(1989)19S9Januan 12 [DEMETRRDES J] IN THE MATTER OFARTICLE 146 0Γ THE CONSTITUTION COSTAS PAPAKYRRKOU MARKIDES. Applicant, THE REPUBLICOF CYPRUS THROUGHTHE MINISTER OFTIN ANCE. Respondent (Case So I79/S6) Customs andexcise duties— Motor Vehicles — Disabledpersons— Relief from import dut\ — The Customsand Excise Duty Law 197S. section 11
(1)
(2)and Order 229/79 of the Council of Ministers — Once determined that applicant is a "disabled 'fyerson.the extent of the relief willbe decided by the Minister of Finance — Taking into consideration 5 the value of applicants immovableproperty, which ifsold wouldenable applicantto bu\ acarandpay all thedutv — Misdirection — Annulment ofSubjudice refusal— Observations by Courtasregardsgeneralincome catena set down by Minister ds a guidance to the exercise of his discretion Though ihc applicant was found to satisf\ the definition of' disabled person'" in the context of the afoiesaid legal prousions. his application for relief from import dun. in respect of importation of amotor vehicle. was refused, because of his iinancial position The facts pointed towards 15 the conclusion that the Minister,in refusing relief,was influenced b\ the fact that applicant was theowner of immovable propertj which if sold. would have enabled him to pav thefull import dun Subjudicc decisionannulledvuth costs 20 against respondents 30 10 3C.L.R. Markides v.Republic Casesreferredto: Mai-kides v. Republic
(1985)3C.L.R. 1393, 5 Miltiadousv. Republic(19S3)3C.L.R. 590. Kalli v. Republic
(1984)3C.L.R.
- Ioannou v. Republic(19S5)3C.L.R.
- 10 Recourse. Recourse against the decision of the respondents whereby applicant's application for relief from payment of import duty 15 inrespect of amotor car adapted for use by disabled persons. Chr.Tnantafyllides, for the Applicant. 20 S. Georghiades.Senior Counsel of the Republic, for the Respondent. Cur. adv.vult. DEMETRIADES. J. read the following judgment. On the 14th March. 19S3.the applicant applied for full relief from the payment of import duty in respect of a motor car specially adapted for use by disabled persons, because of his inability to drive an ordinary car. He based his application on the provisionsof Class01/09ofthe Fourth Scheduleto theCustoms 30 and Excise Duties Law 197S(Law 18/78). 25 The applicant was certified by a Medical Board that on account of poliomyelitis, which he suffered in his childhood. presented atrophy, weakness of the right lower limp with 35 equinus deformity of the right foot and, after he was examined by the Senior Technical Examiner of the Office of Examiners for drivers,was found that he could only drive a vehicle on the following conditions,namely40 (a)the carhadto be automatic. (b)the break and fuel foot-petal hadto be operated with the 31 Demetriades. J. Markides v. Republic
(1989)left foot. (c)the applicant, whilst driving,hadto usesafety belts,and (d)the car. if run on petrol, ought not to exceed 2000 cubic 5 cm. capacity andif it used diesel 2.300cubic cm. The respondent rejected the applicant's request who. as a result, applied to this Court for the annulment of the administrative decision taken. A. Loizou J., as he then was, who tried the recourse of the applicant (see Markides v. The Republic
(1985)3 C.L.R. 1393). annulled the decision taken by the respondent on the ground that it lacked due reasoning. 10 15 Asaresult ofthe abovejudgment oftheCourt therequestof the applicant was re-examined by the respondent and by letter dated the 3rd January. 1986.hewas informed that, although on thebasisofthe repon ofthe Medical Board andtheviewsofthe 20 senior Examiner of Drivers, he (the applicant) was indeed a disabled person for the purposes of paragraph 09of Class01of the Fourth Schedule to the Customs and Excise Duties Law,the Minister had.after takins intoconsideration that the applicant 25 (l)was earning amonthly gross income of£544.-;
(2)possessed immovable property the value of which was £15.000.-: 30
(3)had about £600.-savings:and
(4)had no substantial family responsibilities. decided that the financial position oftheapplicant wassuchthat 35 didnot justify any relief from import dutyfor the purchase of a motor car for disabled persons. The applicant then filed the present recourse by which he praysfortheannulment ofthedecisiontakenbytherespondent. 40 Counsel for the applicant argued that the respondent's 32 3 C.L.R. Markides v. Republic Demetriades, J. authority,undertheLaw. was to decidetheextent of therelief the applicant was entitled to. but not to deny him relief completely. He, in the alternative, argued that the financial position of theapplicantwas notsuchasnottojustify anyrelief 5 atall andthatit is notknown what werethecriteria applied by the Minister inreaching his decision,thus making it impossible for the Court to exercise any control over the sub judice decision. 10 Counselfor therespondent ontheotherhand, arguedthatthe sub judice decision was reasonably open to the respondent, bearing inmindthefinancial conditionof theapplicant andthat the respondent, in reaching his decision, acted upon approved criteria. 15 It is to be noted here that these criteria were set by the respondent and are based on theincome of a disabled person. However, there is no indication whether the respondent relies on thegrossor net income. 20 Before I proceed to make any finding as to whether the decision reachedbytherespondentwasreasonably opento him. Ifeel thattherelevant legal provisions mustbe quotedhere. 25 Theseare: (A) Section 11of theCustoms andExciseDuties Law, 1978 (Law 18/78) which reads: 30 35 40 "11.-
(1)Ανεξαρτήτωςοιασδήποτενομοθετικήςδιατάξεως εμπορεύματα του εν τωΤετάρτωΠινάκι καθοριζομέ νου είδουςαπαλλάττονται,υπό ταςεντωειρημένωΠινά κι οριζομένας περιστάσεις και όρους εκτός εάν άλλως προνοήται εντητετάρτηστήλητουιδίουΠίνακος.τουεισαγωγικούδασμούήφόρουκαταναλώσεωςόστις άλλως θαεπεβάλλετοδυνάμει τουπαρόντοςΝόμου
(2)ΤοΥπουργικόν Χυμβούλιον δύναται,διάΔιατάγματος αυτού εκδιδομένου δυνάμει Κανονισμών εγκρινομένων υπό της Βουλής των Αντιπροσώπων, να προσθετή,δια γραφή,μεταβάλληή άλλωςτροποποιήταςκλάσειςή οιασ δήποτετούτων,ως αύται εκτίθενταιεντωΤετάρτωΠίνα- Demetriades, J. Markides v. Republic
(1989)κι. Οι Κανονισμοί αυτοίδύνανται ναπρονοούνπερί τοι ούτων όρων. περιορισμών, προϋποθέσεων και κριτηρίων τα οποία ήθελον καθορισθή εν αυτοίς διά τους σ/οπούς ασ/.ήσεως της εκχωρούμενη; εις το Υπουργικόν Συμβούλιον εξουσίας. Παντοιούτο Διάταγμαεκδιδόμενον δυνά- 5 μει του παρόντος εδαφίου δημοσιεύεται εν τη επισήμω εφημέριοι της Δημοκρατίας."' ("11.-
(1)Notwithstanding anylegalprovision goodsof theclassspecifiedintheFourthSchedule areexempted, inthe 10 circumstances and conditions specified in the said Schedule unless otherwise provided inthe fourth column of the same Schedule, from the import or excise duty which wouldhave been imposed onthebasisof this Law 15
(2)The Council of Ministers may. by Order issued on the basis of Regulations approved by the House of Representatives, add. delete, alter or otherwise amend the classes or any of them, as they are set out in the Fourth Schedule. These Regulations may provide about such 20 conditions, limitations, prerequisites and criteria as may be specified therein for the purposes of the exercise of the power vestedinthe Council of Ministers. Everysuch Order issued on thebasis of this section is published in the Official Gazette of theRepublic*') 25 .And (B) Order 221/79.published in Supplement No.Ill Pan 1 of the Official Gazette of the Republic, dated the 14th September. 30 1979, and issued in pursuance to section 11
(2)of the Law. as amended, which provides as follows: "Πεοιγοαφή.Απαλλαγή: 35 Βενζινοκίνητα καιπετρελαιοκίνηταοδικάοχήματα,ιππο δυνάμεως μη υπερβαινούσης τα 2000 κυβ. εκατοστά και 2300κυβ.εκατοστά, αντιστοίχως,κατάλληλαπροςχρήσιν υπόπροσ(όπωνπασχόλτωνεκσωματικήςαναπηρίαςεισα γόμεναυπόαναπήρωνπροσώπωντωνοποίωνη αναπηρία 40 πιστοποιείται δεόντως υπό επί τούτω συγκροτουμένου Κυβερνητικού Ιατρικού Συμβουλίου: 34 3 C.L.R. Markides v. Republic Demetriades, J. Νοείταιότιη απαλλαγήαύτηδεντυγχάνειεφαρμογήςεπί αναπήρωνπροσώπων άτινα: 5 10 15 (α) Είναι ιδιόκτητοιήκάτοχοιετέρου ούτως ατελώςεισαχθέντος οχήματος ή (β) δενκέκτηνταιάδειαν οδηγού, νοουμένου ότιοσάκις ανάπηροι κέκτηνταιάδειαν μαθητευομένου οδηγού ο Διευθυντής δύναται ναπαραχώρησηαπαλλαγήνυπό τονόρονότιθαεξασφαλισθήάδειαοδηγούεντόςενός έτους από τουτελωνισμούτουοχήματος ήεντόςτοι αύτης ετέρας περιόδουως ούτος ήθελε κρίνει εύλογον. Έκτασις Απαλλαγής Ως ήθελεν αποφασίσει ο Υπουργός Οικονομικώνβάσει της οικονομικήςκαταστάσεωςτου αιτητού."" 20 25 ("'Description of relief Petrol and diesel motor vehicles of a horse power not exceeding 2000 cc. and2300 cc. respectively, suitable for useby personssuffering from body disablement importedby disabled persons whose disability is duly certified by a Government MedicalBoardconstitutedfor thepurpose: Provided that this exemption is not applicable to disabled personswho: 30 (a)Are the owners or possessors of anotherthus duty free importedvehicle; 35 40 (b)are not the holders of a driving licence, provided that when disabled persons are the holders of a learner's driving licencetheDirectormaygrantsuchexemption on condition that a driving licence will be obtained within oneyearfrom paymentofcustomsdutyfor thevehicleor within such other period which he might consider reasonable. ExtentofRelief 35 Demetriades, J. Markides v. Republic
(1989)As the Minister of Finance may decide on the basis of the financial position of the applicant.") As it emanates from our caselaw.the purpose of the Lawis to grant relief to those disabledpersons whosedisablement does 5 not permit them to drive an ordinary car and are in need of a specially adapted one. (See the cases of Miltiadous v. The Republic
(1983)3C.L.R. 590; Kalli r. The Republic
(1984)3 C.L.R. 443; Ioannou v. The Republic (19S5) 3 C.L.R. 31). Before 1979.when Order 221/79 was issued, the relief in such 10 cases wascomplete, irrespective of the financial position of the applicant. Since, however. Order 221/79 came into existence; the extent of the relief from import duty istobedecidedby the Minister of Finance, on the basisofthe financial position of the applicant. 15 Having in mind the provisions of the law. I find that the person who isauthorised under it to decide whether a person is entitledto relief from payment ofimport dutyisthe Directorof Customs and Excise and that the Minister of Finance is the 20 person who decides the extent of the relief to be granted to a disabled person, bearing in mind the financial condition of the person applying for it. In the present case, the Minister, respondent, obviously in 25 rejecting the request of the applicant, based his decision. although hedidnot clearlysayso.onthevalueoftheimmovable property the applicant owns andwhich,inmy mind, he expects that if the applicant sells, will bring him sufficient funds to buy the vehicle that he needs. This interpretation, however, of the 30 provisions of the legislation that Ihave hereinabove set out. is not. in my mind, correct, as the law does not expect and to my mind never intended a disabled person to sell his property in order to acquire themeans for hisneeds to move around. 35 In the present case, it is not disputed that the applicant is a disabled person andthat heneedsaspeciallyadaptedcar. Heis. thus, a person entitled to relief under the provisions of item 09 in Class 01 of the Fourth Schedule to the Law. Although it was found that the applicant was indeed a person entitled to relief, 40 the Minister, in considering his application, decided that his financial position didnot justify anyrelief. Inthecircumstances, 36 3C.L.R. Markides v.Republic Demctriades, J. the respondent in reaching his decision acted in excess of his powers andthesubjudice decision hastobe annulled. 5 10 15 20 Before concluding, however. I wish to make certain observations on the document entitled "income criteria" approved by the Minister on the 28th August. 1982. The "criteria" mentioned are certain scales of income and percentages of the duty to bepaid opposite to each scale. Itis not known, however, whether any, andif so,what factors were taken into consideration by the Minister in setting up those criteria. In the circumstances, the said criteria seem to be arbitrary- Moreover, it is not mentioned in the document embodying the said criteria that if a person who is entitled to relief on thebasis ofhisincome,asthe applicant was,willcease to be soentitled ifhealsoownsimmovableproperty. It should not, however, in my view, be expected that a disabled person, whohasacertain property,hastosellitinordertobuyacar for hisneeds. In view,however, ofthefact that Ihave annulledthe subjudice decision on another point, Idonot intend to make a finding on thisissue. What Ihaveto say.inconclusion, isthata discretionary power, when granted, has to be exercised reasonably andfor the purpose for which it hasbeen granted. In the result, this recourse succeeds and the sub judice 25 decision isannulled with costs against the respondent. Subjudice decisionannulledwith costsagainstrespondents. 37