(1988)1988February 29 [A.LOIZOU.J.] INTHE MATTER OFARTICLE 146OFTHE CONSTITUTION GEORGHIOS MICHAELIDES, Applicant, v. 1.THE DIRECTOR OFPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PERSONNEL, 2.THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondents. (CaseNo,88187). Generalprinciples ofadministrativelaw—Powers todeferpromotionofapublicofficerpending disciplinaryproceedingsagainsthim—Applicablemutatismutandis tocasesofpermanent appointmentinthePublicService—The CasualPublic Officers (Appointments toPublic Offices)Law, 1985 (Law 160/85),section3—Whetheritexcludesaforesaidprinciple. 5 Public Officers—Appointments—TheCasualPublic Officers(Appointmentsto Public Offices) Law, 1985(Law 160/85)section3—Implicationsof Theapplicant impugns by meansof this recourse thedecision to postpone thetaking of adecision in respect ofapplicant's permanent appointment inthePublic Service under theCasual PublicOfficers (Appointment to Public Offices) Law, 1985 (Law 160/85) until completion of adisciplinary casepending againsthim. Counsel for applicant submitted that section 3of Law 160/85 does not empower theCommission to act asaforesaid, whereascounsel for therespondent suggested that the case Law of the Greek Council of Slate concerning promotions of Public Officers justified the course taken by the Commission. Held,dismissing therecourse:(\) Thegeneral principlesof administra- 370 10 15 3 C.L.R. Michaelides v. P.S.C. & Another live law referred to ina passage from the Conclusions from theCase Law of theGreek Council οΓ State 1929-1959 at pp. 352-353 in respect of pro motions in the Public Service arc mutatis mutandis applicable tocases of permanentappointmentlikeihecase inhand. 5 .„ .ς
(2)Itfollows thatthe Administration is entitled todefer the taking of a decision toappoint,if there is pending "disciplinary charge" against the of ficer concerned.
(3)Section 3 of ihe Law permits deviation from the provisions of the Public Service Laws 1967 to 1981 andany otherLaw relating "tothemelhods and procedures for thefillingof posts" but such appointmentsaccord ing to subsection 2 paragraph (b) of section 3 thereof are subject to the possession by the person tobe appointed of thequalifications required by theSchemeof Service for ihepost as well as theotherqualifications lhal are required by thePublic Service Laws for appointmentto thepublic service. Such otherqualifications arc set out insection 33 of thePublic Service Law and include,inter alia, ihe requirement thattheperson tobe appointed is of good character (paragraph (d)),has not been convicted of an offence of dishonesty or involving moral turpitude (paragraph (e)) and has notbeen previously dismissed from the public service for a disciplinary offence (paragraph
(0). 20 Recoursedismissed. No orderas tocosts. Recourse. 25 Recourse against the decision of the respondent to postpone the taking of a decision in respect of the appointment of applicant, a casual employee, to a permanent post in accordance with the provisions of the Casual Public Officers (Appointment to Public Offices) Law, 1985 (Law No. 160 of 1985) until the completion 30 of the disciplinary case pending against him. C. derides, for the applicant. A. Vladimirou, for the respondent. Cur. adv. vult. A. LOIZOU J. read the following judgment. Upon the enact- 371 A. Loizou,J Michaelides v. P.S.C. &Another
(1988)ment of the Casual Public Officers (Appointment toPublic Offices) Law 1985, (Law No. 160of 1985),—hereinafter to be referred toasthe Law—the Director of Public Administration and Personnel Service prepared and forwarded to the respondent Commission lists of officers serving in the Public Service on a 5 casual basis and who has been so serving both on the 31st December 1984and the 31st October 1985when the aforesaid Law was enacted. The respondent Commission asked from all Heads of Departments toseethat all casual officers working under them comple- JQ ted Form Gen. 6 and submitted them to it after ascertaining that allparagraphs in thesaid Form wereduly filled inandtherewere also attached therequired by theSchemeof Servicefor the post, certificates and testimonials. The heads of Department were furtherasked before forwarding thesaid Forms,toexamine whether ,c each casual officer inquestion satisfied thoserequirements of the Schemeof Service which could notpossibly beascertained bythe respondent Commission from the attached certificates and testimonials. For example good/very good knowledge of English/ other language, administrative ability,judgment initiative,respon- sibility,maturity,reliability, etc.andinform therespondent Commission accordingly together with the submission of the relevant • application Forms. The Head of the Department of theapplicant informed therespondent Commission that an inquiry was being carried out against himfor thepossiblecommission of adisciplinary offence. TheDirectorof theDepartment ofPublic Administration andPersonnel Service,also informed therespondent Commission thatan investigating officer had been appointed already tocarry out an inquiry into the possible commission of a disciplinary offence (Appendices 3,4,and 5). The respondent Commission at its meeting of the 3rd March, 1986,considered thequestion of theappointment of anumberof casual officers among whom there was theapplicant and after it decided that forty of them possessed the qualifications required 372 30 35 3 C.L.R. Michaelides v. P.S.C. & Another A. Loizou J. for thepost under therelevant Scheme of Service and thatthey weresuitable for appointmentdecided tooffer themin accordance with the provisions of theLaw appointmentwith retrospective ef fect asfrom the8thNovember 1985.As regards theapplicantthe respondent Commission postponed thetaking of adecision until thecompletion of thedisciplinary case pending against him.(Ap pendix6). Itisthecase for theapplicant thatintaking thesubjudicedeci sionthe respondentCommission actedcontrary tosection 3ofthe Law which does notgivetoitthe right nottoappointona perma nentbasis acasual officer for any reason including thefact that therewas pending adisciplinary investigation against him having nodiscretion in thematter.Therespondent Commission, it was further urged,ought toappointthe applicantpermanetly and after thecompletionof thedisciplinary case against himandon being found guilty,totake thenecessary disciplinary measures against himonthebasisof such conviction. Itis thecase for therespondentCommission thatitactedpro perly andinaccordancewiththeLaw whenpostponing thetaking of adecision for theappointmentof theapplicant tothe perma nent post of messenger retrospectively from the 8th November 1985,untilthe completionof thedisciplinary caseagainst him. Relianceinthatrespect isbased onthefollowingpassagefrom the Case Law of the Greek Council of State 1929-1959 atpp. 352-353, where thefollowing is said: " Εξ άλλουηνομολογία,προτηςθέσεως εν ισχύι των ανωτέρωδιατάξεων τουΥπαλ. Κωδικός,είχε δεχθήότιη Διοίκησις, υποχρεούμενη να λαμβάνη υπ' όψιν και σταθμίζη προς μόρφωσιν γνώμης περί τηςπροαγωγής υπαλλήλουπάνταταπερίτηςυπηρεσιακήςικανότητος και υπαλληλικής ποιότητοςυπάρχοντα περί αυτού στοιχεία, νομίμως αναβάλλειτηνκρίσιν,ότανυφίσταται εκκρεμής ειςβάροςτουυπαλλήλουκατηγορία,εφ' όσονκρίνει ότιη κατηγορία αυτή, βάσιμος τυχόν αποδεικνυομένη,θέλει 373 A. Loizou J. Michaelides v. P.S.C. & Another
(1988)επηρεάσει την περίπροαγωγήςαυτούκρίσιν: 673
(52), 18
(50), 1617
(49),228
(47), 1136
(46)ίδε και 1694,1962
(52), 59
(47). Η τοιαύτη αναβολή χωρεί νομίμως μόνον εφ' όσον κατά την έκδοσιν της τε γνωμοδοτήσεως του υπηρεσιακού συμβουλίου και του περί προαγωγής 5 διατάγματος υφίσταταιπράγματιεκκρεμής εις βάροςτου υπαλλήλου κατηγορία: 139, 1269
(48). Δεν απαιτείται όμως όπως ούτος έχει παραπεμφθή ίνα δικασθή ή έχη δικασθήή έχη κληθήεις απολογίαν,αλλ' εναπόκειται εις την κρίσιν της Διοικήσεως να εκτίμηση αν τα εν τω 1 Q φακέλλω του υπαλλήλου υπάρχοντα στοιχεία είναι αρκούντωςσοβαρά,ίναδικαιολογήσωσιτηναναβολήντης κρίσεως αυτού:673
(52)ίδε και 786
(48). Εγένετο επίσης δεκτόν ότι εκκρεμής πειθαρχική δίωξις δικαιολογεί μεν την αναβολήν της περί του υπαλλήλου κρίσεως, δεν δύναται όμως να στηρίξει δυσμενή ουσιαστικήν κρίσιν περίτουευδόκιμουτηςυπηρεσίαςτου: 1382
(55), 927
(52). Αποδεικνυομένης εκ των υστέρων αβασίμου της κατηγορίας, ο υπάλληλος δέον να τεθή υπόκρίσιν προς προαγωγήν, κρινόμενος δε προακτέος να προαχθή αναδρομικώς αφ*ηςθαείχε προαχθήαν μηαναβάλλετο η κρίσις, και δη αφ' ης προήχθησαν οι μεθ'ων ούτος θα εκρίνετο ομοιόβαθμοι αυτού: 413
(56), 1954
(52), 18
(50), 1517
(49),ίδεκαι857
(39)" κ.λ.π. InEnglish it reads: "On theother hand theCase Law, before thecoming into force of theaforesaid provisions of theCivil Servants Code, hadaccepted thattheAdministration being boundtotakeinto consideration and weigh, in ordertoform anopinion regard ing thepromotionof anofficer everyexistingmaterial relating 3 0 tohis serviceability andservicequality, itlawfully postpones itsdecision when thereexistsapendingcharge against the of ficer,once it considers that in case the charge is reliably proved it might influence itsjudgment about his promotion: 673
(52), 18
(50), 1617
(49), 228
(47), 1136
(46)see also 35 374 ^5 3 C.L.R. Michaelides v. P.S.C. & Another A. Loi/ou J. 1694, 1962
(52), 59
(47). Such postponement is legally permissible only when at the time of the issue of the opinion of the Service Council and the order for promotion there really exists against the officer a charge: 1139, 1269
(48). It is not necessary, however, that he should have been committed for trialorthat hehasbeen tried orthat hehas been called upon to make hisdefence butit iswithin thediscretion of theadministration toevaluate if theexistingmaterial in thefile of the officerissufficiently serious tojustify thepostponement of itsdecision. 673
(52)see also 786
(48). It has also been accepted that apendingdisciplinary prosecution,justifies the postponement of the decision about theofficer, but itcannot, however, support an adverse substantive decision about the satisfactory nature of his service: 1382
(55), 927
(52). If subsequently thecharges are proved unfounded the officermust beconsidered for promotion, and ifhe isfound suitable for promotion, to be promoted retrospectively as from when hewould have been promoted had thedecision notbeen postponed and particularly since the time other officers of the samerank with him were promoted." It has been argued by learned counsel for theapplicant thatthe aforesaid principles apply only to cases of promotion and not to cases of permanent appointment effected under the Law and that itsprovisionsexclude them. On thetotality of thecircumstances before me and in thelight of thewording of the relevant sectionsof theLaw Ihavecometo theconclusion that theaforesaid general principles of Administrative Law apply mutatis mutandis tocases of permanent appointment as in the case in hand; otherwise apart from amounting to disregard of the law there would be multiplicity of proceedings leading to absurd results.The Administration isentitled to defer the taking of a decision toappoint, if there is pending "disciplinary charge"against theofficer concerned. Section 3of theLaw permitsdeviation from theprovisionsof 375 A.Loizou J. Michaelides v. P.S.C. & Another
(1988)thePublic ServiceLaws 1967 to 1981and anyother Law relating "tothemethods and procedures for the filling of posts" but such appointments according tosubsection 2paragraph (b)ofsection 3 thereof aresubject to thepossession by theperson tobeappointedof thequalifications required by the Schemeof Service for the 5 post as well as the other qualifications that are required by the Public Service Laws for appointment tothepublic service. Such otherqualifications are setout in section 33of thePublic Service Law and include,inter alia,therequirement that theperson tobe appointed is of good character (paragraph (d)), he has not been ,( convicted of an offence ofdishonesty or involving moral turpitude (paragraph (e)) and he has not been previously dismissed from thepublic service for adisciplinary offence, (paragraph
(0). For all the above reasons therecourse is dismissed but in the circumstances there will benoorder astocosts. , Recourse dismissed. Noorderastocosts. 376