clr/1988/1988_3_2537.pdf

(2)(b)—Directorhaspower todiscontinueit—Suchpower may be exercised withoutprior reference of the matter to the Medical Board. 5 10 Revocationofadministrativeact—Discontinuanceofadisabilitypension upon evidencethattherecipientwasinfact capableofworking, butwithoutpurportingtotakebackbenefitsalreadygiven—Itdoesnotconstitutearevocationofthedecision tograntthepension. On 14.10.85 theapplicantwasgrantedretrospectivelyadisabilitypensiononthegroundthathewas"incapableofwork". Following thegatheringofevidencethattheapplicantwasinfactworking in his wife's supermarket the respondent decided to discontinue the pensionasfrom1.8.87. Thequestionsthatarosefordeterminationwere: 15 (a)Whetherthesubjudiceactwasarevocatoryact; 2537 Symillosv.Republic

(1988)(b)WhetherpowerwasvestedintheDirectortodiscontinuethepension;and (c)Whether,ifsuchpowerexists,itcouldbeexercisedwithoutfirst referringthemattertotheMedicalBoard. Held,dismissingtherecourse. 5

(1)Thesubjudicedecisiondoesnotrevokethedecisionof14.10.85 nordoesitpurporttodeprivetheapplicantofthebenefitshereceivedthereunder.Itisanewdecisiongroundedonafindingthatapplicantwascapable ofworkandforthatreasondisqualified fromreceivingapensionoftotal disability. 10

(2)Thepaymentofadisabilitypensionissubjecttotheapplicantremainingincapableofwork. Thisistheeffect oftheunambiguousprovisionsofsubsection2ofs.38.

(3)Referraltoamedicalboardisnotaprerequisiteforadecisionunder s.38eithertogrant,withholdordiscontinueadisabilitypension.Itisa 15 matterofdiscretionfortheexaminerofclaimswhethertheopinionofa medicalboardshouldbesought(seeprovisotos.74

(2)(b)). Recoursedismissed. Noorderastocosts. Casesreferredto: 20 Terzisv.TheRepublic

(1979)3CL.R.477; Hadjiyiorkiv. TheRepublic

(1977)3C.LR.

1. Recourse. Recourse against the decision of the respondents to discontinueapplicant'sdisability pension. T.Papadopoulos, for the applicant. G.Erotokntou (Mrs.), SeniorCounsel oftheRepublic, for the respondents. Cur. adv. vult. 2538 25 3 C.L.R. 5 1Λ Symillos v.Republic PIKIS J. read the following judgment. On 14th October, 1985,theapplicantwas declaredtobeincapableofwork andwas grantedonthataccountadisability pensionundertheSocialInsu­ ranceLaw 1980 (Law41/80).Thedecisionhadretroactive effect andcoveredtheperiodfollowingaheartattackthatrenderedhim, according toa finding of theDirector, incapable of work.The heart attackwas suffered in 1983.Following this affliction and hisheartcondition, hisserviceswiththeMunicipalityof Limassol cametoanend. Thedecision topension himcovered the period following theterminationofhisemploymentwith the Municipali­ Thepension was discontinued from 1.8.87 following anin­ quiry by theInspectorateof theMinistryofLabourandSocialIn­ 1S suranceintohiscapacity towork. Thedecisionwas dulycommunicatedtotheapplicant on 18.8.
2. Ontwo separate occasions inspectorsof theMinistryvisitedthesupermarketor department storeofhiswife atLimassol withaviewtoinquiringintothedo­ ingsof theapplicantatthebusiness ofhiswifethathevisiteddai­ ly andspent long periods during work hours..Theirvisits gave the inspectors first-hand knowledge of what he was doing:He supervised work on thefirst floor of the department,directed shoprassistants whenever necessary inthedischarge of theirdu­ ties,andpersonally served customers whenever occasion arose. Infact, hehelpedoneof theinspectors buy abelt.Also,he was : inchargeofthecash register. Statementsobtainedfromshop-assistants confirmed thatthe applicantvisited thebusiness of his wife daily andthathetook : partinthe transactionof business albeitalimitedone.Onlyin the absence of his wife -the manageress of the business -he as30 sumed anything akin tomanagerial duties.Usually, he confined himself tohis task andoccasionally occupiedhimself with the cash register. 35 Although thestatementsoftheshop-assistants attributedto the applicantalessactiveroleatthestorethanthe inspectorshadoccasion towitness himperform, theinescapable inferencefrom 2539 PikisJ. Symillosv.Republic

(1988)theirstatementstoo,isthattheapplicantrenderedservicestothe business betraying, nodoubt, capacity toperform workof that kind. InthelightoftheevidentialmaterialbeforetheDirector,itwas attheleastreasonably opentohim,ifnotinevitable,toconclude 5 thatapplicantwascapableofdoingtheworkthathewascarrying outatthebusinessofhiswife.Giventhisfinding,twoquestions mustbeanswered(a)whetherpowervested intheDirectortodiscontinuethepensionand,if so, (b)whetherthiscouldbedonewithoutreferenceanewtoamedicalboardsummonedundertheSocialInsuranceLaw(s.74). Counselfortheapplicantsubmittedthatthesubjudicedecision is of arevocatory nature and as such ought toconform to the principles governing thevalidity ofrevocatory decisions.Ican- 15 not,withrespect,agreethatthisisthenatureofthedecisionunder consideration. The subjudice decision does notrevoke the decisionof 14.10.85nordoesitpurport todeprivetheapplicant of the benefits he received thereunder. It is a new decision groundedonafindingthatapplicantwascapableofwork- Jfor 20 thatreasondisqualifiedfromreceivingapensionoftotaldisability.Theterm"incapableofwork"defined ins.2oftheSocialInsuranceLaw wasthesubjectofextensivediscussioninTerzisv. Republic

(1979)3C.L.R.477.Itoriginatesfrom theEnglishInsuranceAct 1946and, astheCourtobservedintheabovecase, 25 guidancemaybederivedfromtheinterpretationofthetermmade by socialinsurancecommissionersinEngland.Verybriefly,"incapableofwork"conveysthenotionoftotalincapacityforwork by reason of some specific diseaseorbodily ormentaldisablement. (See, also, Savvas C.Hadjiyiorkiv. Republic

(1977)3 ~0 C.L.R.144).Doc powervestintheDirectorofSocialInsurance todiscontinueadisablementpension?Theanswerisinthe affirmativeinviewoftheplainprovisionsoftheenactmentwherebya totaldisabilitypensionmaybegranted,notablys.38ofthelaw. 2540 10 3 C.L.R. Symillosv. Republic PikisJ. Infact,thepaymentofadisabilitypensionissubjecttotheapplicantremainingincapableofwork.Thisistheeffect oftheunambiguousprovisionsofsubsection2ofs.38thatprovides:5 "Subjecttotheprovisionsofs.58disabilitypensionispaid from therelevantdatewhilsttheinsuredremainspermanently incapableofworkandhasnotreachedpensionableage." Consequently,therewaspowerintheDirector todiscontinue thepension. Thelastquestionthatrequiresanansweriswhetherthiscould 10 bedonewithoutreferencetoamedicalboard.Referraltoamedicalboardisnotaprerequisitefor adecisionunders.38eitherto grant,withholdordiscontinue adisabilitypension.Itisamatter ofdiscretion fortheexaminerofclaimswhethertheopinionofa medical board should besought (seeproviso to s.74

(2)(b)). 15 Nonreferenceofthequestiontoamedicalboardinthiscasewas, inthelightoftheevidenceavailable,areasonablecourse.There wasampleevidencefromwhichitcouldbeinferredthatapplicant attendedthebusinessofhiswifeoveralongperiodof time;that ,heperformed workatthebusinessofakindindicatingcapacityto 20 work.Hence,theomissiontoreferthemattertoamedicalboard wasnotfraught withanyabuseorexcessofpower. Inthelightoftheabove,therecourseisdismissed,thesubjudicedecisionisconfirmed pursuanttotheprovisionsofpara.4 (b)ofarticle146oftheConstitution. 25 Lettherebenoorderastocosts: Recoursedismissed. Noorderastocosts. 2541