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2025 IECC 11

THE CIRCUIT COURT AN CHÚIRT CHUARDA MIDLAND CIRCUIT COUNTY OF OFFALY Record No. 2023/00112 Neutral Citation: [2025] IECC 11 BETWEEN: WARREN WALSH PLAINTIFF AND CORNERSTONE SLIEVE BLOOM CHURCH GAVIN VON MOLLENDORFF WENDY VON MOLLENDORF RESPONDENTS Judgment of His Honour Judge Meehan delivered on the 4 day of April, 2025 Introduction

  1. In the Amended Civil Bill dated 14 August 2023, the Plaintiff claims damages for defamation. The case was heard over one full day in Tullamore Circuit Court on 20 February
  2. Both parties provided the Court with voluminous booklets of authorities. Further authorities were referred to in oral argument. No written submissions were provided.
  3. The second and third named Defendants (“the Defendants”) are pastors and operate the Cornerstone Slieve Bloom Church (“the Church”) in Tullamore.
  4. On 14 May 2023, seven people were baptised at the Church including the Plaintiff’s daughter then aged
  5. Approximately 80 people attended the ceremony, which was live streamed on the Church’s Facebook page. The Defendants are the operators of that Facebook page.
  6. During the ceremony the Plaintiff’s daughter made a speech in which she stated: “When I was younger I didn’t have a proper family like everyone else… All I had was me and my mum, my dad left me at our very young age… All I had was my mom and dad fighting all the time… All I had was my mum crying every day, my dad fighting with her… He turned me against my mom, saying that the reason he split up with her was because of her… He started calling me names… I was fat, I wasn’t allowed to eat this or I wasn’t allowed to hang out with friends, I wasn’t good enough to be in his presence. I was never allowed to leave my house to go hang out with friends… I wanted to go back to my mam but he wouldn’t allow it… That puts me in a really bad deep depression to a point where I felt trapped in my own house… I wanted to move back with my mam but he would never allow it… I felt so trapped the only way I could cope was to self-harm…”
  7. After the Plaintiff’s daughter’s speech, the second named defendant (“the Pastor”) said; “you did great [name]…well done…powerful…amen.”
  8. In addition to those physically present, the service was visible and audible to any person or persons viewing the live stream. Furthermore, a video of the entire service remained, accessible to all, on the Church’s Facebook page until 2 June
  9. The video was more than an hour in length. The Plaintiff’s daughter’s speech started approximately 1 hour and 7 minutes after the commencement of the video and it lasted about three minutes.
  10. By letter dated 2 June 2023 solicitors for the Plaintiff wrote to the Church alleging that the Plaintiff’s daughter’s statements were defamatory. The letter called upon the Church to make proposals to compensate the Plaintiff, to delete the video, to provide the Plaintiff with a written apology, and to provide an undertaking not to publish any further similar statements.
  11. By email of the same date, the Pastor replied to solicitors for the Plaintiff stating that as standard they record Sunday morning services on Facebook and that they would remove the recording. The video was removed that day.
  12. By letter dated 7 June 2023, solicitors for the Plaintiff wrote to the Church asserting that the removal of the video was not an adequate settlement of the matter. The letter called on the Church to make a proposal to compensate the Plaintiff, to provide a written apology and to provide an undertaking not to publish any further similar statements.
  13. The Defendants passed that letter to their insurers who next made contact with the Plaintiff’s solicitors by email dated 24 July
  14. The subsequent correspondence focused on the identity of the correct defendants. That matter was resolved before the hearing. It is now common case that the first named defendant is not a legal entity and that the Defendants are the correct defendants. The Plaintiff’s Evidence
  15. The Plaintiff’s evidence was that he lives 10 to 15 minutes from Tullamore. He is an electrical contractor. He said he is well known in Offaly because he provides a service to the community.
  16. He identified his daughter as the person in the video. The Plaintiff said that he first saw the video when his wife showed it to him. He said he was devastated that someone he loves would go online and spread lies about him. The Plaintiff said he cried when he saw the video but that he didn’t contact his daughter or the Church. He has had no contact with his daughter since he first saw the video.
  17. He said the content of the video “spread like wildfire”. People approached him on nights out to discuss the video. People phoned him to say they had seen the video.
  18. In cross examination the Plaintiff was asked why he didn’t sue his daughter. He said it would be very difficult to sue his own child. I thought the Plaintiff was forthcoming, helpful and honest in the giving of his evidence. The Second Defendant’s Evidence
  19. The second named Defendant, Pastor Van Mollendorf said that he and his wife, Wendy, the third named Defendant both work for the HSE. They came to Ireland from South Africa, twenty-two years ago. At some point the couple identified a need for Christian evangelical expression in Tullamore. They initially convened small group meetings for Bible studies. The Church grew from there. It procured a premises in
  20. It now has a congregation of between 180 and 200 people.
  21. The Church has a service every Sunday. In 2020, during the Covid restrictions, the Defendants commenced live streaming the services on Facebook. They have not done so since 2 June 2022 when they received the Plaintiff’s solicitor’s letter. The Pastor said that typically 7 to 10 people watch part or all of a service live online, with an average of about 4 at any point in time. He said that 192 people had clicked into the video before he removed it. He did not know whether any of those people had watched part or all of the video. Under crossexamination he accepted that the Facebook page has approximately 1700 followers and that there were no privacy settings on the Facebook page so that anybody could watch the video.
  22. The Pastor said he did not know the Plaintiff’s daughter very well. She started attending the Church in 2022 with her uncle and mother.
  23. He said that baptism is a public display of faith, that it involves an opportunity for people to explain their choice to be baptised, and that the Bible says that it is important to testify in baptism. He said there was no consultation with or vetting of the Plaintiff’ daughter before she gave the speech.
  24. After the Plaintiff’s daughter had finished her speech, the pastor congratulated her. Under cross examination he said he did so because a young person had said something that took courage. He was not agreeing or disagreeing with the content of what she had said. He said he believes God can restore relationships.
  25. He said he took down the video on 2 June 2023 immediately on receiving the Plaintiff’s Solicitor’s letter. He said his intention is not to cause offence. He said he has not live streamed a service since. Again, I found the Pastor to be honest, forthcoming and helpful in his evidence. Defamation / Identification of the Plaintiff
  26. Section 6

(2)of the Defamation Act 2009 (“the 2009 Act”) provides: “
(2)The tort of defamation consists of the publication, by any means, of a defamatory statement concerning a person or more than one person (other than the first-mentioned person) and “defamation” shall be construed accordingly.
  1. Section 2 of the 2009 Act provides that a “defamatory statement” means a statement that tends to injure a person’s reputation in the eyes of reasonable members of society and “defamatory” shall be construed accordingly.
  2. Mr O’Doherty BL for the Plaintiff submitted that the Plaintiff’s daughter’s statements are untrue.
  3. The Defendants did not advance the defence of truth. Mr English BL for the Defendants submitted that the statements were not defamatory. He said firstly that the meaning of the words was not made out. I do not accept this. The meaning of the words is crystal clear.
  4. The second argument advanced to support that submission was one that neither the Plaintiff’s daughter nor the Plaintiff are identifiable from the video. It is pleaded in the defence that the Plaintiff is not named in the subject publication. As a matter of fact, the Plaintiff is not so named.
  5. Mr John Regan gave evidence. He runs a health and lifestyle business in Tullamore. He accesses Facebook every day seeking content relating to Tullamore. He said that the video appeared on his feed and he recognised the Plaintiff’s daughter. He immediately phoned the Plaintiff to make him aware of the video. The Plaintiff was already so aware.
  6. The Plaintiff’s wife, Mrs Denise Walsh said she watched the full ceremony, perhaps the next day, and was appalled. She said she showed it to the Plaintiff who was not aware of it at that stage.
  7. In addition, the Plaintiff said his daughter’s speech “spread like wildfire”. He said people approached him on nights out to discuss it and people phoned him to say they had seen the video.
  8. I do not accept the Defendant’s argument that the Plaintiff was not identifiable. The video is very clear. The Plaintiff’s daughter is identified by her first name in the video. I accept the evidence of Mr Regan and Ms Walsh that they both did in fact recognise her. Any viewer who knows her will recognise her. Some such viewers will know she is the Plaintiff’s daughter.
  9. I am satisfied therefore that the Plaintiff’s daughter’s words amount to a “defamatory statement” within the meaning of Section 2 of the 2009 Act in that they tend to injure the Plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of reasonable members of society. Publication
  10. Mr O’Doherty submitted that there were two separate occasions of publication of the defamatory comments. Firstly, there was the publication to those physically present at the service at the time the comments were made. I will refer to this as the “Church Publication”. Secondly, there was the publication on the Church’s Facebook page. I will refer to this as the “Online Publication”. Mr English argued that the Defendants were not publishers of the comments at all.
  11. Both parties relied on the well-known textbook: Defamation, Law and Practice (Cox and McCullough, 2022 Clarus Publishing). The authors state at paragraph [2-30]; “It seems clear, however that the definition of a ‘publisher’ for the purposes of defamation law is any party that was involved in the publication process. Moreover, as was repeatedly made clear by the High Court and the Court of Appeal in the long running litigation in Jones v Coolmore Stud [2019] IEHC 652; [2020] IECA 116, where there is more than one potential publisher of material, a plaintiff may sue the defendant of his or her choice, albeit perhaps subject to concerns about s35
(1)(
  1. i)of the Civil Liability Act 1961.” 33. Later, the authors state: “[2-35] Subject to section 27 of the 2009 Act, then, in Ireland anyone who, at any stage of production, has any involvement in the publication of a defamatory statement, will be a legitimate defendant in a defamation action and the plaintiff may join any such persons as defendants to the action. As Barton J neatly put it in Gordon v the Irish Racehorse Trainers Association [2020] IEHC 425 at para 62, “… The general rule at common law is that liability for publication extends to any person who participated, secured or authorised the publication”. 34. The Plaintiff argues that the Defendants position is akin to that of a broadcaster. Mr O’Doherty referred to Cox and McCullough [2-39] where it is stated; “…at common law, broadcast media companies are liable for everything they broadcast… In addition, of course, the person who makes the defamatory statement that is broadcast may also be liable. Similarly, where a defamatory comment is made during the course of a theatre play, the actor who makes it, the author of the play, the proprietor of the theatre and possibly the director and producer, may all be liable.” 35. Mr O’Doherty opened the decision of Barton J in Gordon v Irish Racehorse Trainers Association [2020] IEHC 425: “it follows from the rule at common law that if a person or persons arrange and/or attend at a meeting for the purposes of enabling others to make statements concerning a third person about which they are aware or have reasonable grounds for believing will likely be made and such statements are published by others attending the meeting and such statements are proved to be defamatory, those arranging and/or participating at the meeting are concurrent wrongdoers with the authors and publishers and are jointly and severally liable with them in damages.” 36. Mr English for the Defendants relied on the English and Welsh High Court decision in Bunt v Tilley and others [2006] EWHC 407 (QB). That case involved an internet service provider which according to the headnote “performed no more than a passive role in facilitating postings on the Internet”. Counsel relied in particular on paragraph 23 of Eady J’s judgment: “Of course, to be liable for a defamatory publication it is not always necessary to be aware of the defamatory content, still less of its legal significance. Editors and publishers are often fixed with responsibility notwithstanding such lack of knowledge. On the other hand, for a person to be held responsible there must be knowing involvement in the process of publication of the relevant words. It is not enough that a person plays a passive instrumental role in the process.” 37. Both parties seek to distinguish between primary and secondary publishers. McCullough and Cox refer to Monir v Wood [2018] EWHC 3525 (at para 135) where it was held that any knowing involvement in publication makes an entity a publisher, but that there must be knowing involvement in the publication of the particular words complained of in order for that entity to be a primary publisher. 38. The Plaintiff placed considerable emphasis on the case of Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 KB 818. In that case the Court of Appeal found that the proprietors of a golf club could be deemed to be publishers of defamatory statements posted on notice boards within the club in as much as they had responsibility for the notice board and had power to remove the offending material. The court suggested that the club was liable for publication from the point at which it became aware of the defamatory statements on the board and did not remove them. The authors of McCullough and Cox state: “It is arguable that the club could properly be regarded as a publisher from the moment that the material was posted on the board in that (
  2. a)it owned the noticeboard which was on its property; (
  3. b)it knowingly and voluntarily provided a facility for communication; and (
  4. c)it did so in the knowledge that a limited number of people authorised by it would use it for the purposes of publishing messages.” The authors state that the golf club should be regarded as a secondary publisher because it’s lack of control over the material and its lack of knowledge of the particular words that were to be published. The authors describe the club as “… someone who has intentionally participated in the dissemination of the words but who either does not know or could not with reasonable care have known of its content.” 39. In the present case it is clear that the Defendants were publishers in relation to the Church Publication. They were involved in the publication process. They operated the Church, they organised the baptism ceremony where the defamatory statements were made, they knowingly and voluntarily invited the Plaintiff’s daughter to speak. 40. Applying the McCullough and Cox analysis of Byrne v Deane, it seems that the Defendants were secondary publishers of the Church Publication. Their position was analogous to that of the golf club. They provided a platform for the Plaintiff’s daughter but did not know what she would say. To borrow the language of Eady J in Bunt v Tilly (which language was also used in Monir v Wood), the Defendants had no knowing involvement in the publication of the particular words complained of. 41. The parties agree that secondary publishers since 2009, can avail of the statutory defence of innocent publication in s. 27 of the 2009 Act. Accordingly, the defence of innocent publication, as provided for in Section 27 may be available to the Defendants in respect of the Church Publication. It is unnecessary to consider this further because I conclude below that the Defendants can avail of the defence of qualified privilege in respect of the Church Publication. 42. It is even more clear that the Defendants were publishers of the Online Publication. They operated and controlled the Church’s Facebook page. They organised the live stream of the baptism ceremony. They knowingly made the video of the ceremony available online for a period of 20 days. During that period, they were fully aware of the content of the defamatory statement. 43. I accept that the Defendants had no advance knowledge of what the Plaintiff’s daughter would say. However, the second named Defendant, the Pastor, was aware of the relevant words immediately they were spoken. He was standing right beside the Plaintiff’s daughter. His reaction to the defamatory statement is informative. His affirmation and praise of the Plaintiff’s daughter is evidence that he was not particularly surprised by what she had said. As pastors, the Defendants encouraged the Plaintiff’s daughter to be baptised and to testify as to the reasons for her choice. 44. As soon as the comments were made and the Defendants failed to remove the video they became primary publishers in relation to the Online Publication. This is different from a notice board in a golf club where a third party can post a notice. Here the Defendants controlled the analogous notice board and posted the defamatory notice albeit that the notice had originally been authored by someone else. The ongoing availability of the video on the Facebook page amounted to ongoing primary publication of material. They were primary publishers because they had control over what was posted on the Facebook page. Accordingly, the s. 27 defence of innocent publication is not available in respect of the Online Publication. 45. Finally, in relation to the Online Publication, the Plaintiff placed considerable emphasis on the Australian case of Fairfax & Ors v Voller [2021] HCA 27 and the European Court of Human Rights case of Sanchez v France (Application no. 45581/15). Both of these cases consider the responsibility or otherwise of a party, which party operated a website, which website included a facility for third parties to leave comments, where offending comments were posted by such third parties, and which comments were publicly accessible. It is in my view unnecessary to consider those cases in the present case. Here, there is a much closer relationship between the defamatory statements and the Defendants. In contrast to the aforementioned cases, the Defendants in this case posted the offending material online themselves. Qualified Privilege 46. The Defendants rely on the defence of qualified privilege as provided for in Section 18 of the 2009 Act. Mr English submitted that there is no evidence that the author of the words did not believe them to be true. He submits that in the absence of any plea or evidence of malice there is an “absolute defence of qualified privilege”. 47. Section 18 provides: “Qualified privilege. 18.—
(1)Subject to section 17 , it shall be a defence to a defamation action for the defendant to prove that the statement in respect of which the action was brought would, if it had been made immediately before the commencement of this section, have been considered under the law (other than the Act of 1961) in force immediately before such commencement as having been made on an occasion of qualified privilege.
(2)Without prejudice to the generality of subsection
(1), it shall, subject to section 19 , be a defence to a defamation action for the defendant to prove that— (
  1. a)the statement was published to a person or persons who— (
  2. i)had a duty to receive, or interest in receiving, the information contained in the statement, or (
  3. ii)the defendant believed upon reasonable grounds that the said person or persons had such a duty or interest, and (
  4. b)the defendant had a corresponding duty to communicate, or interest in communicating, the information to such person or persons.
(3)Without prejudice to the generality of subsection
(1), it shall be a defence to a defamation action for the defendant to prove that the statement to which the action relates is— (
  1. a)a statement to which Part 1 of Schedule 1 applies, (
  2. b)contained in a report, copy, extract or summary referred to in that Part, or (
  3. c)contained in a determination referred to in that Part.
(4)Without prejudice to the generality of subsection
(1), it shall be a defence to a defamation action for the defendant to prove that the statement to which the action relates is contained in a report, copy or summary referred to in Part 2 of Schedule 1 , unless it is proved that the defendant was requested by the plaintiff to publish in the same medium of communication in which he or she published the statement concerned, a reasonable statement by way of explanation or a contradiction, and has refused or failed to do so or has done so in a manner that is not adequate or reasonable having regard to all of the circumstances.
(5)Nothing in subsection
(3)shall be construed as— (
  1. a)protecting the publication of any statement the publication of which is prohibited by law, or of any statement that is not of public concern and the publication of which is not for the public benefit, or (
  2. b)limiting or abridging any privilege subsisting apart from subsection
(3).
(6)A defence under this section shall be known, and is referred to in this Act, as the “ defence of qualified privilege ”.
(7)In this section— “duty” means a legal, moral or social duty; “interest” means a legal, moral or social interest”. 48. Applying the test in Section 18
(2)in relation to the Church Publication: a. I am satisfied that the Plaintiff’s daughter’s statement was published to persons who had an interest in receiving the information received in the statement. The statement was published to the congregation of roughly 80 people. All those people were interested enough to attend the Church on 14 May
  1. They attended either as supporters of those being baptised, or as part of their faith, or for both reasons. They had a moral or social interest in the Plaintiff’s daughter’s reasons for being baptised. b. I am also satisfied that the Defendants had a corresponding moral or social interest in communicating to the congregation the information to such persons. The Pastor’s evidence of the importance, in his faith, of the person being baptised testifying was very sincere. The Defendants, as pastors had a moral or social interest in communicating to those present the Plaintiff’s daughter’s reasons for choosing baptism.
  2. I am therefore satisfied that the Church Publication was an occasion of qualified privilege.
  3. The position in relation to the Online Publication is different. Mr O’Doherty submitted that the video was broadcast “to the world at large”. In theory he is correct. In the three weeks during which the video was available there were 192 clicks. Mr English suggested that many of these clicks would have been from the Plaintiff and connected parties such as his wife and his solicitor. No doubt Mr English is right and the number of people who viewed the comments at arm’s length is very small.
  4. On the other hand, Tullamore is a relatively small town. Many of those who did view the video are likely to have been local. The Pastor said that followers of the Church’s Facebook page would be prompted to access the video via their Facebook feeds. The Church is based in Tullamore and many such followers would live in the area. Mr Regan’s Facebook feed prompted him to access the video because he typically accesses content relating to Tullamore. The Plaintiff said that news of the video spread like wildfire in the local community; people approached him on nights out, and people phoned him saying they had seen the video.
  5. The Online Publication was published to a group of persons who are not easily identifiable. It was not established (and no evidence was produced or argument made to seek to establish) who those persons were. The group contained Mr Regan who had no apparent duty to receive, or interest in receiving the information contained in the Plaintiff’s daughter’s statement. Furthermore, because the persons were unidentified, the Defendants could not have believed on reasonable grounds that those persons had a duty to receive or interest in receiving, the information contained in the statement.
  6. Accordingly, in relation to the Online Publication, the defence of qualified privilege has not been established. Concurrent Wrongdoing / Contributory Negligence.
  7. The Plaintiff did not issue proceedings against his daughter, the author of the statements. Mr O’Doherty accepted that the Defendants and the Plaintiff’s daughter “might” be concurrent wrongdoers within the meaning of Section 11 of the Civil Liability Act
  8. Section 11
(5)provides:
(5)Where the same or substantially the same libel or slander or injurious falsehood is published by different persons, the court shall take into consideration the extent to which it is probable that the statement in question was published directly or indirectly to the same persons and to that extent may find the wrongdoers to be concurrent wrongdoers.” 55. Mr English argued that the Plaintiff’s daughter, as the author of the defamatory statements, was liable for the defamatory statements. According to the Defendants, the Plaintiff must be identified with the Plaintiff’s daughter under s.35
(1)(i) of the Civil Liability Act 1961, for the purposes of contributory negligence under s.34 of the same Act. 56. Section 35 deals with what it describes as “identification”. Section 35
(1)(i) provides: “
(1)For the purpose of determining contributory negligence… (i) Where the plaintiff’s damage is caused by concurrent wrongdoers and the plaintiff’s claim against one wrongdoer has become barred by the Statute of Limitations or any other limitation enactment, the plaintiff shall be deemed to be responsible for the acts of such wrongdoer;” 57. Section 34 deals with the apportionment of liability in a case for contributory negligence. It provides insofar as is relevant: “
(1)Where, in any action brought by one person in respect of a wrong committed by any other person, it is proved that the damage suffered by the plaintiff partly by the negligence or want of care of the plaintiff or of one for whose acts he is responsible (in this Part called contributory negligence) and partly by the wrong of the defendant, the damages recoverable in respect of the said wrong shall be reduced by such amount as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the degrees of fault of the plaintiff and defendant:…”
  1. Both parties refer to the Supreme Court decision of O’Donnell CJ in Hickey v McGowan [2017] IESC
  2. At paragraph 62 of the decision, the Chief Justice states: “… One of the main provisions of the 1961 Act was to allow the allocation of liability (and consequently damages) between defendants and indeed other concurrent wrongdoers for the damage suffered by the plaintiff. If a plaintiff did not pursue one such wrongdoer (with the consequence then that such wrongdoer may not be available for a claim of contribution by other concurrent wrongdoers who have been sued). Then the Act through s.35 requires that the plaintiff must bear that loss.”
  3. It was not disputed that the Plaintiff’s claim against his daughter, the author of the defamatory statements, has become statute barred. The Plaintiff is therefore identified with the wrongdoing of the Plaintiff’s daughter who was not sued.
  4. I have already decided that the Church Publication was an occasion of qualified privilege. Arguably, the Plaintiff’s daughter could have availed of this defence. In addition, at that occasion, the Defendants were secondary publishers and could possibly have availed of the Section 27 defence of innocent publication. The Defendants have a full defence of qualified privilege in relation to their involvement in the Church Publication.
  5. However, the defence of qualified privilege is not available in respect of the Online publication.
  6. The defamatory statements undoubtedly injured the Plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of reasonable members of society. News of the video spread like wildfire according to the Plaintiff. For every person who phoned or approached the Plaintiff to discuss the defamatory statements there would have been many more who judged him from afar.
  7. Some of this damage would have been suffered if the only occasion of publication had been the Church Publication to the approximately 80 people present at the baptism ceremony. That statement, the spoken word, could have been (and almost certainly was) repeated and spread by some of those present. Of the total damage, I attribute 40% to this first occasion of publication. There is no need to apportion this part of the damage between the Plaintiff’s daughter and the Defendants because the Defendants can avail of the defence of qualified privilege.
  8. The damage was exacerbated however by the Online Publication. The evidence was that the statements were the subject of gossip and excitement for a period after they were made. The Plaintiff, the Plaintiff’s wife and Mr Regan all gave evidence of having seen the video as distinct from witnessing the comments at the ceremony itself. According to the Plaintiff, people approached him to discuss the video. I attribute 60% of the total damage to this second occasion of publication.
  9. The Defendants are publishers and the Plaintiff’s daughter is the author of the Online Publication. As author, the Plaintiff’s daughter must bear some responsibility. She made the defamatory statements. However, there was no evidence that she had any involvement in the video being posted online. The Defendants are adults. They operated the Church’s Facebook page. They had complete control over what was posted thereon. This was not disputed. Indeed, to his credit, the Pastor exercised this control and removed the video on the day he was contacted by the Plaintiff’s solicitors. Taking all of the evidence into account, I consider the Defendants to be 80% responsible and the Plaintiff’s daughter to be 20% responsible for the Online Publication. The Plaintiff is identified with that 20% by virtue of Section 35
(1)(i) of the Civil Liability Act
  1. The Online Publication accounts for 60% of the total damage.
  2. In summary, the Defendants have a full defence of qualified privilege to the Church Publication. 40% of the total damage is attributable to the Church Publication. The Defendants are 80% responsible for the remaining 60% of the damage, i.e. the Online Publication. The Defendants are therefore 48% liable for the total damage to the Plaintiff’s reputation. Quantum
  3. Mr O’Doherty referred to the Supreme Court case of Higgins v Irish Aviation Authority [2023] IR
  4. He submitted that the case identified four bands of damages: moderate, attracting damages of less than €50,000; medium attracting damages of €50,000 to €125,000, serious attracting damages from 125,000 to €199,000 and very serious attracting damages over €200,
  5. He submitted that the present case falls into the medium range and merits damages at the limit of the jurisdiction of this Court. Mr English said that Mc Menamin J wasn’t considering a case such as the present case. He said this was a very particular case and that (without prejudice to his position on liability) there should be a token award of damages.
  6. Higgins v Irish Aviation Authority concerned an appeal in relation to an award of damages from a jury in the High Court. MacMenamin J stated as follows: “Categories or brackets [156] It seems to me that the case law illustrates that, seen broadly, general damages awards in defamation cases are capable of being seen as falling within four general “categories”, or “brackets”. Rather than seeking to identify a “starting point”, it is more helpful to place the case in a range. [157] The first, and lowest, applies to very moderate defamation. Here, awards of 0 to €50,000 have been made. [158] A second band is necessarily wider. It is for a medium “range” of cases where there have been awards of €50,000 to €125,
  7. In Ward v. The Donegal Times Ltd. [2016] IEHC 711, for example, the defamatory statements, although suggesting criminal conduct, were in the case of a local newspaper with a limited circulation. McDermott J., a very experienced High Court judge, considered general damages of €120,000 would have been appropriate. There are other cases where the awards were in high five figures. To identify them all is unnecessary. [159] A third category of award deals with seriously defamatory material. The parameters there range from general damages of €125,000 up to €199,
  8. I come back to this category later. [160] At the top of this general scale there are cases at, or in excess of €200,000, but where the courts have very seldom awarded more than €300,
  9. In Nolan v. Sunday Newspapers Ltd. [2019] IECA 141, [2020] 2 I.R. 490, the Court of Appeal awarded general damages of €200,000, as well as making awards under other headings. In Kinsella v. Kenmare Resources plc [2019] IECA 54, [2019] 2 I.R. 75, the Court of Appeal awarded total damages of €250,000.”
  10. The defamatory statements in the present case are serious. They amount to an assertion that the Plaintiff was a bad father who fought with his wife and caused upset to his young daughter. They included an allegation of verbal abuse and perhaps controlling behaviour that caused his daughter’s mental health to suffer. These are certainly matters that tend to injure the Plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of reasonable members of society.
  11. On the other hand, the comments do not suggest criminal conduct as referred to by MacMenamin J in his description of the medium range of cases.
  12. Furthermore, the comments and the video containing them were not widely circulated. Approximately 80 people attended the ceremony. There were 192 clicks on the video before it was removed. Some of those clicks must have been by the Plaintiff and his legal team. Others would have only accessed part or parts of the video that did not include the defamatory statement. It is clear therefore that only a small number of people viewed the defamatory statement online. Again, this can be contrasted favourably even with a local newspaper with a limited circulation referred to by MacMenamin J in his description of the medium range of cases.
  13. Finally, it is relevant that immediately any concerns were brought to the Defendants’ attention, they removed the video. That important practical step limited the damage. The Defendants did not provide an express undertaking not to publish any further similar statements as called for in the Plaintiff’s solicitor’s letter dated 2 June 2023, but an intention not to so publish is inherent in the Pastor’s email of the same date.
  14. This case therefore falls short of the medium range of cases. It must fall into the first of the four general categories or brackets identified by MacMenamin J. An award of €0 to €50,000 is therefore appropriate. Given the nature of the defamatory statement, the very limited circulation of the statement, and the prompt removal of the video, I consider the full value of the damage to be €30,
  15. I have already decided that the Defendants are 48% liable for the total damage to the Plaintiff’s reputation. The Plaintiff is therefore entitled to 48% of €30,
  16. Conclusion
  17. In conclusion therefore, I order the second and third named Defendants to pay €14,400 in damages for defamation to the Plaintiff.

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AI explanation based on the official legal text. Indicative, not a substitute for legal advice.