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2026 IEHC 350

APPROVED REDACTED AN ARD-CHÚIRT THE HIGH COURT [2026] IEHC 350 Record No. 2025/1514SS BETWEEN/ THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS APPELLANT -AND- J.P. RESPONDENT JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Conleth Bradley delivered on the 5th day of June 2026 1 INTRODUCTION Preliminary

  1. This is an appeal by way of case stated pursuant to s. 2 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1857 (“the 1857 Act”) from District Court Judge Harney (“the District Judge”) dated 17th September
  3. The Respondent was charged with seven alleged offences against two injured parties: six charges of sexual assault contrary to s. 2 of the Criminal Justice (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990 (as amended) on 12th May 2021 (two counts), 13th May 2021 (two counts) in Case No. C:2023/132650 (Garda Lyons) and on 9th and 19th December 2022 in Case No. C:2023/207513 (Garda Clavin); and, one charge of assault causing harm contrary to s. 3 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 on 31st December 2022 in Case No. C:2023/207513 (Garda Clavin).
  4. While the findings of fact are reproduced later in this judgment in the extract from the written case stated dated 17th September 2025, after receiving probation and welfare reports, hearing a plea in mitigation and reviewing a booklet of mitigation materials, the District Judge struck out all seven charges with no further Order on 12th March
  5. Summary of the DPP’s position
  6. In this appeal, it is contended on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions (“the DPP”) that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to strike out simpliciter these charges in the circumstances of this case. 2
  7. It is submitted that at no stage during the currency of these matters did the District Judge indicate that she was planning to strike the charges out simpliciter. The DPP points out that the District Judge had other options available to her which would not have required the recording of a conviction, including inter alia the application of the Probation of Offenders Act 1907 (“the 1907 Act”) or invoking the Court’s common law poor box jurisdiction. It is submitted that the District Judge acted unlawfully in striking the charges out simpliciter. The DPP also makes reference to the Victim Impact Reports which were before the District Court and refers to the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act 2017 which transposes into Irish law Directive 2012/29/EU of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime.
  8. It is argued that the only jurisdiction to ‘strike out’ in the circumstances of the application of s. 13 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967 (as amended) (“the 1967 Act”), when dealing with a summary case on a plea of guilty, is where the District Court applies the common law poor box jurisdiction. Summary of the Respondent’s position
  9. In summary, on behalf of the Respondent, it was submitted that this application was in substance an appeal against leniency and that the written submissions on behalf of the DPP had failed to set out the question or point of law which was sought to be raised.
  10. It was submitted, therefore, that the DPP’s appeal was misconceived in that an appeal by way of case stated was not the appropriate or correct forum for what was, in substance, an appeal against leniency and neither was it a judicial review application about fairness. 3
  11. It was argued that the prosecuting Inspector was present at all times and could have asked the District Judge to make a consultative case stated before the Judge struck out the seven charges and neither did the Inspector oppose the course of action proposed by the District Judge.
  12. It is stated that the District Judge had before her all the requisite information in terms of victims’ impact statements and probation and welfare reports and was in the best position to determine whether this case had exceptional factual circumstances and to treat of the matter in the way that she did.
  13. The narrowness of the jurisdiction of the 1857 Act was emphasised.
  14. Both parties made extensive reference to the decision of the High Court (Kearns P.) in Director of Public Prosecutions v Ryan [2011] IEHC 280; [2011] 3 I.R. 641 (“Ryan”).
  15. On behalf of the Respondent, it was argued, by reference inter alia to para. 13 of the judgment, that the decision in Ryan addressed inter alia the question of whether the District Court had “jurisdiction to strike out the case in circumstances where a guilty plea has been entered” and that the jurisdiction of the District Court to strike out the offences was not ‘tethered’ to the question of making a donation to the court’s poor box.
  16. It was asked rhetorically what the purpose of the appeal was, and it was suggested that remittal to the District Judge for the purposes of making a donation to the poor box would be ineffectual. 4 JURISDICTION ON AN APPEAL BY WAY OF CASE STATED
  17. In this appeal by way of case stated, the DPP contends that the striking out simpliciter of the proceedings by the District Judge was, to paraphrase the High Court (Allen J.) in DPP v Larkin [2019] IEHC 16 at para. 18, erroneous in point of law and it is now sought to have the error of law corrected.
  18. The central question posed – whether the District Judge was entitled to strike out the seven charges simpliciter – raises a question of law which the DPP submits amounts to an error of law.
  19. It is common case that the findings of fact made by the District Judge as recorded in this case stated dated 17th September 2025 (and quoted later in this judgment) are accepted and are not in question: HSE v L.N. [2012] IEHC 611 at para. 25, [2013] 4 I.R. 49 at p.
  21. In Fitzgerald v DPP [2003] IESC 46; [2003] 3 I.R. 247 and DPP (Lavelle) v McCrea [2010] IESC 60, the Supreme Court (Hardiman J.) generally took a strict view against gainsaying the findings made by the District Court save inquiring, where applicable, whether the findings made were based on the evidence adduced.
  22. In Clune v DPP [1981] ILRM 17, the High Court (Gannon J.) in explaining the terms ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ courts, inter alia stated at p. 20 that “the District Court has the sole and exclusive authority to control and supervise the conduct of proceedings in his own court within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred upon him. His independence and authority is secured in his freedom not only from pressures of political or executive nature but also from purported 5 intervention, direction, or control by any superior court. If he should be in error it is the interests of the parties to the suit, whether the public or private individuals, which require the error to be corrected”.
  23. Mr. Justice Anthony M. Collins and James O’Reilly SC in Civil Proceedings and the State (Third Edition, Thomson Reuters, 2019) summarise the position at p. 4 (para. 1-07) as follows (the caselaw referred to in parenthesis in the following extract is footnoted in the original text): “The procedure under the 1857 Act is available exclusively for the determination of issues of law arising out of the facts as found by the District Court (Knight v Halliwell

(1874)38 J.P. 470), and not issues of fact (DPP (O’Driscoll) v O’Connor [1999] 1 ILRM 1 at 4 per Geoghegan J.; Fitzgerald v DPP [20023] 3 I.R. 247 at 263-265 per Hardiman J; Clifford v DPP [2013] IESC 396, [2013] 2 I.R. 396 at para. 14 per Clarke J.). It is a procedure whereby the District Court can request the High Court to give an opinion on a point of law arising from its decision. It thus requires the District Court to set out, for the benefit of the High Court, the relevant findings of fact and the grounds for the determination giving rise to the question of law upon which the opinion of the High Court is sought … (DPP v Pires [2018] IESC 51, [2019] 1 ILRM 248 at para.21 per Dunne J., O’Donnell, MacMenamin, O’Malley, Finlay Geoghegan JJ. concurring)” and p. 4 (para.1-08) as follows: “[t]he High Court will not entertain a case stated involving the determination of issues of fact (DPP v Nangle [1984] ILRM 171 at 173 per Finlay P; Fitzgerald v DPP [2003] 3 I.R. 247 at 264-266 per Hardiman J.; DPP v Pires [2018] IESC 51, [2019] 1 ILRM 248 at paras 24-
  1. The question of law that arose was the application of the Supreme Court judgment in DPP (Moyles) v Cullen [2014] IESC 7, [2014] 3 I.R. 30, involving the use of handcuffs in effecting an arrest by a garda for drunk driving to the facts of the case in the District Court). On a 6 case stated, jurisdiction is confined to questions of law, and findings of fact are conclusive, unless it appears that there was no evidence to support them (Donaghy v Walsh [1914] 2 I.R. 261 at 27 per Gibson J. See also DPP v Penny [2006] 3 I.R. 553 at 564 per Dunne J.)”
  2. The learned authors at paras 1-28 and 2-51 refer to the passage from the then President of the High Court, Costello P. in Proes v Revenue Commissioners [1998] 4 I.R. 174 at p. 182 as authoritatively setting out the approach the High Court is enjoined to take on the hearing of, and the adjudication upon, appeals by way of case stated: “When the High Court is considering a case stated seeking its opinion as to whether a particular option was correct in law, it should apply the following principles:
(1)Findings of primary fact by the judge should not be disturbed unless there is no evidence to support them;
(2)Inferences from primary facts are mixed questions of fact and law;
(3)If the judge’s conclusions show that he had adopted a wrong view of the law, they should be set aside;
(4)If the judge’s conclusions are not based on a mistaken view of the law, they should not be set aside, unless the inferences which he drew were ones which no reasonable judge could draw;
(5)While some evidence will point to one conclusion and other evidence to the opposite, these are essentially matters of degree and the judge’s conclusions should not be disturbed, even if the court does not agree with them, unless they are such that a reasonable judge could not have arrived at them or they are based on a mistaken view of the law”.
  1. In this case, whilst the District Judge may have briefly heard facts for the purpose of accepting jurisdiction pursuant to s. 13 of the 1967 Act, nonetheless the court was in a position to make findings as part of the case stated procedure. 7
  2. Insofar as the question or point of law is concerned, in the transcript of the hearing dated 12th March 2025, the District Judge indicated that “given the extensive engagement with the Probation and Welfare service, the psychotherapy and all of the services” she was inclined to strike all the matters out and the prosecuting Inspector had stated that he was “not in a position to influence the Court.” The District Judge took the view (as did the prosecuting Inspector) that the s. 3 assault was at the lower end of the scale and she decided “to strike everything out” and concluded as follows: “I have to do what I feel is right and proper in the circumstances so, so be it. You can go back and you can tell the injured parties because they’re entitled to know, that I heard extensive representations about the gentleman and the work he had done in the meantime. That I took the view that the Section 3 assault, notwithstanding how the person felt and given the age of everybody involved, was not sufficient for the person of having somebody’s life ruined, in circumstances where they didn’t have anything previous against them. So for all of those reasons I’m going to strike the matter out. Now it’s obviously a matter for the State if they take the view that I have been unduly lenient, but I am where I am.”
  3. Notwithstanding submissions to the contrary on behalf of the Respondent, I do not consider that the fact that the prosecuting Inspector was present and did not appear to make any submission to the contrary in any sense takes away from the central question or point of law raised in this application as to whether the District Judge was entitled to strike out the seven charges simpliciter. The appeal complies with s. 2 of the 1857 Act, which provides that any party to any proceedings heard and determined in the District Court can request a District Judge, if dissatisfied with such determination as being erroneous, after he/she has heard and determined a matter, to state a case to the High Court on a point of law. Here the proceedings had been heard and determined on 12th March 2025 and the case stated was signed by the 8 District Judge on 17th September
  4. (Section 4 of the 1857 Act and the District Court Rules provides that a District Court may not refuse to state a case made or under the direction of inter alia the DPP; the constitutionality of s. 4 of the 1857 Act was upheld in Fitzgerald v DPP [2003] 3 I.R. 247). THE 1967 ACT
  5. The starting point for a consideration of these matters is s. 13
(2)of the 1967 Act which provides as follows: “If at any time the District Court ascertains that a person charged with an offence to which this section applies wishes to plead guilty and the court is satisfied that he understands the nature of the offence and the facts alleged, the Court (a) may, with the consent of the prosecutor, deal with the offence summarily, in which case the accused shall be liable to the penalties provided for in subsection
(3), or (b) if the accused signs a plea of guilty, may, subject to subsection (2A), send him forward for sentence with that plea to that court to which, but for that plea, he would have been sent forward for trial. (2A) The accused shall not be sent forward for sentence under this section without the consent of the prosecutor.
(3)(a) On conviction by the District Court for an offence dealt with summarily under subsection
(2)(a), the accused shall be liable to a class A fine within the meaning of Part 2 of the Fines Act 2010 or, at the discretion of the Court, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve months, or to both such fine and imprisonment”. 9
  1. In this case, on 5th April 2024, the Respondent elected for summary disposal. Jurisdiction was later accepted by the District Judge and guilty pleas were entered in respect of all seven charges. He was remanded initially to 5th July 2024 for a probation and welfare report and victim impact statements.
  2. Thus, from a jurisdictional perspective, the District Judge was dealing with the offences summarily consequent upon the Respondent’s guilty plea pursuant to the application of s. 13
(2)of the 1967 Act. 28. There are occasions, in contrast, where a District Court can strike out matters: O. 23, r. 5 of the District Court Rules (“the DCR”), for example, provides that where an accused (or his or her representative) is present at the required time and place and the prosecutor (or his or her representative) is not present, a court may strike out, dismiss without prejudice or adjourn the hearing of the complaint; O. 38, r. 1
(4)of the DCR provides that where a court is of opinion that the complaint before it discloses no offence at law, or if neither the prosecutor nor accused appears, it may if it or thinks fit strike out the complaint with or without awarding costs. 29. The question or point of law which arises in this case stated is, on the basis of accepting the facts as outlined by the District Judge, and the entering of a guilty plea, whether an error of law was committed in striking out simpliciter the seven charges. This is not a question going to the merits of the leniency or otherwise of the action taken by the District Judge. I am concerned only with whether this option – the striking out simpliciter of the seven charges – was open to the District Judge in the circumstances of the application of s. 13
(2)of the 1967 Act. 10 30. Further, in addressing the question of law as to whether the District Judge erred in striking out the proceedings simpliciter in the circumstances of these cases, s. 6 of the 1857 Act inter alia provides that the High Court can reverse, affirm or amend the determination of the District Judge or may remit the matter to the District Judge with its opinion or make such other order as it may seem fit. 31. In this case, for the reasons set out in this judgment, I am of the view that the District Judge, when dealing with these offences summarily as per s. 13 of the 1967 Act, erred in law in striking out simpliciter the seven charges and I propose to remit the matter to Judge Harney in accordance with s. 6 of the 1857 Act. THE CASE STATED PURSUANT TO S. 2 OF THE 1857 ACT 32. In the case stated, after setting out the ‘background’ by reference to the four alleged offences in Case No. C:2023/132650 (Garda Lyons) and the three alleged offences in Case No. C:2023/207513 (Garda Clavin), the ‘time-line’ was set out by the District Judge as follows (the Respondent is the ‘accused’ and the reference to ‘I’ is to the District Judge): “2nd August 2023 The accused was charged with Garda Clavin’s Charges and given station bail to appear before Limerick District Court on 9th August 2023. 21st November 2023 The accused was charged with Garda Lyons’ Charges and given station bail to appear before Limerick District Court on 7th December 2023. Various Both sets of charges were adjourned from time to time. 11 5th April 2024 The accused elected for summary disposal, jurisdiction was accepted and guilty pleas entered in respect of all seven charges. He was remanded to the 5th July 2024 for a probation and welfare report and victim impact statements. 5th July 2024 XX gave her victim impact statement viva voce in court and I received the written victim impact statement of XX. A probation and welfare report dated 3rd July 2024 was in court. I remanded the accused to 27th September 2024 for an updated probation and welfare report. 27th September 2024 The second probation and welfare report was before the court – Judge Philip O Leary presiding. The accused was remanded to 6th November 2024 to appear before me for a probation and welfare report and finalisation. 6th November 2024 The second probation and welfare report was before the court. A psychotherapy report was handed in. I wanted the defendant to engage further with [the] Probation and Welfare service and empathy programme. The accused was remanded to 12th March 2025 and I asked that the victims be informed and that I would hear from them further in March if they so wished. 12th March 2025 A third probation and welfare report was available to me and I heard the plea in mitigation, including reviewing a booklet of mitigation materials. I struck out all seven charges with no further order.” 33. The findings of fact and the mitigation recorded by the District Judge were stated as follows: 12 “3. The following facts have been proven or agreed and/or otherwise found by me:a. The accused was known to both injured parties. b. The accused sexually assaulted XX on four separate occasions i. That on 12th May 2021 the accused sexually assaulted XX by touching her inappropriately inside her clothing making her feel uncomfortable; ii. That on the 12th May 2021 the accused sexually assaulted XX by rubbing her leg from knee to hip. She had to remove his hands on numerous occasions; iii. That on the 13th May 2021 the accused sexually assaulted XX by lying beside her in her bed, without her consent and placing his hand around her, outside of her clothing; iv. That on the 13th May 2021 the accused sexually assaulted XX by rubbing his hand along her body, outside her clothes, while she lay in bed; c. The accused sexually assaulted XX on two separate occasions and on another date assaulted her causing her harm. i. That on the 9th December 2022 the accused sexually assaulted XX at the XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXX by placing his hand on her crotch without her consent while she was sitting at a bus stop and kissed the side of her head. He did not stop when asked by XX. The incident lasted two minutes. i. That on the 19th December 2022 the accused sexually assaulted XX at XXXXX XXXXXX XXXXX XXXX by placing his foot on her crotch while she was sleeping on an adjacent couch. He removed his foot when asked. ii. That on the 31st December 2022 the accused assaulted XX at XXXXXXXXXXXXXX by striking her on the nose, causing her nose to swell and become painful. She did not require medical attention. 13 d. Both injured parties were adversely affected by the assaults as set out in their victim impact statements. e. The accused has many academic achievements, some since the dates of these offences and he is in employment. f. The maximum sentence permitted by law was one of twelve months in respect of each of the offences with a cumulative maximum of two years. g. I found that while serious, the offending fell at the lower end of severity. h. The accused had no previous convictions. i. I found that there was positive mitigation and that recording convictions would have too adverse an effect on the accused’s entire future. j. None of the accused’s submissions were challenged. k. No submissions were made by the prosecution. 4. In respect of each offence I made an order in respect of each of the seven charges recorded as follows: “…and the offence being an offence to which section 13 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967 applies and the Court having ascertained that the accused wished to plead guilty and the Court being satisfied that the accused understood the nature of the offence and the facts alleged and the Director of Public Prosecutions having consented to the offence being dealt with summarily It was adjudged that the said complaint be struck out.” No objection was made by the prosecution to this course of action after enquiries [had] been made by the Judge. Questions of Law Arising 5. The questions of law arising for the determination of the High Court are: 14 a. Was I correct in law in not recording convictions in the circumstances pertaining? b. Was I correct in law in striking out the seven charges? c. Was I entitled in law to make the Orders referred to?” 34. The appendices to the case stated included: (
  1. a)seven orders; (
  2. b)seven charge sheets; (
  3. c)two Victim Impact Statements; (
  4. d)three Probation and Welfare Reports; (
  5. e)Mitigation Booklet; and (
  6. f)DAR recordings from 9th August 2023, 12th October 2023, 7th December 2023, 22nd February 2024, 5th April 2024, 5th July 2024, 27th September 2024, 6th November 2024 and 12th March 2025. 35. In terms of mitigation, while the DPP accepts that a series of positive mitigation factors apply to the Respondent, including that he had pleaded guilty, he had no previous convictions, he had a good academic record, was doing well and that he had engaged with the probation service, it is argued that there was still a requirement for some supervision. In relation to this latter engagement, the DPP placed emphasis on the fact that the Respondent was assessed as medium risk (not low risk), and that throughout his assessment it was recommended that the Respondent remained suitable for probation supervision. 36. The Probation Report dated 11th March 2025, which was the day before the District Judge struck out the charges on 12th March 2025, concluded that the Respondent had made good progress during the adjournment and had committed fully to therapy and probation intervention. It was stated that his emotional state appeared much improved and that while he remained very anxious over his future, he was learning better coping mechanisms to manage this. It was stated that if, however, he should lose his job as a consequence of his offending, he 15 would require more intensive intervention to help him manage the negative emotions around this to prevent an escalation in risk. It was further stated that the Respondent’s risk factors in terms of his offending behaviour related to his poor ability to understand boundaries, intimacy needs, poor problem solving, general social rejection and negative emotional state. It stated that he had made improvements in this regard but it would be advisable to continue with his psychotherapist to build on this further. 37. The report stated that the Respondent remained suitable for probation supervision, should the District Court see fit. The point is made on behalf of the Respondent, echoing the observations of Gannon J. in DPP v Clune, that the District Court in this case stated ‘did not see fit’. THE COMMON LAW POWER OF THE DISTRICT COURT TO ACCEPT A DONATION TO THE POOR BOX IN LIEU OF A CONVICTION 38. There were a number of common authorities relied on by both the DPP and the Respondent at the hearing before me, though there was a difference of view expressed as to the precedential nature of these decisions when addressing this case stated. 39. Generally, while its operation in practice may be somewhat inconsistent, the common law court poor box jurisdiction is invoked in circumstances involving minor complaints or where, from the perspective of proportionality, there are exceptional factors present for an accused which would militate against recording a conviction. 40. In terms of its operation or application, as an alternative to conviction and sentence, where the circumstances arise after an accused person has pleaded guilty, an accused will, firstly, offer to 16 make a voluntary payment into the poor box in the hope that this offer will have the effect, secondly, of persuading a District Court Judge to strike out the charge rather than entering a conviction. 41. Central to the arguments made on behalf of both parties was their respective references to the decision of the High Court (Kearns P.) in Ryan, which itself referred to a number of decisions, including, for example, DPP v Maughan [2003] IEHC 117 (“Maughan”). 42. In the official report of Ryan, Kearns P. inter alia held as follows at p. 653 (which page number was expressly referenced subsequently by the High Court (Hogan J.) in Kennedy v District Judge Gibbons & The DPP [2014] IEHC 67 (“Kennedy”)): “[43]… 128, [2007] 4 I.R. 145 when the independent function of the jury was held to have been abrogated. This course would be particularly objectionable where, as in the present case, the notice party has made a substantial payment to charity without demur from the prosecution and effectively undergone a sanction in any event. [44] Despite the fact that there is some lack of clarity surrounding the origins and development of the Poor Box jurisdiction, it has from time immemorial been part of the repertoire of remedies available in limited circumstances to judges of the District Court to apply where the facts of the particular case suggest that the higher interests of justice would best be served by doing so. I have no doubt that such humane considerations were to the forefront of the mind of Judge Maughan in the driving case in which he believed there had been extenuating circumstances of an unusual degree (DPP v Judge Maughan (Unreported, High Court, Ó Caoimh J., 3rd November, 2003)) albeit that the High Court did not find he had the discretion to do as he did. However, I am satisfied the District judge did have such discretion in this particular case. It is clear that the 17 District judge found extenuating circumstances of a special character which justified her in exercising her discretion in the manner she did. [45] Unless there is clear evidence that a judge of the District Court is misapplying discretion in operating a ‘strike out’ and ‘pay’ method of disposing of exceptional cases I would be extremely averse to the idea of truncating or wiping out that power. [46] I am also of the view that, on procedural grounds, the applicant must fail because the appropriate remedy in this case was to exercise one of the appeal options which were available to the applicant which would have been more respectful of the distinct and separate functions of the Director of Public Prosecutions and a member of the judiciary. [47] For these reasons I would refuse the relief sought in this case.” 43. The decision in Maughan concerned a District Judge accepting a donation to the poor box in lieu of convicting the accused of a drink driving offence. 44. The High Court (Ó Caoimh J.) held that the District Judge had acted ultra vires as he was obliged at the time to determine the case before him and to proceed in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions to enter a conviction and to impose a penalty and was not entitled to strike out the charge. Section 49
(7)of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (as inserted by s. 10 of the Road Traffic Act 1994) provided that s. 1
(1)of the 1907 Act did not apply to the road traffic offence in that case and therefore the District Court judge was required to proceed to conviction where the facts and the law so warranted.
  1. The decision in Kennedy, which post-dated Maughan and Ryan, is significant because of its discussion and analysis of each of these judgments. 18
  2. In Kennedy, the applicant had pleaded guilty in the District Court to an offence of speeding contrary to s. 47 of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (as amended). The District Court was informed that the applicant was a pensioner who had no previous convictions and the District Judge was invited to strike out the proceedings and to accept a donation to the court poor box in lieu of a formal conviction.
  3. The question which arose was where the imposition of penalty points in respect of a traffic offence was made mandatory by legislation and where the accused did not dispute the offence, did the District Court have any jurisdiction to strike out the proceedings in return for the accused making a donation to the court poor box.
  4. In summary, the High Court (Hogan J.) applied Maughan and found, at para. 20, that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to strike out the proceedings in return for the accused making a donation to the court poor box.
  5. In addition to the application of bespoke mandatory sentences and the disapplication of the 1907 Act, the decision in Kennedy is also important in setting out Hogan J.’s understanding of the ratio of Kearns P. in Ryan. This is clear when one considers a number of the extracts from his judgment in Kennedy, first at paras 6, 7 and 8, as follows: “
  6. In the present context it may be said that the poor box system is so inveterate, established and of long standing that its existence as part “of the repertoire of remedies available in limited circumstances to judges of the District Court to apply where the facts of the particular case suggest that the higher interests of justice would be best served by 19 doing so” must now be universally accepted: see Director of Public Prosecutions v Ryan [2011] IEHC 280, [2011] 3 I.R. 641, 653, per Kearns P.
  7. Second, if the existence of the poor box as part of the common law inheritance must now be accepted in the manner which I have indicated, then the extent to which this common law practice is to be abrogated, qualified or even abolished remains entirely a matter for the Oireachtas. There may be some who think that the existence of such a practice operates as a salutary and humane check on the possible harshness of the sentencing system while also providing a source of revenue for needy and deserving charities. There may be others who think the continued existence of such a practice is unsatisfactory and that it enables the affluent (and others) to escape the proper strictures of the criminal justice system, while simultaneously eroding a source of revenue for the State.
  8. If, however, the law is considered to be unsatisfactory inasmuch as it allows for the continued existence of the poor box system, then any change in this regard would represent a policy judgment which is exclusively committed to the Oireachtas by Article 15.2.1 of the Constitution.”
  9. In Kennedy, Hogan J. observed that Ó Caoimh J. in Maughan had concluded that the terms of s. 49
(7)of the 1961 Act necessarily excluded informal sanctions short of formal conviction, “such as the acceptance of a donation to charity and the striking out of the charges.” At para. 12 of his judgment in Kennedy, Hogan J. pointed out that s. 55 of the Road Traffic Act 2010 provided that s. 1
(1)of the 1907 Act did not apply to a penalty point offence. 51. As the following extracts at paras 20, 21 and 22 of his judgment in Kennedy confirm, Hogan J. refers to the power of the District Court at common law to accept a donation to the poor box in 20 lieu of proceeding to a formal conviction and further explains, at para. 22 of his judgment, differences in the judgments in Ryan, Maughan and Kennedy: “20. To my mind, the present case is indistinguishable in principle from Maughan. Just as in that case, the Oireachtas has here prescribed a mandatory penalty and sanction upon conviction, namely, the endorsement of four penalty points upon the offender’s licence. As we have already noted, s. 55 of the Road Traffic Act 2010 also provides for the disapplication of the Probation of Offenders Act 1907 to speeding offences and other traffic offences. 21. The cumulative effect of these statutory provisions is to override the District Court’s power at common law to accept a donation to the poor box in lieu of proceeding to a formal conviction in the case of those road traffic offences which attract the application of penalty points on a mandatory basis. 22. It is true that in Ryan Kearns P. held that the District Judge in that case was entitled to accept a donation to the poor box following a plea of guilty in respect of the offence of sexual assault in lieu of a formal conviction for that offence. It is also true that the offence of sexual assault is inherently graver and more serious than the offence of speeding. The essential difference, however, between this case and Maughan on the one hand and Ryan on the other is that the Oireachtas has elected for policy reasons to provide for mandatory sanctions and penalties upon conviction in the case of certain categories of road traffic offences. No such mandatory penalties have been prescribed in the case of sexual assault (along with a significant majority of other offences coming before the District Court), so that in those circumstances the District Court’s power at common law to accept a charitable donation from an accused in lieu of a formal conviction continue in principle to hold full sway”. 21 52. In Kennedy, Hogan J., at para. 26, summarised his conclusions in that case as follows: “(
  1. i)Despite its obscure and uncertain origins, the existence of the poor box jurisdiction is of such long standing and is so widespread and inveterate, that it must be considered now to be part of the common law which was adopted by Article 50.1 following the coming into force of the Constitution on 29th December, 1937. (
  2. ii)In the case of those traffic offences where the imposition of penalty points has been made mandatory by the Oireachtas via the enactment of the Road Traffic Act 2002, and where the Probation of Offenders Act 1907 has been disapplied to such offences by s. 55 of the Road Traffic Act 2010, the District Court’s common law poor box jurisdiction must be taken to have been superseded by these statutory provisions. In such cases it must accordingly be concluded that the District Court enjoys no jurisdiction to impose an informal sanction short of actual conviction such as accepting a donation to the poor box, as this would amount to an indirect circumvention of these statutory provisions.” 53. In this case stated, in dealing with the offences summarily under s. 13 of the 1967 Act, the District Judge did not seek to invoke the common law power of ‘strike out and pay’, i.e., the established poor box common law jurisdiction, or seek to apply the 1907 Act, to the circumstances. In relation to the common law power of ‘strike out and pay’, any amendment, attenuation or qualification of that power, by, for example, seeking to limit it to a ‘strike out’ and disapplying the requirement ‘to pay’, would be a matter for the Oireachtas. I am satisfied, therefore, that the order made by the District Judge in striking out the seven charges simpliciter was erroneous in law. 22 54. In relation to the poor box jurisdiction, at para [3.18], p. 70 of its recent 2026 “Report Compensating Victims of Crime” (LRC-2026), the Law Reform Commission (“the LRC”) noted that it had examined the operation of the Court Poor Box in Ireland in its 2005 Report on the Court Poor Box: Probation of Offenders (LRC 75-2005), adding that “[t]he Court Poor Box is a non-statutory mechanism whereby a court (usually the District Court) may direct a defendant in criminal proceedings to make a payment to a charity, with the understanding that no conviction will be recorded against them. The payment is usually accompanied by a dismissal of the charge under section 1 of the Probation of Offenders Act 1907. The fund exists as a means of helping largely first-time offenders avoid a conviction for minor, non-violent crimes. Their donation is generally lodged by the defendant with the court and paid by the Courts Service to a charity. In 2024, the Court Poor Box paid out just over €1.67 million to charities across Ireland.” 55. At para [3.19], pp. 70-71 of its 2026 Report, the LRC added that “[i]n its 2005 Report, the Commission recommended that the Court Poor Box should be maintained as a positive form of restorative justice, but should be significantly reformed to address inconsistencies and a lack of transparency in its use. proposed establishing a statutory fund to replace the payments currently made under the Court Poor Box system”. 56. A similar analysis to that carried out by Hogan J. in Kennedy is evident in DPP (Revenue Commissioners) v Fitzgerald [2020] IEHC 476 (Meenan J.), where the DPP sought to challenge by way of judicial review a decision of the District Court to strike out a number of proceedings for alleged offences of knowingly or wilfully producing incorrect documents in connection with Income Tax for various tax periods contrary to ss. 1078
(2)(d) and
(3)of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997, as amended by s. 138
(1)(d) of the Finance Act
  1. 23
  2. The High Court (Meenan J.) records at para. 5 of its judgment that having heard the plea in mitigation, the District Judge noted that if fines were imposed, it would be a “significant sum of money” for the respondent to have to discharge. The District Judge in that case had indicated that a Community Service Order should be imposed but, after reconsidering the matter, suggested that he would use “restorative justice”. It was submitted that the principles pertaining to restorative justice could not be applied in respect of offences of this nature. Upon hearing this, the District Judge stated that the facts of the case had been proven and struck out all of the charges before the Court.
  3. Meenan J. referred to the decisions in Kennedy and Maughan and granted the DPP the order of certiorari sought on the following basis, at paras 10 and 11 of his judgment: “
(10)The jurisdiction of the District Court to impose a penalty is set out clearly in s. 1078 of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997, as set out above. The Oireachtas has clearly imposed a statutory scheme of mandatory penalties. It was not open to the District Judge, in the face of a plea of guilty, to strike out the charges.
(11)Each of the points made by the respondent in mitigation were persuasive and, taken together, made a compelling case for leniency. Understandably, the District Judge took the course he did and struck out the charges. However, he did not have jurisdiction to do this. Nor, as is clear from the relevant statutory provisions, did the District Judge have jurisdiction to deal with the matter under the provisions of the Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act 2017.”
  1. Insofar as this appeal by way of case stated is concerned, it is noted that in Maughan and Kennedy there is judicial recognition of the District Court’s power at common law in an 24 appropriate case to accept a donation to the poor box in lieu of proceeding to a formal conviction, referred to by Kearns P. in Ryan as “strike out and pay”. The option chosen by the District Judge in this case, to strike out the proceedings simpliciter, was not, in my view, available and was an error of law.
  2. Further, in contrast to Maughan and Kennedy, there is no statutory provision overriding that common law power to accept a donation to the poor box in lieu of proceeding to a formal conviction and, separately, nor is there a statutory provision in this case which expressly disapplies s. 1
(1)of the 1907 Act. 61. Generally, it can be observed that the application of the 1907 Act in a hypothetical case does not result in charges being ‘struck out’. Rather, in circumstances where s. 1
(1)of the 1907 Act is applied, a court finds the facts proven and dismisses the charge, which is a different type of order to an order striking out charges. 62. In this regard, s. 1
(1)of the 1907 Act provides for the power of courts to permit the conditional release of offenders as follows: “[w]here any person is charged before a court of summary jurisdiction with an offence punishable by such court, and the court thinks that the charge is proved, but is of opinion that, having regard to the character, antecedents, age, health, or mental condition of the person charged, or to the trivial nature of the offence, or to the extenuating circumstances under which the offence was committed, it is inexpedient to inflict any punishment or any other than a nominal punishment, or that it is expedient to release the offender on probation, the court may, without proceeding to conviction, make an order either– (i) dismissing the information or charge; or (ii) discharging the offender conditionally on his entering into a recognizance, with or without sureties, to be of good behaviour and to appear 25 for conviction and sentence when called on at any time during such period, not exceeding three years, as may be specified in the order.” (Emphasis and underlining added). 63. Section 1
(3)of the 1907 Act provides that “[t]he court may, in addition to any such order, order the offender to pay such damages for injury or compensation for loss (not exceeding in the case of a court of summary jurisdiction ten pounds, or, if a higher limit is fixed by any enactment relating to the offence, that higher limit) and to pay such costs of the proceedings as the court thinks reasonable.” In its 2026 “Report Compensating Victims of Crime” (LRC2026), at footnote 6, para [14.9], the LRC stated that it “also acknowledges that section 1
(3)of the Probation of Offenders Act 1907 provides that a court may make a financial order on an offender where the court has made an order dismissing the charge against the accused or issuing a conditional discharge. The Commission has previously stated that this provision appears to have limited practical use given that the Act limits the order to [€12] and it is likely that section 6 compensation orders under the Criminal Justice Act 1993 have effectively superseded the provision. See Law Reform Commission, Report on the Court Poor Box: Probation of Offenders (LRC 75-2005) at paras 3.71 – 3.72.” 64. For completeness, it is noted that s. 2
(1)of the 1907 Act, which deals with probation orders and conditions of recognisances, states as follows: “2.–
(1)A recognizance ordered to be entered into under this Act shall, if the court so order, contain a condition that the offender be under the supervision of such person as may be named in the order during the period specified in the order and such other conditions for securing such supervision as may be specified in the order, and an order requiring the insertion of such conditions as aforesaid in the recognizance is in this Act referred to as a probation order”. 26 CONCLUSION & PROPOSED ORDER 65. Whilst the case stated dated 17th September 2025 sets out three related “questions of law arising”: ((
  1. a)was I correct in law in not recording convictions in the circumstances pertaining?; (
  2. b)was I correct in law in striking out the seven charges?; (
  3. c)was I entitled in law to make the orders referred to?), having regard to the facts of this case as outlined in the case stated, when the District Judge was exercising its jurisdiction pursuant to s. 13 of the 1967 Act, I am of the opinion that it was an error of law, for the reasons set out in this judgment, to strike those offences out simpliciter when dealing with the offences summarily on 12th March 2024. 66. This is the core point of law which arises in this appeal by way of case stated pursuant to the 1857 Act. 67. I shall, therefore, remit the matter to the said District Judge and I propose to make an order to this effect. 68. Further, in terms of the first question, where a District Court does not wish to record a conviction, that court has either the option of applying the 1907 Act or invoking the Court’s common law poor box jurisdiction. 69. On the question of remittal, I do not consider that to be an ineffective course of action in the circumstances of this case. 27 70. This is an appeal by way of case stated in the context of the summary disposal of proceedings on a plea of guilty where the point of law raised was whether the District Judge erred in striking out simpliciter seven charges. That point of law has been addressed in this judgment. 71. It is also clear that from 5th April 2024 to 12th March 2025, considerable efforts were made by the parties and the District Judge in their respective preparation and consideration of the various reports referred to. The transcript of the hearing on 5th April 2024 records a discussion, after the court accepted jurisdiction, about the matter being adjourned to allow receipt of victim impact statements and a probation and welfare report. One of the injured parties furnished a victim impact statement on 5th July 2024 and appeared in person in an in camera hearing before the District Judge. The matter appeared before a different District Court Judge on 27 th September 2024 who adjourned it to Judge Harney and it was confirmed that there were victim impact statements. 72. When the matter came before Judge Harney on 6th November 2024, she indicated that she had read the victim impact statements and the probation and welfare report dated 5th July 2024. The Judge referred inter alia to the progress made by the Respondent and also to the concerns set out by the Probation and Welfare Service in their reports and to the fact that it was not an isolated incident but had occurred 16 months apart and addressed the position of the two victims. She adjourned the matter on that occasion for the purpose of receiving an updated report from the Probation and Welfare Service and said that the State could advise the two victims of this. 73. The District Judge dealt with the matter on 12th March 2025 and the Inspector confirmed that Garda Clavin had spoken to the two injured parties who had made written victim impact 28 statements which were before the court and had been advised of the hearing taking place that day. The Judge also stated that she had read the report from the psychotherapist. This was in addition to the three probation reports and the two victim impact statements and a mitigation booklet and had regard to other matters including the respondent’s employment. 74. It shall be a matter for the District Judge on remittal to address the matter having regard to the point of law raised and answered in this appeal by way of case stated. 75. I shall put the matter in for mention before me at 10.30am on Tuesday 16th June 2026 to deal with the precise terms of any final order, the question of costs and any ancillary or consequential matters which arise. CONLETH BRADLEY 5th June 2026 29

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