clr/1989/1989_1_321.pdf

(1989)At the material timethe plaintiff was working as a Stevedore A in the hold of the ship M/V MERCK CONTINENTAL,loading bags of asbestos The plaintiff felt the need to go to the W C and ease himself Heasked for aportable ladder,but,as such ladderwas not provided,heasked thednverof thefork lift tolift himup Hestoodon 5 the forks and grasped with his handsonthefork lift When the forks reached thebags onwhichtheplaintiff wasabouttostepon,thefork lift moved andtheplaintiff losthisbalanceandfell off andlandedon the floor of thehold As a result the plaintiff sustained the hereinabove described injunes 10 In thelight of theevidence adducedtheCourtconcludedthat the plaintiff was not an independent contractor, but the servant of defendants 1,who broke theirduty towards the plaintiff inthatthey failed toprovide asafe place of work andasafe passage from andto 15 the place of work Aservant going totheW C isstill, mthe Court's opinion, actingwithin thescope of hisemployment On the issue as to who should be held vicanously liable for the negligence of the dnver of the fork lift the Court reached the conclusion on the grounds indicated in the hereinabove headnote 20 that itisthedefendants andnotthegeneral employers of thednver who are so liable for such negligence A person is guilty of contnbutory negligence if he ought reasonably to have foreseen that if he did not act as a reasonable prudent man, ne might hurt himself, and in his reckoning he must 25 take intoaccount thepossibility of othersbeing careless (SeeOmer ν Pavhdes and Another

(1971)1C LR 404} In this case the plaintiff isguilty of contnbutory negligence inthat hefailed tohave asafer gnponthefork lift Hecouldhavehadasafe gnp on the fork lift and having landed on the bags he then should 30 have let go Applying the common sense approach in assessing degree of liability, theplaintiff is25% toblame for this accident Finally the Court assessed the damages as follows a)General damages for pain and suffenng and loss of amenitiesof life £3,500 35 andforlossoffutureearnings(£800peryearmultiplied,inthelightof the plaintiff's age at themat - 52 years old -by 8)£6,400 b)Special damages £9,841 322 1C.L.R. Od>sseosv.Mantovani& Sons Taking into account the aforesaid percentage of contnbutory negligence the Court gave judgmentfor theplaintiff ashereinafter referred to Judgment for the plaintiff for £14 806 against defendant 1 with costs Action against defendant 2 dismissed with no order as to costs Claim of defendant 1 against third party, ιe the general employers of the dnver of the fork lift, dismissed withcosts 5 10 Cases referredto The Cyprus Palestine Plantations Co Ltd ν Leandrou

(1982)1 C LR 880 Bhoumidasv Portof Singapore Authority (1978] 1 All ΕR 956 15 MerseyDocksandHarbourν CoggmsandQutffiths(Liverpool)Ltd andMacFarlane[1946]2All ΕR 345, Erodotouv Shoham (Cyprus)Ltd andAnother (\9S7) 1CLR 107. ParaskevaidesLtd ν Chnstofi

(1982)1C LR 789, Zacharia ν Elmini LyonessInc andAnother

(1983)1CLR 415, 20 Nicolaides Ltd ν Nicou as Admmistratnx of the Estate of the Deceased Andreas NicouFtancu

(1981)1CLR 225 Kemal ν Kasti, 1962 CLR 317 Omerv PavlidesandAnother (197Ί) 1CLR 404 Admiralty action. 25 Admiraltyaction for special and general damages as a resultof an accident which occurred on 2 0 6 1977 on board the ship «Merck Continental». Ν Anastassiades, for theplaintiff St McBnde, for the defendants 30 X Clendes, for theinterestedparty Cur adv vult KOURRIS J read thefollowing judgment Theplaintiff's claim against both defendants oreither of them isfor specialandgeneral 323 KourrisJ. Odysseosv.Mantovani& Sons

(1989)damages as a result of an accident which occurred on 20.6.1977 on board the ship«Merck Continental» inthe Port of Limassol. Ithasbeen thecas? for the plaintiff thatatthe material time he was employed by both defendants or either of them and that the accident occurred whilstinthe courseofhisemployment and that itwasduetotheirnegligenceinthattheyfailedtoprovidehimwith a safe system and with a safe place of work. 5 On the other hand, ithasbeen the casefor the defendants that theplaintiff wasan independent contractor and no relationshipof masterand servantexisted between themand theplaintiff andthat 10 theyare not guiltyof negligence because the accident wasdue to a frolic oftheplaintiff.Theyfurther alleged thatdefendants 1were acting as agents for the third party and that if negligence is establishedthen thethirdpartyisliabletocompensatethe plaintiff. The third party denied thatthe defendants wereactingastheir 15 agents at the material time and they alleged that if negligence is established then the defendants are liable to compensate the plaintiff. Itis common ground that the plaintiff isa stevedore of list«A» and that togetherwith otherstevedoreswasengaged inloading in 20 the hold of the ship bagged asbestos belonging to the Cyprus AsbestosLimited, the third partyinthese proceedings. Afork liftwasinthe holdassistingthestevedores instackingthe baggedasbestostothesideofthehold.Thebuiltinladderthrough which one could obtain access to the hold was blocked by the 25 bags.Atabout 1.30 p.m. the plaintiff wanted togotothe W.C.to ease himself and asked the driver ofthe fork liftto lifthim up. He stood on the forks and grasped with his hands on the fork lift. When the forks reached the bags on whichtheplaintiff was about tostep on, the fork liftmoved andtheplaintiff losthisbalance and 30 felloffandlandedonthefloorofthehold.Theplaintiff intended to step on the bags which were near thetop of the hold inorder to obtain accesstothe deck of theship. As a result of the fall he suffered personal injuries and was removed to the Limassol Hospital fortreatment. Theversion oftheplaintiff isthatwhenthebuilt-inladderofthe hold was blocked by the bags he asked the foreman Andreas Lambis (D.W.2)toprovide himwitha portable ladderinorder to 324 -35 1C.L.R. Odysseos v.Mantovanl &Sons Kourris J. getonthe deck,butthe foreman failedtodosoand thatashewas in a desperate state because he wanted togo to theW.C.toease himself, he was obliged to use the fork lift as the only means to obtainaccesstothe deck. 5 The version of the defendants is that Andreas Lambis has expressly toldthe plaintiff prior tohisfall torefrain from usingthe forkliftasameansofleavingthehold.Lambisinhisevidence,also denied that the plaintiff asked him to fetch a ladder provided for thepurpose ofleaving the hold. 10 I was impressed favourably by the way the plaintiff gave his evidence and I accept his evidence as the true account of the accident in question. His evidence is also supported by the evidence of Andreas Demetriou {P.W. 2)who isalso a stevedore and at the time he was working together with the plaintiff in the 15 hold of the ship and he supported the evidence of the plaintiff to the effect that the plaintiff asked Lambis for the portable ladder andthatLambisfailed tofetch ittoenabletheplaintiff togetonthe deck. He also impressed me asa truthful witness and I accept his evidence and Ireject the evidence of Andreas Lambis (D.W. 2) 20 whodidnot impressmeasatruthful witness. Inthe circumstances, Ifind that the plaintiff was obliged touse the fork lift in that Lambis failed to provide him with a portable ladder. Thequestionwhichposesnowfordeterminationiswhetherthe 25 plaintiff was an independent contractor and ifthe answer isinthe negative by'whom he was employed. When persons requiring the services of stevedores for the loading orunloading of cargo,thepracticeisfor them toapplyin writing to the District Labour and Social Insurance Officer of the 30 Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance, stationed atthe portthe ship calls, and ask that they are supplied with a number of stevedores theysorequire.Theirapplication isthen passed tothe stevedoreswhoassignforeachjobanumberofnamed stevedores from the list «A» and when any stevedore from this list is not 35 available,theyallocatestevedores whobelong tothe list«B».The persons requesting the services of stevedores must have a valid insurance, covering them for injuries caused during the time the stevedores rendered theirservices. On 18.6.1977,AndreasErgatoudes,{D.W.3),whoisemployed 40 by the defendant 1, who are the shipping agency which acts in 325 KourrisJ. Odysseosv. Mantovani & Sons

(1989)Cyprus on behalf of shippers and owners of cargo and ships, applied tothe District Labourand Social InsuranceOfficer posted atLimassol tosupply them with stevedores, for the loadingofthe cargo consisting of bagged asbestos on board the ship «Merck Continental». According to the evidence of thiswitness, hiscompany wasacting as a agentsfor the third party. Hisdutieswere to supervise the loading of thecargo. 5 It should be noted at this stage that Lambis, (D.W. 2), was employed byDefendants 1 astheirforeman or«Cappo»ashewas commonly called. The plaintiff was working in the hold with 10 another 7 stevedores and another 3 stevedores were working at the winch and allwere paidbydefendants 1. On the evidence adduced, I am satisfied that theplaintiff at the material time wasnot an independent contractor but a servantof defendants 1 and the ouestion that falls for determination is 15 whether the defendants 1are guiltyof negligence or not. Thedutyofa mastertowardshisservantistoprovidehimwitha safesystem and asafe placeof work. There isalsoa duty on themastertoensure safepassage from and tothe actual place of work(The CyprusPalestinePlantations 20 Co. Ltd. v. Kalliope Leandrou,

(1982)1 C.L.R. 880). In the present casethe defendants 1failed toprovide the plaintiff witha safe placeofworkand theyalsofailed toensuresafe passage from the place of his work. When a servant isgoing to the W.C. he is acting within the course of hisemployment and the defendants 1 25 ought to have provided the plaintiff with a portable ladder. Their failure to do soestablishes negligence against them. In view of the above, the contention of defendants 1that the plaintiff wasatrespasser onthefork-lift and theaccidentwasdue toa frolic ofthe plaintiff cannotstand. Ithasbeen defendant's 1contention that for mattersof loading of the bagged asbestos on the ship were the agents of Cyprus Asbestos Mines Ltd., the third party, and that they secured the employment ofthestevedores,includingtheplaintiff for the third party. The third party, on the other hand, denied that defendants 1 were their agents for matters ofloadingand theyalleged that the defendants 1acted as independent contractors. 326 30 35 1C.L.R. Odysseos v. Mantovani &Sons KourrlsJ. The evidence of Edward Thompson, (D.W.4),wastohe effect that the ship was chartered by the third party, that the third party were loading the vessel, and that they met all loading payments, reimbursing defendant 1 foranypayments madebythem on their 5 behalf as their agents. According to the evidence of thiswitness, theagencyagreementwasmade orallywiththeshippingofficerof the third party, namely, Christakis Anastassiades, otherwise knownas«Dixon»whohassincediedandhedidnotgive1evidence inthe present case. 10 TakisMichaelides,whoisnowtheshippingofficer andincharge of loading cargo on board the shipsof thirdparty, and whoat the timewasassistanttoChristosAnastassiadesandhadhisdeskinthe same office with him, was the only witness called by the third party. His evidence is to the effect that Anastassiades spoke 15 through the telephone to a certain Napoleon Joseph of defendants 1 and agreed with him that defendants 1 would undertake the loadingofthe cargoupon payment as independent contractors. He denied that Anastassiades engaged defendants 1 as the agents of the CyprusAsbestos MinesLimited. He said that 20 hiscompany couldneither engage stevedores norappoint agents to act on their behalf because they had no insurances to cover stevedores incase ofaccidents.HesaidthatNapoleon Joseph has died.Healsosaidthatthethirdpartyneverauthorised defendants 1 to describe themselves on exhibit 11 as the agents of the third 25 party. Exhibit 11 is an overtime application in connection with stevedoresmadebydefendants 1 totheDistrictLabourandSocial Insurance Officer and atthe place where itisstated «thesignature and statusoftheapplicant»itisstatedasfollows; «A.L.Mantovani 30 and SonsLtd.,foraccount CyprusAsbestosLimited».Thisexhibit wasproduced byErgatoudes (D.W.3),whofilledinthetoppartof exhibit 11 and said that he described his company acting for account of the third party from instructions received from the management of his company. ,35 This issue caused me considerable anxiety because two of the protagonists, namely ChristosAnastassiadesofthethirdpartyand Napoleon Joseph of the defendants 1, have died and gave no evidence. On this issue, I accept the evidence of Michaelides, witness of the third party, who heard Anastassiades speaking to 40 Joseph Napoleon, andwhoimpressed mefavourably. Hisversion 327 KourrisJ. Odysseos v.Mantovani& Sons

(1989)is more consistent with the truth in view of the fact that the third party had no insurance to cover stevedores in case of accident, and, in view of the arrangements between the District Labour Officer and Social Insurance Officer, and the stevedores, and those who applied for the supply of stevedores, they could not 5 apply to thesaid office toengage stevedores eitherbythemselves or though agents.Againboth defendants 1and the third partyare reputable companies and of long standing and Iexpected thatif any agency agreement existed, tobe reduced inwriting. Further, exhibit 11 cannot be considered as bearing any weight on the 10 matter because it was prepared by defendants 1 without any authorization by the third party. For these reasons, I am satisfied that the defendants Iwere not acting as agents for the third party. Defendants 1further contendedthattheactualpersonwhowas 15 instrumental in causing the plaintiff to fall, namely, the fork-lift driver, wasnever in the employment of defendants 1,but he was in the direct employment of the third party. Itiscommon ground thatthe thirdparty lent todefendants 1afork-lift together withhis driverwhowas intheiremployment toworkfortheloadingofthe 20 bagged asbestos. The leading authority on the subject which was applied in the recentcaseofBhoomidas v.PortofSingapore Authority, [1978]1 All E.R. 956, isthe case of Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Cogginsand Quiffiths(Liverpool)Ltd.andMcFarlane, [1946]2All 25 E.R. 345,inwhich itwasheld:(i)The question ofliabilitywasnottobedetermined byany agreement between thegeneralemployersandthehirers,but depended onthecircumstancesofthecase,thepropertestto applybeing whether ornot the hirershad authoritytocontrol 30 themanneroftheexecutionoftherelevantactsofthedriver. (ii)Theboard, asthegeneral employers ofthecrane driver, had failed to discharge the burden of proving that the hirers had such control of thewokman atthetime oftheaccident as to become liable as employers for his negligence, since, 35 although thehirerscouldtellthecranedriverwheretogoand whattocarry,theyhadnoauthoritytogivedirectionsastothe 328 1CX.R. Odysseos v. Mantovani&Sons KourrisJ. manner in which the crane was to be operated. The board were, therefore, liable for his negligence.» Viscount Simon inhisjudgment said (atpp. 348,349): 5 10 15 «It is not disputed that the burden of proof rests upon the general or permanentemployer -in this case the board -to shift the prima facie responsibility for the negligence of servants engaged and paid by such employer so that this burden inaparticularcase may come torestonthehirerwho for thetimebeing hastheadvantages of theservice rendered. And, in my opinion,thisburden isa heavy one and can only be discharged in quite exceptional circumstances If, however, the hirers intervene togive directionsas tohow to drive which theyhave noauthoritytogive,andthedriver pro hacvicecomplieswiththem,withtheresultthatathirdpartyis neglignetly damaged, the hirers may be liable as joint tortfeasors.» Lord Porter in delivering his judgment in the same case approached the problem by expressing his opinionas follows (at Λ 351: 20 25 30 35 40 «Many factors have a bearing on the result. Who is paymaster, who can dismiss, how long thealternative service lasts, what machinery is employed -all these questions have to be kept in mind. The expressions used in any individual casemustalwaysbeconsideredinregardtothesubject matter underdiscussion, but among themany tests suggested I think that the most satisfactory by which to ascertain who is the employer atany particulartimeistoask who isentitledtotell the employee the way in which he is to do the work upon which he is engaged. If someone other than his general employer is authorised to do this, he will, as a rule, be the person liable for the employee's negligence. But is is not enough that the task to be performed should be under his control, hemustalso controlthemethodof performing it.Itis truethatin mostcasesno ordersastohow ajob shouldbe donearegivenorrequired.The man islefttodo his own workin. his own way, but the ultimatequestionisnot whatspecific or­ dersorwhetherany specificordersweregiven,but who isen­ titled to give the ordersas to how the workshouldbe done. Where a mandriving amechanicaldevice, such as acrane,is sent to perform a task, it is easier to infer that the general 329 KourrisJ. Odysseos v.Mantovani &Sons

(1989)employer continues to control the method of performance since it ishiscrane andthe driver remains responsible tohim for itssafe keeping.» This case was followed in the case of Erodotou v. Shoham (Cyprus)Ltd. andAnother,

(1987)1C.L.R.

1. 5 Inthe lightofthe evidence before me,andtheauthoritieswhich Ihavemade reference, Iamsatisfied thatdefendants were entitled to give the orders as to how the work should be done, and they controlled the method used inthe loadingofthebagged asbestos in the hold of the ship. They, therefore, are vicariously liable for 10 thisaccident and not the third partywholenttothefirst defendant the fork -lift with itsdriver. Quantum of Damages. The plaintiff, as a result of hisfall on the floor ofthe hold of the ship lost consciousness for afew minutes and he wasremoved to 15 theLimassolHospital fortreatment.Theinitialinjuries receivedby the plaintiff as well as the reassessment of his condition resulting from the injuries suffered in the accident, are described in the medical reportswhich wereproduced byconsentbyboth counsel and are marked as exhibits 8, 9 and
2. Exhibit 8 isthe medical 20 report of Dr. J. Kannavas who treated the plaintiff when he was taken to the hospital and he stated that the plaintiff suffered multiple injuries but the mostseriouswere fracture of the 8th and 9th right ribs and fracture of radius of the right wrist.The plaintiff was discharged from the hospital on the 27th June, 1977 and he 25 was advised to be followed up as an out-patient. The opinion of this doctor is that the injuries of the plaintiff entailed a moderate amount of pain and suffering initially subsiding gradually over a period of 6-8 weeks. Dr George Doritis who examined the plaintiff on 9.11.1977, 30 and prepared the medical report marked exhibit 9,stated that the plaintiff complained tohimofheadachesanddizzinessaggravated by postural changes and sleeping disturbances which in the opinion of this doctor were consistent with a mild postconcussional syndrome. Appropriate treatment was advised and 35 the plaintiff was followed up for two more occasions and during the last examination on the 29.10.1987, the plaintiff isstated to have improved. 330 IC.L.R. Odysseos v.Mantovani & Sons Kourris j . On 4.11.1987, the plaintiff was jointly examined by Dr. K. Andreou onbehalf oftheplaintiff and Dr.G.S.Tornaritisonbehalf of the defendants. They prepared a joint medical report which is exhibit
3. The plaintiff was seen and examined again on 5 29.10.1987 and 4.11.1987 by these two doctors for the purpose of re-assessing hiscondition resultingfrom theinjuries suffered as a result of his accident on 20.6.
4. The recent examination referred toafter effects of the injury tohis rightwrist, as the other injuries had already well improved as reported in the previous 10 reports.Atthetimeoftherecentexamination hiscomplaints were of pain in the right wrist after doing heavy work. He had no pain after lightdutiesorwhen atrest.Thereportstates«on examination the findings were essentially unchanged in the interval between 1985and now, i.e: 15 1.There isa slightthickening ofthe rightwrist;
5. Mild limitation of the range of palmar flexion, radial deviation and supination;
6. No muscle wasting of the rightarm of forearm; 4.The gripof therighthand is satisfactory; 20 5, The X Rays of the right wrist are also essentially without change.» Intheopinion ofthesedoctors,the mild-post-traumatic arthritic changes present in 1985 do not seem to have progressed to a degree discernible intherecentXrays.Theyconcludedthattaking 25 intoconsideration the injury, progressand findings ofthepast and present examinations that the use of the right wrist in heavy manual work will,after awhile,startcausing pain, discomfort and stiffness. The plaintiff in his evidence stated that at the end of his sick 30 leave, which was on 5.9.1977, he returned to work but he could notdoheavywork.Hestatedthathecannot liftupanythingwhich which isheavier than 10kilos.He isnothandicapped inhiswork, he said, when for loading or unloading are used pallets and his work istotieoruntieropes.But,when the load consistsofbagsof 35 50-60kiloseach, such asfertilizers, he cannot work. I think the plaintiff exaggerated his incapacity, which, is inconsistent with the medical reports and does not justify the plaintiff refusing toacceptworkbeca-iseofhisinjuriesbecause the 331 KourrisJ. Odysseosv. Mantovani & Sons

(1989)reportcertifies onlythatafter useoftherightwristinheavy manual work, it will, after a while, start causing pain, discomfort and stiffness. His injuries were notsuch that he could turn down work inadvance. The damages awarded should be fair and reasonable. For the physical injury and pain andsuffering, and lossofamenitiesof life I think that asum of£3,500 isa reasonable compensation. 5 Inow propose to award the plaintiff damages for lossof future earnings. A multiplier is used in order to reduce the element of uncertainty and provide an objective basis for the assessment of 10 damages. (Paraskevaides Ltd. v. Christofi,

(1982)1 C.L.R. 789, followed in the case of Zacharia v. Elmini Lyoness Inc. and Another,

(1983)1C.L.R. 415. Inthe present case, the plaintiff at the timeof the accident was 41 years old and he was earning as he said £8-£10 a day. Atthe 15 timeoftheconclusion ofthehearing,theplaintiff was52yearsold. Ihave given serious consideration to the physical injuries of the plaintiff and the resulting incapacity and having taken everything into account, Iarrived at the conclusion that the plaintiff cannot pursue his pre-accident work as before. I cannot say that the 20 plaintiff willbeincapableofdoinganyheavymanualworkatall,as hetried toimpress me,buthewillhavealossofearnings because ofhisincapacityand hishandicap inthelabourmarket. Bearingin mind the earnings of the plaintiff, Ihave reached the conclusion that the plaintiff will have an amount of £800 per year loss of 25 earnings.Anappropriate multiplier,bearinginmindtheage ofthe plaintiff.at the trialis8years.(SeeNtinosArseniou Nicolaides Ltd. v. Charaiambia A. Nicou asAdministratrix of the Estate of the Deceased Andreas Nicou Ftanou,

(1981)1 C.L.R. 225). Multiplying the sum of £800 by 8 years, there is an amount of 30 £6,400which I award to the plaintiff. Withregardtospecial damages,theplaintiff isentitledto£1026 forlossofwagesfortheperiod thathewasoutofwork,which was not actually disputed by the defendants, i.e. from the time of the accident till 5.9.1977 which I also award to the plaintiff. The 35 plaintiff isalso entitled to partial loss of wages from 5.9.1987 till 9.7.1988 when the hearing of this action was concluded. (See HaliiKemal v. Georghios M. Kasti, 1962 C.L.R. 317). Inpointof fact,theactionwasconclusedon31.5.1989butthiswasduetothe delay of counsel to file theirwritten addresses.The evidence was 40 331 1C.L.R. Odysseosν, Mantovani& Sons KourrisJ. concluded on 9.7.

1. Consequently, the plaintiff is entitled by way of special damages, topartiallossof wagesfor 10 years and 9 months which I estimate at £800 per year because of his incapacity. So,there isasum of £8,600 for partiallossofwages till 5 the conclusion of the hearing. The plaintiff proved to my satisfaction that he incurred £165 for transport and medical expenses which I award tohim.Ialsoaward tohimthesum of £50 for thepreparation of medical reports,exhibits 9 and
2. Thedefendants further alleged thatifitwere tobe heldthatthey 10 were guilty of negligence, thentheplaintiff also would have been guilty of negligence for contrubutingtothe accident. The principles of contributory negligence were expounded by theSupreme Courtinaseries of cases and I need notrepeatthem here. Suffice it tosay that«justas actionable negligence requires 15 the foreseeability of harm to others, so contrubutory negligence requires theforeseeability toharmtooneself.Aperson isguilty of contributory negligence if he ought reasonably to have foreseen that if he did notactas a reasonable prudent man, he might hurt himself, and in his reckoning he must take into account the 20 possibility of othersbeing careless.»(SeeAli RizaOmer v. loannis Pavlidesand Another,

(1971)1C.L.R. 404.) Ithinkthattheplaintiff isguilty of contributorynegligence inthat he failed tohave a safer grip onthefork lift. To my mindhe could have had asafe grip on thefork liftandhaving landed onthebags 25 he thenshould have let go. Applying the common sense approach in assessing degrees of liability, I thinkthatthe plaintiff is2 5 % toblame for thisaccident, and the defendants are toblame 75% for thisaccident. To sum up, the plaintiff is entitled to £3,500 for pain and 30 suffering and loss'of amenities of life, and £6,400 for future lossof earnings. So the plaintiff is entitled to £9,900 by way of general damages. Theplaintiff isalso entitledtothesum of £9,841 by way of special damages, making thus a total of £19,741 special and general damages. From this amount the sum of £4,935 is 35 deducted representing the 25% liability of the plaintiff to the accident in question, leaving thus a balance of £14,806 which I award to the plaintiff. Inassessing damages for the loss of actual and prospective earnings, Imade allowance for any incidence of incometax on the earnings. 333 KourrisJ. Odysseosv.Mantovani &Sons

(1989)Inthe circumstances, there willbejudgment for the plaintiff for £14,806 against defendants 1 only, with costs to be assessed by the Registrar. The action against defendant 2 isdismissed with no orderforcosts.Claimofdefendants 1 againstthirdparty dismissed with coststobe assessed bythe Registrar. Judgment for£14,806 againstdefendant 1 with costs. Action against defendant 2 dismissed without costs. Claim of defendants 1againstthirdparty dismissed withcosts. 334 5 10