i 3 C.L.R. 1988February29 [PIKIS, J.] INTHE MATTER OFARTICLE 146OFTHECONSTITUTION MARIA CHRISTOUDMA, Applicant, v. THEREPUBLIC OFCYPRUS, THROUGH THEDIRECTOR OFPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ANDPERSONNEL SERVICE, Respondents. (CasesNo. 667/86). Legitimateinterest—AcceptancewithoutreservationofappointmentinthePublicService—Deprivesacceptoroflegitimateinteresttochallengeanyaspect oftheappointmentortermsofservice. Executoryact—Confirmatoryact—Anactconfirmatoryofanealrieroneisnot justiciable underArt.146oftheConstitution. 5 Executory act—informative act—An informative act is notjusticiable under Art. 146.1 ofthe Constitution. The facts of thiscasesufficiently appear inthejudgmentoftheCourt Recoursedismissed. No orderastocosts. 10 Recourse. Recourseagainstthedecisionoftherespondenttoplaceapplicantonthestartingpointof thesalary scaleuponappointmenttothepostoftemporary ClericalAssistant 377 Christoudia v.Republic
(1988)Chr.Christoforou, for the applicant. L. Koursoumba (Mrs), for therespondents. Cur. adv. vult. PIKIS, J. read the following judgment. The Temporary Civil Servants (Appointment toPublic Positions) Law, 1985 (Law 160/85) made provision for theorganic emplacement in thecivil service of temporary government personnel, by their appointment tocorresponding positionsintheestablishment of the public service; provided theypossessed the qualifications envisaged bytheschemesofservicefor appointment.Thematerialdatefor qualification for appointment (service inthecapacity of temporary personnel) was the 31st December,
- ^ Notwithstanding theserviceof theapplicant with government, first employed in 1975 as Care personnel, she did not qualify for appointment; for atthematerial time sheserved onanhourly basis and not as temporary personnel. Success at govern- 15 ment examinations was a prerequisite for appointment to the temporary personnel establishment of theService.This qualification she acquired after theenactment of the law, that is,on 3.1.
- A while later, on 1.9.85, she was appointed Clerical Assistant Second Grade. Asit happened she suffered a dimi- 20 nution of earnings for heremoluments were fixed atthe startingpointof the salary scale applicabletotheposition towhich shewas appointed. Ascan begathered, sheaccepted theposition offered her in 25 September, 1985,without reservation ofrightsorchallenge of any termof theconditionsofher serviceby wayofjudicial review. She first complained about the terms and conditions of her service in April, 1986.First, about herineligibility for permanent appointment under Law 160/85 and, shortly afterwards, about thediminution of herearnings, compared toher 30 emoluments when she served on anhourly basis. On 11.4.86 sheaddressed alettertothePublic Administra378 3 C.L.R. 5 IQ 20 30 35 Christoudia v.Republic Pikis J. tion and Personnel Dept. of the Ministry of Finance, seeking retroactive appointment tothepostof "temporary"clericalassistant and sequentially thereto acknowledgment of eligibility for appointment toanorganicpost underLaw 160/85.Herrequest drew a negative response from the respondents. On 24.4.86 thePersonnel Department informed herthat herclaim wasuntenable,pointingout that shewas,inanyevent,ineligible for appointment as temporary Clerical Assistant before 3.1<85, when she passed the relevant government examinations.On 4.7.86 the applicant aired her second complaint respecting thediminution of heremoluments upon appointment tothepostof temporary Clerical Assistant.Once more,herrequest wasrejected on 19.8.86.Areply wasgiven herexplaining that according to the settled government policy evolved since 1979 (Circular No. 503 - 7.7.79), temporary personnel were invariably placed on appointment at thestartingpointof the salary scale applicable to their grade. The only exception made,affecting personnel of theWater Development Department (74of them), had legislative sanction (Law 145/85). Respecting her claim for retroactive appointment to a"temporary" post, the Personnel Department signified their adherence totheposition adopted and explained in theirletter of 23.4.
- The present recourse was mounted against the decision or decisions setout in theletterof 19th August, 1986.Theexposition of the facts made above makes it self-evident, to my comprehension that therecourse is nonjusticiable. The letter of 19th August, 1986, was, in so far as it concerned her request forretroactive appointment, confirmatory of theposition communicated on 24.4.86.Hence,therecourse isoutoftime.. Furthermore, I am of opinion that thedecision of 24.4.86 did notcontain ajusticiable acteither. Unqualified acceptance of appointment tothepositionof temporary Clerk deprived the applicant of legitimate interest tochallenge anyaspectof her appointment orterms of service. On the other hand, thedeci379 Pikis J. Christoudia v. Republic
(1988)sioncommunicatedon24.4.86totheextentitreferred theapplicationofLaw 160/85wasplainly inforrnatory ofits effect. Likewise,applicantisbarredfrom mountingachallengetothe termsofherappointmentastemporaryclerk.Byherunqualified acceptanceof thetermsofherappointment sheforfeited 5 every interest to challenge it thereafter. Nor have hercomplaints of unequal treatment been substantiated. There isno evidencewhatevertojustify thecomplaintsofdiscriminatory treatmentbytheAdministration. In the light of the above, the recourse is dismissed. Let therebenoorderastocosts. Recoursedismissed. Noorderasto costs. 380 li