(1989)1989 April10 [KOURRIS,J.] INTHE MATTEROFARTICLE 146OFTHECONSTITUTION. PARISMOTORSAGENCYLTD, Applicants, v. THE MUNICIPALITY OF LIMASSOL, Respondent. (CaseNo. 145/86) Wordsandphrases —"Factory"in Reg.106ofthe LimassolMunicipaiity Regulations— Whetheragarage, inwhich electricalpowerisused,isa factorywithinthemeaningof thewordfactoryinthesaidregulation— Question determinedinthepositive. 5 Reasoning ofanadministrative act — Municipal taxforkeepingagarage —Casesofthisnaturedonotrequirealongreasoning. Executoryact — Connrmaioryact —Imposition oftaxby Municipality for keeping a garage— Objectionto the Municipality itself — 10 Confirmation oforiginal decision —Inthecircumstances the decision determining the objectionisofaconfirmatorynature. By means of this recourse the applicants impugned the decision, whereby therespondents required themto pay£100taxfor keeping a 15 garagein Limassol during1985. The Court thought that the sub judice decision lacked executory nature. In any event, the Courtproceeded anddismissed therecourse onthemeritsaswell. Recoursedismissed with£50 costs in favouroftherespondents. 422 20 3 C.L.R. Paris Motors Agency Ltd v. Mun. of L/ssol Cases referredto: P.M. Tserioiisv.Republic
(1984)3 C.L.R. 693, 5 lonides andAnother v. Republic
(1982)3 C.L.R. 1136, Skaros v.Republic
(1986)3 C.L.R. 2109. Recourse. 10 Recourseagainst thedecision oftherespondenttoimposeon applicant £100,-tax inordertokeep agarage in Limassol. C.Mdas, for the Applicant. 15 G.Potamitis withPh. Potamitis, for the Respondents. Cur. adv. vult. 20 KOURRIS, J. read the following judgment. By the present recourse applicants pray for a declaration thatthe decision of the Limassol Municipality dated 17.2.1985 whereby they imposed£100.-tax on theapplicantinordertokeepagarage in Limassol, is nullandvoid andof noeffect whatsoever. 25 Thefacts of thiscase shortly are asfollows:The respondents addressed to the applicants their decision contained ina notice dated8.11.1985,whereby they informed 30 themthatthey imposed uponthematax of £100.-for keeping agaragein Limassol. The applicants on 4.12.1985 addressed a letter to the respondentsprotesting attheimposition ofsuchahightaxupon 35 them which they considered as excessive and unreasonable. (Appendix Βtothe application). On 17.12.1985, respondents addressed a letter to applicants whereby they rejected the request of applicants to reduce the 40 tax. Hencethepresent recourse. The respondents raised the preliminary issue that the 423 Kourris, J. Paris Motors Agency Ltd v.Mun. of L/ssol
(1989)challenged decision is not executory but confirmatory and, consequently,therespondentsfailedtofiletheirrecoursewithin 75 days as provided by Article 146.3 of the Constitution. Counsel for the respondents said that the decision which is executoryistheonetakenbytherespondentson8.11.1985and 5 theirletterof 17.12.1985bywhichtheyrejectedtheobjectionof applicants for reducingthetax ismerelyconfirmatory because applicant byhisletter dated4.12.1985,didnot adduceanynew material. 10 Counsel for applicant, on the other hand, stated that applicantskept atLimassolpremisesconsistingofshowrooms, offices and a garage and they did not know whether the imposition of tax by the Limassol Municipality covered the wholeofthepremisesorpartofitandtheyaddressedaletteron 15 4.12.1985,toenquireaboutitandthatassoonastheyreceived theletter of respondents dated 17.12.1985,(Appendix Atothe application) whereby theywere informed that the tax referred tothegarageonly,theyfiledthepresentrecourse. 20 Counselforapplicantsarguedthatapplicantsdidnotfiletheir recourseoutoftimebecauseassoonastheywereinformedthat thetaxwasreferringtotheirgarageonly,theyfiledthepresent recourse. 25 I have examined the material before me and I think that argument of counsel for applicants cannot stand. Before the imposition of the tax applicants signed exhibit 1 dated 23. 4.1985 which is a printed form which was filled in by an employee of the Limassol Municipality for the purpose of 30 issuingalicencefor 1985for keepingagarage. Thisformwas signedbyapplicants,whichindicatesthattheyknewasfrom23. 4.1985thatthesaidtaxwasinrespectoftheirgarageandnotof theirwholepremisesincludingshowroomsand offices. 35 Thus, I agree with learned counsel for the respondents that the decision of the respondents dated 17.12.1985 is not justiciableasitisnotexecutorybut confirmatory. Applicant, byhisletter dated4.12.1985,didnot adduceany 40 newmaterial andrespondents didnotcarry out,iinview ofany newmaterialadducedbeforethembyapplicants,anewinquiry. 424 3 C.L.R. Paris MotorsAgency Ltd v.Mun.of L/ssol Kourris, J. {P.M. Tseriotis v. The Republic
(1984)3 C.L.R. 693 at pp. 701-702), and for thisreason alone,therecourseis dismissed. Although therecourse was dismissed onthegroundthat the 5 decision is not executory but confirmatory, I propose to deal withthesubstance of therecourse. Thelegalgrounds onwhich therecourse is based aremainly the following:
(1)that a garage does not come within the 10 definition of "factory" so as to be taxable underthemunicipal laws and regulations;
(2)the sub judice decision of the respondents is not duly reasoned;
(3)respondents reached the sub judice decision without a proper inquiry; and
(4)the respondentsactedunderamaterial misconceptionof fact. 15 Counselfor theapplicants arguedthatagaragedoesnotfall within the definition of a factory so as to be taxable under the municipal lawsandregulations. 20 Before proceeding any further, Ithinkit is pertinentatthis stagetostatethelawsandregulationsunderwhichtheLimassol Municipalityimposedtax onthe applicants. Section 103
(1)of the Municipal Corporations Law, 1985, 25 (111/85),states asfollows:- 30 35 40 "103.-
(1)Ουδένπρόσωπον διατηρείεντός των δημοτι κώνορίωνοιουδήποτεδήμουοιανδήποτεοικοδομήνήχώρον εντός των οποίων ασκείται οιαδήποτε επιχείρησις, βιομηχανία,εμπόριον,επάγγελμαή επιτήδευμα,καθοριζόμενον διό.δημοτικών κανονισμών,άνευαδείας λαμβανο μένηςπροηγουμένωςαπότοσυμβούλιοντουτοιούτουδή μου." Regulation 106 of the Limassol Municipality Regulations reads asfollows:"106. Από κάθε πρόσωπο που διατηρεί οποιοδήποτε απόταακόλουθαμέρηήκτίριαμέσασταδημοτικάόριαθα καταβάλλεται στο ΔημοτικόΤαμία κάθεχρόνοδικαίωμα που θακαθορίζεται απότοΔημοτικόΣυμβούλιοανάλογα μετηνκάθεπερίπτωση,ωςακολούθως:. 425 Kourris, J. Paris MotorsAgency Ltd v. Mun.of Vssol
(1989)Γιαεργοστάσιο όπουχρησιμοποιείταιατμήρης, ηλεκτρική ήμηχανικήδύναμη ήόπουχρησιμοποιείται οποιαδήποτε εκρηκτική ύλη." 5 It appears from thesaid Regulation thatafaaory is taxable wheresteam,electric,ormechanicalpower is used,orinwhich anyexplosivesubstance isused. Although itiscommongroundthatelectricpowerisusedfor the said garage, for thepurposes of lifting up andlowering an electriclifting jack,counsel for theapplicants invited the Court tofindthat this garage does not fall within the definition of a faaory, andhereliedonthedefinition of"faaory" setoutin the Factories Law, Cap. 134, s.2(
- l)and on certain passages with regard to the definition of a faaory in Halsbury's Laws of England,3rdedn.Vol. 17 at pp. 13&14. 10 15 Thedefinition of "faaory" given intheFactoriesLaw,Cap. 20 134,unders.2(l)is asfollows:"Subject to the provisions of this section, the expression 'faaory' means any premises in which, or within the close or curtilage orprecinctsofwhich,persons areemployedinmanual 25 labour in any process for or incidental to any of the following purposes,namely:(
- a)themaking of anyarticle orof partof any article;or (
- b)the altering, repairing, ornamenting,finishing,cleaning or washing, or the breaking up or demolition of any article;or (
- c)the adapting for sale of any article, being premises in which, or within the close or curtilage or precinas of which, the work is carried on by way of trade for the purposes of gain andtoor over which theemployer of the persons employed thereinhas therightof access or control." Counsel for the respondents also relied on the definition of 426 35 40 3 C.L.R. Paris Motors Agency Ltd v.Mun. of L/ssol Kourris, J. "factory" as stated in the Factories Law, Cap. 134 and he contended that the passages from Halsbury's Laws of England reliedonbycounsel ontheotherside,werereferringto"special classesofpremises"andnotthegeneralmeaningof"factory"as 5 given in p. 11 of Vol. 17 of Halsbury's Laws of England. He stated that expression "factory" isgiven in Halsbury's Lawsof England as almost identical with the definition given in our Factories Law Cap. 134. He arguedthat electricpower isused in the said garage for servicing and carrying out repairs on 10 Citroen carsandtheinevitableconclusion isthatitcomeswithin the expression of "factory" under Regulation 106 of the Limassol Municipal Regulations. I have considered carefully the arguments of both counsel 15 and with the assistance of the definition of "factory" under the Factories Law Cap, 134 and the definition given in Halsbury's LawsofEngland,Vol. 17,1havecometotheconclusionthatthe garage inquestion comeswithin themeaningof"factory"given underReg. 106and,therefore, it istaxable. 20 With regard to the contention that the sub judice decision is not dulyreasoned, Iam oftheview that cases of thisnature do not require a long reasoning and I think that the sub judice decision issufficiently reasoned. (See Ionides and Another v. 25 TheRepublic
(1982)3C.L.R. 1136at 1150and Skaros v.The Republic
(1986)3C.L.R.2109at2116). 1 am also of the view that the respondents reached the sub judice decision by carrying out a proper inquiry and I am also 30 satisfied that they have not acted under a material misconception of fact. Forthese reasons,therecourseisdismissedwith £50costsin favour ofthe respondents. 35 Recourse dismissed with £50,costsagainstapplicants. 421