clr/1988/1988_3_844.pdf

(1988)1988April25 [A.LOIZOUP.,MALACHTOS,SAVVIDES,STYLIANIDES,PIKIS,JJ.J DORAHOURIDOUANDANOTHER, Appellants-Applicants, THEIMPROVEMENTBOARDOFAYIOSDHOMETIOS, Respondent. (RevisionalJurisdictionAppealNo.711). StreetsandBuildings—Divisionoflandwithbuildingsthereonintobuildings sites—The StreetsandBuildingsRegulationLaw. Cap. 96,asamended— Thequestionisgovernedbysection3

(1)(c)andnot3

(1)(d)—Therefore, section9

(1)(c)(vi)appliesand,asaresult, theLicensingAuthoritycan imposeaconditionrelating tothe cessionofpartofthe landfor widening 5 thestreetabuttingontheplotinquestion. Theappellantsaretheco-ownersofathree-storeybuilding,whichhad beenerectedinvirtueofabuildingpermitandinrespectofwhichacertificateofapprovalhadbeenobtainedTheappellantsappliedforapermittodividethelandintotwosites,aprocessentailingtheverticaldivisionof the 10 buildingtoo.Thepermitwasgranted,butonconditionthatpartofthesite fronting theroadshouldbecededforstreetwideningpurposes.Theconditionwasattackedbyarecourse,andwhenthelatterwasdismissed,thisappealwaslodged. Theappeal wasfinallydismissedbymajority ofthreetotwo.Pikis,J. 15 with whom A.Loizou, P.concurred, and Sawides,J.delivered separate judgments dismissing theappeal. Stylianides,J., with whom Malachtos,J.concurred,delivered ajudgmentallowingtheappeal.Theratiodecidendiofthejudgmentsdismissingtheappealappearsinthehereinabove headnote. Had the appellants applied for the horizontal division of the 20 buildings,section3

(1)(d)ofCap.96wouldhavebeenapplicableand,perhaps,theymighthavehadagoodcaseinattackingthecondition. Appealdismissed. Noorderastocosts. 844 3 C.L.R. Houridou & Another v. lmpr. Hoard Ay. Dhometlos Casesreferred: HouridouandAnother v.ImprovementBoardofAyios Dhometios

(1979)3 C.L.R. 219. Appeal. 5 Appeal against thejudgment of aJudgeof theSupreme Court of Cyprus (Kourris,J.) given on the 18th February, 1987 (Revisional Jurisdiction Case No.565/85)* whereby appellant's recourse against thedecision of therespondents that a stripof land affected by the street widening scheme should be ceded to the 10 public road before issuing adivision permit totheappellants was dismissed. E.Efstathiout for the appellants. E. Odysseos, for the respondents. Cur. adv. vult. 15 A.LOIZOU,P.:Thefirstjudgment will bedelivered byPikis, J. PEGS, J.: The appellants are the co-owners of a three-storey building.They applied totherespondents,theappropriate authority undertheStreets and Buildings Regulation Law,Cap.96,fora 20 permit to divide the land into two sites, a process entailing the vertical division of the building too.Each of the two co-owners would become the soleowner of one of the twopans into which theland andthe buildings standing thereon would bedivided. At the same time they applied for theissuance of separate titles for 25 each of theapartmentsof which theproperty wasmadeup. Respondents approved theapplication for division of theland into two sites and sequentially the division of the building, on condition that part of the site fronting theroad should be ceded *(Reported in

(1987)3CLA. 245) 845 Pikis J. Houridou & Another v. Impr. Board Ay. Dhometios

(1988)for street widening purposes.Theappellantsobjected totheimposition ofthistermandchallengeditsvaliditybyarecoursebefore the Supreme Court. Their action was premised on the proposition thattheStreetsandBuildingsRegulationLawconfers nopowertotherespondentstoimposeaconditionrelavanttostreet 5 widening upon application for the sub division of theland and buildingsintoseparateplots.Thelearned trialJudgeruledagainst themholding thatthelawconferred powerontherespondentsto impose therelevant condition.Hefound thistobethecombined effect of the provision of s. 3

(1)(c) and s. 9

(1)(

1. c)(
2. v)of the 10 StreetsandBuildingsRegulationLaw. TheappealturnssolelyontheviewtakenbythetrialCourtof the powers vested in the appropriate authority under Cap.96, uponapplicationforthesub-divisionoflandwithbuildingsthereon intoseparate sites.Counselrenewed the submissions earlier raisedbefore thetrialCourt'andinvitedustoholdthatanapplicationforthesub-divisionofabuildingintotwoseparateplotsfalls exclusively within thepovisionsof s.3

(1)(d)of thelaw,lapropositionhavingasanecessarycorollary theabsenceofanypower on thepartoftheappropriateauthoritytoimposeanycondition, for streetwidening.Counsel arguedthattheprovisionsofs.3(

1. l)(
2. d)of the law apply in the case of an application for the subdivisionoflandintobuilding sites.Ithasnoapplication tocases involving thesub-division of abuilding,beitonahorizontalor verticalbasis. Fortherespondentsitwasarguedthattoconstruetherelevant provisions of Cap. 96 in the manner suggested by appellants would beflyingin theface of theplain provisions of s. 3(l)(
3. c)whichreads: "Noperson shalllayoutordivideanyland(irrespectiveof 30 whetheranybuildings,otherthanbuildingsusedsolelyforagriculture orforestry,existthereonornot)intoseparatesites". Theapplicabilityofs.3(l)(d)isconfined tothehorizontaldivisionofabuildingintosepararetenements,aprocessinvolving 846 15 20 25 3 C.L.R. Houridou & Another v. Impr. Board Ay. Dhometlos Pikis J. nodivisionoftheland.Section3

(1)(d)reads: "No person shall divide any building (irrespective of whether any such division necessitates any construction or not)intoseparatetenements". 5 Section3(l)(d)ofCap.96doesnotpermitthedivisionofthe landintoseparatesites.Nomatterwhatglossonemayputupon itswording,thepoweroftheappropriateauthorityisconfined to adivisionofthetenementsofwhichitconsists. Theonly provision that permits thedivision of theland into 10 buildingsitesiss.3

(1)(c);andtoavoidanyambiguityrespecting theambitandeffect ofitsprovisions,itisspecified thatthesection finds application irrespective of whether buildings stand uponthelandtobedividedintoseparatesites.Thatbeingthe effect of s. 3(l)(c), the application of the appellants for thesub15 division of thebuildingintotwoseparateplotshadtobeexamined in the context of this provision of the law and the corresponding provisions of s.9(l)(c)(vi) that specifically empower theappropriateauthorityuponapplicationforthesub-divisionof thelandintoseparatesites,toimposeaconditionrelevanttostreet 20 widening.Whysuchpowershouldbeconferred upontheappropriateauthorityuponapplicationforthesub-divisionofabuilding intotwoparts,isamattersolelyaffecting thepolicyof thelaw. Atissuebeforeusistheeffect ofthelawandthelegalityandproprietyoftheaction oftheAdministration ininvoking theprovi25 sionsof s.9(l)(c)(vi). InagreementwiththelearnedtrialJudgewerulethattheappropriateauthorityexaminedtheapplicationinacorrectlegalperspective;theresultoftheiractioncannotbefaultedeitherasillegal orimproper. 30 Intheresulttheappealisdismissed. A.LOIZOUP.:IagreewiththejudgmentofPikis,J.,justdelivered,andIhavenothingtoadd. 847 Houridou & Another v. Impr. Board Ay. Dhometios

(1988)SAVVEDES J.: This is an appeal against the judgment of a Judge of this Court sitting in the first instance whereby he dismissed therecourse of the appellants challenging thedecision of therespondent Improvement Board bywhich itimposed acondition for the division of appellants' property under plot No. 31, 5 sheet/plan XXI.45.V, registration No.A30,at Ayios Dhometios to the effect that a strip of land part of the plot affected by the street widening scheme should beceded tothepublicroad for the purpose of its being widened. Theappellants are registered owners in undivided shares of a 10 building site at AyiosDhometios on which theyerected in 1963 "a twodwelling building intended tobeused astwoseparate and self-contained independent residences".Thebuilding"waserected in accordance with the terms ofapermit in thatrespect issued to them bytherespondent which is "theappropriateauthority" under 15 the Streets and Buildings Regulation Law, Cap. 96.The appellants havingcomplied with theconditions stipulated inthepermit applied totherespondent for acertificate of approval under s.10

(2)of the Law, Cap. 96, in respect of the buildings erected on their property. This was refused on the ground of non- 20 compliance with acondition imposed bytherespondent on anapplication made by the appellantson 3rdMarch, 1967for apermit todivide that building into twodwellings with aview totheissue of separatecertificates of registration -onetoeachowner -inseveralty. As aresult the appellantsfiled arecoursechallenging the refusal of therespondent toissue acertificate of approval.The Court held in thatrecourse on whichjudgment wasdelivered on the9th June, 1979 (See Dora Houridou and Another v. The Improvement Board of Ayios Dhometios

(1979)3 C.L.R. 219) that the 30 refusal of therespondent to issuethe certificate of approval was unwarranted inlaw and that theappellantswereentitled toadeclaration that the refusal in question was in abuse of the respondent's powers. On the26th March, 1984,theappellant applied for thedivision 35 ofthesaidplotintwoseparateplotswhichentailedtheverticaldi848 25 3 C.L.R. Houridou & Another v. Impr. Board Ay. Dhometios Sawides J. vision of thebuilding tooaswell asfor theissueof separatetitle deeds oftheflatscomprising thebuildings which implied ahorizontaldivision oftheproperty. Therespondent havingexamined the application of theappel5 lants communicated its decision by'letter dated 8th December, 1984,informing them thattheirapplication wasapprovedon the condition that the strip of land, part of the plot, affected by the street-widening schemeshouldbecededtothepublicroad for the purpose of its being widened. The appellants challenged the 10 abovedecisionbyrecourseNo.565/85 The learned trialJudgpin hisjudgment after making adetailed reference tothehistory of thecaseand after anexposition of the law relevant to thematter concluded that in view of thefact that the appellants by their application sought not.only the issue of 15 separate titles for each plot but they also sought to divide the building siteon whichthesaidflats were standingintotwo separateplotstheappropriate authority wasauthorized toimpose such condition by virtue of s.9(l)(c) of the law read in conjunction with s. 3

(1)(c) (see Houridou and Another v.The Improvement 20 Board ofAyios Dhometios

(1987)3 C.L.R., 245). Counsel for appellants argued thatonce the building inquestion waserected underapermit issued for that purposebytheappropriate authority andonce acertificate of approvalhadbeenissued, therespondent, in granting apermit for thedivision of the 25 property for the purpose of the issue of separate titledeeds, was not entitled to impose any condition that part of the property should beceded for street-widening schemepurposes.Such condition,counsel submitted,could havebeenimposedwhen anapplication for abuilding permit wasissued but not when thedivi30 sionoftheproperty wastotakeplace.Itwashissubmission that thecasefalls exclusively withintheprovisionsof s.3(l)(d) of the lawwhichdoes notempower theappropriate authority to impose any condition for'street-widening scheme purposes. He further argued that thedecision of therespondent was wrong in law and 35 was taken in excess of itspowers and wasbased on a wrong in849 Sawides J. Houridou &Another v.Impr. Board Ay. Dhometios

(1988)terpretationofthelaw. Ifindtheargumentsadvancedbycounselforthe appellantsas untenable.Thebuildingpermitandthecertificate ofapprovalof thebuildingserectedthereonwasproperlygrantedbytherespondentinexerciseof its powersundertheprovisionsof the lawap- 5 plicableforthegrantof buildingpermits.Atthetimewhensuch permitwasgranted therewasnoapplication bytherespondents for thedivision of thelandintotwoseparatetenements.Hadthe appellantsappliedfor ahorizontaldivisionofthe propertynotinvolvingadivisionof the landtheymighthavehadagoodcaseto 10 argue.Butinthepresentcasewhatwearedealingwithisaverticaldivisionofpropertyinvolvingthedivisionofthe landintotwo separatebuildingplots. Thepresentcaseclearlyconcernsdivisionofthelandintoseparatetenementsandwhatisapplicableiss.3(l)(c)whichclearly 15 providesfor apermittolayoutanddivideanylandintoseparate sitesirrespective of whether anybuildings other than buildings used solely for agricultureor forestry existed thereonornotand s.9(l)(c)oftheLawreadinconjuntion withs.3(l)(c)andthatin ity is empowered toimpose acondition similar to theone im- 20 posed inthepresentcaseingrantinganapplicationfordivision. Ifully agreewiththelearned trialJudgeastohisfindings that therespondent had powertoimpose suchcondition byvirtueof s.9(

1. l)(
2. c)oftheLawreadinconjunction withs.3(l)(c)andthatin thecircumstancesof thecase therespondentproperlyexercised 25 its discretion in imposing the condition challenged by thisrecourse.Iagree that thisappeal should bedismissed butwithno costs. STYLIANTDESJ.:This appealisdirected against thejudgmentof aJudgeofthisCourtwho,intheexerciseofrevisionalju- I30 risdiction, dismissed therecourseoftheappellants,wherebythey sought theannulment of acondition imposed byTheImprovement Boardof AyiosDhometios,(the"Respondent"),inadivisionpermit. 850 3 C.L.R. Houridou & Another v. Impr. Board Ay. Dhometios Styllanidesj . TheRespondentwasatallmaterialtimestheAppropriateAuthority, under the Streets and Buildings Regulation Law (Cap. 96, Law Nos. 14/59, 67/63, 6/64, 12/69, 38/69, 13/74,28/74, 24/78,25/79,80/82,15/83). 5 Theappellants,beingregisteredownersinundividedsharesof a building site at Ayios.Dhometios, shown on D.L.O. Map as plotNo.31, Sheet/Plan XXI/45.V, erected on it,on theground floor, atwodwelling buildingintended tobeusedastwoseparate, self-contained and independent residences, two.self10 containedflatsonthefirstfloorandoneself-contained flatonthe secondfloor on the onesidewithastoreandawashingroomon thesame sideonthethirdfloor anda staircaseatthefront between the twosetsof flats. These buildingscovered the whole areaof the buildingsite.Actuallythedistancefrom theboundar15 iesisonly8-9feetinsteadofthe 10 feetprovidedbytherelevant Regulation.Atthetwoextremeendsof therearontheground. theyerectedauxiliarybuildings(garageandwashingroom). TheyobtainedfromtheRespondentthenecessary certificates ofapproval. 20 On 20th March, 1984,they applied for adivision permit of building-(D462/84).Theyattachedtheretoasiteplanandarchitecturaldrawings.Theproposeddivision was: Twoseparatetenementsonthegroundfloorincludingthenarrowyardandtheauxiliary buildings,twoseparate tenements -thetwoflats -onthe 25 first storey,onetenement-theflatonthesecondfloorincluding thestoreandthewashingroomonthethirdflooroverit. Theunbuiltterraceofthesecondfloor wouldbeincludedinthetitleof thecorrespondinggroundfloorresidenceandtheunbuiltareaof the terrace of the third floor next to the store and the washing 30 room,towhichreference hasbeen made,would becommon to allowners.Thestaircasewouldbeaseparatesub-plotcommon toall. The Respondent issued the division permit applied for, in whichtheyimposedthefollowingcondition:851. Stylianides J. Houridou &Anotherv. Impr. Board Ay. Dhometios

(1988)'Toτμήματουτεμαχίουπουεπηρεάζεταιαπότη ρυμο­ τομίαπουδείχνεταιμεπράσινηγραμμήστατοπογραφικά σχέδια θαπαραχωρηθεί γιατηνδιεύρυνσητουδημόσιου δρόμου (Αρθρο 9

(1)(γ)(νί)τουΝόμου,Κεφ.96).Οιυφι­ στάμενες πάνω σ' αυτόκατασκευές(περίφραγμα κ.λ.π.) 5 μπορούν ναπαραμείνουν μέχρι πουηΑρμόδιαΑρχήνα αναλάβειτοέργοτηςδιεύρυνσηςτουδρόμου." Theappellants,beingaggrieved, filed arecourseseekingthe annulmentof thesaid condition. Thegroundsfor annulmentare:- 10 (

1. a)Thematterwas resjudicata; and (b)Theconditionwas imposed inexcessandabuseof the Re­ spondent's power. On3rd March, 1967,when only twodwelling buildings onthe ground floor were erected,theapplicantsapplied totheRespon- 15 dentfor apermittodivide thatbuilding into twodwellings witha view totheissueof separate certificates of registration -oneto each owner -in severalty. Onthefollowing August the Respon­ dent issued thatdivision permit andimposed aconditionwhich reads:20 "(
2. c)the strip, part of the plot, affected by the streetwidening plan ('rymotomia') shall beceded free of buildings tothepublicroadfor thepurposeof itsbeing widened." Theappellants,having compliedwith theconditionsstipulated in thepermit,otherthanthecession of the strip -thesubject of 25 condition (c)-applied totheRespondentfor acertificate of ap­ proval undersection 10

(2)of theLaw. This was refused onthe groundof thenon-compliancewiththecondition.The appellants thereupon, by Recourse No.271/68, sought a declarationthat, thatrefusal was nullandvoid andwithoutanylegal effect what- 30 soever. 852 3 C.L.R. Houridou &Another v. Impr. Board Ay. Dhometios Styllanides J. AJudgeofthisCourtdecidedthat,whattheappellants sought wasnotadivision of land andaccordingly theRespondenthad no power, under sections9(l)(c) and3

(1)of theLaw,toimpose the condition inquestion,anddeclared therefusal toissuethe certifi5 cateof approval asunwarranted in law and abuseoftheRespondent's powers. The sub-judice decision wasannulled -(seeHouridou & Another v. Improvement Board of Ay. Dhometios

(1979)'3 C.L.R. 219). The first instance Judge, in the Judgment under appeal, held 10 that the ground of resjudicata was untenable, asin 1967 theappellants applied for the division of a building, whereas by their application in 1984they sought thedivision of their building site intotwoseparateplots,aswellastheissueofseparatetitledeeds for the various flats comprising the said building and, conse15 quently, thematterisnot resjudicata. He,also,held that theAppropriate Authority, by virtue of section 9(l)(c) read in conjunction with section 3

(1)(

1. c)of the Law, had power to impose the condition in question. The question that falls for determination is whether the divi20 sion soughtisadivision of building ordivision of land for building PHiP.Pses· Section 3(l)(
2. c)and (d)of theLawreads asfollows:"3. (l)r^o person shall(
3. a)25 (
4. b): : -...: ;. (
5. c)lay out or divide any land (irrespective of whether any buildings, other than buildings used solely for agriculture or forestry,exist thereonornot)intosepararesites; (
6. d)divide any building (irrespective of whether any such 30 division necessitates any construction or not) into separate tenements;" Section9(l)(c)provides:853 Stylianldes J. Houridou & Another v. Impr. Board Ay. Dhometios

(1988)"9.

(1)Ingranting apermitundertheprovisionsof section 3of this Law, the appropriate authority shall havepower,subject to any Regulations inforce for thetime being,toimpose conditions as hereinafter, tobe set outinthepermit,thatis tosay(

1. a)5 (
2. b)'. (c)with regard tothelayingoutordivision of any land for buildingpurposes, conditions asto (i)thedemarcation andsizeofboundary marks; ' (
3. ii)την μεταφοράν, εγκατάστασιν και συνεχή παροχην ίο καταλλήλου ύδατοςτοοποίονδέον ναείναι επαρκές,ωςκαι την κατάλληλον και ικανοποιητικήν συντήρησιν και λειτουργίαν της άνω εγκαταστάσεως και συστήματος υδατοπρομηθείας. Νοείται ότι, κατά την λήψιν αποφάσεως, εν οιαδήποτε 15 συγκεκριμένη περιπτώσει,ωςπροςτηνεπάρκειανύδατοςως προνοείται ανωτέρω, δέον να λαμβάνωνται υπ* όψιν αι ανάγκαιτηςπεριοχής ωςσυνόλου εκτης οποίαςπαρέχεταιτο ύδωρ. (iii) thediversionof natural andartificial water courses; 20 (
4. iv)thelevellingof thesite; (ν) την κατασκευήν οδών,γεφυρών, μικρών γεφυριών, παρόδιωνοχετών καιπεζοδρομίων'. (
5. vi)thewideningof any street upon which theland, to which theapplicationrelates,abuts. (vii) την εξασφάλισιν χώρων δι' υποσταθμούς εις καταλλήλους περιπτώσεις. 854 2 5 3 C.L.R. Houridou & Another v. Impr. Board Ay. Dhometios StytianideaJ. (viii)την εξασφάλισινδημοσίωνχώρωνπρασίνου. (
6. ix)την φύτευσινδένδρωνκαι θάμνωνειςκαταλλήλους περιπτώσεις. (Χ) την κατασκευήν υπογείων αγωγών και την 5 εγκατάστασινηλεκτροφόρων καλωδίων εις καταλλήλους περιπτώσεις. (
7. xi)την εγκατάστασιν οδικούφωτισμούειςκαταλλήλους περιπτώσεις.'" 10 The appellants applied on aprintedForm Ε. Δ.7 provided by the Respondent. It isaform of applicationfor:- • (i)Construction ofroad, (ii)division of landfor building purposesand (iii)division of building. 15 The first two were deleted andclearly theapplication was for adivision of building.Thishowever isnotthesolecriteria for the determinationof the questionposed. Ten, out of the eleven permissible conditions set outin section 9

(1)(c),can be applied only for the laying outor division of landon which buildings maybeerected. 20 25 In the present case, there was no land "for building purposes" tobedivided.Thelandwasfully builtupon. By theordinary meaning of thewords andthe purposive interpretation of therelevant provisions of theLaw, read to­ gether, it is impossible for anyone even to argue thatthe division in question was a division of land "for building purposes". Thebuildings were already erected.Thewordsin brackets insection 3

(1)(c)donotaffect thepresentcaseand 855 Stylianides J. Houridou & Another v. Impr. Board Ay. Dhometios

(1988)the subject matter of the division is not "land for building purposes". Anappropriateauthorityisempowered toimposeanyofthe conditions set out in section 9

(1)(c),iftwoprerequisites exist; Division of land and land which may be used for building purposes. "Building purposes" imparts thenotion of erecting a 5 buildingof the land -sites which result from thedivision. The argument of counsel for the Respondent that the division of the narrow yard on the ground, round the two residences, which is not permissible by Law and the Regulations made thereunder to be used for any building 10 purposes, attributes the characteristic of the division of "land for building purposes", isfallacious. The fallacy is shown by thefollowing example. Suppose on a site a building is erected, which covers the whole area of the ground and the total building constant 15 permissible. If the owner, thereof, seeks to divide this buildinginto separatetenements,including theunbuilt areaon the ground, would this be a division of land for building purposes, or a division of building? Definitely it is not a division of land for building purposesin any sense. 20 In thepresent case there wasnoland for buildingpurposes and theRespondent Appropriate Authority acted inexcess and in abuseof power. For theforegoing reasonsIwould allow theappeal. MALACHTOS,J.: Iagree with thejudgmentjust delivered 25 by StylianidesJ. and Ihave nothing useful toadd. Appeal dismissed by majority. 856