(1989)1989January 27 (MALACHTOS,DEMETR1ADES,STYLIANIDES,JJ.) ALEXANDROSPAIKKOS, Appellant-Defendant, v. ANTONISKONTEMENIOTtS, Respondent-Plaintiff. (CivilAppeal No. 6783). Wordsandphrases: «CriminalProceedings». Construction of statutes —Expressions used in variousstatutes in pari materia—Presumption thatthey bear the same meaning in all of them. Mental Patients— The Mental Patients Law, Cap. 252 —Proceedings 5 thereunder — Their nature is not criminal, but akin to criminal proceedings —//unsuccessful, anaction formalicious prosecution againstthe instigatormay be brought atcommon law,provided the other elements of the tortaresatisfied. CivilProcedure —Setting down fortrialapreliminaryissueonapoint of 10 law— Testapplicable — TheCivilProcedure Rules, 0.27, rule
- Maliciousprosecution — TheCivilWrongsLaw, Cap. 148,section32 — Whether it excludes the Common Law inrespect of instances not expressly mentioned in it (Criminal Proceedings, bankruptcy or windingupproceedings) —Questiondetermined inthenegative — 15 TheMentalPatientsLaw, Cap.252 —Proceedings thereunder are akin to criminalproceedings and may, if the otherprerequisites are satisfied, support an action for malicious presecution under the Common Law. Malicious Prosecution — Common Law —Historical development — 2 0 Review ofauthorities — Testapplicable. Common Law — The history of its introduction to Cyprus— When applicable —Review of authorities— The Courts of Justice Law, 1960 (Law14/60) section 29 (l)(c). 50 1 C.L.R. 5 Paikkosv.Kontemeniotis The defendant, a practicing advocate, on 4th June, 1982, laid information on oath before a Judge of the DistrictCourt of Nicosia, that he had good cause tosuspect and believe and did suspect and believe the plaintiff to be mentally afflicted and proper suspect of confinement, undersection3oftheMentalPatientsLaw,Cap.
- On 2nd August 1982,the DistrictJudge, after holdingthe inquiry envisaged by the Law, found that the plaintiff was not a mentally afflicted person:theplaintiff wasnotadjudged amentalpatientanda proper subject of confinement. 10 15 20 The plaintiff thereafter instituted this action whereby he claims against the defendant special and general damages for malicious prosecution. Thisappeal isdirected againstan interim decision,whereby itwas held that section 32 of the Civil Wrongs Law, Cap. 148, is not exhaustive: that the Common Law is applicable; and laying information on oath before a Judge of the District Court, under section 3 ofthe MentalPatients Law,Cap.252,whereby an inquiry starts as to the state of mind of a suspected person, being akin to criminal proceedings, creates a cause of action for damages for malicious prosection. Thedecisionappealed fromwasissuedafteratrialofapreliminary issue on a pont of law ordered under 0.27, rule 1 of the Civil ProcedureRules. 25 30 35 Itwasargued bycounselfortheappellantthatincaseof malicious prosecution,thelegislatorintendedtoconfinemaliciousprosecution within the four walls of the definition of section 32 of our Civil Wrongs Law; that section 32 is an exhaustive and all inclusive definition of what malicious proceedings are and that proceedings that could give rise to malicious prosecution must be criminal proceedings stricto sensu. He based his such submission on the wording of the section «malicious prosecution consists» and he endeavoured to make a differentiation between thissection and the section which came underjudicial consideration inthe Vouros case (infra.) Section 32 ofCap. 148reads asfollows: «
- Malicious prosecution consists of actually, maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause instituting or carrying on against anyperson unsuccessful criminal,bankruptcy or winding-up proceedings,wheresuch proceedings- 40 (a)causedscandaltothe creditorreputation of, orpossiblelossof libertyby,suchperson, and 51 Palkkosv. Kontemeniotis
(1989)(b) terminated, ifinfact theywere capable of soterminating,in favourofsuchperson. Providedthatnoactionformaliciousprosecutionshallbebrought against anyperson byreason onlythat hefurnished information to some competent authority by whom any proceedings were 5 instituted.» Held,dismissingtheappeal:
(1)Thetruetestwhetherthetrialofa preliminary issue on apointof lawshould beordered under0.27, rule 1iswhere the pointof law, ifdecided inone way,should be decisiveonthelitigation—ThetrialCourtrightlydirectedthetrialof 10 thepointraisedasapreliminaryissue.
(2)Criminalproceedingshavebeendefined invariousstatutesin pari materia as any proceeding instituted against any person to obtain punishment of such person foranyoffence against thelaw. The definition isdeclaratory of the Common Law,ithasthesame 15 meaningas«criminalmatter».
(3)TheobjectoftheproceedingsundertheMentalPatientsLawis an inquiryas to the state of mind of the suspected person, ifsuch personIsamentalpatientandapropersubjectof confinement.
(4)Proceedings under the Mental Patients Law lack the main 20 characteristics of criminalproceedings,asherein aboveexplained. Theyarenottakeninrespectofacriminaloffenceandtheirobjectis notthepunishmentofthesuspectedperson. Inviewof theabove,thestatementof claim doesnotdisclosea cause of action withinthe ambit of section32 of theCivilWrongs 25 Law,Cap.148.
(5)However, under Common Law an action for malicious prosecution lies,iftheotherelementsarepresent,forabuseoflegal process and for proceedings analogous or akin to criminal proceedings.Theactionformaliciousprosecutionisnotconfinedto 30 criminalproceedings,bankruptcyandwinding-up. The test of Holt, C.J. in Savilev. Roberts [1558-1774] AllE.R. Rep.456aboutthethreesortsofdamage,whichmaysupportsuch anaction (damagetoaman'sfame,dangertolife,limbandliberty, anddamagetoproperty)isstillvalid. Proceedings instigated undertheMental PatientsLaw,Cap.252 endangerthelibertyofthesuspectedpersonnamedinthe affidavit causedamagetohisfame,i.e.reputation,injurytohisfeelingsforthe indignity, humiliation anddisgrace,causedtohimbythefactofthe holding of an inquiry under the Law as to his state of mind. It 40 certainly causes damage to hisproperty as he isforced toexpend moneytoprotecthisrights(ifhedoesso)beforetheCourt. 52 35 1 C.L.R. Paikkosv.Kontemeniotis
(6)The Common Law is now applicable in Cyprus in virtue of section29(l)(c)*ofthe CourtsofJusticeLaw, 1960(LawNo. 14/60). TheCommon Law,notasmodified bystatute,isapplicableinthis countryifthe followingare satisfied:5 10 Nootherprovision hasbeen madebyanylawsavedunderArticle 188oftheConstitution,orenactedbytheLegislativeAuthorityofthe Republic. «Other provision» ismade, if itisvery clear from the enanctment which is being relied on, that it is the intention of the Legislative Authoritytoexclude the Common Law. The Common Law is not inconsistent with, or contrary to our Constitution. 15 And lastly itissuitable for Cyprus, as the Common Law must be planted here as a living grouth which can be pruned by judicial decision tosuitlocalconditions.The object and the intention of the country'sleglislatorwasthe serviceofthepeople ofthiscountry.
(7)Doessection32 of Cap. 148exclude theCommon Lawasfar asmaliciousprosecution isconcerned? 20 25 This Court does not share the view that the legislator by the wordingofsection32intentedtoexcludetheCommonLaw.Section 32 isnotsuch «otherprovision»asrequired bythe Courtsof Justice Law to exclude from the legal order of this Country the Common Lawand the doctrinesof Equity. Our Constitution safeguards the right of liberty and the right of reputation.Therefore, asacauseofaction,intendingtoprotect these rights from being endangered by malicious prosecution not onlyis not repugnant or inconsistent, but, on the contrary, it accords toit constitutional provisions and enables the citizen to vindicate such rights. 3Q Appeal dismissed withcosts. Casesreferredto: Michaelidesv.Diakou
(1968)1C.L.R.392; Papamichae!v.Chaholiades
(1970)1C.L.R.305; 35 Jupiter Electrical(Overseas)Ltd.and Another v. Christides
(1975)1 C.L.R.144; •Quoteda/p.60post. 53 Paikkosv. Kontemeniotis
(1989)Malachtou v.ArmeftiandAnother
(1984)1C.L.R. 548; Everettv. RibbandsandAnother[1952]1AllE.R. 823; Kasipv.ThePolice, 1964C.L.R. 48; InreZamin
(1983)2C.L.R. 188; R.v. Loxdale
(1758)1Burr.445; 5 CliffordandO'Sullival[1921] 2A.C.570; Amandv.SecretaryofStateforHomeAffairs andAnother [1942] 2AllE.R. 381; R.v. SouthamptonJusticesexparteGreen [1975] 2AllE.R.1073; R.v. ManowJustices, exparteO'Sullivan [1983]3AllE.R. 578; 10 Smalley v. Crown Courtat Warwick and Others [1985] 1 All E.R. 769; Glinskiv. Mclver[1962] 1AllE.R. 696; Savilev. Roberts[1558-1774]AllE.R. Rep.456; The QuartzHill Consolidated GoldMining Company v. Eyre, 15 11882-83]11Q.B.D.674; Berryv. British TransportCommission [1961]1Q.B.D. 149; Wiffen v. Bailey&RomfordU.D.C. [1914-1915]AllE.R. Rep.967. Cashiquev. Behrens, 121E.R. 608; Bynoev. BankofEngland[1902]1K.B. 467; 20 Stewardv. Gromett, 141E.R. 788; Aminv. BannerjeeandOthers[194ηA.C.322(P.C.); Giffordv. Kelson
(1943)3D.L.R.441; Vassilliouv. Vassiliou, XVIC.L.R.70; Schmuel v. TheOfficer in Command Illegal JewishImmigrants' 25 CampKaraolos, XVIIIC.L.R. 158; UniversalAdvertisingandPublishingAgencyv.Vouros, XIXC.L.R. 87; Anastassi&Anotherv. ThePolice, XIXC.L.R. 131; Georghiades&Sonsv. Kaminaras, 23C.L.R. 276; 54 30 1C.L.R. Paikkosv.Kontemeniotis TheElectricityAuthorityofCyprusv. Kipparis, 24C.L.R. 121; Constantinouv. Panayides
(1984)1 C.L.R.466; Zfv/asv.MunicipalityofLimassolandAnother
(1975)J.S.C.989; Markouv.Michael, XIXC.L.R.282; c J Myrianthousisv. Petrou, XXIC.L.R.32; Bibeev. Ghose, 19TimesLawReports295; Papadopoulouv.Polycarpou,
(1968)1 C.L.R.352; Tseriotisv. ChristodoulouandAnother, XIXC.L.R.216; Iordanouv.Anyftos,24C.L.R.97; 10 Protopapasv. Gunther&Another
(1974)J.S.C.981; Bainv. Fothergill
(1874)L.R.8(H.L.) 158; Pissourios v.Dervish (Limassol Action No.916/71 the FullDistrict CourtofLimassol). Appeal. 15 Appeal bydefendant againsttheinterim decision of the District Court of Nicosia (Nikitas, P.D.C.) dated the 19th June, 1984 (Action No. 4546/82) whereby it was decided that laying information on oath before aJudge under section3 ofthe Mental Patents Law,Cap.252wherebyaninquirystartsastothestateof 20 mind of a suspected person, being akin to criminal proceedings, createsa cause of action for damages for malicious prosecution. G. Cacoyannis, forthe appellant. H.Stavrakis,for the respondent. Cur.adv. vult. 25 MALACHTOSJ.: TheJudgment ofthe Courtwillbe delivered byMr.JusticeStylianides. STYLIANIDES, J.: This appeal is directed against an Interim Decision, whereby itwasheld thatsection 32 ofthe CivilWrongs Law, Cap. 148, is not exhaustive; that the Common Law is 30 applicable; and laying information on oath before a Judge of the District Court, under section 3 of the Mental Patients Law, Cap. 252, whereby an inquiry starts as to the state of mind of a suspected person, being akin to criminal proceedings, creates a causeofaction fordamages for malicious prosecution. 55 Stylianirfes J. Paikkosv. Kontemeniotis
(1989)The defendant, a practicing advocate, on 4th June, 1982, laid information onoathbeforeaJudgeoftheDistrictCourtofNicosia, thathehadgood causetosuspectandbelieveanddidsuspectand believe the plaintiff to be mentally afflicted and proper subject of confinement, under section 3 of the Mental Patients Law, Cap
- 5 In consequence, thereof, the Judge directed the issue of a summonscallingontheplaintiff -thesuspectedperson-toappear before the Court on the 25th June, 1982, for the purpose of an inquiry as to the state of his mind and directed the plaintiff to 10 submit toan examination bygovernment psychiatrist. On 2nd August, 1982, the District Judge, after holding the inquiry envisaged by the Law, found that the plaintiff was not a mentally afflicted person;the plaintiff was notadjudged a mental patient and a proper subject ofconfinement. 15 The plaintiff thereafter institutedthisaction, whereby he claims against the defendant special and general damages for malicious prosecution. The defendant resistedand denied theclaim.Inhisdefence he contended thatthestatementofclaimdisclosesnocauseofaction, 20 in that the civil wrong of malicious prosecution does not lie in respectofproceedingsundertheMentalPatientsLaw,Cap.
- Counsel for the defendant followed the orthodox procedure directedbythisCourtinTheHeirsoftheLate Theodora Panayiv. The Administrators of theEstate of the Late Stylianos Mandnotis 25
(1963)2 C.L.R. 167,atp. 170,thatwherean objection istakenin thedefence, theinterestedpartymustapplytotheCourttohavea particular point of law under Order 27 formulated and set down forhearingbefore thedateoftrial.Anapplication under Order 27 should normally bemade on thesummons for directions. 30 The function of the Court isnotto decide abstractquestionsof law, but to decide questions of law when aristing between the parties as a result o( a certain state of facts. Only points of law should be dealtwith under the provisionsof Order27, rule 1. Whilst cases of mixed law and fact or fact alone should follow 35 theprocedure laiddowninOrder 33, regarding thehearingof an action. Thetruetestwhetherthetrialofapreliminaryissueonapointof lawshould be ordered iswherethepointoflaw,ifdecided in one 56 1C.L.R. Paikkosv. Kontemeniotis StylianldesJ. way, should be decisive on the litigation - (Maroulla Athanassi• Michaelides (Wife of Aristotelis Gregoriades) v. Pinelopi Hji Michael Diakou
(1968)1 C.L.R. 392; Michael Papamichael v. Klitos Chaholiades
(1970)1 C.L.R. 305; Jupiter Electrical 5 (Overseas)Ltd. andAnotherv. Sawas Costa ChrisUdes
(1975)1 C.L.R. 144;Malachtou v.ArmeftiandAnother
(1984)1C.L.R. 548andEverettv.RibbandsandAnother[1952]1AllE.R.823at p.827perRomer,L.J.). ThetrialCourtrightlydirected thetrialofthepointraisedasa 10 preliminaryissue. TheCivilWrongsLaw,Cap.148,whichcameintooperationon 1stJanuary,1933,providesinsection32asfollows:- 15 «32.Maliciousprosecution consistsofactually,maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause instituting or carrying on against any person unsuccessful criminal, bankruptcy or winding-up proceedings, where such proceedings(a)causedscandaltothecreditorreputationof,orpossible lossoflibertyby,suchperson,and 20 25 (b)terminated,ifinfacttheywerecapableofsoterminating, infavour ofsuchperson: Provided thatnoaction formaliciousprosecution shallbe broughtagainstanypersonbyreason onlythathe furnished information to some competent authority by whom any proceedingswereinstituted.» Proceedings underCap.252aredefinitely neitherbankruptcy norwinding-upproceedings. Theterm«criminalproceedings»isawellknownexpressionto ourstatutorylegislation. 30 IntheCyprusCourtsofJusticeOrder, 1927,acomprehensive statutoryenactment, dealingwiththeConstitution oftheCourts, Jurisdiction,Law,etc.,«criminalproceedings»isdefined:«...anyproceedinginstitutedagainstanyperson toobtain punishmentofsuchpersonforanyoffence againstthelaw.» 35, Almostidenticalisthedefinitionof«criminalproceedings»inthe EvidenceLaw,passedin1946,(Cap.9),theCriminal Procedure Law,enactedin1948(Cap.155),theCourtsofJusticeLaw,1953 57 StylianldesJ. Paikkosv. Kontemeniotis
(1989)(No.40/53), (Cap.8)and the CourtsofJustice Law, I960(Law No.14/60). In a number of cases the Supreme Court hasconsidered this definition-(see, interalia,VedatAhmetHasipv. ThePolice, 1964 C.L.R.48;InreZamin
(1983)2C.L.R.188). 5 Theaforesaid arestatutesinparimateria. Itiswellsettledthatinstatutesinparimateriasimilarlanguageis similarly interpreted and retains the same meaning unless the same term is otherwise defined in the statute which the Court seekstointerpret. 10 Lord Mansfield in R. v.Loxdale
(1758)1Burr 445 atp. 447 said:«Where there are different statutes in pari materia though madeatdifferenttimes,oreven expired,andnotreferringto eachother,theyshallbetakenandconstruedtogether,asone 15 system,andasexplanato/yofeachother». The term «criminal proceedings», as used and defined in our statutory legislation, is declaratory of the Common Law on the subject and has the same meaning as the expression «criminal causeormatter»inEngland. ^0 In Clifford and O'Sullivan [1921] 2 A.C.570, Viscount Cave saidatp.580:«... but in order that a matter may be a criminal cause or matteritmust,Ithink,fulfiltwoconditionswhichareconnoted by and implied in the word 'criminal*. It must involve the 25 consideration of some charge of crime, thatistosay, of an offence againstthepubliclaw(ImperialDictionary,tit.'Crime' and 'Criminal');andthatchargemusthavebeenpreferred or be about to be preferred before some Court or judicial tribunalhavingorclaimingjurisdictiontoimposepunishment 30 for the offence or alleged offence. If these conditions are fulfilled, themattermaybecriminal,eventhoughitisheldthat no crime has been committed; or that the tribunal has no jurisdictiontodealwithit...» In Amand v. Secretary of State for Home Affairsand 35 Another[1942]2 AllE.R.381, at385ViscountSimon,L.C., said:'Ifthematterisonethedirectoutcomeofwhichmaybetrial 58 1 CX.R. Paikkosv.Kontemeniotis StylianldesJ. of the applicant and hispossible punishment for an alleged offence bya court claimingjurisdiction to doso,the matteris criminal.» This passage was adopted in R. v. Southampton Justices, ex 5 parte Green [197512 All E.R. 1073,where Lord Denning M.R. saidatp.1076:«The words 'criminal cause or matter' were considered by the House of LordsinAmand v.Secretary ofState for Home Affairs[1942]2AllE.R.381at385.ViscountSimon LCsaid: 10 15 20 'Ifthematterisonethedirectoutcomeofwhichmaybe trial of applicant and his possible punishment for an alleged offence by a court claimingjurisdiction to do so, thematter iscriminal.' Apply that test to an application to estreat a recognisance. The outcome isnota 'trial'ofthesurety.Thereisno 'possible punishment' ofthesuretyforan'offence'. Arecognisanceisin the nature of a bond. Afailure to fulfil it gives rise to a civil debt.Itisdifferent fromtheordinarykindofcivildebt, because theenforcement isdifferent. Itisenforceable likeafine. ...But that"method of enforcement does not alter the-nature of the debt. Itissimply a civildebt on abond and as suchitisnota criminal cause or matter». WiththatJudgment BrowneLJ.andBrightmanJ.agreed.(See, also,R. v.MarlowJustices, exparte O'Sullivan[1983]3AllE.R. 25 578,andSmalley v.Crown CourtatWarwickandothers[1985]1 A11E.R.769.) Criminalproceedings have two characteristics:(a)Prosecution foran offence underthelaw, and (b)Possible punishment. 30 Theobject oftheproceedings undertheMental PatientsLawis an inquiryasto the state of mind of thesuspected person, ifsuch person isa mentalpatientand aproper subject ofconfinement.If itappears to the Court that any person isa mental patient and a propersubject ofconfinement, theCourt, after adjudication, shall 35 proceedtoordersuchpatienttobeconfined inamentalhospital. The procedure which regulates the conduct of such inquiry is 59 StylianldesJ. Paikkosv. Kontemeniotis
(1989)governed bytheMentalPatientsRules -Subsidiary Legislation of Cyprus,Volume II, p.430.Rule7. -
(1)reads:«7.-
(1)Theproceduretobefollowedattheinquiryshall,as nearly as possible, bethesame astheprocedurefollowedin criminalproceedings uponsummary trial.» 5 Rule20 provides:«The law and rules governing criminal proceedings upon summary trialandonappeal shallapply toanymatterarising out of proceedings before the Courtoron appeal for which provision isnothereinmade.» 10 Proceedings under the Mental Patients Law lack the main characteristicsofcriminalproceedings,ashereinaboveexplained. Theyarenottakeninrespectofacriminaloffence andtheirobject isnotthepunishmentof thesuspected person. Inviewof theabove, thestatementofclaimdoesnotdisclosea 15 cause of actionwithin theambitof section32 oftheCivilWrongs Law, Cap. 148. The trial Courtproceeded further and decided thatthere isa Common Lawrightof actionfor malicious prosecutioninrespect ofproceedings akin tocriminalproceedings,which isavailablein 20 this country undersection 29(l)(
- c)of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960 (LawNo. 14/60),asthereisnoprovision intheCivilWrongs Law which expressly excludes or is repugnant to this cause of action. Itconcluded thatthe statementof claim does, therefore, disclosea cause of action. 25 Thelaw applicable inthiscountryaccordingtosection29ofthe CourtsofJustice Law, I960 (LawNo. 14/60) is:«(
- a)(b)The Laws saved underArticle 188 of theConstitution subject to the conditions provided therein save in so far as 30 other provision hasbeen orshall be madeby a law madeor becoming applicable underthe Constitution. (c)TheCommonLawandthedoctrinesofequitysaveinso far as otherprovision hasbeen or shall be madeby any lawι made orbecoming applicable underfhe Constitutionorany 35 law savedunderparagraph (b)ofthissectioninsofar asthey arenotinconsistentwith orcontrarytotheConstitution». 60 1C.L.R. Paikkosv.Kontemeniotis StylianldesJ. The CivilWrongsLawisapplicable under paragraph (b). Wehave toconsiderwhetherthefactual situation alleged inthe statement of claim founds a cause of action under the Common Law. 5 The history of malicious prosecution in England goes back to the old writ of conspiracy, which was in existence as early as Edward I'sreign and wasprobably ofstatutory origin. TheJudges atWestminster were makinguse of an action upon the caseinthe nature of conspiracy. Itlayagainstasingle person, 10 aswellasagainstthosewhoacted incombination. Thisgradually became known astheaction for malicious prosecution. AsitiswritteninWinfield andJolowiczonTort,9thEditionatp. 488:15 «Itsprogresswasgradual,forithadtomakeitswaybetween two competing principles - the freedom of action that every man should have in bringing criminals to justice and the necessity for checking lyingaccusations of innocent people.» (See Glinskiv.Mclver [1962] 1 AllE.R., 696). In Savile v. Roberts [1558-17741 All E.R. Rep., 456, Sir John 20 Holt,C.J., puttheactionon afirmbasis.Hesaidatp. 457:- 25 30 35 «There are three sorts of damage, any of which would be sufficient ground to support this action, (i)The damage to a man's fame, as if the matter whereof he is accused be scandalous.Thiswastheground ofHenley v.Burstal(76E.R. 899)... (ii)The second sort of damage which would support suchanaction issuchasisdonetotheperson,aswhereaman isput in danger to lose his life, or limb, or liberty, which has been alwaysallowed a good foundation of such an action,... (Hi)Thethirdsortofdamagewhichwillsupportsuchanaction is damage to a man's property, as where he is forced to expend his money in necessary charges, to acquit himself of thecrime ofwhichhe isaccused,whichisthepresentcharge. ...;andifthatinjury isdonetohimmaliciously, itisreasonable that he shall have an action to repair himself. Although this doctrine hasbeen questioned lately,itwasalwaysreceivedin ancient times:...» Heclarified thatnoaction formaliciousprosecution lieswherea civilaction wassuedwithoutcause /n 458):61 StylianldesJ. Paikkosv.Kontemeniotis
(1989)«To that it was answered that there is a great difference between the suing ofan action maliciously, and the indicting ofa man maliciously.When aman suesanaction,heclaimsa righttohimself,orcomplainsofaninjury donetohimself;and ifa man fancies he hasa right, he maysue an action.» 5 InThe QuartzHillConsolidated GoldMiningCompany v.Eyre, Q.B.D. 11[1882-83J p.674, Bowen,L.J., atp.688said that«... the bringing of an action under our present rules of procedure, and with the consequences attaching under our present law, although the action is brought falsely and 10 maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause, and whatever may be the allegations contained in the pleadings, will not furnish a ground for a subsequent complaint by the person who has been sued nor support an action on hispart for maliciously bringingthe first action.» 15 He repeated with approval and appreciation the three categories of damage for the purpose of the tort of malicious prosecution, andreferred tothedoctrinelaiddownbyHolt,C.J.in Savile v.Roberts (supra),and atp. 691 he said:«But although an action does not giveriseto an action for 20 maliciousprosecution, inasmuch asitdoes notnecessarily or naturally involve damage, there are legal proceedings which do necessarily and naturally involve that damage; and when proceedings of that kind have been taken falsely and maliciously, and withoutreasonable orprobable cause,then, 25 inasmuchasaninjuryhasbeen done,thelawgivesaremedy». The word «scandalous» in the doctrine of Holt, C.J., was considered latertomean defamatory and damage tothefair fame of a person - (Berry v. British Transport Commission [1961] 1 Q.B.D. 149,166 (Diplock,J. inthefirstinstance); Wiffen v.Bailey 30 &Romford U.D.C. [1914-1915]AllE.R. Rep. 967). In Castrique v. Behrens, 121 E.R. 608, Crompton, J., in deliveringtheJudgment ofthe Court, said atp.613:«Thereisnodoubt, onprincipleand ontheauthorities,that an action lies for maliciously and without reasonable and 35 probable causesettingthelawofthiscountryinmotiontothe damage of the plaintiff, though not for a mere conspiracy to dosowithoutactuallegaldamage;Cotterellv.Jones (11C.B. 713),Barber v.Lesiter(7 C.B.N.S. 175).Butinsuchanaction 62 1C.L.R. 5 10 Paikkosν. Kontemeniotis StylianldesJ. it is essential to shew that the proceeding alleged to be instituted maliciously and without probable cause has terminated in favour of theplaintiff, if, from its nature,itbe capable ofsuch atermination.Thereasonseems tobethatif, intheproceedingcomplainedof, thedecisionwas againstthe plaintiff and was still unreversed, itwould notbe consistent with the principle on which law is administered for another Court,notbeing aCourtof appeal,toholdthatthedecision was cometowithoutreasonable andprobable cause». (See, also, Bynoe v. Bank of England [1902] 1 K.B. p. 467, 470). InSteward v. Gromett, 141 E.R. 788, it was held that an ex parteproceedinginthenatureofawritofprocessmaliciously and withoutreasonable orprobablecausesufficiently foundsanaction 15 for malicious prosecution.Thiswas anactionfor maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause procuring certain magistratestocommittheplaintiff togaoluntilhefoundsuretiesof thepeace. Byles, J.,said atp. 795:20 25 30 35 40 «The only objection which has been urged against the maintenance of this action is, that the inquiry before the magistrates appears tohave terminatedunfavourably forthe plaintiff. Whether theproceeding was of ajudicial natureor not depends upon whether or not the plaintiff had an opportunity of being heardbefore themagistrates in answer tothecharge. Nodirectauthorityhasbeen citedtoshewthat he had; but two faint traces of authority in support of the affirmative havebeenshewn,-one,theassertion madebyMr. Marryattin TheKingv. Doherty, 13East, 171,whichdoesnot seemtobewarrantedbytheauthoritiescited,andthepassage inDalton'sJustice,c.116,totheeffect thatthemagistrate has adiscretioninthematter.Therecertainlyseemstobenogood reason why the magistrate should not receive information from the defendant as well as from the plaintiff. But the question is whether the plaintiff had a right to be heard to controvert thestatementmadeagainst himuponoath.Upon the authorities, itseems clear that he had not. Itwas an ex parte proceeding: but Iam not disposed to admit thatthe actionwould nothave been maintainableeven ifthe plaintiff hadanopportunityofdefendinghimself,andofcontroverting 63 StylianidesJ. Paikkosv. Kontemeniotis
(1989)that which was alleged against him. Under the statute 1 &2 Vict, c.110, the judge does not allow a capias as a matterof course; and yet ithas been held that an action liesagainst a party for maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause procuring a capias to be issued against the plaintiff, 5 although he has a right to come before the judge to shew cause whythewritshould notissue». In the Indian case Mohamed Amin v. Jogendra Kumar Bannerjee and Others[1947]A.C.(P.C.)322,SirJohn Beaumont, delivering the advice of the Board, said at pp. 330-331, after 10 referring toSavile v.Roberts:«Thatthe word 'prosecution' in thetitleof the action isnot used in the technical sense which itbears in criminal law is shown by the fact that the action lies for the malicious prosecution of certain classes of civilproceedings,...» 15 In Everett v. Ribbands (supra) Sommervell, L.J., after quoting the passage from Castriquev.Behrens above,said atp.825:«The principle isthere stated ascoveringa widerfield than prosecutions. Where an action of this kind is brought in respectofcivilprocesstheplaintiff has,Ithink,toshowspecial 20 damage». Lord Denning said atp.827:«Itisthisconduct which isthesubject ofthe complaint and which must be proved before an order for sureties can be made. In these circumstances it seems to me that the 25 proceedings are analogoustoa criminal proceeding and that no action liesformaliciouslyinstitutingthemunlesstheyhave ended favourably for the plaintiff. In the present case they ended unfavourably for the plaintiff. An order was made againsthim.Thisaction, therefore, doesnot lie.» 30 We underline the words *are analogous to a criminal proceeding». Theywerenotcriminalproceedings,butanalogous. The Canadian case Giffordv.Kelson
(1943)3 D.L.R. 441,was action for malicious prosecution for damages. The plaintiff established that the defendant, with malice and without 35 reasonable and/or probable cause,lardaninformation, under the Mental Diseases Act, whereunder the plaintiff was arrested and confined in the psychopathic ward of a certain hospital. The plaintiff succeeded and damageswere awarded to her. 64 \ \ 1C.L.R. Paikkosv.Kontemeniotis StylianldesJ. 1 Wehave madea review ofthe Common Lawon thesubjectof maliciousprosecution. From the Judgments quoted above, we arrive at the safe conclusion that an action for malicious prosecution lies, if the 5 other elements are present, for abuse of legal process and for proceedings analogous or akin to criminal proceedings. The action for malicious prosecution is not confined to criminal proceedings,bankruptcyandwinding-up.Thedoctrinelaiddown by Holt, C.J., three centuries ago, continues to be valid. In 10 proceedings under the Mental Patients Law, Cap. 252, in this country the Court acts on the instigation of the person laying the information on oath before it.Theproceedingsinstigated thereby endanger the liberty of the suspected person named in the affidavit, cause damage to his fame, i.e. reputation, injury to his 15 feelings for the indignity, humiliation and disgrace, caused tohim bythefactoftheholdingofaninquiryundertheLawastohisstate of mind.Itcertainlycausesdamage tohisproperty, asheisforced to expend money to protect his rights (if he does so) before the Court. 20 In conclusion, we are of the opinion that the factual situation alleged in the statement of claim founds an action for malicious prosecution under the Common Law. It was, however strongly argued by counsel for the appellant thatsection32isexhaustive,therebyotherprovisionwasmadeby 25 statute and, therefore, the Common Lawisnot applicable in this country. Rivalargumentswereplacedbefore theCourtbycounselofthe parties. The Island of Cyprus became byconquest part of the Ottoman 30 Empire in the late part of the 17th century. The Ottoman Laws applied. On 4thJune, 1878,byConvention,GreatBritaintookoverthe administration ofthe Island. The Cyprus (Annexation) Order in Council, 1914, dated the 35 Fifth day of November, 1914, provided that from and after that daytheIslandofCyprusshouldbeannexedtoandformpartofthe British Dominionsand our Islandwasannexed accordingly. 65 StylianldesJ. Paikkosv. Kontemeniotis
(1989)This Annexation Order was amended by The Cyprus (Annexation)AmendmentOrder inCouncil,
- By Article 20 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, signed at Lausanne on the twenty-fourth day of July, 1923, Turkey recognised the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government on the Fifth November,
- 5 The said Treaty of Peace was duly deposited and came into force asbetween theBritishEmpireandTurkeyonthesixthdayof August,
- Asfrom 1928, gradually the English Common Law was being 10 introduced inthiscountry by statute. In1928,witheffect from 1stJanuary, 1929,theCriminal Code, that isa codification of the English Criminal Law,was introduced bythe Cyprus Criminal Code Order in Council,
- In1930,witheffect 1stJanuary, 1931,aCode ofContractLaw, 15 modelled on the Indian ContractAct,came into operation. Two years later the Civil Wrongs Law, 1932, (Law 35/32), anotherCode,whichwasinoperation inPalestine,introducedthe Common Law onTort inthiscountry. Allthese Codes had analmost identical provision, that:- 20 «This Law shall be interpreted in accordance with the principles of legal interpretation obtaining in England, and expressionsused initshallbepresumed,sofarasisconsistent with their context, and except as may be otherwise expressly provided, to be used with the meaning attaching to them in 25 Englishlawandshallbe construed inaccordance therewith». Ultimately, bysection 49(c)of the Courtsof Justice Law, 1935 {No.38/35):«thecommon lawandtherulesofequityasinforcein Englandon the5th dayofNovember, 1914,saveinsofarasother provision has been or shall be made by any Law of the Colony» 30 was made applicable by every Court inthe exercise of itscivilor criminal jurisdiction. Section49wasrepealedandsubstitutedbysection4ofLaw19/
- The said paragraph (c)was amended by the Courts of Justice 35 (Amendment No.2)Law, 1952 (LawNo.29/52),soasto read as follows:66 1C.L.R. Paikkosv. Kontemeniotis StylianldesJ. «(c)Thecommonlaw andthedoctrinesofequitysaveinso far as otherprovision has been orshall be made any Lawof theColony». Law 38/35 was repealed and substituted by the Courts of 5 Justice Law, 1953 (Law No. 40/53). Section 33(l)(c) is identical with49(c)of Law38/35asamendedby Law 29/
- Law 40/53, Cap.8 ofthe 1959 edition,remainedinforceuntil after the establishment of the Republic, when Law 14/60 was enacted. 10 Thesame provision withsome modification isfound insection 29 of Law 14/60, which reads asfollows:«
- -
(1)Έκαοτον δικαστήριον εν τη ασκήσει της πολιτικήςήποινικήςαυτού δικαιοδοσίας θαεφαρμόζη (α) 15 20 (β) · (γ)το κοινόνδίκαιον(commonlaw) καιταςαρχάςτης επιεικίας(equity)εκτόςεάνάλληπρόβλεψιςεγένετο ήθα γίνη υπόοιουδήποτενόμουεφαρμοστέουήγενομένου δυνάμει του Συντάγματος ή οιουδήποτε νόμου διατηρηθέντος εν ισχύϊ δυνάμει της παραγράφου (β) του παρόντος εδαφίου, εφόσον δεν αντιβαίνουνήδεν είναι ασυμβίβαστοιπροςτο Σύνταγμα! » («29. -
(1)Every Courtintheexerciseof itscivilorcriminal jurisdition shall apply- 25 (
- a)(. (
- b)30 (c)thecommonlaw andthedoctrines of equity save inso far as otherprovision hasbeen orshall be made by any law made orbecoming applicable underthe Constitutionorany law savedunderparagraph (b)of thissection insofar asthey arenotinconsistentwith orcontrarytotheConstitution;») Section 49(c)of theCourtsofJustice Law, 1935, was judicially considered in Themistocles Vassiliou v. Christos Vassiliou, XVI C.L.R.70,inwhichitwasheldthatpowerwasgiventherebytothe 35 Courtsof theColony toapply theEnglish CommonLaw andthe Rules of Equity in the absence of any provision in the existing 67 StylianldesJ. Paikkosv. Kontemeniotis
(1989)Laws. Because an action lay for damages for assault under the EnglishCommonLawandbecausetherewasnoprovisionforitin the Civil Wrongs Law, actions for damages for assault could therefore be brought by virtue of section 49(c) of the Courtsof JusticeLaw,1935. Crean, C.J., saidatpp.72-73:«Healsoargued thatasthere wasacodified CivilWrongs LawtheEnglishLawofTortscouldnotapply:tortsgenerally beingprovided forbytheCivilWrongsLaw. This case raises a matter of great importance to the 10 administrationofjusticeintheColony,sinceitseemstobethe firsttimethatsection49(c)oftheCourtsofJusticeLaw,1935, anditsbearingontheexistingLawofCivilWrongshascome beforetheCourtforconsideration. Whatever civilwrongswererecognized byOttoman Law, 15 and defined in the Mejelle, priorto 1932,the CivilWrongs Law of that year repealed, and enacted that certain acts or omissions set out therein were tobe civilwrongsfor which actioncouldbebrought.Afterthepassingofthislawtheonly partoftheMejelledealingwithcivilwrongsthathadnotbeen 20 totally repealed was the first, namely: Articles 1 to 100 containing legal maxims. These, however, were only operative in so far as they did not conflict with the Civil WrongsLaw, 1932.Soitcanbestatedthattheonlytortious acts for which actions could be broughtafter the 1932 Law 25 werethosecivilwrongsincludedintheCivilWrongsLaw.At thetimeitwaspassed,thatactwasexhaustive. Now the section already set out states definitely that the EnglishCommonLawandRulesofEquityareonlytoapplyin 30 theabsence of any provision intheexistinglaw.Itdoes not excludeexpresslyorimpliedlythewholeexistinglawrelating totortiousacts,andsofollowingtheaboveprinciplecanonly beheldtoexcludesuchtortiousactsasarealreadyprovided forbytheCivilWrongsLaw,1932.Thatlawnowherestates 35 expresslythatitisexhaustiveofthecivilwrongsintheColony, assupplyingremediesforallinjuriescausedbytortiousacts;it merelycodifiesthecivilwrongsforwhichaction,could,under thatlaw,bebrought.» 68 '5 1C.L.R. 5 Paikkosv.Kontemeniotis StylianidesJ. Andatp.74hesaid:«Theeffect then of introducing the English commonLaw and RulesofEquityintotheColonyisthatcivilactionssince 1935canbebroughtfor anytortsknowntoEnglishLawon 5thNovember,1914,thoughnotincludedintheCivilWrongs Law,1932,providednootherprovisionismadeinrespectof it.» In the case of RudolfSchmuel v. The Officer in Command Illegal Jewishimmigrants' Camp, Karaolos, XVIII C.L.R. 158, 10 sections49and51wereconsideredinanapplication forawritof habeascorpus.TheSupremeCourtheldthat,thoughsections12 and13ofLaw38/35gavenoauthorityfortheissueofsuchawrit, thejointeffect ofsections49and51madethewrit(admittedlya partoftheCommonLawofEngland)issuableinCyprus. 15 20 Thelearned ChiefJusticesaidatp. 161:«Now,byvirtueofsections49and51oftheLawof 1935 wehaveinoperationinCyprusboththesubstantiveLawfrom which thewritderivesandtheprocedural Lawgoverningits issue.Andtherecanbenodoubtoftheexistenceofthelegal rightwhichitisthefunctionofthewrittoenforce,forthatisthe right topersonalliberty.» UniversalAdvertisingandPublishingAgency v.PanayiotisA. Vouros, XIXC.L.R.87, isa landmark on the interpretation and application of the provision introducing the Common Lawand 25 Equityinthiscountry. Section 31 of the Civil Wrongs Law was interpreted that it provided onlyfor passing-off of goodsand notfor passing-off of business. ItwasarguedthatotherprovisionalreadyexistedintheLawso 30 astoexcludetheCommonLawrightofactionforthe passing-off of business. First by section 31 of the Civil Wrongs Lawwhich providedarightofactionforpassing-off ofgoods,andsecondlyby sections14and20oftheCourtsofJusticeLawwhichprovidedfor thepaymentofcompensation incriminalcases. 35 Itwassaidatp.92:«Theargument undersection31oftheCivilWrongsLaw containstwopropositions-First,thathavingdealtwiththetort of'passing-off insection31thelegislativeauthorityhasmade 69 StylianldesJ. Paikkosv.Kontemeniotis
(1989)provision for all species of that tort so as to exclude the CommonLaw;secondly,thatbyprovidingarightofactionfor thepassing-off ofgoodsonly,thelegislativeauthorityhasby necessaryimplicationintimateditsintentionnottogivea right ofactionforthepassing-off ofbusiness.» 5 Halliman,C.J.,atpp.94-95said:«ForthereasonswhichIhavediscussed,Iconsiderthatthe intention of the legislative authority when introducting the Common Lawin1935,canbestbeimplementedbyrefusing to allow the saving clause in section 28(l)(c) to exclude a 10 common lawrightunless the Other provision' isclear and imperative: a cause of action at Common Lawshould after 1935beavailable,unlessthisremedyiseitherexpresslytaken awaybyanyLawoftheColonyorisclearlyrepugnanttoany suchLaw.Now,iftheword'goods'insection31oftheLawof 15 1932 does not (as counsel for the appellants submitted) include'business'thennocauseofactionlayupto1935for the passing-off of business. On the other hand there is no provisioninthelawoftheColonywhichexpresslyexcludesor is repugnant to this cause of action which consequently 20 became justiciable inthisColony under section 28
(1)(c) of theLawof1935.» Before reachingthisconclusionhesaidatp.94:«Itisreasonabletosupposethatthelegislativeauthorityin applying the Common Law to this Colony in 1935 had in 25 mindtheseconsiderationswhichindeedarepartoftheideals and beliefs that underlie all British administration. For this reasonaCourt,calledontointerpretaprovisionsuchasthat contained in section 28(l)(c), should not regard the Civil Wrongs Lawasa stockade around the Common Lawlestit 30 breakoutand damagethecitizensofCyprus;inmyviewthe CivilWrongsLawisnothingmorethantransitorylegislation intended topreparethesoilofCyprusfortheplantingofthe Common Law.Iamnotsuggestingforamomentthatallthe provisions of the English Common Law are suitable for 35 Cyprus;whatIaffirm isthatitmustbeplantedhereasaliving growth which can be pruned by legislation and judicial decision tosuit local conditions; but itcannot flourish ifitis choppedupintostatutorydefinitions». 70 1C.L.R. Paikkosv.Kontemeniotis StylianldesJ. InAntonisAnastassi&Anotherv.ThePoIice, XIXC.L.R. 131, atp. 132itwassaid:- 5 «Ithasbeen held recentlyinthisCourtthatthisCourtwill onlyholdthatotherprovisionhasbeenmadeifitisveryclear from the enactment which is being relied on that it is the intention ofthelegislativeauthoritytoexcludetheCommon Law.» InLoizosD.Georghiades&Sonv.RenosKamlnaras,23C.L.R. 276; Zekia,J.,saidatp.283:10 15 «Vassiliou v. Vassiliou,16 C.L.R. 69, The Universal AdvertisingandPublishingAgencyandothers v. Panayiotis Vouros, 19C.L.R.87,hadenlargedthescopeofthissection andasaresultnotonlythetortsspecified intheCivilWrongs Law but those left out and recognised by Common Law unlessclearlyexcludedbysomelegislationwereactionablein theCourtsoftheColonyaswell.» (The Eletricity Authorityof Cyprus v. AntonisKipparis, 24 C.L.R.121;Jupitercase(supra)). In CreonConstantinou v. Pavlos Panayides
(1984)1C.L.R. 20 466,itwas heldthatsection29(l)(c)ofthe CourtsofJusticeLaw, 1960 (Law No. 14/60) makes the Common Law applicable in Cyprus;thatsince enticement isa causeofaction recognisedby the Common Law, in fact it is a cause that was recognised as actionable many centuriesago, itispart of ourlawand assuch 25 applicable inCyprus.Though itcanbe arguedthattheactionof enticement isinsomerespectsoutdated, ithasnotceased tobe partofourLaw. InZivlasv. MunicipalityofLimassolandAnother
(1975)J.S.C. 989, itwasheldthatsection51
(2),whichprovidesthat:«Adutynot 30 tobenegligentshallexistinthefollowingcases,thatistosay»and thenfivesub-paragraphsfollow, itwasnotexhaustive. Itiswellestablishedbythe jurisprudenceoftheSupremeCourt oftheCountryforthelasthalfcenturythattheCivilWrongsLaw is notexhaustive,itdoesnotprovideforallactionabletortiousacts,it 35 doesnotsupplyremediesforallinjuriescausedthereby,itmerely codifiesthe civilwrongsforwhichactioncould,underthatLaw, be brought. 71 StyllanidesJ. Paikkosv. Kontemeniotis
(1989)Thisprinciplewasextendedandapplied totheContractLaw, which isagainacodification oftheEnglishCommon Lawonthe subject. (See Christos Markou v. Gregoria Michael, XIXC.L.R. 282). InPanayiotisS. Myrianthousis v.Despina Petrou, XXIC.L.R. 5 32,itwasheldthatapersonwhodoesnotcomewithinsection11 (asitwas then before itsamendment byLaw No.7/1956)isby inference not competent to contract under section 10
(1)and therefore suchagreementisvoid.TheCommonLawofEngland wasnotapplicable,because oftheexpressed provisionmadeby 10 section 11andtheinterpretationgiventosimilarprovisioninIndia inMohoriBibee v.Dhurmodas Ghose(19,Times LawReports 295).(SeeinthisrespectAnthoullaPapadopoulou v.Xenophon Polykarpou
(1968)1 C.L.R. 352). InChristodoulosNicola Tseriotisv.ChryssiChristodoulouand 15 Another, XIXC.L.R.216,itwasheldthatundertheContractLaw, section 74,a specific amount istobepaid incaseof breach, no question arises whether compensation isliquidated damages or penalty.Itwassaid:«... we have come to the conclusion that before the 20 amendmentitwasclearlytheintentionofthelegislaturetodo away with the distinction between penalty and liquidated damages,sothatwheneverasumisnamedinacontractasthe amounttobepaidincaseofabreach,theCourtineverysuch case must award such sum as it considers reasonable 25 compensation notexceedingtheamountsonamed.» (See Eleni Panayiotou lordanou v. Polycarpos Neophytou Anyftos,24C.L.R. 97). TheCommon Law,notasmodified bystatute,isapplicablein thiscountryifthefollowingaresatisfied:No other provision has been made by any law saved under Article 188 of the Constitution, or enacted by the Legislative AuthorityoftheRepublic. «Otherprovision»ismade,ifitisveryclearfromtheenactment which isbeingrelied on, thatitistheintention ofthe Legislative 35 AuthoritytoexcludetheCommonLaw. TheCommon Lawisnotinconsistent with,orcontrarytoour Constitution. 72 30 1C.L.R. Paikkosv. Kontemeniotis StylianldesJ. AndlastlyitissuitableforCyprus,astheCommonLawmustbe planted here asa livinggrowth which canbe pruned byjudicial decision tosuitlocalconditions.Theobject and the intentionof the country's legislator was the service of the people of this 5 country. TheFullDistrictCourtof Kyrenia inProtopapas v.Gunther& Another
(1974)J.S.C. 981, having regard to the wording of section 29(l)(c) and the judicial pronouncements aforesaid quoted, decided thatthe rule inBainv.Fothergill
(1874)L.R.7 10 (H.L.)158,isnotapplicable.Itwassaidatp.1006:- 15 20 «WehavetoviewthisruleoftheEnglishLawinthelightof thelocalconditions,andweseenoreasonwhyananomalous situation the existence of which has some justification in another jurisdiction must be introduced in the law of this country. Weconsiderthisruleasbadlawforourcountrywherethe landtenureandlandregistrationlawwasmodernisedandfor many years the Department of Lands &Surveys functions satisfactorily and no uncertainties can be entertained by a carefulvendor.» InPanayiotisPissouriosandReginaDervishofLimassolAction No. 916/71, the Full District Court of Limassol, in view of the nature of contractual leases in Cyprus ruled as inapplicable the 25 EnglishprincipleoftheCommonLawthatforfeiture ofthelease for non-payment ofrentshouldbe preceded bydemand of the exactsumduebeingmadeuponIhedemisedpremises;itdidnot apply,also,the doctrinethattenancyautomatically comestoan end on the ground that the sub-tenant disclaimed, even inthe 30 pleadings,thetitleofhisimmediatelandlord. Atp.26oftheJudgmentweread:-' 35 «Whatwehavesaidaboutthenecessityforthedemandof rentbeforetheexerciseoftherighttoforfeittheleaseapplies perforcefortheforfeiture duetodisclaimer.Thisruleisnot partofourlaw.Werejectit. TheCommonLawisevolutionary.Thisisoneofitsmerits and main characteristics. This feudal relic is not only unnecessary today but offends commonsense and justice. 73 StylianldesJ. Paikkosv.Kontemeniotis
(1989)Even if we had to apply the English Common Law, we would notapplythisruleinourcountryhavingregardtothe conditionsprevailinginoursociety.» It was argued by counsel for the appellant that in case of maliciousprosecution,thelegislatorintendedtoconfinemalicious 5 prosecutionwithinthefourwallsofthe definition of section32 ofourCivilWrongsLaw;thatsection32isanexhaustive andall inclusive definition of what malicious proceedings are and that proceedingsthatcouldgiverisetomaliciousprosecutionmustbe criminalproceedingsstrictosensu.Hebasedhissuchsubmission 10 onthewordingofthesection«maliciousprosecutionconsists*and he endeavoured to make a differentiation between this section and the section which came under judicial consideration in the Vouroscase(supra). TheCivilWrongsLawisaCode.Itisnotexhaustive. 15 Wedonotshare theviewthatthelegislatorbythewordingof section32 intended toexcludetheCommon Law.Section32is notsuch«otherprovision»asrequiredbytheCourtsofJusticeLaw toexcludefrom thelegalorderofthiscountrytheCommonLaw andthedoctrinesofEquity. 20 ThelegislatordidnotintendtomodifytheEnglishLaw,asinthe caseoftheContractLaw,sections10and 11,orsection249
(3)of the Criminal Code, as decided in Myrianthousis and Anastassi casesrespectively. Whatever therightsof aperson under the CivilWrongsLaw 25 before 1935,theyhavebeenextendedtoallcausesofmalicious prosecution undertheCommonLaw,providedthattheyarenot contrarytoourConstitutionandaresuitableforCyprus. OurConstitution safeguards therightoflibertyandtherightof reputation.Therefore,acauseofaction,intendingtoprotectthese 30 rightsfrombeingendangeredbymaliciousprosectution,notonly isnotrepugnantorinconsistent,but,onthecontrary,itaccordsto theconstitutional provisionsand enablesthecitizen tovindicate such rights. Inviewoftheforegoing,weareoftheopinionthatanactionfor 35 maliciousprosecutionliesforproceedingsanalogoustoorakinto * criminalproceedings,subjecttoproofoftheotherelementsofthe tort, that is «maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause»andensuingdamages;theburdenofproofliessquarelyon theshouldersoftheplaintiff. . 40 74 IC.L.R. Paikkosv.Kontemeniotis StylianldesJ. Thelaying,therefore, ofinformation onoath,undersection3of theMentalPatients Law,and the facts averredinthestatementof claim,sufficiently disclosean actionabletortinthiscountry. Intheresult,thisappeal failsand ishereby dismissed. 5 With regard to costs, appellant to pay the costs of the respondent inthe appeal, but we leave undisturbed the orderof the District Court. Appeal dismissed. Order forcostsas above. 75