3 C.L.R. 1988March15 [PIKIS,J.] INTHEMATTEROFARTICLE146OFTHECONSTITUTION MARIACHRISTOUDHIA, Applicant, v. THEREPUBLICOFCYPRUS,THROUGH THEPUBLICSERVICECOMMISSION, Respondent. (CaseNo. 668/86). -5 ConstitutionalLaw—Separationofpowers—Prescriptionofqualificationsfor apost inthepublicservice, Contents ofascheme ofservice—They are matters within thecompetence oftheexecutive, andinparticular ofthe CouncilofMinisters—TheTemporaryPublicEmployees(Appointmentto PublicPositions)Law, 1985(Law160/85)—Unconstitutional. 10 ConstitutionalLaw—Separationofpowers—Predicatingbylawinadefinitive mannertheconditionsofappointmentandthoseeligibleforappointmentto apostinthepublicservice—Transgresseslimitsoflegislativepower—The Temporary PublicEmployees (Appointment toPublicPositions) Law, 1985(Law160/85)—Unconstitutional. TheTemporary PublicEmployees (Appointment toPublic Positions) Law, 1985(Law160/85)—Unconstitutionalasitinfringesdoctrineofseparation ofstatepowers. 15 Theaforesaid lawprovidedthattemporaryemployeesinthepublicserT vicewhoheldthesameposition on31stDecember, 1984,shouldbeappointedtocorrespondingorganicposts,providedtheysatisfied therelevant schemesofserviceandhadtheformalattributesrequiredforappointmentto apublicposition. InvirtueofthesaidlawtheinterestedpartieswereappointedClerical 515
(1988)Christoudhia v. Republic Officers 2ndGrade.TheapplicantholdsapermanentpostinthePublicService.Shesatisfied thequalifications oftheschemeofserviceforappointmenttothesaidpost.Butshewasconsidered ineligiblefor appointment, because she wasnota temporary employeeat the material date, i.e.on 31.12.84. 5 Hencethisrecourse. Held,annullirgthesubjudicedecision:
(1)TheConstitutionofCyprus, asoften proclain ed, isbased ona strict separation of thepowersof the State;theLegislative,theExecutiveandtheJudicial.Consequently,every Statecompetencemust,unlessspecifically allocatedbytheConstitutionto 10 anotherbranch of theState,beassummed andexercisedbythatpowerto whichthecompetencenaturallybelongs.
(2)The residue of Executive and Administrative power vests in the Council of Ministers.However,inplainandundisguised languages.3of Law 160/85prescribesthequalifications forappointmentinthepublicservice. 15
(3)Moreover,Law 160/85modifiesaschemeofservice;thisisanother transgressionofthelimitsoflegislativepower.
(4)Furthermore,bypredicating inthedefinitive mannerlaiddownin s.3 theconditionsofappointment,andenumerating thoseeligiblefor appointment,thelegislatureassumedtoagreatextenttheappointingandselectionfunctions ofthePublicServiceCommission,aswellasencroached uponthecompetenceoftheorganassignedbytheConstitutiontomakeappointmentsinthepublicservicetotheexclusionofeveryotherbody. 20 25 Subjudicedecisionannulled. Casesreferredto: Papapetrouv.TheRepublic,2R.S.C.C.61; Ishinv.TheRepublic, 2R.S.C.C.16; ThePresident oftheRepublic v.The HouseofRepresentatives
(1985)3 C.L.R. 1724; ThePresident oftheRepublic v.TheHouse ofRepresentatives
(1985)3 C.L.R.2137; 516 «« 3 C.L.R. Christoudhia v. Republic ThePresidentoftheRepublic v.TheHouse ofRepresentatives
(1985)3 C.L.R.2729; ThePresident oftheRepublic v.The House ofRepresentatives
(1985)3 C.L.R. 2801. 5 10 Recourse. Recourseagainstthedecisionoftherespondenttoappointthe interestedparties,whoweretemporaryemployees,tothepostof Clerk2ndGradeundertheprovisions of theTemporary Public Employees (Appointment toPublicPositions)Law, 1985(Law No. 160/85). Chr.Christophorou*fortheapplicant. L. Koursoumba (Mrs.), for respondent. L.ParparinosforP.Polyviou,for interestedparty Sk.Petrou. Cur. adv.vuli. 15 PIKISJ.read thefollowingjudgment. AtissueintheseproceedingsistheconstitutionalityoftheTemporaryPublicEmployees(Appointment toPublicPositions)Law,1985(Law 160/85), hereafter referred toas"theLaw".Theresolutionoftheconstitutional issuerequires ustodetermine theamenity,if any,of the 2Q legislaturetoprescribequalificationsforappointmenttothepublic service,andfreedom todeterminewhoshallbecandidatesforappointmentto.positionsinthecivilestablishment.Thelawprovidedthattemporary employees in thepublic servicewhoheld the sameposition on 31st December, 1984,should beappointed to correspondingorganicposts,providedtheysatisfied therelevant schemesofserviceandhadtheformal attributesrequired forap-' pointment toapublicposition.Selectionwasordainedtobeconfined topersons included in alist submitted by the Directorof Personnelcompiledinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthelaw. 30 Thediscretion of thePublic ServiceCommission tochoosethe 517 PikisJ. Christoudhia v.Republic
(1988)candidates for appointment waslimited toascertainingwhether thepersons listed in thecatalogueof thePersonnel Department satisfied theschemeof serviceandwerenototherwiseprecluded from enteringthepublicservice. Thecasefortheapplicantisthatthelawisunconstitutionaland 5 appointmentsoftheinterested partiesmadeinfurtherance tothe provisionsof thelawareinvalid.Unconstitutionality arisesfrom breachoftheprincipleofseparationofpowersderivingfrom the assumption bythelegislatureof executivecompetenceand,secondly,breachof theprovisionsofarticle 125oftheConstitution JQ thatconfers onthePublicServiceCommission solecompetence to make appointments in thepublic service.Also,theapplicant challengesthelawasinconsistentwiththeprovisionsofthePublic ServiceLaw (33/67) tothedetriment of constitutional order safeguarded thereby.Thesubmissionrestsontheassumptionthat ,thePublic ServiceLaw isin pari materia with theConstitution andthatbreach thereof impairsconstitutional order, a fallacious assumption. Like every statute, Law 33/67 can be modified, amended or suspended by a subsequent enactment. As indeed happened with Law 160/85 that provided that effect should be given toits provisions notwithstanding the stipulations ofLaw 33/67. In plain language, Law 160/85 sanctioned a departure from theprovisionsofLaw33/67.Ifunconstitutional foranyreason,theobjection mustbepegged totheprovisionsoftheConstitutionitself. 25 .Afew wordsaboutthegrievanceof theapplicant thatledher to challenge the appointments of the interested parties. Maria Christoudhia, thoughinthegovernment serviceatthetimeofthe enactmentof thelaw,lackedthequalifications necessary forappointment under itsprovisions.In particular, she lackedoneof thequalifications envisaged bylaw,namely,holdingtheposition ™ ofatemporary employeeatthematerialdateof31.12.84.Otherwise,shesatisfied theschemesofserviceandwaseligibleforappointmenttothepositionsawardedtotheinterestedparties-ClericalOfficers SecondGrade.Becauseoflackofthe qualifications laid down byLaw 160/85,shewasconsidered ineligiblefor ap- 35 518 3 C.L.R. Christoudhia v.Republic Pikis J. pointment.Hencethepresentproceedings. 5 10 25 30 35 The Constitution of Cyprus,asoften proclaimed isbased ona strict separation of the powers of the State; the Legislative, the Executive andtheJudicial.Consequently,every Statecompetence must,unless specifically allocated by theConstitution toanother branch of the State, be assumed and exercised by that power to which thecompetence naturally belongs. From theearlydaysof the establishment of the Cyprus State it was acknowledged that the residue of Executive and Administrative power vests in the Council of Ministers.InTheodorosG.Papapetrouv.Republic, 2 R.S.C.C. 61,65 (E),it was held that power associated with the making of the amendment of schemes of service prescribing the qualifications necessary for appointment in the public service, vestsexclusively in theCouncil of Ministers.Whereas themaking of appointment in thepublic service isentrusted to an independent body specified by the Constitution - the Public Service Commission - again to the exclusion of every other body. The sameprinciples were given expression toinliter Ishin v.Republic, 2 R.S.C.C. 16, 18.Emphasis was laid on the fact that in the absence of an organic law sole competence for the making of schemesofservicelieswiththeCouncilof Ministers. The Constitution of Cyprusprohibits the assumption of competence by any power of the State of a species that naturally belongs to another branch of the State or is assigned to abody set up under the Constitution, such as the Public Service Commission.Recently, theFull Bench of the Supreme Court pronounced inThePresident of theRepublic v.TheHouseof Representatives
(1985)3 C.L.R. 1724 that the prescription of conditions necessaryfor employment in thepublic service isthe soleprovinceof theExecutive, wholly outsidethesphereof authority ofthelegislature.Thedirection andcontrol of Government of the Republic, it waspointedout,isacompetence thatvestsin theExecutive in' virtueof theprovisions of article54.1of theConstitution.Therefore, theprovisionsof theEngagement ofTemporary Employees (Public and Educational Service) Law, 1985,was held unconstitutional totheextent thatitmade theengagement of personnel in 519 PikisJ. Christoudhia v. Republic
(1988)thepublicservicesubjecttoapproval,beitindirectly,bythelegislature.Asimilarapproach underlinesthedecisionoftheCourt inThePresidentoftheRepublicv. TheHouseofRepresentatives
(1985)3C.L.R.2137.Inafairly detailedjudgment thatIdeliveredinthatcase,Idrewattentiontotheprinciplesunderlyingthe 5 separationofthepowersoftheStateandtheneedforstrictadherence tothedivision of competenceamongthethreebranchesof Government;intheinterestofconstitutional orderandthesustenanceof theruleoflaw.TwootherdecisionsoftheFullBench of the Supreme Court may becited with benefit, notably, The .« President of the Republic v. The House ofRepresentatives
(1985)3C.L.R.2729andThePresidentoftheRepublic v. The HouseofRepresentatives,
(1985)3C.L.R.2801astheyexemplify theallocationofStatecompetenceandpreconditionsforthe validexerciseofit. For twoindependent but equally consequential reasons,the lawhereunderreviewisunconstitutional.Therefore,theauthorisationfortheappointment oftheinterested parties and thelegal framework oftheirappointmentweredefective,necessitatingthe. invalidationofthesubjudicedecision. Thereasonsfor theunconstitutionality of thelawarethefollowing: In plain and undisguised language s.3 of Law 160/85 prescribes thequalifications for appointment in thepublic service. The prescription of qualifications for appointment in thepublic «^ serviceistheexclusiveprovinceoftheExecutive.Evidently,the legislature assumed competenceoutsidetheconstitutional frameworkofitspowers.Forthereasonsindicatedearlierinthisjudgment, prescription of the qualifications for appointment in the public serviceisin theexclusive competence of theCouncilof Ministers. Moreover, they modified by legislative action the schemesofserviceinforce,transgressingagainthelimitsoftheir power,aprocessentailinginadditiontheoverridingofthewillof theExecutive inamatterassigned toitbytheConstitution; furthermore,bypredicating inthedefinite mannerlaiddownin s.3 35 520 3C.L.R. 5 Christoudhia v.Republic PikisJ. theconditionsofappointment,andenumeratingthoseeligiblefor appointment,thelegislatureassumedtoagreatextenttheappointingandselectionfunctions ofthePublicServiceCommission,as well^encroached uponthecompetenceoftheorganassignedby theConstitutiontomakeappointmentsinthepublicservicetothe exclusionofeveryotherbody. Theinevitable conclusion isthatthesubjudicedecision was founded onthepremiseofalawenactedinbreachofthedoctrine ofseparationofpowers,indefiance tothecompetenceoftheEx10 ecutive and that of thePublic Service Commission. That being mydecision,itisunnecessarytodebatewhetherLaw 160/85was alsounconstitutionalforviolationoftheprovisionsofarticle28.1 oftheConstitutionbydifferentiating betweenholdersofthequalifications laid down in the schemes of service depending on , - whethertheyheldtheposition ofatemporaryemployeeon31st December, 1984. In delivering myjudgment I have not overlookedthatthemotivesofthelegislatureinenactingLaw 160/85 werebenevolent, intended toremedy an anomaly in thepublic service.Nodoubt thelegislature aimed bytheenactment of the lawtoconferontemporarygovernmentpersonnelthesecurityof tenureenjoyed byholdersoforganicpositionsinthepublicservice.Ontheother hand,themotives of thelegislature,salutary though theymay be,cannotprevail overthedictatesof thelaw andtheConstitution. 25 Foralltheabovereasons,thesubjudicedecision isdeclared nullandofnoeffect whatsoever,pursuanttotheprovisionsofarticle 146.4(b)oftheConstitution. Subjudicedecisionannulled. 521