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(1988)1988April16 [A.LOIZOU,P.) INTHE MATTER OFARTICLE 146OFTHE CONSTITUTION CONSTANTINOS PHOKAS, Applicant, v. THE REPUBLIC OFCYPRUS, THROUGH THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent. (CaseNo. 951/87). Public Officers—Secondment—The Public Service Law, 1967 (Law 33169), section 57—"Toperform special duties in asection other than theone to which this section belongs"—-Whethersecondment under this provision presupposes existence ofapost towhich theofficer would be seconded— Questiondeterminedinthenegative. 5 Public Officers—Secondment—The Public Service Law, 1967 (Law 33167), section 47 -Strained relations betweenofficer concerned and othermembers of the same Ministry—Wether valid groundfor removing him from theMinistry bysecondment—Questiondeterminedintheaffirmative. Reasoning of anadministrative act—Administrative Courtcanupholdvalidity ofadecisiononground other thanthatinvokedbyadministration. \Q General principles of administrative law—Public interest—Conflict between suchpublic interestandtheprivateinterestofanofficerintheservice—The former prevails. Theapplicant heldandstillholdstheorganic postof Directorof theDepartmentof Agriculture. Bymeansof thesubjudicedecision hewasseconded tothe Ministry of Foreign Affairs inorder toperform special duties. Thedecision wastaken undersection47of Law33/67. 790 15 3 C.L.R. 5 Phokas v. Republic •Therespondentsjustified·such decision on two separate reasons, i.e. theexigenciesof theservice,which required theperformance ofsuchduties in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the "strained relations between the applicant and members of the Ministry of Agriculture,which,at present, t rendered the further stay of the applicant of the Ministry injurious to the public". Section 47provides that "when apermanent officer isrequired temporarily toperform thefunctions ofavacantoffice otherwise than inanacting capacity ortoperform specialdutiesinasection otherthan theonetowhich hisoffice belongs,heisseconded tosuchoffice orsection." 10 Counsel for applicant submitted thai: (a)Thepredominant purpose was not theperformance of special duties,but achieving other objectives, and (b) Secondment presupposesexistence of apost, whilst in thiscasetheapplicant wasnotseconded toanexistingpost.· *»' 15 20 Held,dismissingtherecourse:
(1)Thesecondment wastaken underthe second leg of section 47, i.e. for performing "special duties in a section other than theone to which his office belongs". What matters is whether therearisestheneedfor theperformance ofspecialduties inaSection ofthe public serviceandnot ina post in thepublic service. Had the legislator intended theperformance of thedutiesofapost, hewould havesaid so inexpresslanguageashedid in thecaseof thefirstlegof thesection where he speaksofperformance of;functions ofavacantoffice. Insteadin.(hesecond legthelegislator speaksofperformance ofspecial duties.Therefore, theexistenceof apost isnotrequired. , , 25
(2)Having regard tothe undisputed existence of strained relations between the applicant and the members of the Ministry in question; therespondent could lawfully resort tothesubjudice secondment by way ofan administrativemeasure for thesakeof thesmooth functioning of thePublic Service. 30
(3)An administrativeJudge can uphold thevalidity of anacton thebasis of another lawful reasoning even though such reasoning is different i from thatgiven by theadministration. Inthiscase>thevalidityof thesubju+r,diceactcan besupported bythenotionof publicinterest Strained relations %j,between theDirectorof avital sectorof.'. rpublic Service- theDepartment of Agriculture -and theothermembersof thestaff of theMinistry -.arenot atall conducive tothe smooth functioning of theparticular public service buton thecontrary they promote disruption and anomaly which aredetrimental tothe interests of thepublic service-and in effect todie interests of thepublic. '>' 35 791 Phokas v.Republic
(1988)Publicinterestrequiredthetakingofappropriatestepssothattheparticularpublicserviceshouldfunction smoothly.Therespondentstooktheappropriate*stepbymeansofthesubjudicedecision. Recourse dismissed. Noorderastocosts. Casesreferredto: Tourpekkiv.TheRepublic
(1973)3C.L.R.592; Republic v.Koufettas
(1983)3C.L.R.1950; Anthoupolisv.TheRepublic
(1980)3C.L.R.296; Voulpiotisv.TheRepublic
(1974)3 C.L.R.313; 10 SpyrouandOthers(No. 1)v.TheRepublic
(1973)3C.L.R.478; Stokkos v.TheRepublic
(1982)3 C.L.R. 1110. Prodromouv.TheRepublic
(1982)3C.L.R. 10. ·; Tikkiv.TheRepublic
(1981)3CX.R.250; lordanouv.TheRepublic
(1966)3C.L.R.696; 15 Xenopoulos v.TheRepublic
(1979)3C.L.R.546. Recourse. Recourse against thedecision of therespondent to second the applicant to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for performance of special duties relating to matters of "agricultural products and generally tomattersof agriculture which emanatefrom theinterpretation andapplication of the agreement for theUnion of Cyprus with theE.E.C. 792 20 3 C.L.R. Phokas v. Republic E.Efstathiou,for theapplicant. S. Georghiades, Senior Counsel of the Republic, for the respondent. Cur. adv. vult. 5 10 15 20 25 OQ A. LOIZOU P.read thefollowingjudgment.Theapplicant has atallmaterial times,been theDirectorof theDepartment ofAgricultureinthe Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources.By means of a letter dated 6th November, 1987, addressed to the Public Service Commission, the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, submitted arequestfor thesecondment of asuitable officer of theMinistry ofForeign Affairs for theperformance of special dutiesrelating toagricultural products and generally to agricultural matters which emanate from the application of the recently signed Protocol for the Customs Union of Cyprus and the European Economic Community (E.E.C.). Further the Acting MinisterofForeign Affairs, bymeansofa letter of the same date addressed to the Minister of Agriculture, stated thatinrespect of theabovementioned matters theMinistry of Foreign Affairs isin needof anofficer whoisconversant with mattersof agricultural products and agriculture and possessesthe requisite experience due toperformance of therelevant dutiesin the Public Service for purpose of giving to the Ministry of ForeignAffairs immediate adviceandguidance.AlsotheActingMinisterofForeign Affairs added that such anofficer isnot available at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Acting Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources by his letter dated 6th November 1987, informed thePublic Service Commission that asfar asthe Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources wasconcerned the above request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was accepted and for the purpose aforesaid they proposed the secondment of Mr. Constantinos Fokas,Director of theDepartment of Agriculture. Regarding the proposed secondment the Ministry of Agriculture andNatural Resourcestookintoconsideration: 793 A.Loizou P. Phokasv.Republic
(1988)(a)The knowledge, capabilities and experience of Mr. Fokas in relation to the matters heisexpected toadvise the Ministryof Foreign Affairs, and, (b)Thefact that the said secondment isdeemed expedient too for thesakeof themoregeneralinterestof theserviceoftheMin- 5 istry of Agriculture and Natural Resourcesduetothestrainedrelations between Mr. Fokas and members of the Ministry, which at present render the further stay of Mr. Fokas at theMinistry of Agriculture injurious tothepublic. In hisabove letter theActingMinisterofAgricultureand Natu- 10 ral Resources stressed that theproposed measureof secondment was not taken due to the blame of the said officer, but its main purpose onthe one hand, wasthefacing of the needsoftheMinistry ofForeign Affairs, assameweresetoutin therelevant letter of theActing Minister of Foreign Affairs, and on the other hand 15 the more general interest of theServices of the Ministry of Agriculture andNatural Resources.TheActingMinisterof Agriculture and Natural Resources,further attached anadviceof theAttorneyGeneral of theRepublic which wastotheeffect that a transfer of an officer can belegallyjustified in theform of an administrative -n measure in cases such as this,given that by such a measure no blame is attributed tothe officer and that such measure does not aim at hispunishment but it is being resorted todue to aproblematic situation which arises asaresult of the saidofficer remaining at his post and damaging the smooth functioning of thePublic Service,regardless of any blame on the part of the officer. In the said legaladviceit wasfurther stated thatinthe circumstances the Appropriate Authority which proposes the transfer/ secondment and the Public Service Commission which decides thereon,maytake intoconsideration theabove problematic situation when proposing ordeciding on the secondment/transfer. Fi- ^0 nally inthesaid advice itwas stated thattheinstanceof the above administrative decision is distinguished from the instance of the disciplinary measureof transfer whichmayormay not bedecided in a parallel way in respect of the same facts as a result of a disciplinary prosecution for the punishment of a disciplinary of- 35 794 3 C.L.R. Phokas v.Republic A.Loizou P. fence on behalf ofanofficer ifthefactsjustify suchameasure. 5 10 AC ** 30 35 The Public Service Commission at its meeting of the7thNovember 1987,having taken intoconsideration all thematerialbefore it, observed that in the instant case there had not been followed the procedure envisaged by circular No. 64, dated 24th July, 1980,of theChairman ofthePublic Service Commission in thatthere hadnotbeplaced before theCommission astatementof theDirector General, of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources,on the question whether Mr. Fokas was aware of his proposed secondment and whether he had been given theopportunity toput forward in writinganyrepresentations. Inview ofall theabovetheCommission decided toinvite Mr.Fokas before itat. its impending meeting in order to be informed of the proposed secondment and be thus afforded theopportunity toput forward any representations or views.Thereupon Mr. Fokas was invited before the Commission and its Chairman explained to him the contentsof theproposal regarding hissecondment for the performanceof special duties at theMinistry of Foreign Affairs byvirtue of the second leg of section 47 of the Public Service Law 1967;and, alsoinformed him thathecould make any representations and put forward his views. Mr. Fokas enquired as to whether the secondment was dependent on his own consent and in case of secondment what would have been the legal situation regarding his status.TheChairman explained tohim that secondments under the second leg of section 47 are effected notwithstanding the consent or not of the officer affected and the sole guidance isalways theserving of theinterests of the Serviceand after takingintoconsideration therepresentations oftheofficer affected. Regarding the secondquestion, the Chairman replied that the seconded officer continues holding his organic post and enjoys all the benefits deriving therefrom but without performing theduties thereof.Mr. Fokasrequested tobefurnished withcopies of all thedocuments which were before the Commission and asked tobegiven some timetoplace hisviewsin writing. Thereafter the Commission furnished Mr. Fokas with copies of all therelevant documents and thelatter by means of his lettei 795 A. Loizou P. Phokas v.Republic
(1988)dated the 10thNovember 1987,stated the following: "(
  1. a)Ihave been a public officer for more than twenty-five years and I have been holding aDirector'spost since the 15th September 1985.Consequently Iam aware of the obligations of a public officer and hisforemost obligation toperform his 5 duties within the framework of the lawsinforce and theConstitution. (
  2. b)In view of all the above Iam bound to obey if it were found thattherearefulfilled thelegal prerequisites for mysecondment by reserving all my lawful rights with regard to the matter." 10 The Public Service Commission went on with the consideration of the matter at its meeting of the 10th November 1987.At the said meeting theCommission having taken into consideration allthematerial before it as wellas thecontentsof theabove reply 15 of Mr.Fokas,and thecontentsof a letter of the Director-General of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resourcesdated 10th November, 1987,totheeffect that in theeventof theproposal for the secondment of Mr. Fokas being approved the Ministry intends to submit a proposal for the appointment of an Acting Di- 20 rectorof theDepartment of Agriculture, decided, byvirtue of the second leg of section 47 of the Public Service Laws 1967 to 1987, tosecond Mr. Fokas totheMinistry of Foreign Affairs for performance of special duties relating tomatters of "agricultural products and generally to matters of agriculture which emanate ^<from theinterpretation and application of the agreement for the Union of Cyprus with theE.E.C." for the serving of the interests of the Public Service. The above decision was communicated to Mr. Fokas on the 10th November 1987. On the 21st November 1987, he filed the 3Q present recourse whereby heprayed for adeclaration that "thedecision of the respondent Commission dated 10th November 1987,bymeans of which they decided to second applicant tothe Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with effect from 11th November 796 3 C.L.R. Phokas v. Republic A. Loizou P. 1987, from thepost of Directorof theDepartmentof Agriculture in the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources is null and voidand/orillegal and/oris devoid of legalconsequences, and/or the secondment ought nottohave been taken". 5 10 15 20 25 30 Learned counsel for theapplicant mainly contended that what was intended was not the secondment by virtue of section 47 for performance of special duties duties but theremoval of applicant for the purpose of serving other objectives. Further learned counsel referred to section 29
(1), 58
(1)(b) and 30
(3)of the Public Service Law and submitted that the se­ condment of an officer from thepost he is serving toanother sec­ tion presupposes the existence of a post in the public service. In the instant case in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there was no post providing that acertain officer will perform thespecial duties relating tomatters of agricultural products; and thus the applicant was seconded to a nonexistent post and his secondment was made in excess of power. I shall now deal with the meaning of secondment. According to the text-book "Ελληνικό Διοικητικό Δίκαιο, Γ Ειδικό Μέρος, 'Εκδοσις Τετάρτη" by Elias G. Kyriakopoullos, sec­ ondment is thus defined atpp. 313-14: "9.- Απόσπασις (αρθ. 96) είναι η απομάκρυνσις του υπαλλήλου εκ της υπηρεσίαςήτου γραφείου, εις οοργανι­ κούς ανήκει,και η θέσις αυτού εις ετέραν υπηρεσίαν, είτε εντός είτε εκτός της έδραςτου, επί τω τέλει όπως ασκήση καθήκοντα συναφή προς την λειτουργία ταύτης. Ηαπόσπασις δεν αποτελεί οργανικήν μεταβολήν, καθ' όσον ο αποσπώμενος εξακολουθεί ν' ανήκη οργανικώς εις την αυτήν υπηρεσίαν, αφ'ης απεμακρύνθη (Σ.Ε. 1971/1947). Η απόσπασις, ως εκ τηςφύσεως αυτής, εθεωρήθη,ότι απο­ τελεί προσωρινόν μέτρον, διό και ωρίσθη, ότι χωρεί' δι εξάμηνον το πολύ χρονικόν διάστημα', δικαιολογείται δε μόνον προςπλήρωσιν σοβαράςυπηρεσιακήςανάγκης,και δεν είναι δυνατήαν μη προβλέπηταιυπό του οικείου ορ797 A. Loizou P. Phokas v. Republic
(1988)γανικούνόμου." And inEnglishit reads: "9.- Secondment (section 96) is theremoval of the officer fromtheserviceortheoffice towhich heorganicallybelongs, and his posting toanother service,either within or outside his 5 seat,for thepurpose of performing duties relevanttothe func­ tioning thereof. Secondment does not constitute an organic change because the seconded officer continues to belong or­ ganically tothesameservicewherefrom hewas removed(De­ cision 1971/1947of Council of State).Secondment inviewof io its nature was considered tobe a temporary measure and for this reason it was providedtolast' for aperiod of six months atthemaximum' and isjustified only for thepurposesof cop­ ing withaseriousserviceexigencyanditis notpossibleif it is notprovidedby theappropriate organic Law." 15 In Conclusions from the Jurisprudence of the Greek Council of State pp.340-41we read thefollowingregardingsecondment :"ΣΤ. Απόσπασις. Απόσπασις υφίσταται οσάκις ο δημόσιος υπάλληλος απομακρύνεταιτηςυπηρεσίαςήτουγραφείου,εις οοργανι- «ο κώς ανήκει,καιτίθεται εις τηνυπηρεσίαν άλλου γραφείου προςτον σκοπόν όπωςεκτέλεσηυπηρεσίανυπαγομένην εις την αρμοδιότητατουτελευταίου τούτου:52
(33),316,1031
(36),765
(38). Έξοδον δε εκτός έδραςκαιουχί απόσπασιν αποτελεί η ανάθεσις εις τον υπάλληλον της εντολής προς εκτέλεσιν εκτός της έδραςτουωρισμένης εργασίαςυπαγό­ μενης ειςτην δικαιοδοσίαντηςυπηρεσίαςτουΓραφείου εις ο οργανικως ανήκει ήκαιυπάγεταικατ'απόσπασινήπροσκόλλησιν: 52
(33),ίδεκαι316,1031
(36).Τοάρθρον96 του Υπαλ. Κωδικός καθορίζει μόνον τααρμόδιαόργαναπρος ενέργειαν των αποσπάσεων (όπουαύταιεπιτρέπονται από 30 τους οργανικούς νόμους) και προσδιορίζει την χρονικήν διάρκειαν αυτών: 1861
(53). 798 3 C.L.R. 5 Phokas v. Republic A. Loizou P. Η απόσπασις ,ως εκ της φύσεως της,αποτελείμέτρον προσωρινόν λαμβανόμενον-προς πλήρωσιν υπηρεσιακής ανάγκης: 1062
(46), 195
(53). Κατά συνέπειαν η πράξις αύτη είναι ελευθέρως ανακλητή, της ανακλήσεως ταύτης αποτελούσης ενέργειαν υποκειμένηνκατ'εξοχήν εις την διακραικήν εξουσίαντουαρμοδίου οργάνου." And inEnglish itreads: "Secondment. 10 15 20 Thereexists secondment whenever thePublic Officer isremoved from the service oroffice to which he organically be­ longs, and is placed in the service of another officer for the purpose of performing services coming within the competence of the latter: (52/33, 316, 1031/36, 765/38). We have an exit outside theseat and notsecondmentwhenever anofficer isin­ structed toperform outside his seat,certain work which comes within thecompetenceof theservice of theoffice towhich he organically belongs orserves by way of secondmentor attach­ ment: 52/33, see also 316, 1031/
  1. Section 96 of the Civil Service Code makes provision only for thecompetentorgans which affect the secondments (whenever same arepermitted by theorganic laws)anddefines theirduration: 1861/
  2. The secondment in view of its natureis a temporary meas­ ure, which is resorted tofor the purpose of coping with a ser­ viceexigency: 1062/46, 195/
  3. Consequently this actis free­ ly revocable and such revocation constitutes anact which falls ., predominantly within thediscretion of theappropriateorgan." 25 30 Section 47 of thePublic Service Law, 1967, which was relied upon by therespondent provides "that when apermanent officer is required temporarily to perform the functions of a vacant of­ fice, otherwise thanin aacting capacity or toperform special duties ina section otherthan theonetowhich his office belongs, he is seconded tosuch office orsection". 799 A. Loizou P. Phokas v. Republic
(1988)In the case of Vasso Tourpekki v. Republic
(1973)3 C.L.R. 592 atp.599 I had theopportunity toconsider theabove quoted section and I said: "The^gist of this section isthetemporary performance of the functions of a vacant office and it may be said that since thisoffice was temporarily vacated bythe secondment of its holder to a senior post, the interested party was seconded 5 temporarily to this post and not promoted, his substantive status remaining thesameas his secondment could beterminated atany timeand soautomatically revert tothesubstantive post held." TheTourpekki case (supra) wascited with approval by Stylia- JQ nides J., in R. v. Koufettas
(1985)3 C.L.R. 1950, in which the learned Justice giving thejudgment of the Full Bench, said atp. 1961: "Secondment does not change the substantive status of a public officer. It is of an undeterminable duration; it is of a 15 temporary nature. It is neither a promotion nor appointment. The fact that a secondment iseffected after selection does not changeitscharacter." Coming now tothe second legof section 47 on which the sub judice decision was based. I hold that its gist is the performance 20 of special duties in a Section other than the one to which the officeof thePublic Officer concerned belongs.Therefore whatmattersiswhether there arisestheneedfor theperformance of special duties in a Section of the public service and not in a post in the public sevice.Had the legislator intended the performance of the duties of apost, he would have said soinexpress language as he 25 did in the case of the first leg of the section when he speaks of performance of functions of avacant office. Instead in thesecond leg the legislator speaks of performance of special duties.Therefore having regard to the wording of the,second leg of the said Section 47, Iam of the opinion that its invocation does not pre- ~« suppose the existence of a post. It is enough if in the particular Section ofthePublic Service therearises the need for the performanceof specialduties byaparticularofficer. And in thiscaseas itmanifestly appears from therelevant correspondence such need 800 3 C.L.R. Phokas v. Republic A. Loizou P. clearly arose.Inview of all theabovetherespondentby relying onthesecond leg of section47couldlawfully resort tothe meas­ ureof secondmentof applicantfor performanceof special duties asdescribed inthesubjudicedecision. 5 10 2Q As itclearly appearsfromthesubjudicedecision andfromall thematerialbefore the respondenttheperformanceof specialdu­ ties in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was nottheonly reason thatpromptedthesubjudice secondment.Therewas anotherrea­ sonmerely: "Thefact thatthesaidsecondmentisdeemedexpedientfor thesakealsoof moregeneral interestof theservicesofthe Ministry of Agriculture andNaturalResources inviewof theex­ isting strained relations between MrFokas andmembers of the Ministry which atpresentrenderedthefurther stay of Mr.Fokas attheMinistryinjurious tothe public." Muchstresswas laidinthelettersreferred toabovetotheexis­ tenceof "strained relations between Mr.Fokas andmembersof theMinistry of Agriculture". This assertion was notdisputed by learned counsel for theapplicant. Imust therefore consider the caseontheclearassumption thatthe relations between Mr. Fokas andmembersof thestaff of theMinistry of Agriculture werein­ deedstrainedtothe extentof rendering "atpresentthefurtherstay of Mr.FokasattheMinistry injurious tothe public". And Ishall proceed todeal with thelegal aspectof asituation such astheabove. IntheConclusionsfromthe CaseLaw of theGreekCouncilof Stateweread thefollowing atp.339; 30 "Ναι μενοΥπαλ. Κώδιξ εθέσπισεν εν άρθρω 133 παρ. 1 εδ. γ' ως πειθαρχικήν ποινήν την δυσμενήμετάθεσιν, πλην δια τηςδιατάξεως ταύτης δενκατηργήθησαν οικοιvol περί μεταθέσεως κανόνες, ουδέπεριωρίσθησαν οι δυ­ νάμενοι ναυπαγορεύωσιταύτηνλόγοι.Συνεπώς δεναπο­ κλείεται ημετάθεσις,εφ"όσον αύτηκρίνεται επιβεβλημένη χάριν του γενικωτέρου υπηρεσιακού συμφέροντος, υπό 801 A. Loizou P. Phokas v. Republic
(1988)των αρμοδίωνοργάνωνκαιυπότην εγγύησιν τηςγνωμο­ δοτήσεωςτουκατάτοΣύνταγμαυπηρεσιακού συμβουλίου, έστωκαιανπροεκλήθηαύτηεξυπαιτιότητοςτουυπαλλή­ λου,ήτιςεντηπεριπτώσειταύτηεκτιμάται διατον σχηματισμόν της κρίσεως περίτου αναγκαίου της μεταθέσεως 5 και ουχί υπό την έννοιαντης πειθαρχικής υπαιτιότητος: 1124
(57)ί/>εκαι 312
(56), 1056
(58).Αλλωστε καιειςπε­ ρίπτωσιν πειθαρχικού κολασμούτουυπαλλήλουουχίδια τηςποινής τηςδυσμενούςμεταθέσεωςείναιπροφανές,ότι δύναται ν' ανάκυψη, λόγωτης εκτουπαραπτώματοςτού­ τουδημιουργηθείσηςκαταστάσεωςυπηρεσιακή ανάγκητης μεταθέσεωςαυτούωςδιοικητικούμέτρου: 1224
(57). ("Though the Public Service Code has, under section 133
(1),made provision for theadverse transfer as a disciplinary punishment,by meansof thisprovision theordinary Rulesre­ lating totransfers have notbeen abolished norhave therea­ sons thatmay dictatea transfer been restricted. Consequently thereis notexcluded atransfer, solong as itis consideredim­ perative for thesakeof themoregeneral interests of theSer­ vice, by theCompetentOrgans andundertheguaranteeof the opinion of theservicecouncil functioning underthe Constitu­ tion, even if thetransfer hasbeen brought aboutby the default of theofficer, which in such acase is for theformation of the opinion regarding thenecessity totransfer andnotwithin the meaning of disciplinary default: 1124/57 see also 312/56, 1056/56). Inadditioninthecaseofdisciplinary punishmentof anofficer notby meansof thesentenceof adverse transfer itis evident that there may arise the need of the service for his transfer as anadministrative measure asaresult of thesituation thathasbeencreated becauseof hisoffence: 1224/57)" And atp. 343: "Και παλαιότερονεγένετο δεκτόν ότι και εν ελλείψει ειδικήςδιατάξεως,δεναποκλείεταιεκτωνγενικώναρχών 35 του διοικητικού δικαίου, το δικαίωματης προσωρινής απομακρύοεωςτουδημοσίουυπαλλήλουαπό της ασκήσε802 15 20 25 30 3 C.L.R. Phokas v. Republic A. Loizou P. ως των καθηκόντων του,εφ'όσον, κατά κρίσιν προσηκόν­ τως ητιολογημένην, παραμονή αυτού εις την θέσιν του αποτελεί σοβαράν αναπόφευκτον απειλήν των υπό την επιμέλειαν αυτούδημοσίων συμφερόντων: 881
(52)." 5 10 ("Formerly it was also accepted that due to the lack of a special provision, it is not excluded by the general principles of Administrative law, theright of removal of the public offi­ cer from the performance of his duties, so long as according to a duly reasoned opinion, his stay at his post, constitutes aseri­ ous unavoidable threat tothe public interests under his control: 881/52.") Also at p. 368: 15 20 25 ΛΛ "Αι περί δεδικασμένου αρχαίτου δικαίου,αι συνοψιζόμεναι εν τω κανόνι' non bis in idem' έχουσιν εφαρμογήν εντός του πεδίουτου πειθαρχικούδικαίου. Επομένως απο­ κλείεται η επιβολή δευτέρας ποινής δια παράπτωμαδι' ο ετιμωρήθη ήδηο υπάλληλος: 245
(30),240
(34)86
(39), 390
(50)κατ"εξαίρεσιν η προ του Υπαλ. Κωδικός νομολογία εδέχθη ότι δεν απεκλείετο ηυπό του προϊσταμένου επιβο­ λή δευτέρας ποινής διατο αυτόαδίκημαεις ην περίπτωσιν ο προϊστάμενος έκρινε την επιβληθείσαν ποινήνανεπαρ­ κή: 96
(30), 802
(33), 261, 320
(39). Την εξαίρεσιν όμως ταύτην από του κανόνος, δεν απεδέχθη ο Υπαλ. Κώδιξ όστις ορίζει γενικώς εν αρθρ. 139
(1)και ότι ουδείς διώκε­ ται εκ δευτέρου δια το αυτό πειθαρχικόν αδίκημακαι ότι ένεκα του αυτού πειθαρχικού αδικήματος μία ποινή επι­ βάλλεται. Πάντως η αρχή 'non bis in idem' δεν έχει στάδιον εφαρμογής οσάκις διατο αυτό αδίκημαδι' ο υπάλλη­ λος ετιμωρήθη πειθαρχικώς πρόκειται να επιβληθή και εν δυσμενές διοικητικόν μέτρον. Διότι τα διοικητικά μέτρα άτιναλαμβάνει ηδιοίκησις ουχί επί σκοπώ ασκήσεως πει­ θαρχικής εξουσίας αλλά χάριν του συμφέροντος της δημο­ σίας υπηρεσίας ως είναι η μετάθεσις;δι^χθεσιμότης, αργία κλπ'., δεν αποτελούσι πειθαρχικάς πεινάς. Κατ' ακολουτ θίαν των ανωτέρω πράξις δι' ην επεβλήθη πειθαρχική 803 A. Loizou P. Phokas v. Republic
(1988)ποινή δύναται να δικαιολόγησηνομίμως καιτηνπρόσθετον λήψιν των διοικητικών τούτωνμέτρων: 111
(32), 1003
(33), 1233
(47),884
(49)." ("The principles of law on res judicata which are summa- 5 rised in the rule 'non bis in idem' are applicable within the sphere of disciplinary law: Therefore theimposition of a sec­ ondpunishmentinrespect of an offence for which the officer has already been punished, is excluded: 245/30, 240/34, 86/ 39, 390/
  1. Exceptionally the Case-Law prior to the Public Service Codeaccepted thattheimposition of a second punish- ^Q ment by theHeadof theDepartment inrespectof the same of­ fence was notexcluded incase hejudged thepunishment that has been imposed inadequate: 96/30, 802/33, 261, 320/
  2. This exception, from the Rule, however, has notbeen accept­ ed by the Public Service Code which by its section 139
(1),c provided thatnooneshould be prosecuted for asecond timein respect of the same disciplinary offence and that for the same disciplinary offence there is imposed only one punishment: The principle non bis in idem has no stage of application whenever in respect of the sameoffence for which the officer has been punished disciplinarily there is going tobe imposed an adverse administrative measure too. Because theadminis­ trative measures which aretaken by theadministrationnot for the purpose of exercising disciplinary power but for the sake of theinterestof thepublic service such as transfers, interdictions,placing off duty,etc.,do notconstitutedisciplinary pun- Z J ishments. Itfollows from theabove thatanactioninrespect of which there has been imposed adisciplinary punishment, can lawfully justify the additional taking of these administrative measures: 111/32, 1003/33, 1233/47, 884/49." 30 In this case having regard to the undisputed existence of strained relations between the applicant and the members of the Ministry in question, I think that the respondent could lawfully resort tothe subjudice secondmentby way of an administrative measurefor thesake of the smooth functioning of the Public Ser- 35 vice (Χάριν της ευρύθμου λειτουργίας των δημοσίων 804 3 C.L.R. υπηρεσιών). 5 Phokas v. Republic A. Loizou P. ... Notwithstanding my above conclusion Ithink thatthe validity of the subjudice decision can be upheld on the basis of another lawful reasoning for it is open toan administrative-Judge toup­ holdthevalidity of an acton thebasts of anotherlawful reasoning even though such reasoning is different from thatgiven by thead­ ministration (see Anthoupolis v. Republic
(1980)3 C.L.R.296; Voulpiotis v.The Republic
(1974)3 C.L.R. 313, andSpyrou and Others (No. 1) v. TheRepublic
(1973)3 C.L.R. 478.) 10 15 2Q ~r 35 The otherlawful reasoning referred toabove, is the reasoning relating tothe notion of public interest. And being aquestion of public interest itcan be examined notonly for thepurpose of af­ fording a reasoning but even ex proprio motu {Stokkos v. The Republic
(1982)3 C.L.R.illO.) As already said relations of theapplicant and members of the Ministry of Agriculture were strained andthequestion which aris­ es is this;Doessuch a situation promotepublic interest ? Ithink that paramountconsiderations of public interest dictate that all public services should function smoothly. Smooth functioning, however, canonly be achieved in aspirit of good will andbroth­ erly relations between those burdened with theresponsibility for thefunctioning of public services. Strainedrelations between the Directorof avital sectorof the PublicService -theDepartmentof Agriculture -and theothermembers of thestaff of theMinistry are notatall conducive tothesmooth functioning of theparticular public service but on the contrary they promote disruption and anomaly which are detrimental to theinterests of thepublic ser­ viceandineffect totheinterests of thepublic.Foritgoes without sayingthatapublic servicewhose functioning is renderedproble­ maticfunctions in amannerwhich infringes thepublic interest.It was therefore imperative for the administration for paramount considerations of public interest to take appropriatesteps sothat the particular public service should function smoothly. And it took the appropriate step by means of the sub judice decision. Even if by such step theapplicantmight suffer some detriment or 805 A. Loizou P. Phokas v. Republic
(1988)hardship andwe would thusbe having aconflict between apri­ vate interestandthepublic interest,thelattershouldprevail.(See Prodromou v. TheRepublic
(1982)3 C.L.R.1055; Tikkiv.The Republic
(1981)3C.L.R.250;lordanou v.TheRepublic
(1966)3 C.L.R.696; Xenopoulos v. The Republic
(1979)3 C.L.R. 546).SeealsoDagtoglouGeneralAdministrative Law p. 115and DendiasAdministrative Law,thefollowingpassageatp.207. 5 "Αναγνωρίζεται όμωςσυγχρόνωςότιτοδημόσιονσυμ­ φέρον υπέρκειται παντόςατομικού τοιούτου, δι' ο καιη θυσίατούτουέναντιεκείνουείναιπολλάκιςαναγκαία." JQ InEnglish: "It is at thesame timerecognized thatpublic interest pre­ vailsoveranypersonalinterestandfor thisreasonthe sacrifice of thisasagainst thatisonmanyoccasions necessary." Furthereven if, ascontendedby learnedcounselfor theappli- 15 cant,thereal andpredominantpurposeof therespondentwasthe removal of applicantfrom thedepartmentof Agriculture and not the performance by him of special duties, then such removal could belawfully resorted tointheinterestsof thepublicservice andonconsiderationsof publicinterestbecauseof thestrainedre- 20 lations aforesaid. Forall theabove reasons the recoursemustfail,andis hereby dismissed with no orderas tocosts. Recourse dismissed. Noorderastocosts. 25 806

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AI explanation based on the official legal text. Indicative, not a substitute for legal advice.