clr/1988/1988_3_891.pdf

(1988)3CLJi. 515 adopted. ConstitutionalLaw—Equality—Constitution, Art. 28—The TemporaryPublicEmployees (Appointment toPublic Positions) Law,1985 (Law 160/ 85)—Repugnant toArt.28^-Distinction betweenpermanentand temporaryemployees—Cannotbesupportedbylogicorexperience. ,t - 10 Constitutional Law—Separation of Powers—Christoudia v. The Republic

(1988)3CL]Ji. 515 adopted. 15 Theinterestedpartieswereappointedtothesubjudicepostinvirtueof theaforesaidLaw160/85.Theapplicant,whowasapermanentpublicofficer,wasnotappointed,becausehewasnot,atthematerialtime,likethe interestedparties,atemporaryemployee.Theapplicantsatisfied alltherequirementsoftheschemeofserviceforthesubjudicepost 891 Christoudias v. Republic

(1988)Hencemisrecourse. Held,annullingthesubjudicedecision:

(1)Theinterestnecessarytosustainadministrativereviewisnotconfined toafinancialone.It issettled thatadecision adversetothelegitimateexpectationsofapublicofficer forascentinthehierarchicalladderof 5 theserviceentitleshimtoseekitsreview.Theapplicantdidhavealegitimateexpectation tosubmitacandidature for appointment tothepostof Administrative Officer. Hehadthequalifications necessary for appointmentMoreoverhehadevincedhisinteresttocompeteforappointmentas farbackas 1983. 10

(2)Law 160/85 is unconstitutional for the reasons expounded in Christoudiav.TheRepublic

(1988)3C.L.R. 515.

(3)Moreover, Law 160/85 is repugnant to Art 28 of the Constitution.There is no logical or experiential justification for the distinction madebetweenpermanentandtemporaryemployeeswhoseekappointment 15 topositionsin thepublicservice. Broadasthepower of thelegislatureistoclassify theobjects of the law,itmuststopshortofarbitrary distinctionssuchascannotbesupportedinlogicorexperience. Subjudicedecisionannulled.20 Noorderastocosts. Casesreferredto: Christoudiav. TheRepublic

(1988)3C.L.R. 515. Recourse. Recourse against the decision of therespondent to promote the 25 interested parties to the post of Administrative Officer in preference and instead of the applicant. N. Loizou, for applicant. A. Vassiliades, for the respondent. Cur. adv. vult. 30 892 3 C.L.R. Christoudias v. Republic PUGSJ.readthefollowingjudgment.Thisisanapplication ofChristosChristoudiasforjudicialreviewofthedecisionofthe respondentstoappointtheinterestedpartiestothepostofAdministrativeOfficer (publishedon4.7.1986).Hecomplainsthatthe 5 P.S.C.arbitrarily excluded himfrom consideration for appointmentnotwithstandingthefactthathepossessedthequalifications forappointmentenvisagedbytheschemeofservice. Christos Christoudias joined the public service in 1963.In 1983hewaspromoted toClericalOfficer, thesameyearheap10 plied for appointment totheposition of Administrative Officer and wasoneof thecandidates for appointment orpromotion to thatposition. Asacknowledged hehad thegeneral and special qualifications necessary for appointment; that is,hehadpassed thespecialqualifying examinationforappointmenttothepostof 15 Administrative Officer. Theprocessoffilling thepostwasdiscontinued attheendof 1983.TheAdministration chosetosatisfy theirpersonnel needs bytheappointmentoftemporarypersonnelandtheinterestedpartieswereappointedAdministrativeOfficers onatemporarybasis. 20 Ihey servedinthatcapacity when theTemporary CivilService (AppointmenttoPublicPositions)Law 1985wasenacted(Law 160/85).Thelawmadeprovisionforthepermanentappointment oftemporarycivilservants.Itprovidedthattemporarypersonnel employedatthetimeoftheenactmentofthelawandwhoserved 25 inthecapacityandweretemporarymembersoftheserviceon31st December, 1984,shouldbeappointedonapermanentbasisprovidedtheyhad(a)thequalifications for appointment,and(b)the formalrequirementsforappointment,tothepublicservice.Ifthey satisfied theserequirements,thelawstipulatedtheirappointment 30 shoulddatebacktothedateofenactmentofthelaw.Theinterestedpartieswereemployedinatemporarycapacityatthematerial datesandmoreoverpossessedatthetimeoftheirappointmentby theP.S.C.thequalifications laiddownintheschemeofservice. Consequently,theywereappointedAdministrativeOfficers from 35 thedateofpromulgationofthelaw. 893 Pikis J. Christoudias v. Republic

(1988)Theapplicant challenged thedecision asfounded onanunconstitutional law. Similar arguments to those raised in Christoudia v. Republic

(1988)3 C.L.R. 515 were advanced in support of the proposition that Law 160/85 is unconstitutional. Therefore, the legal framework within which theappointments wereeffected 5 wasdefective, exposing the subjudicedecision toinvalidity. The respondents supported the law as constitutional. Furthermore they doubted the legitimacy of the interest of the applicant to move theCourt toreview thedecision hereunder consideration. To mount an application for the review of administrative ac- 10 tion, the pursuer must have a legitimate interest in the decision. The natureof hisinterest is specified bypara 2 of Art. 146.To bejusticiable thedecision must adversely affect animmediate interest of the applicant and mustfurther prejudice itdirectly. The interest necessary tosustain administrative review isnotconfined 15 toafinancialone.We neednotreviewtoanyextenttheprinciples governing the speciesof interestnecessary tolegitimize recourse tothe Court. It suffices tomention that itis settled beyond doubt that adecision adverse to the legitimateexpectations of a public officer for ascentin thehierarchical ladderof the serviceentitles 20 him toseekreview of theactionprejudicing thatexpectation.The applicantdidhavealegitimateexpectationtosubmit acanditature for appointment tothepostof Administrative Officer. Hehad the general and special qualifications necessary for appointment (he passed the special examination in 1981). Moreover he had 25 evinced his interest to compete for appointment as far back as 1983. In those circumstances hehad a legitimate interest in the filling onapermanent basisofthepostofAdministrative Officer, more soashe had theformal qualifications necessary forjoining the civil service. In fact, he was a member of the civil service. 30 Consequently, theobjection oftherespondents tothejusticiability of therecourse for lackof alegitimateinterestmustbedismissed. In Christoudia v. The Republic (supra) it was decided that Law 160/85 is.unconstitutional. Therefore, the decision, subject to review in that case, was annulled. Although ajudgment of a 35 Court of coordinatejurisdiction, be itof my own,is not binding 894 3C.L.R. Christoudiasv.Republic PikisJ. uponthisCourt,nothingheardinthiscasepersuadesmethatits reasoning isin any wayerroneousorthatLaw 160/85canpass thetestofconstitutionality.Forsimilarreasonstothosegivenin theabovedecision,thelawisfoundtobeunconstitutionalandthe 5 subjudicedecisionisdeclarednullandvoid.Acopyofthatdecisionisappendedtothisjudgmentandshouldbereadasanintegral partofit.InthecaseofChristoudia v.TheRepubic (supra)we left unanswered thequestion whetherLaw. 160/85wasalsounconstitutional for breachoftheprincipleofequality safeguarded 10 byArt.28.1of theConstitution.Thecircumstancesof thiscase maketheresolution of thatissuenecessary inviewof whatappearstometobemanifestly unequaltreatmentbetweentheapplicant and the interested parties. The exclusion of the applieant from thelistofeligiblecandidateswas,inmyjudgment,arbitrary 15 andcannotbesustained. Applicanthadthequalificationsenvisagedbytheschemeoftheserviceandliketheinterestedpartieshe wasamemberoftheservice,albeit,onapermanent basis.Ican find nologicalorexperientialjustification forthedistinctionmade betweenpermanent andtemporaryemployeeswhoseekappoint20 menttopositionsinthepublicservice.ThenotionofequalityunderArt.28.1hasbeenexplored bydecidedcasesmorethanany otheraspectofthefundamental rightsandlibertiesofthesubject guaranteed bytheConstitution. Itisunnecessary torefer toany decidedcases, savetoemphasizethattheyconsistently support 25 thethesisthattheobjectofArt.28.1istoensureintrinsicequality.Broadasthepowerofthelegislatureistoclassify theobjects ofthelaw,itmuststopshortofarbitrarydistinctions suchascannotbesupportedinlogicorexperience.Highastheburdeninvariably is tomakeout acaseof unconstitutionality of thelaw,in 30 thiscaseithasbeendischarged.Merecontemplationofwhathappened, particularly the abandonment in 1983of the processof filling thepostsof AdministrativeOfficer onapermanentbasis, andsubsequentconfirmation oftheinterestedpartieswhojoined theserviceafterthediscontinuanceofthatprocessonatemporary 35 basis,suffices toshowthemagnitudeofthebreachoftheprincipleofequalitybeforethelawandtheAdministration. Foralltheabovereasonstherecoursesucceeds.Thesubjudice decisionsare,pursuanttoArt. 146.4(b)oftheConstitution,declaredtobewhollyvoid Lettherebenoorderastocosts. 40 Sub judice decision annulled.Noorderastocosts. 895