(1989)1989June 9 [MALACHTOS.J] IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY
- KYRIACOS KAMMOUYIAROS AND
- OMIROS VASILIOU FOR AN ORDER OF CERTIORARi/MANDAMUS/PROHIBITION, AND INTHEMATTEROFTHEJUDGMENTOFTHEDISTRICTCOURTOF NICOSIADATED 14.5.88INCRIMINALCASENO. 15620/
- (Application No. 91/88). CriminalProcedure —Reservingaquestion oflawfortheopinion of the Supreme Court —The CriminalProcedure Law, Cap. 155, section 148
(1)—Meaning of «question oflaw» inthatsection —Review of authorities. Prerogativeorders— Certiorari—Lies tocorrectanerroroflawwhere revealed on the face of an order or decision, or irregularity,or absence of,orexcessof,Jurisdiction —Itdoesnotlieasacloakofan appeal. 5 Prerogative Order— Certiorari—Failureto attach to the application copy of the decision complained of— Obiter dictum that such a 10 failureisfata!tothe application forcertiorari. The legalprinciplesemanatingfromthiscasesufficiently appearin the headnotes-hereinabove. This was a case of an application for certiorari to quash a ruling of a court exercising criminal summary Jurisdiction, whereby an application by the accused to reserve 15 certain «points of law» for the opinion of the Supreme Court was dismissed. The Court dismissed the application for certorari on the ground that the questions sought to be reserved were not questions of law. Application dismissed. 20 Casesreferredto: The Republic v.Kalli(No.1), 1961C.L.R.266; InRe Charalambous andAnother
(1974)2C.L.R.37; Stephenson, Blake &Co.v. GrantLegros&Co., 86 L.J. Ch.439; Williamsv.O' Keefe [1910]A.C. 186; GlasgowNavigation Co v.IronOreCo. [1910]A.C.293; Australian Commonwealth Shipping Board v.Federated Seamen's Union ofAustralia,36C.L.R.450. 292 25 1 C.L.R. InreKammouyiaros TheRepublic v.PresidentDistrictCourtFamagusta exParteLoukia K.Marouletti
(1971)1C.L.R.
- Application. Application foranorderofCertiorari/mandamus/prohibition in 5 respect of the judgment of the District Court of Nicosia dated 14.5.88in Criminal Case No. 15620/
- E.Efstathiou withM. Tsangarides, forthe applicants. CI.HadjiPetrou,fortheAttorney-General ofthe Republic. Cur. adv. vult. 10 MALACHTOS J. read the following judgment. The present proceedings arose out of and in the course of the hearing of Criminal Case No. 15620/87 before aJudge of the District Court of Nicosia, where the two applicants were charged under 17 counts for stealing by agent sums of money on various dates, 15 during the period between 1983 and 1985, which they collected on behalf of the Cyprus Tourism Organization {C.T.O.), contrary tosections 255and 270 ofthe Criminal Code, Cap.
- Itwasthe caseforthe Prosecution before the trialcourtthat the two applicants, who at the material time were managing the 20 Trokadero Cabaret inNicosia, that although they were collecting on the various bills of their customers the amount of 3 % for the C.T.O., they appropriated it. • The case was reported to the Police by Georghios Pericleous, an InspectoroftheC.T.O.,whoalsotookpart inthe investigations 25 together with P.C. 286A.Neofytou, the Police investigator. On 19.9.85 various premises of Accused 1, namely, Kyriakos Kammouyiaros, were searched on the strength of a judicial warrant and a number of documents were received, the contents ofwhich could support acriminalchargeagainstthetwo accused. 30 In the meantime, a number of statements were received from various persons and one of those statements; that of George Kammouyiaros, referred to Accused No. 2, namely, Omiros Vassiliou, as the person who indicated to the employees of accused 1 whowerethecashiersoperatingthetillmachinesofthe 35 cabaret of accused 1,how to prepare two tapes of account, each one with different amount collected. It should be noted here that according to the prosecution the above charges concerned the stealing of various sums of money 293 MalachtosJ. InreKammouyiaros
(1989)consisting of the 3 % which the accused were collecting for the accountofC.T.O.from thecustomersofthecabaretofaccused 1. On the basis of the collections shown by the till machines the relevant declarations were submitted to C.T.O. and the case for theprosecution isthatthetwoaccuseddeclared theamountofthe 5 tape with the lesser amount collected. On 21.9.85 P.W.I, Inspector Pericleous, together with the Police investigator, met accused 2 who. according tothe prosecution, had a conversation with them. When P.W.I wasabout togive evidence atthe trial as to what was exchanged between them, counsel for the defence 10 objected and alleged thatthewitnesscould notstateastowhatwas said or done by accused 2 atthat meeting as the investigator did not observe the Judge's Rules. According to counsel for the accused at that time the investigator was in possession of evidence, which raised reasonable suspicion that the accused 15 committed the offence with which he was charged and so the investigator had to caution him.Inviewofthe objection raised by counsel for the accused a trialwithin trialtook placewhere itwas revealed that what accused 2 said and did wasthat he found the tapes of the tillmachines and delivered then tothem. 20 ThetrialJudge,after makingreference tothecases oiFournides v. TheRepublic
(1986)2 C.L.R. 73,R.v. May,36Cr.App.R. 91, R. Prager,56 Cr. App. R. 51,and Azinas v. The Police
(1981)2 C.L.R. 9, on 3.5.88 decided that what was said by the accused doesnotamount toaconfession and alsothedelivery ofthe tapes 25 wasfree and voluntary.So, he overruled the objection. After the issue of the ruling of the court, counsel for the two accused applied for an adjournment inorder to be able to apply in writing to the court to state the case for the Opinion of the Supreme Court under section 149
(1)of the Criminal Procedure 30 Law,Cap. 155.Thissection readsas follows: «149
(1): The Attorney-General and any party dissatisfied with the decision of a judge exercising summary criminal jurisdiction asbeing errouneous ona point oflaworasbeing in excess of the jurisdiction or of powers of the judge, may, 35 within the time setout insubsection 7of thissection, applyin writing to the judge who gave the decision to state a case setting forth the facis and grounds ofsuch for the Opinion o* the Supreme Court.» The trialjudge then adjourned thecase to 14.5.88. 294 40 I C.L.R. In re Kammouyiaros MalachtosJ. On 13.5.88 counsel forthe twoaccused filed anapplication to thetrial court undersection 149
(1)tostatethecasetorthe Opinion of the Supreme Court on thefollowing grounds: Α. Δεδομένου ό π ο μάρτυρας κατηγορίας αρ. 1 Γεώργιος 5 Περικλέους κατά την 7.8.1985, υπέβαλαν παράπονον ειςτην Αστυνομία ν εκ μέρους του Κ.Ο.Τ. του οποίου τυγχάνει υπάλληλος διά γραπτής καταθέσεως εις τηνοποίαν ανέφερεν γεγονότα και ε;ς την οποίαν διατΰπωσεν την θέσιν ότι ο κατηγορούμενος αρ. Ιήτο οδράστης κλοπής ποσοστού 3% επί 10 εισπράξεων πελατών του εις Βάρος του Κ.Ο.Τ., καιδεδομένου ότ: αυτός στην συνέχεια προέθη εις πλήρη ανάκρισιν και διερεόνησιν της ίδιαςυπόθεσηςσε συνεργασίαν μετονμάρτυρα κατηγορίας αρ.6ανακρίνοντας άλλα πρόσωπα και περισυλλέ γοντας όλα ταάλλα αποδεικτικάστοιχεία, κατάστασις η οποία 15 συγκεντρώνει τηνιδιότητα παραπονουμένου και ανακριτήεις το ίδιον πρόσωπον, ζητείται ευσεθάστως απότοΑνώτατον Δικαστήριον να γνωμοδοτήσει εάνη περισυλλεγείσα μαρτυρία που λήφθηκε κατά τον αναφερόμενον τρόπον θαμπορούσεν να αποτελέσει το υπόβαθρον διά τηννομικά έγκυρη θεμελΐωσιν, 20 συνταξιν και καταχώρησιν του Κατηγορητηρίου εναντίον των κατηγορουμένων. Β. Δεδομένων όλων των ανωτέρω γεγονότων, ζητείται ευσεθάστως από το Ανώτατον Δικαστήριον να γνωμοδοτήσει εάν'οι κατηγορούμενοι έχουν πληγεί ειςτα συνταγματικά των 25 δικαιώματα ίσης και αμερόληπτης μεταχείρισης, ή εάν παραθιάσθησαν οι κανόνες της Φυσικής Δικαιοσύνης, της προστασίας το)νοποίων δικαιούνται οι κατηγορούμενοι, και περί του κατά πόσον τοΚατηγορητήριον και/ήηεπίτη θάσει αυτού επακολουθείσασα διαδικασία είναι έγκυρη και/ή 30 μαρτυρίαηοποίαπερισυνελέγη κατάτοναναφερόμενοντρόπον και κατόπιν τωναναφερΟεισών παραβιάσεων, μπορούσεν να παρουσιασθεί ενώπιον του Δικαστηρίου που εκδικάζει την υπόθεσιν και/ή εάν τοαναφερόμενον Κατηγορητήριον πάσχει ήόχιαπό ακυρότητα. 35 Γ. Δεδομένων όλων των ανωτέρω γεγονότων που έχουν εκτεθεί εις την παράγραφον Α, ευσεθάστως ζητείται από το Ανώτατο Δικαστήριον, ναγνωμοδοτήσει περί του πως μπορεί 295 MalachtosJ. In re Kammouyiaros
(1989)να προστατευθεί ένα κατηγορούμενον πρόσωπον όταν η διεξαχθεΐσα ανακριτική διαδικασία εναντίον του η οποία οδήγησεν εις την συνταξιν του κατηγορητηρίου έγινεν κατά παράβασιν των κανόνων της ίσης μεταχείρισης, της αμεροληψίας, και κατά παράβασιν των αρχών της Φυσικής Δικαιοσύνης, οι οποίες εφαρμόζονται εις όλους ανεξαιρέτως τουςανθρώπους. 5 Δ. Δεδομένου όλων των γεγονότων που εκτίθενται εις την παράγραφον Α, ζητείται ευσεθάστως από το Ανώτατον Δικαστήριον να γνωμοδοτήσει εάν είναι επιτρεπτόν να 10 τυγχάνουν άνισης και/ή άδικης(UNFAIR)και/ήκαταπιεστικής και/ή δυσμενούς μεταχεΐρησης, μερικοί πολίτες της Δημοκρα τίας, όταν ευρίσκονται εις την δισμενή και ολέθριαν θέσιν υπό πτου διαπράξεως ποινικού αδικήματος και εν συνεχεία ως κατηγορούμενοι εις ποινικές υποθέσεις εν όψει των 15 Συνταγματικών διατάξεων που ισχύουν επί του προκειμένου, της Νομολογίας και της Ευρωπαϊκής Συμβάσεως Ανθρωπίνων Δικαιωμάτων, η οποία κατέστη εσωτερικόν δίκαιον της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας. Ε. Δεδομένου του περιεχομένου της αποφάσεως η οποία 20 εξεδόθη στις 3.5.1988, εάν είναι νομικώς ορθές οι θέσεις που διατυπώνονται εις την αναφερομένην απόφασιν αναφορικώς προς το περιεχόμενον της ενστάσεως των κατηγορουμένων της οποίας η ουσία είναι διατυπωμένηεις ταςπαραγράφους Α, Β, Γ και Δανωτέρωκαιηοποίααφοράένστασιν επίτηςεγκυρότητας 25 του κατηγορητηρίου. Η ένστασις επί της εγκυρότητας ενός κατηγορητηρίου, είναι δυνατόν να εγερθεί εις οιονδήποτε στάδιον της διαδικασίας,ευθύς ως περιέλθουν εις γνώσιν των κατηγορουμένων τα στοιχεία επί των οποίων μπορεί να εδραιωθεί μία τοιαύτη ένστασις. ^ ΣΤ. Εάν η ένστασις επί της εγκυρότητας ενός κατηγορητηρίου είναι ένστασις αρμοδιότητας ή όχι και περί τουεάν η αρμοδιότης ενός Δικαστηρίου ταυτίζεταιμε τηνκατά τόπο αρμοδιότητα.» At the commencement of the hearing of the application on 35 14.5.88 the trial judge drew the attention of counsel for the two accused tothe case of Kaourasv. ThePolice
(1973)2 C.L.R. 112, which is a case directly on the point as to whether a party dissatisfied with a decision of a judge exercising summary jurisdiction in a criminal case, which is not final, appliesto him to 40 296 1C.L.R. InreKammouyiaros MaJachtosJ. state the case for the Opinion of the Supreme Court as being errouneous on apoint of laworin excessofjurisdiction. Counsel for the two accused then stated that in view of the above case,had towithdraw hisapplication under section 149
(1)5 but, at the same time, applied orally to the court to reserve the questions of law mat arose in hissaid application for the Opinion oftheSupremeCourtbasinghissaidapplicationonsection 148
(1)oftheCriminalProcedureLaw,Cap.155,whichreadsasfollows: 10 «148
(1):Anycourtexercisingcriminaljurisdictionmay,and upon application bythe Attorney-General shall, atany stage of the proceedings, reserve a question of law arising during thetrialofanypersonfortheOpinionoftheSupremeCourt». Counsel forthe twoaccused submitted tothetrialcourtthatthe aforementioned questionsof lawwillaffect, ifdecided upon atthe 15 stage of the proceedings, thefinal result ofthecaseasthey touch important matters and, consequently, had to be reserved for the Opinion ofthe Supreme Court. The trial judge in *his interim decision as regards the interpretation and application of section 148
(1)of the Criminal 20 Procedure Law, imde reference toa number ofcasesdecided by the Supreme Court, particularly to the case of The Republic v. Georghios Theori Kalli (No.l)
(1961)C.L.R. 266 and In Re Charalambous andAnother
(1974)2 C.L.R. 37. The following passage from the case of Kallis, supra, at page 25 286to 287was cited: «Such proceedings duringa trialshould, inmyopinion, be discouraged as tending to cause inconvenience, delay and embarrassment intheadministration of criminaljustice. 30 35 Interruptions in criminal trials are highly undesirable for a number of obviousreasons.Iventure theviewthat solongas this, extraordinary provision, isstillallowed to remain on the Statute Book, trial courts faced with an application by or on behalf of the Attorney-General under this section, should comply withtheperemptory provision inthestatute,without, wherever possible, interrupting the trial; especially if the application ismade after theCourthasruledonthepoint,asit happened inthiscase. Atrialfor murder orother seriouscrime,shouldnot, inmy opinion, be interrupted under this section, unless the Court 297 MalachiosJ. InreKammouyiaros
(1989)think that in the interests of justice and for the Court's own benefit, a question of law arising during the tnal, should be reserved for theopinion of theHigh Court.» Thetrialjudge alsocited the following passage from page 42of the Charalambous case, supra: «in our view 'a question of law arising during the trial' means onlya question oflawarisingduringthe trialatastage at which it has to be decided in order to enable the trial to proceed further in accordance with the law and rules of practice relating to criminal procedure: and within the ambit 10 of such expression itisnot included a question of law which was prematurely raised at a stage of the trial at which it does not have to be decided for the purposes of the trial at that particularstage:because,inouropinion,section 148doesnot provide aprocedural machinerybymeansofwhich apartyto 15 a criminal case can seek a ruling on a point of law, from the Supreme Court, in anticipation of the stage of the trial at which the state of thelawinrelation tosuch point mayorwill become actually material and of immediate importance for the further progress of the case;what isenvisaged under the 20 said subsection
(1)isasituation where aquestion of lawis,so tospeak, obtrudingitselfupon thetrialCourtand demanding an answer straightway. In construing, as above, section 148
(1)we have borne in mind, interalia,the general principlethatquestionsof laware 25 not to be decided on a hypothetical basis (see,for instance, Stephenson, Blake &Co. v. GrantLegros Co., 86 L.J. Ch. 439, Williams v. O'Keefe [1910] A.C. 186 and Glasgow Navigation Co. v.IronOreCo. [1910]A.C.293,aswellasthe Australian caseAustralian Commonwealth Shipping Boardv. 30 Federated Seamen's Union of Australia, 36 C.L.R. 442, 450).» The trialjudge after examining the questions raised by counsel for the two accused inthe lightof the above citationscame to the conclusion that no one of them falls within the ambit of section 35 148
(1)oftheCriminalProcedure Law,Cap. 155andsodismissed the application and fixed the case for continuation of hearing on 18.5.88 tobe continued on 20.5.88 On 18.5.88theapplicantsobtained leavetoapplyforOrdersof 298 5 1C.L.R. InreKammouyiaros MalachtosJ. Certiorari and/or Mandamus and/or Prohibition and the proceedings inCriminal Case No. 15620/87 were stayed. Counsel for applicants in arguing his case before me put forward the same allegations as those put forward before the 5 Court below and submitted that since the questions raised are novellegalpointsthiscourt hadtopronounce on them becauseif theyareanswered inhisfavour thatwouldbetheendofthecase. On the other hand, counsel for the Republic in supporting the decision of the lower court repeated that the questions raised are 10 exclusively connected with matters of admissibility of evidence, credibility and weight ofevidence andtheyareprematurely raised and, in any case, do not fall within the ambit of section 148
(1)of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155. Inviewof the fact that acopy ofthe decision ofthe lower court 15 complained of, was not attached to the application at the time it was filed, counsel for the Republic submitted that thisisfatal and sothe application for thisreason alone had tobe dismissed. Although Iam inclined to agree with this last submission of counsel for the Republic, Ishall not proceed to pronounce on it 20 since during his reply counsel for applicants filed a copy of this decision without any objection on the part of counsel for the ' Republic. After the filling of the present application I had the opportunity to deal with a similar case namely, Applications Nos. 110/88 and 25 115/88,*as regards the interpretation and application of section 148
(1)of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155. Inthat case, amongthelineofauthoritiesIreferred toisthecaseof The Republic v. President District Court Famagusta ex Parte Loukia K. 30 Marouletti
(1971)1 C.L.R. 226, where at pp. 243 to 244, the following isstated: 35 «Certiorari liestocorrecterroroflawwhere revealed onthe face of an order or decision, orirregularity, or absence of, or excess of, jurisdiction where shown. The control is exercised by removing an order or decision, and then quashing it. Certiorari will not issue as the cloak of an appeal indisguise, *SeeInreAttorney•General
(1988)1 C.L.R. 459. 299 MalachtosJ. InreKammouyiaros
(1989)and it does not lie to bring up an order or decision for rehearingoftheissueraisedintheproceeding(seealsoRex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal ex parte Shaw [1952] 1K.B.338 (C.A.)atpages347,348 and 357).» Having considered the arguments of counsel in the lightof the 5 above authorities, ImustsaythatIfullyagreewiththeapproachof the Court below which, in exercising itsdiscretion, dismissed the application as the questions raised were not questions of law within the ambit ofsection 148
(1)ofthe CriminalProcedure Law, Cap. 155. Inthe result, the application isdismissed and the Order issued for the stay of proceedings in Criminal Case No.15620/87 is hereby cancelled. Application dismissed. 300 10