(1989)19S9July 31 [STYLIANIDES. J.] INTHEMATTER OFARTICLE 146OFTHE CONSTITUTION ADIDASSPORTSCHUHFABRIKEN ADIDASSLER KG, Applicants. v. THE REPUBLIC OFCYPRUS. THROUGHTHEMINISTER OF COMMERCE ANDINDUSTRY AND/ORANOTHER, Respondents. (CaseNo. 101/85) Words andphrases— "Personsaggrieved"—Aphrase tobeveryliberally construed. Trademarks—Rectification ofRegister— TheTrademarksLaw, Cap. 268, section 31— Extensivereferencetoauthorities. 5 Judicial control — Trademarks — Decision inrespect of application for rectificationof Registry of Trademarksunder section 31 of the Trademarks Law, Cap.268— Interference by Court— Principles applicable — Court does notinterfere if thedecision wasreasonably \0 open totherespondent. The applicants who are registered proprietors in Cyprus of Trademark "adidas anddevice"appliedfor theremoval of thescriptof the word "alysida" from another Trademark, belonging to interested 15 party. TheRegistrarrejected theapplication. Indoingsohe referredto thecaselawand concludedthat: (a)Thereisnoconnection orsimilaritybetween thetwoTrademarks, 20 (b)The word "adidas" is different as regards appearance (οπτικώς), sound (ακουστικώς) andmeaning(εννοιολογυΐώς), 874 3 C.L.R. Adidas v. Republic & Another (c) The products in respect of which the two Trademarks arc used are consumedbypeoplewhoarcinaposition todistinguishbetween them. 5 (d)The device of the applicants, which is registered with the word "adidas'".does not look like the device, which is registered and used with theword "alysida", (c)Taking intoconsideration allthecircumstances of thecasethere isno possibility of confusion or error of the one withthe other, 10 (0 The applicanis arc estopped from raising the present application because three years have passed since Trademark "alysida and device"hadbeen used. 15 In the light of the authorities, to which extensive reference is made, but.also,in viewof the nature of thejurisdiction of the Court under Art. 146.1,the Court dismissed therecourse on theground that thesubjudicc decision was reasonably open to the respondent, 20 Recoursedismissed. No orderasto costs. Casesreferredto: Smith HaydenandCo.'sApplication 63R.P.C 97, 25 "BALI" TradeMark [1969]R.P.C. 472, GETradeMark [1973]R.P.C. 297, 30 Jcllmck'sTradeMark[1946] 63R.P.C. 59, InreanApplication by GeorgeAngus & Coy.Ldfor Rectificationof the Registerof TradeMarks[1943] 60R.P.C. 29, 35 Constontinidesv.RepublicandAnother
(1988)3 C.L.R. 2375, Matsasv.Republic
(1988)3C.L.R. 1448, WhiteHorse v.ElGreco
(1987)3C.L.R. 531, 40 Merck v. Republic
(1972)3 C.L.R. 548, 875 Adidasv.Republic & Another
(1989)Scvcn-Up Companyv. Republic
(1973)3C.L.R. 612. Curzon TobaccoCo. Ltd. v. Republic
(1975)3C.L.R. 363, 5 Beechom GroupLtd. v. Republic
(1982)3C.L.R 622, P.M. &G. StavnnidesClothingIndustriesLtd. v. Republic
(1983)3C.L.R. 98, EffemsA.G. v. Republic
(1985)3C.L.R. 793, \Q PepsiCo. Inc. v. Republic
(1985)3C.L.R. 1092. Fisons Ltdv. RegistrarofTrade Marks
(1985)3C.L.R.
- 15 Recourse. Recourse against therefusal of the respondents torectify by part removal from theregister of theregistered trademarkNo.
- " 20 G.Platritis, for the Applicants. St. Ioannides (Mrs), Counsel of the Republic Β ' , for the Respondents. 25 Cur.adv. vult. STYLIANIDES,J.readthefollowing judgment.Bymeansof thisrecourse theapplicantsseektheannulmentofthe decision of 30 Respondent No. 2, the registrar of Trade Marks (the "Registrar"), dated 29th December,
- whereby he refused their application for rectification by part removal from the register of theregistered trademark No.
- 35 The applicants, Adidas Sportschuhfabriken Adi DasslerKG, of Germany, are the registered proprietors in Cyprus of trade mark underapplication No. B13340,AdidasandDevice as from 27th March,
- On 28th June, 1984, the applicants changed their name to AdidasSportschuhfabriken AdiDassler Stiftund &Co.KG. Such 876 40 3 C.L.R. Adidas ν. Republic & Another Stylianides, J. change was recorded with theRegistrar on 31st October, 1984 andwas duly advertised intheOfficial Gazetteof theRepublic No.2039, dated8thMarch,
- 5 Krashias ShoeFactoryLtd.. of KokkinotrimithiaCyprus,are the registered proprietors in Cyprus of trade mark under application No.
- Alisida & Device (a knot) since 27th November, 19S
- 10 On 13th May.
- the applicants applied to the Registrar by application dated 11th May, 19S
- under the provisions of the Trade Marks Law, Cap. 268 (the "Law"), for the rectification of theRegister of Trade Marks by the removal of thescript of theword"Alisida'*from thetrademark No.
- 15 Theprocedureprescribed by thelaw andtheTradeMarksRules 1951-1984 was followed. The applicants' application was refused by decision dated29th December, 19S
- The sub judice decision is challenged on the following 20 grounds:The Registrar, once he found that the applicants are "aggrievedperson",oughttohaveacceptedtheirapplication: he acted under misconception of law: hefailed to carry out adue 25 inquiry; he failed to take into consideration the affidavit evidence adduced by the applicants and acted under misconception of fact. Thegrounds oftheirapplication for partial removal fromthe 30 register wereasfollows:"α)Οι αιτηταί είναι πρόσωπον δυσηρεστημένον (person aggrieved). 35 40 β) Οι αιτηταί είναιούτωδυσηρεστημένον πρόσωπον διά την εγγραφήν καιγενομένην καταχώρισιν τουεμπορι κούσήματος αρ.21118 alisida & device ειςτο Μητρώον εμπορικών σημάτων Κύπρουδιότι περιέχει την λέξιν alisidaμεγραφήνπανομοιότυπονμετηνγραφήντουεγγεγραμμένου εμπορικούσήματος αρ.Β13340addidas& device των εναγόντων καταχωρημένουεπίσης εις το ΜητρώονΕμπορικώνΣημάτων Κύπρουκαι διότι: 877 Stylianides, J. Adidas v. Republic & Another
(1989)(Ι) Αύτηεγένετο άνευευλόγου αιτίας και/ή
(11)Η τοιαύτηκαταχώρισιςαδικαιολογήτωςπαραμένει επί του Μητοώου. 5 γ) Τα εμπορεύματαδιαταοποίαεγένετο η εγγραφήείναι τα ίδιακαι/ή της ιδίαςπεριγραφήςεμπορεύματαδιά τα οποία χρησιμοποιείται τοεμπορικόν σήμααιτητών." The exact remedy requested by the applicants is set out in 10 paragraphs 14and 15of the Statement of case, dated 11th May. 1983, accompanying their application. "
- Διά ταύταη παρούσααίτησις δι' ηςοι αιτηταί αι τούνται την όιαγραφήν της γραφής της λέξεως alisida εκ 15 του εμπορικού των σήματος αρ.211ISκαι τηναντικατάστασιν της τοιαύτης γραφής με οιανδήποτε άλληνγραφήν μηομοιάζουσαν. 15.Οι αιτηταίδεν ενίστανται εις την ύπαρξιντηςλέξε- 20 ως alisida επί του εμπορικού σήματος αρ. 211IS των • καθ'ιον ηαίτησις νοουμένου ότι η γραφήτης δενθαείναι ηιδία με εκείνην της γραφήςτου εμπορικού σήματος των αιτητών adidas." 25 -Krashias Shoe Factory Ltd., filed a counter-statement on I5th June 1983, in support of their registration and they based their objections on thefollowing propositions:"
- Toυπ'αρ.21118 εμπορικόν σήμασυνίσταται εκτηςλέ- 30 ξεως alisida& device καιουδεμίανσχέσιν ή ομοιότητα έχει με το εγγεγραμμένον .σήμα των αιτητών adidas & device.
- Το όνομα adidas οπτικώς,ακουστικώς και εννοωλογι- 35 κώς διαφέρει εκ διαμέτρου από το όνομα alisida το οποίον υποδηλοί διαφορετικήν ιδέανκαι έννοιαν.
- Ταπροϊόνταεπίτωνοποίωνχρησιμοποιώνται τααντί στοιχα ως άνω εμπορικά σήματακαταναλώνονταιυπό 40 αγοραστικού κοινού ευρισκομένου εις θέσιν ευκρινώς ναδιακρίνηκαιδιαχωρίζη ταως άνωρηθέντα σήματα. 878 3 C.L.R. 5 Adidas v. Republic & Another Slylianides, J.
- Toσχήμα τριφυλιούτωναιτητών όπερείναι εγγεγραμμένον ομού μετάτης λέξεως adidas πόρρωαπέχει από του ναομοιάζειήπροσομοιάζειπροςτον κόμβοντης -.. αλυσίδαςόστις είναιεγγεγραμμένοςκαι χρησιμοποιεί?.. ταιπάνταμετοόνομα 'alisida'.
- Λαμβανομένωνυπ'όψινόλωντωνπεριστάσεων ουδε μίαπερίπτωσιςυπάρχεισυγχύσεωςή πλάνηςτουενός μετάτουάλλου σήματος. 10
- Οι αιτηταίκωλύονται απότουναεγείρουντηνπαρούσαναίτησιν μετάτηνπάροδον καιχρήσιντουεμπορι κούσήματοςalisida &device διάτριετίανπερίπου." 15 The applicants filed on 22nd December, 1983, 23rd December, 19S3, and 20th March, 19S
- affidavits by Nicos Soleas of LimassoL a certain Costas Miltiadous, who is not described, Eleftherios Mettis,whoisnotdescribed andbyMarios Agathagelou, aP.T. teacher. 20 TheRespondents inthatapplication,ontheotherhandfiled on 20th January, 19S4 and 23rd January, 19S4 affidavits by Michalakis Krashias,theirDirector,Andreas Eleftheriou, aP.T. teacher,YiolaSymeonidou,aP.T. teacher, trainerofthe female 25 section of APOEL Sporting Club,andby Zacharias Panayides, shopkeeper selling athletic and other kinds of shoe products since
- At the hearing before theRegistrar on 18th October, 1984, 30 counsel for theparties addressed inextenso ontheissues raised inthatapplication. The Registrar found that the applicants were an"aggrieved person" under section 33
(1)of the Law, but they did not 35 discharge theonuscast onthemtoshowsufficient reputationof theirtrademarkNo.Β13340toinvoke theprovisions ofsection 13 of the Law and they did not place before him sufficient material uponwhichhecouldconcludethattheexistence on the register of theRespondents' trade mark No.21118 is likelyto 40 leadtoconfusion within themeaningof thedecision ofGeorge Anguscase andherefused theapplication. 879 Stylianides. J. Adidas v. Republic &Another
(1989)Section 33 in dependence of which the application for rectification was made provides:"33.
(1)Any person aggrieved by the non-insertion in or omission from the register of any entry, or by any entry 5 made in the register without sufficient cause or by any entry wrongly remaining on theregister, or byanyerror or defect in any entry in the register, may apply in the prescribed manner to the Court or. at the option of the applicant and subject to the provisions of section 51. to theRegistrar, and 10 the Court or the Registrar, as the case may be. may make suchorder for makingexpungingorvaryingtheentry asthey may think fit.
(2)The Court ortheRegistrar,asthecasemaybe.mayin 15 any proceeding under thissection decide any question that it may be necessary or expedient to decide in connection with therectification of the register." Thisisidentical tosection 32oftheEnglishTradeMarks Act, 20
- Only a "person aggrieved" has a locus standi and is entitled to make application to have the register rectified. This phrase has been very liberally construed and, except, perhaps, in the 25 case of a mark consisting of aname it would be difficult to find any person engaged in the trade concerned, or any allied or connected trade,which ispreventedbythequalification whichit requires from moving to rectify the register. The persons who are aggrieved are -it isheld -all persons who are in same way 30 or other substantially interested in having the mark removed where it is aquestion of removal -from the register. In rectification proceedings the onus of proof is on the applicants. The Registrar in the elaborate sub judice decision directed himself to thelaw applicable. He referred to section 13(section 11of the English Act), to the test formulated under the English section 11 by EvershedJ.,ashethenwas,in Smith Hayden and 40 Co/s Application 63R.P.C.97,at p. 101,lines 3950.indeedas modified by Lord Upjohn in "BALI"Trade Mark [1969] 880 35 3 C.L.R. Adidas \, Republic & Another Stylianidcs, J. R.P.C.
- The Registrar said at p.3:"I adopt them and may be adapted to the facts of this rectification case as follows: 5 10 (A)Section 13(s. 11of theEnglish Act). Having regard tothe user of the Applicants of theirtrademark No. Β13340 am I satisfied that the use by the Respondents of their mark No. 21118 as registered in a normal and fair manner in connectionwith thegoods for which they have registration will not be reasonable likely to cause deception and confusion amongst a substantial number of persons?" He referred, also, to the date at which the inquiry should be 15 directed under section 13.which is the time of registration and that incases of application for expunction it is atany time,if the registered mark is disentitled to protection in a Court of justice. He further referred to passages from Kerly's Law of Trade Marks, 10th Edition, relating to the mark becoming deceptive 20 andthatwhere the mark was incapable of registration it must be removed. Headdressed his mindtothecase of GE Trade Mark [1973] R.P.C. 297, on the principles regarding the legal status underthelaw of aregistered trademark,theuse of which islikely to cause confusion, andat p.298 of thereport,where the House 25 of Lords held:- 30 35 40 "(i) The fact that the mark is entered upon the register is prima facie evidence of the validity of the original registration andof theright of the registered proprietor totheexclusiveuse of themark,subject however tothe rights of concurrent user by any registered proprietor of an identical mark or one nearly resembling it. (ii) If the mark was likely to cause confusion at the time when it was first registered it may be expunged from the register as "entry made in the register without sufficient cause' unless the proprietor of the mark at that time would have been entitled to have it entered on the register by reason of his honest concurrent use of the mark as a trade mark before the original registration of the mark. 881 Stylianides, J. Adidas v.Republic &Another
(1989)(iii) If the likelihood of causing confusion did not exist at thetimewhenthemarkwasfirst registered,butwasthe result of events occurring between that date and the date of application toexpunge it,themark maynot be expunged from the register as an entry wrongly 5 remaining on the register, unless the likelihood of causingdeception resultedfrom someblameworthyact of the registered proprietor of the mark or of a predecessor in titleof hisas registered proprietor. 10 (iv) Where amark isliabletobeexpungedunder (ii)or(iii) the court has a discretion whether or not to expunge it andastoanyconditions oflimitationstobeimposedin the event of its being permitted to remain on the register." TheRegistrar alsonoted,took intoconsideration andapplied what was said by the House of Lords in the case of "BALI" Trade Mark [1969]R.P.C.472 on thequestion of likelihoodof deception or confusion relative to rectification proceedings and 20 particularly by Lord Upjohn at p.473and496-497:"
(5)That to establish that a mark offended against section 11it was necessary only toshow the likelihood of deception or confusion, and not necessary to show something further, 25 such as some possible, probable or certain success in a passingoff action ..." "What, then, is the test? This must necessarily be a question of fact and degree in every case. I am content in 30 amplification ofthetestlaiddownbyEvershed,J.totakethe test as in effect laid down by Romer, J. in Jellinek's Trade Mark [1946]63R.P.C.59at page78. It is not necessary in order to find that a mark offends 35 against section 11to provethat there isan actual probability of deception leading to a passing off or (I add) an infringement action. It is sufficient if the result of the registration of themark willbe that anumber ofpersonswill becaused to wonderwhether itmightnot bethecasethatthe 40 two products comefrom thesame source,it isenough ifthe ordinary person entertains areasonable doubt, but the court 882 15 3 C.L.R. Adidas v. Republic &Another Stylianides, J. 5 has to be satisfied not merely that there is a possibility of confusion; it must be satisfied that there is a real tangible danger of confusion ifthemark which it issought to register is put on the register. And so mutatis mutandis when it is sought to expunge amark." 10 Finally he referred to the In re an Application by George Angus & Coy. Ld. for Rectification of the Register of Trade Marks [1943J 60 R.P.C. 29 and cited passages from it,thematerial part of whichreads:"But the difficulty which Ihave in this case is in seeing how thetrade inwhichtheAppellants'goodsaresoldandinwhich theRespondent'sgoodsaresold,iscarriedon.Itseemsto me to be impossible for aCourt to determine whethertheuseof thesetwotrademarksislikelytoleadtoconfusion unlessthe Court is informed by evidence as to the way in which the goods of the Appellants andoftheRespondent aresold. Ido not know (andthere isno evidence which informs me) as to whether goods made by the Appellants and goods made by theRespondent areinthehandsofthird personswithaview to being sold bythose third persons to persons whowant to buy them. If that isthe case, of course,there is a possibility of confusion;" The Registrar, however, indeed incorporated in his decision almost the whole judgement in George Angus case. It isthe contention of MrPlatritis that the evaluation of the 30 evidence andail the other material,includingthetwo registered trade marks, which were before the Registrar, was defective. That his finding is contrary to the evidence as set out in the affidavits. That the affidavits proved or disclosed that the existence of the trade mark No. 21118 actually lead to 35 confusion. That the Registrar did not analyze and did not consider each one of the affidavits in his decision. He, further, argued in length that the Registrar disregarded the affidavit evidence adducedbytheapplicants. 40 The affidavit evidence, aswell as the two trade marks, were before theRegistrar.Hestatedclearlyinthesubjudicedecision that heconsidered allthematerial before him.According to the 883 Stylianides, J. Adidas v. Republic & Another
(1989)presumption of regularity, which was not displaced by the applicants, the Registrar, took into consideration all the evidence before him. The Court is an Administrative Court and not an Appeal 5 Court. In determining a recourse it does not interfere with the subjective evaluation of the facts by the administration; it only interferes to review to the extent that the findings of fact are taintedby amisconception offact,orlaw,ortheadministration hasexceededtheextreme limits of its discretionary power inthe 10 sense that its findings are not reasonably open to it, on the consideration of the material before it in its totality. (See, Christoforos Constantinides v. The Republic of Cyprus, through the Minister of Finance and/or The Director of Customs &Excise
(1988)3C.L.R. 2375 andPetros Matsas v. 15 The Republic of Cyprus, through the Public Service Commission
(1988)3C.L.R. 1448. In White Horse v.EIGreco(19S7)3C.L.R. 531.itwas said at p.534:- 20 "It isthewell established approach of ourSupreme Court, on the basis of the principles governing the exercise of its jurisdiction as an administrative Court in the first instance and on appeal, that it does not interfere with an 25 administrative decision regarding theregistrability of atrade mark ifsuch decision was reasonably opentotheRegistrarof Trade Marks and does not substitute its own evaluation in the place of that of the Registrar (see, inter alia, in this respect, Merck v. The Republic
(1972)3 C.L.R.548,564, 30 Seven-Up Company v. The Republic (19Ί3)3 C.L.R.612, 621, Curzon Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. The Republic
(1975)3 C.L.R. 363, 369, and on appeal
(1979)3 C.L.R. 151, 158, , Beecham Group Ltd. v.Republic
(1982)3C.L.R 622,632, P.M. & G. Stavrinides Clothing Industries Ltd. v. The 35 Republic
(1983)3 C.L.R. 98, 107, Effems A.G. v. The Republic
(1985)3 C.L.R. 793, 798 Pepsi Co, Inc. v. The Republic (19S5)3C.L.R. 1092,1102 andFisonsLtd v. The Registrar of Trade Marks
(1985)3 C.L.R.2318,2327)." 40 Having gone through the affidavits and the other material before the Registrar, found inthefile Exhibit Z,andbearing in : 884 3 C.L.R. Adidas ν. Republic & Another Stylianides, J. mind the afore judicial pronouncements. I reached the conclusion that the findings of the Registrar were reasonably open to him on consideration of the totality of the material before him. 5 Thecontentionof MrPlatritis isthattheRegistrar shouldnot look for evidence of use or reputation of the goods and this is misdirection of law. 10 Iregret I cannot agree with counsel for the applicants. The Registrar did not only cite the statutory provisions and the judicial pronouncements relative to their construction and application, but he did apply them on the facts of this application.There is nomisdirection or misconception of law. 15 20 Mr. Platritis complainedthatno dueinquiry was made atthe time of the registration of thetrade mark sought to be rectified because the Searching Officer and the Registrar did not take note of the trade mark of theapplicants.The explanation of the Registrar isthatthere isnosuch resemblance as tonoteitonthe application of the interested party. In the present case, on the material before me. having considered carefully the sub judice decision, the grounds put 25 forward by thecounsel for the applicants andthegrounds given by the Registrar. Ihave come to the conclusion that there was no misconception of law; a due inquiry was carried out; there was no misconception of fact: thefindings of theRegistrar were reasonably opentohim;heexercised hisdiscretion according to 30 law andnot inadefective manner;itwas reasonably open tothe - respondent Registrar torefuse theappliedfor rectification of theregister by pan removal. Fortheforegoing reasons,thisrecourse fails andis dismissed. 35 Let there be no order as to costs. Recourse dismissed. No order as tocosts. 8S5