(1988)1988December21 [BOYADJIS,J.] INTHEMATTEROFARTICLE146OFTHECONSTITUTION CARAMONDANIBROS.LTD., Applicants, v. THECYPRUSATHLETICORGANISATION, Respondents. (CaseNo.566/86). Tenders—Principlesgoverning theexerciseofthediscretion—Reviewofauthorities. Tenders—Belatedawardoftender—Inthecircumstancesanonmaterialirregularity. Theapplicantimpugnsthevalidityofthedecisionoftherespondentsto awardtotheinterestedparty thetenderfor thefloodlighting servicesofa stadiumatLarnaca. 5 Clause6oftheprescribedtenderformprovidedasfollows: "Weagreetoabidebythistenderfortheperiodofthree
(3)calendar monthsfrom thedatefixed forreceivingthesameanditshallremain bindinguponusandmaybeacceptedatanytimebeforetheexpiration ofthatperiod". 10 Therespondents awarded thetender totheinterested party,whohad submittedthelowesttender,wellafter theexpirationoftheperiodprovided intheaforesaid Clause6.Applicant'scomplaint wasthetimelinessofthe 15 award. Afterreferringtotheprinciplesgoverningtheexerciseofthepowerto awardatender,thecourt, 2542 3 C.L.R. Caramondani v. Κ.Ο.A. Held,dismissingtherecourse:' 5
(1)Therespondent'sactiondidnotresultandcould'nothaveresulted to anyunfair advantagetotheinterestedpartyovertheapplicantsnortoany inequalityoftreatmentofthetendererswhohadsubmittedtheseveralinitial tenders: , 4
(2)Theeffect of clause.6ofthe:prescribed TenderForm (supra) was thattheinterestedpartywhoseinitial1tenderwas acceptedby thesub-judice decision hadtherighttorefuse toabideby thetermsthereof, if itsochose, duetoitsbelatedacceptanceby therespondents. 10 15
(3)The irregularity in:the'procedure followed by the respondents, whichisrestrictedtothe timelinessof theacceptance,wasneitheramaterial• irregularitynoranirregularitythatviolatestheprincipleofgoodadministra tion. Recoursedismissed: Noorderastocosts.. Casesreferredto: George D. Kounnas & SonsLtd. andAnother v. TheRepublic
(1972),'3 CX.R. 542; /.N. Christoftaes TradingLtd. v.TheRepublic
(1985)3CLJ*.546;, Matsouka (No. 2)v. TheRepublic
(1985)3C.L.R.686; MedconConstructionandOthersv. TheRepublic
(1968)3 C.LSL535; K. andM. Transport Co.Ltd. v.Eteria Fortigon Aftokiniton and Others
(1987)3C.L.R. 1939. Recourse. 25 Recourseagainstthedecisionof therespondentstoawardthe tender for the flood-lighting services of the Athletic Centre G.S.Z.atLamacatotheinterestedpartyinsteadoftheapplicants. G.Michaelides, for theapplicants. 2543 Caramondaniv.K.O.A.
(1988)Μ.Christofides, for the respondents. Cur. adv. vult. BOYADJIS J.readthefollowingjudgment By thepresent re coursetheapplicantsseek adeclarationof theCourtthat:"Thede cisionof theRespondentswhichwas communicatedtothe Appli- 5 cantsby letterdated8July 1986 (Exh.A) whereby thetenderof theApplicants for theflood-lightingservicesof theAthleticCen tre G.S.Z.atLamaca was rejected andinstead thetenderof an other tenderer was accepted,is null and void and of no effect whatsoever". Thehistory of events thatled totheinstitution of thepresent proceedings is briefly this: InAugust 1985 therespondents invited tendersfor the flood lighting services of the Athletic CentreGSZat Larnaca which should be submitted by 28 September 1985. Thetendersprovi- 15 dedfor floodlighting servicessuitable for immediateinstallation of black andwhite television system with possibility of futurein stallation of colour television system. By their letters dated 11 September 1985 and 8 October 1985, therespondents extended thetimefor thesubmission of thetendersuntil 12October 1985, 20 and31October 1985, respectively. Term No. 2 of the Instructions totheTenders provided that tenders should be made on the tender form appendedthereto. Qause'6 of theprescribed tenderform provided thefollowing: "We agree toabideby thistenderfor theperiodof three
(3)25 calendarmonthsfrom thedatefixed forreceiving thesame and it shall remain binding uponus and may be accepted at any timebefore theexpiration ofthatperiod." Pursuanttotheabove, theapplicants andtheinterested party duly submitted their respective tenders on the aforesaid tender 30 form, together with othertenderers.Thatof theinterested party 2544 \ 10 3C.L.R. Caramondaniv.K.O.A. Boyadjis J. wasfor asumof£182,890andwasthelowestofall.Thatofthe applicantswasthesixthlowertender. 5 Bytheirletter dated 3February 1986therespondentsasked the applicants to submit by March 3, 1986, later extended to March26, 1986,anadditionaltenderforfloodlightingservices suitableonlyforblackandwhitetelevisionsysteminaccordance withthespecifications therein setout Theapplicantsdulysubmittedtheiradditionaltenderwhichwasthelowestofall'otheradditionaltenders. 10 Bytheirletterdated8July1986therespondentsinformedthe applicantsthat,havingconsideredthewholematterinthelightof theoriginalandtheadditionaltenderssubmittedtothem,they(the respondents)ultimatelydecidedtomakeinstallationswhichpermitfurther extension of thefloodlighting servicesrequired for 15 coloured T.V. and that,inviewof theabove,having evaluated applicant'stender,theydecidedrorejectsame,andacceptthetender submitted by another tenderer (the interested party) which wasmoreadvantageous.' 2o Itiscommongroundthatthesub-judicedecisionwas reached on 3 June 1986, i.e. more than four months after 31 January 1986whentheaforesaid periodofthreecalendarmonths,stated intheinitialtenders,hadexpired. Feelingaggrievedwiththeaforementioneddecisiontheapplicantsseektohaveitannulledthroughthepresentrecourse filed 25 on 10September 1986onthefollowing groundsoflaw: "1. Thedecision wastaken incontravention of theconditionssubjecttowhichthetendershadbeeninvited. 30 2.Thetenderwasawardedtoanothertendereronthebasis oftenderswhoseValidityhadexpiredandnotonthebasisoftenderswhichwerevalidatthetimeoftheaward. 3. The decision was taken in excess and/or in abuse of 2545 Boyadjis J. Caramondani v. Κ.ΟΛ.
(1988)powerand/orinanirregularmanner. 4.Thedecision was takenasaresultof misconception regard ingthefacts and/orthe law." In theOpposition of therespondentOrganisation itis alleged thatthesub-judice decisionislawful ineveryrespectandthatitis; 5 theoffspring ofacorrectandfair exercise ofdiscretionary power. Theinterestedparty,thoughduly servedwith noticeof thesepro ceedings, hasnotappeared andhasnottakenanypart therein. In his written address learnedcounsel for theapplicants sub mittedthatthesub-judice decision was takeninexcessand/orin 10 abuse of power and/orin anirregular mannerfor thefollowing reasons:
(1)Therespondentsdid notaward thetenderon the basis of thevalidtenderswhich theyhadinvited on3 Febru ary 1986 (after theexpiry of thefirsttenders)thelow- 15 estof which was theonesubmitted by the applicants. (ii)TTie respondentsawarded thetendertoanothertenderer on thebasisof theinitial tenderswhich hadexpiredon 31January 1986,withoutaskingthe tendererswhohad submitted themtoeitherrenew themortosubmitafresh 20 theirtendersonthebasisof theoriginal specifications. Therefore,counsel added,theaward of thetender was doneonthebasisof invalid tenders. (iii)Furthermore,in awarding thetender,the respondents actedwhilstlabouring underamisconceptioninrelation 25 tothefacts and/ortheLawinthattheytreatedtheinitial tendersasvalidtendersasatthetimeof theawardand/ orinthattheytreatedthemselves entitledtoaward the tenderonthebasisof theinitialtenders. (iv)Whereas intheirmeetingof 20May 1086,therespon- 30 dentshadprovisionally decidedtoadoptthealternative 2546 3C.L.R. Caramondani v.K.O.A. Boyadjis J. solution ofblackandwhiteT.V. system,inrespectofwhich theapplicantshadsubmittedthelowesttender,thereisnodue oranyreasoningwhytherespondentshadrevertedtothesolution inrespectofwhichtheinitialtendershadbeensubmitted. 5 Insupportofhissubmissionlearnedcounselfortheapplicants citedanumberofauthoritiestowhichIshallreferinduecourse. Inanswertotheabovesubmissions,learnedcounsel for the respondentsallegedthatthey.hadtreatedatalltimesalltheinitial aswellastheadditional tenderssubmitted tothemasvalidand 10 thattheyactedbonafideinthebestinterestoftheOrganisation andofthePublicingeneral.Hedidnotciteanyauthority. Oneoftheauthoritiesrelieduponbytheapplicantsisthedecisionin GeorgeD.Kounnas andSonsLtd. andAnotherv.The Republic through theCyprusPotatoMarketingBoard
(1972)3 15 C.L.R.542,where,inawardingthetendertotheinterestedparty,therespondentMarketingBoardfailed toconsideratallthe tendersoftheapplicantsdulysubmittedtoit,becausebyinadvertencetheywerenottakenoutofthetenderbox.Theawardofthe tenderin thosecircumstances wasannulled.Thedecision isan 20 authorityforthepropositionthat:anadministrativedecisionconcerningtendersisthesubjectofjudicialreviewunderArticle146 of the Constitution·,like all other administrative decisions,and. suchdecisionistreatedseparatelyfromanycontractenteredinto bytheadministrativeorganasaresultthereof;andthatthedecide sion isliable tobeannulled if thetenders submitted areconsideredbytheadnunistfation inamannercontrarytotheprinciples of free competition orin anirregularmanneraffecting theoutcomeofsuchconsideration. 30 The*otherauthorityreliedupontheapplicantsisthedecisionin /JV. ChristofidesTradingLtd. v. The Republic throughThe MinisterofFinanceandothers
(1985)3C.L.R.546,wherethe applicants succeededinobtainingadeclaration annullingtherespondent'sdecisionwherebyapplicants'tenderhadbeen rejected andthetenderof theinterestedpartyhadbeen acceptedior the 2547 Boyadjis J. Caramondaniv. Κ.ΟΛ.
(1988)supply and installation of floodlighting services for the aircraft parking apronofPaphosInternationalAirport,onthegroundthat thetenderof theinterestedpartydidnotcomply with thespecifi cations required by the invitation,in thatitdid notprovide for proof of the expected valuesof illuminance without which the 5 tendercouldnotbeevaluated atall Annulling theadministrative decision takenintheabovecircumstances,theCourtheldthat the breachof theconditionof thetenderwas material sinceitmade theevaluationof thetenderimpossible; andthatconsiderationof thetenderin breachof specificconditionsthereof inrelation toa ,« substantial matterinvolved abuse of power andviolation of the principleof equality before the administration,embodiedinArti cle28.1 of the Constitution. Thenextauthoritycitedbylearnedcounselfor theapplicantsis thedecision inPetrosMatsouka(No. 2)v.TheRepublicthrough Λ5 TheMinistry ofInteriorandOthers
(1985)3C.L.R.686, where, in breach of theconditionintheinvitation which provided that tenders should be submitted ina sealed envelope the latest by May21,1982,theinterestedpartieshadsubmitted theirtenderon May 22,1982,after theothertendershadbeenopened,the Court annulled theaward of thetendertotheinterested parties onthe groundthatsuch tenderwas invalid. TheCourtalsoheldthat, in acceptinganinvalid tenderfromthe interestedparties,therespon dentshadactedinabuse ofpowers andinflagrant violation ofthe principles of goodadministration. Anotherinstanceof annulmentby theCourtof theadministra tive decision of acceptanceof atenderwhichdidnotcomplywith a termsetoutintheinvitation for tendersis afforded by thecase oiMedcon Construction andOthers v.TheRepublic(Ministerof Finance and Others)
(1968)3 C.L.R. 535, where the non- 30 complianceconcernedtherequirementthattendersshouldbeac companied by a certificate of fitness of thematerial offered and wheretheCourtstressedthat:(i) tendererswereentitledtoequali tyof treatment:and(ii)toexemptonetenderer(theInterestedPar ty)from compliancewith anexpressedterm'of theinvitation for 35 tenders,andfrom thesanctionforsuchnon-compliance, wasnot 2548 3C.L.R. Caramondani v.K.O.A. Boyadjis J. onlycontrarytogoodandproperadministrationandinabuseand excessofpowers,butalsocontrarytotherequirementforequalityoftreatmentlaiddownbyarticle28.1oftheConstitution. Reference shouldfinallybemadetotherecentdecisionofthe 5 FullBenchinK.&M.TransportCo.Ltdv.EteriaFortigonAftokinitonandOthers
(1987)3C.L.R. 1939,wheretheimplicationsstemmingfrombreach of theconditions stipulated inthe tenderwereexaminedandwherereferenceismadetosomeofthe decisionscitedhereinabove.It washeld that,fromaconsidera10 tion.of thecaselawonthematter,theprinciplewhichemergesis thatstrictcompliancewiththetermsofaconditionofthetender dependsonthematerialityoftheterm;thatatermismaterialifit isconsequentialforthedecisionorifitsobservanceisnecessary for thesustenanceof theefficacy of theadministrativeprocess; that thetimelinessofthetenderisordinarilyafactorconsequential 15 for thedecision becauseon theonehand it ensuresequalityof treatmentamongtenderersand,ontheotherhand,itrulesoutthe possibilityofabusearisingfromanyforewarningtoalatetendereraboutthecontentsoftimelytenders;thatcompliancewiththe time provisionsof theinvitation totenderis,therefore, acondition fortheacceptanceofthetender,andthatatermoftheinvitationtotenderprovidingthattendersshouldbesubmittedthrough thetenderboxwasnotinitself amaterialtermofthetenderbut onlyaproceduraltermdesignedtoensuremaximumefficacy in thesubmissionoftenders. 25 . ., • Closeexaminationofthefactspertainingtothesub-judicedecision,uponwhichtheapplicantsrely,revealsthatintheinstant case the interested party is not being accused with noncompliancewithanymaterialorimmaterialconditionoftheinvi30 tationtotender.Onthecontrary,theInterestedPartyaswellas theApplicantscompliedfully withtherequirementtosubmittheir initialtendersontheprescribedformattached totheInstructions of Tendererswhich formed partof theinvitation totender.The resultwasthat,bydoingso,theybothstipulatedtoabidebytheir 35 respective tendersfor theperiodexpiringon 31January,1986. Thereisnoallegation(nonecouldvalidlybemade)thattheinter2549 BoyadjisJ. Caramondani v.K.CKA.
(1988)estedparty1sinitialtenderwasinvalidwhenitwassubmittedor that, in considering the initial tenders, therespondentsshould have ignored the interested party's tenderfor anyreason whatsoever which did not applytotheapplicants' tender aswellor thattheinterestedpartyhadatanytimecausedorcontributed to 5 the suggested irregularity or wrongful act of the respondents, whichconsisted solelyinthebelatedandoutoftimeconsideration bythemofalltheinitialtendersfour monthsapproximately after31 January 1986whentheaforesaidperiodofthreecalendar monthsduringwhichallthetenderershadstipulatedtoabideby 1 0 theirrespectivetendershadexpired.Therespondent'sactiondid notresultandcouldnothaveresultedtoanyunfairadvantageto the interested party over theapplicants nortoanyinequalityof treatmentof thetenderers whohad submitted theseveralinitial tenders.Theinstantcaseisinthisrepectclearlydistinguishable *^ from thedecisionsrelieduponbytheapplicantswheretheadministrativeactswereannulled onthegroundthattheconsideration ofthetendershadbeenmadeincircumstancesamountingtoaviolationoftheprincipleofequalityoftreatmentofthetenderersrequiredbyArticle28.1oftheConstitution. 20 Theeffect ofclause 6of theprescribed TenderForm(supra) wasthattheinterestedpartywhoseinitialtenderwasacceptedby the sub-judice decision had therightto refuse to abide bythe termsthereof,ifitsochose,duetoitsbelatedacceptancebythe respondents.Bethatasitmay,theinterestedpartydidnotraise 25 thequestionofthebelatedawardandconsidereditselfboundby itsinitialtender.Havingconsideredallthecircumstancespertainingtothetimeofthefinalconsiderationoftheinitialtendersand totheacceptancebytherespondentsofthetenderoftheinterested party,which wasadmittedlythelowesttender,includingthefact 30 that neither therespondents noranyoneof thetenderershadat anytimeeitherexpresslyorbynecessaryimplicationwithdrawn anyoftheinitialtendersfromconsideration,Iamoftheopinion thattheirregularityintheprocedurefollowed bythe respondents, whichisrestrictedtothetimelinessoftheacceptance,wasneither 35 amaterialirregularitynoranirregularitythatviolatestheprinciple ofgoodadministration.Theverynatureoftheirregularityruled 2550 3CX.R. 5 0 - Caramondani v.K.O.A. Boyadjis J. out thepossibility ofabuseintheformofderivingofanyunfair advantagebyonetendereroveranothertenderer,orinanyother formthatIcanthinkof, anddidnotcontraveneinanymannerthe requirementforequalityoftreatmentbytheadministrationofall thetenderers.Theapplicants'grievancerelatesineffect totheir claimtobegivenasecond.chancetosubmitanothertender,perhapslowerthantheirinitialtender,after thetendersoftheircompetitors had been opened andhad beenplaced-on the table for consideration. The sub-judice decision was not,in thecircumstances,taken bytherespondents inabuseorinexcessof their powers. Sincetheobjectionoftheapplicantsagainsttheacceptanceof theinitialtenderoftheinterestedpartyconcernedsolelythebelatedtimingthereof,therecourseiswithout merit,forthereasons statedhereinabove,andisliabletobedismissed.Concerningthe complaint of theapplicants against theomission of therespondentstoaccepttheiradditionaltender,whichwasadmittedlythe lowest,theanswertoitisthattherespondentswereundernoobligauontoacceptanyoneoftheadditionaltenders. In.theresult, therecourseisdismissed.Taking,however,all therelevantcircumstancesintoconsideration,Idonotproposeto makeanyorderastocosts. Recoursedismissed. Noorderastocosts. 2551