(1988)1988December28 [KOURRIS,J.] INTHEMATTEROFARTICLE146OFTHECONSTITUTION YIANGOSPENTALIOnSANDCO.LTD.. Applicants, v. THEREGISTRAROFTRADEMARKS, Respondent. (CaseNo. 291187). TradeMarks—Registrability—Resemblancewithatrademarkalreadyin the Register—TheTradeMarksLaw,Cap.268,section14
(1)—TheRulesof comparison—Passagesfrom Kerly'sLaw of Trade MarksandTrade Names,11thEd.Chapter17,paras17-07to17-41,pages407-430cited withapproval—Disclaimedpartoftrademark—Inmakingthecomparison, 5 itshouldbetakenintoaccount. Trade Marks—Registrability—Confusion or deception—The Trade Marks Law,Cap.268,section IS—Merepossibilityofconfusionnotenough—A tangibledangerofconfusionnecessary—Matterstobeconsideredindetermininglikelihoodofdeception—Similar to thosewhich mustbeconsi- JQ dered TradeMarks—Registrability—Judicialcontrol—Principlesapplicable. InthiscasetheRegistraracceptedregistrationof"MMASER"asatrade markforgoodsinclass25withadisclaimerof "A"andonconditionthat noticeshouldbegiventointeralia,theowneroftrademarkMAYER,reg- 15 isteredfor goodsinthesameclass.Theownerof thelattermarkopposed theregistrationof "MMASER".TheRegistrarconsidered theopposition undersections13and14
(1)ofCap.268and,finallyfoundthattheoppositionfailedinthat: a)Thesimilaritybetweenthetwomarkswasnottoanextentprohibited 2608 20 3 C.L.R. Pentaliotis &Co.v. Reg. of Trade Marks bysection 14
(1)andb) Therewasnottangibledangerofconfusion as to justify prohibitionofregistrationundersection13. . Hencethisrecourse.TheCourtdismissedtherecourse.In'doing, so, theCourtexpoundedtheprinciplessummarizedinthehereinaboveheadnote. Recoursedismissed withcosts. 5 1 Casesreferredto: · Jellinek'sApplication[\9A6]63R.P.C.59; 10 Seixo v.Provezende [1895] L.R. 1 Ch.192; ' PepsiCo. v.TheRepublic
(1985)3C.L.R. 1092; FisonsLtd. v.TheRegistrarofTradeMarks
(1985)3C.L.R.2318; ;· BeechamGroupLtd.v. TheRepublic
(1982)3 C.L.R.622; 1 5 - WhiteHorseDistillersLimitedv.ElGrecoDistillersLtd.andothers
(1987)3OLA: 531. •, • - Recourse. 2Q Recourse against thedismissalofapplicant's opposition to the registrationof thewords Μ MASER asa"trade mark inClass25 of Schedule IVofthe Trade Marks Rules, 1951-1984inrespect* ofclothing madefromwovenandknittedmaterialinfavour ofthe· r interested party. , ., G.Platritis, fortheapplicant L. Koursoumba (Mrs.), fortherespondent. St.Triantqfyllides, fortheinterested party. 25 Cur,adv.vult. 2609 Pentaliotis8c Co.v. Reg.of TradeMarks
(1988)KOURRIS J. read the following judgment. The presentre course is directed against thedecision of theRegistrar of Trade Marks,dated 10thFebruary, 1987, whereby hedismissed oppo sitionNo.542 of theapplicantstotheregistrationof thewordsΜ MASER as trademark in class 25 of ScheduleIV of the Trade 5 Mark Rules 1951-1984 in respect of women's, men's andchil dren'sclothing madefrom woven andknittedmaterial in favour of theinterestedparty. Thesalient facts of thepresentrecoursearebriefly asfollows: On 5.7.1984,Mrs.Maria Maser Hedwing ThumherandRosemarietradingasBenediktMaserfrom Austria (hereinafter called MariaMaser)filedApplication No.25111 with theRegistrar of Trade Marks, for the registration of the words Μ MASER as trademarkinclass25of ScheduleIV of theTradeMarks Rules 1951-1984,inrespect of women's,men'sandchildren'sclothing madefrom woven andknittedmaterial. 10 15 Theapplicationwas acceptedfor registration inPartA of the Register of TradeMarkswithdisclaimerof theletter"M"andon conditionthat after advertisementintheOfficial Gazetteofthe Re public,noticeof suchadvertisement shouldbesenttotheowners 20 of thefollowing trademarks:Β14270Mayerand2340 NASR. On8thJanuary, 1985,noticeof oppositionwasfiledbyYiangos PendaliotisandCo.Ltd.,whohavebeentheregistered own ers of theTradeMark No.Β 14270inclass25 MAYER written in plain capital letters for shoes, slippers, since 6.6.1972.On 17.9.1985, anaffidavit sworn byYiangosPendaliotis, oneof the directorsofYiangosPendaliotisandCo.Ltd.f wasfiled.Anoth er affidavit Sworn by E. Evangelou, an employee of the same company,we alsofiledontheirbehalf. On 26.2.1986, Maria Maser filed an affidavit declared by Nearchos Theodorou of Nicosia,oneof thedirectors of IntersportAlpine andMarineLtd.,whoarethesolerepresentativesof MariaMaserinCyprus. 2610 25 I 3 C.L.R. Pentaliotis &Co.v. Reg.of Trade Marks Κourris J. 5 On 11.3.1986, Yiangos Pendaliotisand Co.Ltd. ,filedano ther affidavit. On 15.5.1986, MariaMaser applied totheRegis trarfor permission tofilefurther evidence and such permission was grantedwithpermission alsotoYiangosPendaliotisand Co. Ltd. tofilefurther evidenceinreply. On 23.5.1986, Maria Maser filed further evidence andoh 3.6.1986, YiangosPendaliotisandCo.Ltd.filedtheirreply. 10 15 20 On 19.6.1986, Maria Maser submitted their written address andon 23.7.1986, Yiangos Pendaliotis and Co.Ltd. submitted theirown written address on6.10.1986,MariaMasersubmitted their reply and'the case was fixed for clarifications on 12.12.1986. The Registrar, having considered very carefully everything, properly putbefore himby theparties tothoseproceedings,ineluding all the materialfacts andconsidering theadmissibleevi dence and counsel's submissions, came to theconclusion that Maria Maser had discharged theonusof proof cast upon them thattheoppositionis notjustified and,therefore,found that the oppositionfailed, andconsequently shedismissed the opposition anddirectedthatApplication No.25111 beproceededtoregistra tionas advertised. On 10.2.1987, the respondent's decision as aforesaid, was communicatedtocounselfor theapplicant- ExhibitAappended tothe opposition. 25 30 As aresult,the applicantfiledthepresentrecoursechallenging the sub judice decision and praying for its·annulmenton'the ground,interalia,thatthe Registrar actedunderamisconception oflaw and/orfact andthatthedecisionis notdulyreasoned, and thattherespondentregistrar erredinadmittinguncorroboratedevidencewhichwas alsocontradictorytothecontentsof paragraph3 of theapplicants'counterstatementwhile sheignored the oppo nent'soverwhelming corroboratedevidenceanddocumentaryev idencegenerally andparticularly abouttheopponent'suseofthe 2611 Kourris J. Pentaliotis & Co.v.Reg.of TradeMarks
(1988)markinCyprus. AsrightlystatedbytherespondentRegistrar,inhersubjudice decision,inreachingherdecision theRegistrarhadtoapplythe following provisions of Section 13 and Section 14
(1)of the TradeMarksLaw,Cap.268,whichreadasfollows:- 5 "Section 13.Itshallnot.belawful toregisterasatrademark orpart of atrademarkanymatter theuseof whichcouldby reasonofitsbeinglikelytodeceiveorcauseconfusion orotherwise, be disentitled toprotection in a Court of Justice, or would becontrary tolawormorality,orany scandalous de- 10 sign. Section 14
(1).Subject totheprovision of subsection 2no trademark shall beregistered inrespect of anygoodsordescriptionofgoodsthatisidenticalwithatrademarkbelonging toadifferent proprietorandalreadyontheregisterinrespect 15 of the same goodsordescription of goods,or that sonearly resemblessuchatrademarkastobelikelytodeceiveorcause confusion." The wordingof Sections 13and 14
(1)of Cap.268above,is thesameasthatofSections 11 and 12(l)of theTradeMarksAct, 20 1938inEngland. Therefore, theRegistrar hadtoconsider whethertherelevant applicationsoffended againstSection 14
(1)andfor thispurpose shehadtoconsider (i)whetherthegoodsinrespectofwhichthe applicants (interestedparty inthisrecourse)wereseekingregis- 25 trationwereofthesamedescriptionasanyofthegoodsoftherespondents,(applicantsinthisrecourse):and(ii)ifsothedegree ofresemblancepresumingnormalandfairmannerofuseofthe goods.Also,shehadtoconsiderwhetheritoffended Section13. InconsideringtheapplicationunderSection 14
(1)theregistrar 30 examinedfirst,whetherthegoodswereof thesamedescription after analysingproperly thelegalposition withreference tothe 2612 3 C.L.R. Pentaliotis &Co.v.Reg.of Trade Marks Kourris J. well-established criteriafordetermining suchquestions,andapplying the test laid down in thejudgment of Romer, J. in the courseofJellinek'sApplication, [1946]63R.P.C.59atpage70, theRegistrar cametotheconclusion that thegoodswereof the 5 samedescription.Havingfound thatthegoodswereofthesame description, the Registrar then proceeded to the second issue whichcallsforconsideration,namelyacomparisonofthemarks. TheRegistrarquitelegitimatelycomparedthetrademarksinthe manner which well appears in Chapter 17 of Kerly's Law of IQ Trade Names, 11th Edition, paragraphs 17-07 to 17-41, pages 407-430. Atpage407ofthatbookfrom thesummingupofLordCranworth,inSeixo v.Provezende [1895]L.R. 1Ch. 192,itisstated:· ' 15 "Whatdegreeofresemblance isnecessary isfrom the natureofthingsincapableofdefinition apriori. Andthestandardofcourseisnotalwaysthesame." 20 25 Andfurtherdownonthesamepageofthatbook:"Itfollows thatexceptinsofarastheylaydownanygeneralprinciple,thedecidedcasesareoflittleassistanceinthedetermination of new1questions of fact raised upon materials In allcases,as stated above,it should beborneinmind that adecision on thequestion whether amark sonearlyresemblesanotherastobelikelytodeceiveorcauseconfusion is not an exercise of discretion by a tribunal but a finding of fact." '" : Samebookpages415-416paragraph 17-19:- 30 "Common elements:somedicta.InBroadhead'sApplication, EvershedM.R.followed theobservationsofLordRussell inCocaCocaCanadav.PepsiCocaCanada,wherehestated: 'Whereyougetacommondenominator, youmustinlooking 2613 Kourris J. Pentaliotis &Co.v.Reg.ofTradeMarks
(1988)atthecompetingformulae paymuchmoreregardtotheparts oftheformulae whicharecommon-althoughitdoesnotflow fromthatthatyoumusttreatthewordsasthoughthecommon partwasnotthere atall'.Wherecommon marksareincluded inthetrademarkstobecompared,orinoneofthem,thepro- 5 percourseistolookatthemarksaswhole,andnotdisregard thepartswhicharecommon. In the 'Kleenoff case Maugham L.J. said: 'In thepresent casemyviewis thatthetestof infringement wherethetrade markhasadescriptiveelementisthesameasthetestwhereit \Q hasnodescriptiveelement,exceptsofarasthedescriptiveelementisitselfcommontothetrade.' InHarrod'sApplication, theRegistrar stated:'Itisawellrecognisedprinciplethathastobetakenintoaccountinconsideringthepossibility ofconfusion arisingbetween anytwo 15 trademarks,that, wherethosetwomarkscontain acommon elementwhichisalsocontainedinanumberofothermarksin useinthesamemarket,suchacommonoccurrenceinthemarkettendstocausepurchaserstopaymoreattentiontotheother features of the respective marks and to distinguish between «0 thembythosefeatures.Thisprincipleclearlyrequiresthatthe markscomprisingthecommonelementshallbeinfairlyextensive use and, as I have mentioned, in use in the markets in which the marks under consideration are being or will be used."* Samebookpage417paragraph17-22:"Theresemblancebetween twomarksmustbeconsidered withreference totheearaswellastotheeye." Andatpage418:"Examination of thereported case, showsthat where the 30 marksaremeaninglesswords,orwordsofessentially similar character,thecourtsgiveasmuchweighttophoneticastovis2614 25 3 CX.R. 5 Pentaliotis &Co.v.Reg.of Trade Marks Kourris J. ualresemblance. But for amere accidental phoneticresemblance(inthesensethattheideaofthemarks,onceproperly graspedisquitedifferent) toconvincethecourtofdeceptive resemblancecallsforsomethingspecial:foraconvincingdemonstrationthatsomecontextlikelytooccurinactualcommerce wouldconvert theaccidental resembanceintosomething'approachingidentityofsound." Thesamebookunderthehearing"Evidence"page424,states atparagraph1734:- 10 15 2Q "Thequestion whetheronemarksonearlyresemblesano' therastobelikelytodeceiveisaquestionforthetribunaland is not amatter for a witness.Thus where*the case turnson phoneticresemblance,oncetheevidencehasestablishedhow the'marksarepronouncedinuse,thejudicialearhasthefinal say.The questionof infringement, thequestion whetherone mark is likely to cause confusion "with"another, is aJmatter upon which thejudge mustmakeuphismindand whichhe andhealonemustdecide.Hecannotabdicatethedecisionin thatmatter towitnesses before him.Ontheother hand,itis equallytruethathemustbeguidedinallthesemattersbythe evidencebeforehimandwheretheevidenceisthattherebeen noconfusion that is amaterial matter which thejudge must takeintoaccount." Andatpages427-428paragraph17-38:- 25 ™ "Proofof actualdeception,ifthemarkisintheopinionof thetribunallikelytodeceiveorifithasbeensubstantiallycopied from another is unnecessary. Nevertheless, if one or morecasesofactualdeceptionaremadeouttothesatisfaction of thecourt,thiswill,of course,afford very strongevidence thattheresemblanceofthemarksinquestionissocloseasto belikelytodeceive.Theabsenceofevidenceofactualdeceptionisacircumstancewhichvariesgreatlyinweightaccording tothenatureofthecase.Evenwheretheproperinferencetobe drawnisthattherehasbeennoconfusion,thiscannotbecon· 2615 Kourris J. Pentaliotis &Co. v. Reg.of TradeMarks
(1988)elusivebyitself:thedecisionisforthecourtwhichcannotabdicateinfavourofthewitnesses.Theremaybedifferences of get-uporpresentation whichprecludeconfusion inthecaseof theparticulargoodsconcerned,notwithstandingthatthemarks arein themselves confusing similar.Nevertheless,wherethe 5 markshavebeencirculatingsidebysideinthemarketwhere deceptionisallegedtobeprobable,thefactthatnooneappears tohavebeen misledisverymaterial,unlesssatisfactorily explained." Samebookpage423paragraph 17-30:- 10 "In general, theexistence of anumber of markseither as commonmarksorastrademarks,mayoperatetorendera finerdistinction allowablethanwouldotherwisebethecase,for thepersonsconcerned in thetradeinquestion mayhavehad theirattention directed tothekindofdistinction whichexists 15 betweenthemarkpropounded andanyoftheothers,because itisanalogoustotheknowndistinctionsexistingbetweenthe latter." TherelevantpassageofthedecisionoftherespondentRegistrarasstatedinparagraphs20and21ofthedecisionreadasfol- 20 lows:"20.Furtherand despitetheprovisions of s.16ondisclaimersIproceededtocomparefurther thetwomarks:Themannertrademarksarecompared,wellappearsinChapter 17of Kerly's Law of Trade Marks, 11th Ed. f paras 17-07-17-41. 25 Comparing therefore the marks inthe light of the said legal principles andbearing inmindthattheresemblancemustbe consideredwithreferencetotheearaswellastotheeyeIhave reachedtheconclusionthattheydonothaveconsiderablesimilaritybothvisuallyandphoneticallytotheextentprohibitedby ™ s. 14
(1)oftheTradeMarksLawCap.268(asamended). 21.Bearinginmindtheaboveconsiderationsandgivingto thematterthemostcareful attentionandconsideringtheadmis2616 3 C.L.R. Pentaliotis & Co. v. Reg. of Trade Marks Kourris J. sible evidence and considering.also the Counsel's submis sions,Ihave reached theconclusion thattheOpponent's ob jectionundersec. 14
(1)fails." 5 10 15 20 25 Inthelightof theabove-quoted legalprinciples andthereasoning of the subjudice decision of therespondentRegistrar,the Registrar was correctinherdecision anditwas reasonablyopen toher.toreachherdecision. Theabove answers thecontentionof learnedcounsel for the interestedparty thatthetrademarkappliedfor coversgoodsnot of thesamedescriptionasthoseof thegoodscoveredby thetrade mark of theapplicants. Inmy view theRegistrar did noterrin holdingthatthesetwocategories of goods aregoods of thesame description. , Learned counsel for the applicants argued thatthe Registrar was wronginfinding thatthetwomarksdonothaveconsidera blesimilarity bothvisuallyandphoneticallytotheextentprohibit ed by Section 14
(1)of the Trade Marks Law, Cap. 268 (as amended). Iamof theview,thatamerecomparisonof thefacsimiles of thetwomarks,theoneproposedfor registration under Applica tion No.25111 (which appears atR.3of Exhibit B)andthe one of theopponentunderRegistration No.Β14270(whichappears atRs. 12-1-1 of Exhibit A) andbearinginmindthe rulesofcom parison expounded upon above, supports and substantiates the view of theRegistrar thatthesimilarity of themarks,if any, is nottoan.extentprohibitedby Section 14
(1). . Learnedcounsel for theapplicants alsoallegedthatthe letter "M" which appears ontopof themarkproposed for registration was disclaimed andtherefore,didnotcountforregistration. 30 Onthispoint,Iagreewithlearnedcounsel for therespondent thatthisviewis notcorrect Registrations subject todisclaimer aregoverned by theprovisions of Section 16of theTradeMarks 2617 KourrisJ. Pentaliotis &Co.v.Reg.of Trade Marks
(1988)Law, Cap. 268 (as amended). The purpose and effect of disclaimer, however, which appearsinKerly'sBookatpages129132,hasnothingtodowiththetestofsimilarity,thatis,onestill has to look at the mark as awhole and does not excludedisclaimedwordsorlettersinthecomparisonofthetwomarks. 5 TheRegistrarlookedatthemarksasawhole,paidmoreattention todissimilarparts such astheshape,design,size,lettering andcolour,withoutdisregardingthesimilarparts,andconsidered themvisuallyandphonetically. Themarksarewritteninaradicallydifferent characterandthey 10 sounddifferently andthesuggestionsofapplicantfor accidental phoneticresemblance havetobeen substantiated by the affiant. The Registrar had to decide herself relying upon the evidence whichestablished howthemarksarepronounced inuseandignoringopinion evidence astohowtheymaybemispronounced 15 andtaking intoaccount theconsiderationsplacedbefore herby evidence,ithadnotbeencontradicted,totheeffect that,notwithstandingthelongconcurrentuseofthetwomarkstherehadbeen noincidenceof confusion. IholdtheviewthattheRegistrarinapplyingtheaboveconsi- 20 derationstothefacts of thecaseinhandandconsideringtheadmissibleevidenceanddiscardingopinionevidenceandproperly treatingtheissuebeforeherasaquestionoffactfortheRegistrar andnotfor awimess,hascorrectlyreachedtheconclusionsthat theapplicantsbeforeher(theinterestedpartyinthisrecourse)had 25 dischargedtheonusofproof whichwascastuponthemtoestablishthenon-likelihood ofconfusion anddeceptionamongasubstantial number of persons of themarkswere used by different proprietorsinrelationtotherespectivegoodsconcerned. on Ithinkthatsheproperlydecidedthattheprobabilityofdeception wasnotof adegree thatcouldreasonably beconsidered as offending againstSection 14ofTheTradeMarksLaw,Cap.268. TheRegistrar,havingdecidedthematterunderSection 14
(1)26' c 3 C.L.R. Pentaliotis &Co.v.Reg.of Trade Marks Kourris J. shethenproceededtoconsiderthecaseunderSection13. 5 InconsideringacaseunderSection 13itiscommonlyacceptedthat,althoughthatSectionisnotlimitedtogoodsofthesame description, thematterstobeconsidered in deciding thelikelihoodofdeceptionarenecessarilysomewhatsimilartothosetobe considered under Section 14
(1)(seePepsi Co.v.TheRepublic
(1985)3C.L.R.1092atpage1098). Itispertinent,heretostateparagraph25ofthesubjudicedecisionoftheRegistrarwhichreadsasfollows:- 10 15 20 25 30 "Readingcarefully theaffidavits submitted I amnotconvinced thatbyusingtheapplicant's trademarkin theCyprus marketthereisalikelihood ofdeceptionorconfusion within themeaningof Section 13.Todecideonthisquestion Ihave inmindthetestasineffect waslaiddownbylateFarewell J., inBailey'scasereportedin52R.P.C. 136atpage 153:1think thattheCourthastobesatisfied notmerelythatthereisapossibility of confusion; I think theCourt mustbesatisfied that ' thereisarealtangibledangerofconfusion ifthemarkwhichis soughttoberegisteredisputontheRegister." ThetestappliedbytheRegistrarinrelationtoSection 13inthe present case was approved in FisonsLtd. v. TheRegistrar of TradeMarks
(1985)3C.L.R. 2318. Withregard to Section 13,learnedcounsel for the applicant contendedthattheRegistrarinconsideringtheevidenceadduced, wronglyacceptedtheevidencesubmittedbytheapplicant(interestedpartyinthepresentrecourse)thattheirgoodswereusedin theCyprusmarket(thoughnotcorroborated)whereas,inhisallegation,theRegistrardidnotaccepttheevidenceoftheopponents because it was without corroboration. He also alleged thatthe Registrarwaswrongingivingundueweighttothatfact thatshe hadnotbeengivenaninstanceofactualdeceptionorconfusion. Ihaveconsideredthepointsraisedbylearnedcounselforthe 2619 Kourris J. Pentaliotis &Co.v.Reg.of TradeMarks
(1988)applicant andIamof theviewthatthecombinedeffect ofpara·: graphs 23,24, 25 and 26of the subjudice decision is that the Registrarconsidered allevidence adducedbyboth sidesandin weighingtheevidenceadducedshewaspersuaded bytheapplicantsforregistration astotheuseoftheirproductsinthemarket- 5 though theevidence wasnotcorroborated -partlybecausethey produced invoicesasproofoftheirsubmissionandtheRegistrar found thatthisproofcouldnotberebuttedbytheuncorroborated opinionevidenceoftheopponent. I am also of the view that the Registrar did not give undue IQ weight on theissueof actual deception. Sheapplied theestablishedprinciplespertainingtotheissueandsheconsidered that, since nosingle instanceof deceptionorconfusion could beinvoked,inspiteof thelongconcurrent useofwhichshehadconvincingevidence,therewasnorealtangibledangerofconfusion ,,ifthemarkwhichwassoughttoberegisteredwasputontheregister. The approach of the Supreme Court as to when the Court shouldinterferewithanadministrativedecisionregardingtheregistrabilityofatrademark,isthat"thisCourtwillnotinterfere with «0 suchdescriptionifdueweighthasbeengiventoallmaterialfacts, it has not been based onamisconception of law or fact, andit was not exercised in excess orabuse of power" (seeBeecham GroupLtd. v.TheRepublic
(1982)3C.L.R.622atpage633). In arecentcase,White HorseDistillersLimitedv. ElGreco «5 DistillersLtd. andOthers
(1987)3C.L.R.531, it washeldby theFullBenchoftheSupremeCourtthatonthebasisoftheprinciplesgoverningtheexerciseofitsjurisdiction,asanadministrativeCourtin thefirstinstanceandonappeal,doesnot interfere with anadministrative decisionregarding theregistrability ofa trademarkifsuchdecisionwasreasonably.open totheRegistrar ofTradeMarksariditdoesnotsubstituteitsownevaluationinthe placeofthatoftheRegistrar. Inthepresentcase,onthematerialbeforeme,whichwasalso 2620 3 C.L.R. 5 10 Pentaliotis & Co.v. Reg.of Trade Marks Kourris J. before therespondentRegistrar andbearing inmindthewelles tablishedprinciplesthatthetrialCourtdoesnotinterferewiththe •decisions of an administrative organ, nordoes it substitute its owndiscretiontothatof theadministrativeorgan if thedecision challengedwas reasonably opentosuchorgan,I havereached the conclusionthat theapplicanthasfailed toshowgoodcauseforin terference with theRegistrar's decision.Ihave cometothe con clusion thatitwasreasonably opentohertodecideasshedid and herdecisionis,therefore, affirmed. Intheresult, therecourse fails and is hereby dismissed with costs infavour of therespondentandinfavour of theinterested party.Coststobeassessedby theRegistrar. Recoursedismissed ' >withcosts infavourof respondentandinterestedparty. 15 Λ • 1 ·. V ,2621