός τελωνειακού νόμου διατο τοιούτο αδίκημαήπράξιν.
(2)ΕπίτηπληρωμήτουτοιούτουποσούειςτονΔιευθυντήν ή εξουσιοδοτημένον λειτουργόν, απαγορεύεταιη λήψις περαιτέρω δικαστικών μέτρων δια το εν λόγω αδίκημα ήπράξιςεναντίον τουούτω συμβιβασθέντως, εάνδεούτοςτελήυπόκράτησιναφίεται ελεύθερος." andinEnglish itreads: "178-
(1)Saveinrespect of any of theoffences under sec tions 9 and 10,the Director and any officer authorised in thatbehalf by theCouncilof Ministers, may compound any offence oractcommitted orreasonably suspected of having been committed by any person againstorin contravention of the provisions of any Customs and Excise Laws, on such conditions as they may think proper, with full power to accept from such person apayment in money, not ex ceeding themaximum fine provided for underany customs law for such offence oract.
(2)Onpayment of such sum totheDirector or authorized officer, further legalproceedings inrespect of thatparticular offence or act against the person who has been so compoun-ded areprohibited and, if heis incustody, heshall be discharged." Itis clear from the contents of theabove section thatcom pounding isresorted toinlieuof criminal proceedings andthat af2471 SavvidesJ. Boyadjis v.Republic
(1988)tercompounding thetakingofanyCourtproceedingsinrespect oftheallegedoffence isprohibited. In thisrespect I sharetheviewexpressed byA.Loizou,J.in Erodotou v. The Republic (supra) "that the compounding is closelyinterwoven withcriminalproceedingandassuchitdoes 5 notconstituteanexerciseofexecutiveoradministrativeauthority withinthemeaningofArticle146oftheConstitution". Havingfound asaboveIconsideritunnecessary todealwith anyotherlegalobjections. Intheresultthisrecoursefails andisherebydismissed butin 10 thespecialcircumstancesofthiscaseImakenoorderforcosts. Recoursedismissed. Noorderastocosts. 2472