2026 IEHC 374

(6)of the Health Act, 1947 (as amended) (hereinafter “the 1947 Act”) for leaving her residence without reasonable excuse. By separate motions the Applicant also seeks to strike out the DPP’s opposition to her proceedings and a protective costs order (hereinafter “PCO”). As all three motions were listed for hearing before me and 1 concerned overlapping matter, it was decided that the best use of court time was to hear all three matters before ruling on them together. BACKGROUND 2. These proceedings arise from events on the 10th of January, 2021, during Covid-19 health restrictions, when the Applicant was present in Dublin city centre at the location of an anti-lockdown protest/convoy. Two summonses issued in respect of the Applicant alleging breaches of s. 31A

(8)(a) and

(12)of the Health Act 1947 (as amended) for failing to comply with a Garda direction and s. 31A

(6)of the 1947 Act for leaving her residence without reasonable excuse.

1. The Applicant did not appear in the District Court on any occasion and was convicted of both offences in her absence on the 24th of October
2. A fine of €300.00 was imposed on each count (€600.00 in total).
3. Following service of the notice of fines, the Applicant applied for an extension of time to appeal to the Circuit Court. The appeal came on for hearing before the Circuit Court on the 15th of October,
5. On appeal, one charge was dismissed and one conviction was upheld. The fine imposed on foot of the conviction was reduced to €200.
6. Specifically, the Circuit Court found the Applicant not guilty of failing to comply with a direction issued, but guilty of leaving her residence without reasonable excuse. THE CIRCUIT COURT HEARING
7. The DAR (Digital Audio Recording) of the Circuit Court appeal hearing on the 15th of October, 2024, was available in evidence in this case. From the DAR transcript, it is apparent the appeal proceeded by way of de novo hearing and evidence was given by both sides (Garda and Applicant).
8. As recorded on the DAR, made aware that the Applicant had a hearing impairment, at the outset the Circuit Court Judge invited the Applicant to stand near the prosecution 2 witness stating that it was important she be able to hear the proceedings. The Applicant confirmed that she was wearing her hearing aid in one ear and had no hearing in the other ear. The Circuit Court Judge invited her to let her know if she could not hear.
9. On behalf of the Prosecution, Sergeant Moulton gave evidence that the Applicant was present in Dublin city centre on the 10th of January, 2021, at Bachelor’s Walk, the location of an anti-lockdown protest/convoy which he was policing. His evidence was that she filmed and questioned him while he tried to execute his duty in performing an arrest. He told the court that he asked her to give her lawful authority, a reasonable excuse, for being there in breach of the 1947 Act, specifically s. 31A and the regulations thereunder then in force. He gave evidence that he explained the penalties for breach of the 1947 Act and directed the Applicant to leave and return home. His evidence was that initially she walked away but he later observed her on O’Connell Street Upper where he said he warned her again to come into compliance with the regulations. His evidence was that at about 5.45 p.m. he encountered her at Talbot Street where he again warned her and asked her to come into compliance.
10. Under examination by the Applicant, it was put to Sergeant Moulton that the Applicant was going to the chemist when she saw a Sergeant Moulton speaking to a man and went to record it. Sergeant Moulton disputed that the “chemist” explanation was given at the time. It was then put to him by the Applicant that he had not sought an explanation. She further submitted that had she known she would be prosecuted she would have procured video footage of her interaction with Sergeant Moulton. Sergeant Moulton reiterated that he asked the Applicant for a reasonable excuse and the Circuit Court Judge confirmed she had noted this evidence.
11. In her own evidence, the Applicant said that she had been staying in Ballybough at the time and went to a chemist on O’Connell Street to obtain Calpol medication for her adult son. While out she encountered a crowd, stopped to observe/record briefly and then left. She denied being part of a protest, having multiple interactions with Gardaí or failing to comply with directions. She also maintained that she had not received the summons and contended that earlier lack of notice affected her ability to defend herself as she only became aware of the charges when served with the notice of fines. The 3 Applicant accepted that she was present on Bachelor’s Walk and that she had been asked to leave but claimed she did leave.
12. Under examination by Sergeant Moulton, the Applicant refused to answer questions in relation to advertising the protest in advance, her participation in the convoy earlier that day and the streaming of the events on Twitter saying that she was present in court on the summonses only. The Circuit Court Judge confirmed that the matter before her related only to the Applicant’s presence on Bachelor Walk and she was not going to take evidence in relation to other matters. The Applicant reiterated to the court that she had (p. 11 of transcript of DAR): “an SOS out and I asked out on my stream, on my live stream for the video footage….I was looking for footage where he said to me, “leave the area”, and I did. He never asked me anything about your reasonable excuse for being there.”
13. The Applicant resolutely denied that she did not comply with the direction to leave and contested that Sergeant Moulton met her again on having given that direction. She further maintained that the restrictions were not in force on the 10th of January, 2021, a claim she made several times during the hearing. She also asserted that she would have video footage from other bystanders if the matter went to the High Court.
14. The DAR transcript sets out the summing up of the Court Presenter as follows: “The S.I is before the Court … it was in date at the time, and the regulation in place at the time was in relation to leaving your place of residence without reasonable excuse. The Court heard Sergeant Moulton ask, or state to the Court that he asked Ms. Webster to give an explanation as to why she wasn’t in her home. He said that she couldn’t give an explanation and then he gave evidence to the Court of seeing her three other times and his evidence, as the Court has heard itself, no explanation was offered, so.” 4
15. As recorded on the DAR transcript, the Circuit Court Judge made a split decision having first considered the Regulations and confirmed that the Regulations handed into court applied on the 10th of January, 2021 to restrict movement.
16. In relation to the failure to comply with direction charge, the Circuit Court Judge found there was insufficient evidence and the conviction was overturned. As for the charge of leaving her residence without reasonable excuse charge, the Judge found the Applicant was outside her residence. Her explanation, going to the chemist for Calpol, an explanation which Sergeant Moulton claimed in evidence had not been given at the time despite request, was not accepted as establishing a reasonable excuse and the conviction was upheld accordingly.
17. In ruling in this way, the Circuit Court Judge was not satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to ground a conviction for failure to comply with a Garda direction but accepted the Garda evidence on the remaining offence, finding that the Applicant’s explanation was insufficient.
18. The original District Court order was varied on appeal and the fine was reduced to €200 following evidence from the Applicant that she was a pensioner with two dependents living with her. PROCEEDINGS
19. Proceedings by way of judicial review were commenced by filing papers in the Central Office on the 6th of January,
20. Leave was granted ex parte on the 26th of May, 2025 (Gearty J.). Opposition papers were filed on the 12th of November,
22. In her affidavit grounding these proceedings, the Applicant claims she never received a District Court summons, had no notice of the District Court proceedings and was convicted in the District Court without knowing about the case. She complains about long delays in the process which she contends prevented her from gathering evidence and defending herself properly claiming that the first she heard of the prosecution was when she received notice of the fine imposed in February, 2024, necessitating an application for an extension of time (which was granted) in order to appeal to the Circuit 5 Court. She contends that the lapse of time resulted in an unfair outcome because it prevented her presenting evidence in her defence. She further complains that the Judge sitting in the Circuit Court was inconsistent in dismissing one charge for lack of evidence, which the Applicant contends was because she accepted that the Applicant was prejudiced due to the lapse of time, but convicting on foot of the other charge.
23. In addition, the Applicant argues she had a lawful reason to be outside her residence as she claims she was going to a chemist for medication. She also claims citizen journalist status as a basis for asserting an entitlement to an exemption from the Covid restrictions. She says these excuses were ignored or unfairly rejected by the Circuit Court Judge. She further argues her credibility was unfairly questioned, complaining that evidence used against her was not disclosed to her and she had difficulty hearing the evidence with the result that she had no proper opportunity to challenge the evidence against her in breach of her right to constitutional fair procedures protected under Article 40.3 of the Constitution and her rights under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
24. In the Opposition papers filed in November, 2025, the DPP rejects all the Applicant’s claims and argues the prosecution was lawful and proper as the Applicant was served with the summons and was notified (in person and by letter) of the District Court hearing. The DPP contends that the Applicant participated in an anti-lockdown protest on the day in question and was stopped, warned and cautioned multiple times and failed to provide a reasonable excuse. The DPP contends that the Applicant not only participated in the protest but helped to organise the event and was seen filming Gardaí, moving around the city centre with demonstrators. In summary, the DPP pleads that the Applicant was afforded a trial in due course of law, there was no breach of constitutional or fair procedure rights and any alleged errors by the Circuit Court Judge would, in any event, be errors within jurisdiction and therefore not reviewable. It is contended on behalf of the DPP that the Circuit Court accepted the Garda evidence and found that the Applicant had left her residence without reasonable excuse.
25. It is further maintained on behalf of the DPP that the Applicant’s account “lacks candour”, and misrepresents the facts as, contrary to her claims, she was actively promoting and participating in an anti-lockdown protest, had been stopped by Gardaí 6 earlier that day and was present in central Dublin as part of that activity. The claim to not be on notice of the District Court proceedings is treated by the DPP as a basis for the claim of lack of candour as the DPP not only strongly disputes the claim of lack of notice as the Applicant was served with the summonses but goes further in maintaining on affidavit that she was warned in person about the hearing date (by Sergeant Moulton when he met her in August, 2023) and was also notified by letter dated the 8th of October, 2023, in advance of the District Court hearing.
26. The DPP denies that delay caused unfairness contending that the Applicant had an opportunity to defend herself at the appeal hearing. It is further contended that the absence of evidence (e.g. video) was irrelevant to the offence. In relation to disclosure, it is confirmed on behalf of the DPP that the Applicant, although present in the Circuit Court in March, 2024, when a hearing date was fixed, made no application for a precis of the evidence or disclosure.
27. The affidavit evidence on behalf of the DPP is contained in the affidavits of Sergeant David Moulton (prosecuting Garda), Sergeant Patrick Martin (court presenter present in Court in March, 2024, when the hearing date was fixed for the Circuit Court appeal) and Garda David Buckley confirming that he had stopped the Applicant on the day in question.
28. In his affidavit, Sergeant Moulton addressed the background to the Investigation and says he became aware, from social media, of a planned anti-lockdown convoy/protest on the 10th of January, 2021 organised in part by the Applicant. The convoy was to travel from Dublin Airport through Northern Ireland and return to Dublin city centre. He stated the Applicant was part of the convoy earlier that day and present in Dublin city centre later, near Bachelor’s Walk and O’Connell Street. She was observed filming Gardaí and engaging with them, in a group of demonstrators, with a mobile speaker and shouting slogans such as “until the next convoy.”
29. Sergeant Moulton confirmed he directed the Applicant to return home under s.31A of the 1947 Act. He said she refused to provide a legitimate explanation for being outside her home. She was warned once, then seen again shortly afterwards, and warned a second and third time, yet remained in the area. He considered that the Applicant had failed to comply with Garda directions and was outside her place of residence without 7 reasonable excuse. He further maintained that the summonses were served at the Applicant’s address (in person by one Garda William Byrne on the 2nd of May, 2023) and she was personally cautioned about the hearing date in August, 2023, by him when he met her on the street. A letter dated the 8th of October, 2023, confirming the hearing date was sent and not returned. This letter stated that the Applicant had been summoned to attend before the District Court on the 26th of June, 2023 and the case was adjourned to the 24th of October,
30. The letter further referred to the fact that the Applicant was cautioned in person about the court date on the 26th of August, 2023 when Sergeant Moulton met her on O’Connell Street Lower, Dublin
31. Accordingly, it was Sergeant Moulton’s position that the Applicant had notice of the District Court hearing. Despite this, the Applicant did not attend the District Court on the 24th of October, 2023 and was therefore convicted in her absence.
32. Sergeant Moulton confirmed that thereafter the Applicant appealed, seeking an extension of time for appeal and the matter was heard de novo before the Circuit Court on the 15th of October,
33. The Circuit Court allowed the appeal on one offence and upheld the conviction on the second offence (DAR available in evidence before me).
34. Sergeant Moulton’s evidence on affidavit in opposing these proceedings went further than his evidence before the Circuit Court. Notably, he avers that when stopped the Applicant gave an address in Ballyfermot (although she claimed before the Circuit Court that she was staying in Ballybough) and he refers to the Applicant using a loudspeaker on O’Connell Street after he had cautioned her on Bachelor’s Walk shouting “until the next convoy,” verifying the plea in the Statement of Opposition in this regard.
35. In his affidavit sworn in his capacity as Court Presenter on the 5th of March, 2024, Sergeant Martin confirmed that the Applicant attended the appeal mention on that date and did not seek disclosure or a precis of evidence at that stage.
36. In a separate Affidavit, Garda Buckley confirmed he stopped the Applicant earlier that day on the 10th of January 2021, while she was participating in the convoy.
37. By Notice of Motion dated the 20th of November, 2025, the Applicant sought an order striking out the Statement of Opposition filed by the DPP. The Applicant contends that 8 much of the Statement of Opposition raises factual disputes going to the merits of the criminal case, rather than addressing the legality of the decision. It is asserted that the opposition does not meet the central complaints in the proceedings (lack of notice, delay, breach of fair procedures) and therefore fails to disclose a valid answer in law. The Applicant maintains that the factual narrative put forward (e.g. about her participation in protests and credibility) is irrelevant, prejudicial, and lacking candour and should not be relied upon to defeat a procedural fairness challenge. It is argued that the Statement of Opposition amounts to an improper attempt to re-litigate the underlying prosecution rather than address whether the process was lawful.
38. Separately, by further motion dated the 20th of November, 2025, the Applicant seeks a PCO. The PCO is ostensibly sought on the basis that the case raises public law and constitutional issues of general importance, the Applicant has limited financial means and that denying a PCO would impede access to justice and deter legitimate challenges to alleged breaches of fair procedures.
39. Written submissions were exchanged in March and April, 2026 and the matter came on for hearing before me on the 4th of June,
40. ANALYSIS AND DECISION Overview
41. The Applicant claimed in the Statement of Grounds upon which leave was granted that she only discovered that she had been prosecuted arising from events occurring on the 10th of January, 2021, when notified that a fine had been imposed by the District Court in February,
42. She obtained an extension of time within which to bring an appeal to the Circuit Court. The appeal was heard over four years after the alleged offence and the Applicant complained that she was never provided with the evidence against her and was hampered in her defence by this and by the lapse of time.
43. For the record, I note that the summonses which issued in respect of the offences alleged against the Applicant have not been produced by either side in these proceedings. It is no part of the case for which leave was granted that the summonses were applied for 9 out of time. There is no evidence before me in relation to the date of application for the summons and no submissions were addressed to me in this regard.
44. I propose to address each of the three motions before the Court in turn, starting with the Applicant’s application to strike out the DPP’s Opposition papers, then her application for a PCO and, finally, her application for relief by way of judicial review. Application to Strike Out
45. By Notice of Motion dated the 20th of November, 2025, the Applicant seeks an order pursuant to Order 19 r. 27 and 28, Order 40, r. 4, Order 84 r. 20

(5)of the Rules of the Superior Courts (RSC) and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the Court striking out in its entirety the Statement of Opposition and verifying affidavits/exhibits delivered by the DPP on the 14th of November, 2025 or alternatively striking out specific paragraphs. She also seeks an order debarring the DPP from further opposing these proceedings and directing that the judicial review proceed unopposed.

1. The Applicant argues that the Statement of Opposition should be struck out because it focuses on the merits, contains irrelevant and prejudicial allegations, concerns matters not in evidence before the District Court and fails to engage with the procedural and constitutional issues that are properly before the Court in judicial review.
2. In response, the DPP emphasises that striking out a pleading is a drastic remedy that should only be granted in clear and obvious cases. It is contended that a Statement of Opposition should only be struck out if it discloses no arguable defence. It was further submitted on behalf of the DPP that its pleading raises genuine disputes of fact and clearly sets out a defence to the judicial review application. In particular, the Applicant’s claims about lack of notice, service of summons and fairness of the proceedings are contested. The DPP argues that the material complained of (e.g. the Applicant’s conduct, presence at the protest, interactions with Gardaí) is relevant background and necessary for the Court to understand the context of the decisions under challenge. It is contended that judicial review often requires factual narrative, especially where issues like notice, credibility, or procedural fairness are in dispute. 10 The DPP contends that the Statement of Opposition directly answers the Applicant’s case, including allegations of no notice, delay and breach of fair procedures.
3. In their written submissions, neither party relied on specific authorities on striking out pleadings. The DPP makes a bald assertion, which I do not accept and which is not supported by any authority, that the application to strike out is misconceived because the Statement of Opposition is neither a pleading nor a defence. Although Order 125 of the RSC defines a pleading as including an originating summons, statement of claim, defence, counterclaim, reply, petition or answer, this does not have the effect of excluding the exercise of a strike out power in judicial review proceedings. In Delaney and McGrath on Civil Procedure, (5th Ed., 2023) the term “pleading” is described as “a generic one applied to a variety of documents which set out the contents of the claim or defence of a party to proceedings and, thus, identify the issues between the parties” (para. 5-01).
4. I am satisfied that I have a jurisdiction to strike out pleas in a Statement of Opposition (be that under Order 19 or under the inherent jurisdiction of the court) but that this is a power which should not lightly be exercised. A respondent in judicial review proceedings does not need to satisfy the court that it has an arguable basis for opposition as a condition of pursuing grounds of opposition (unlike in the case of a Statement of Grounds) and there is therefore no minimum threshold permission regulating what may be pleaded in opposition. To this extent, a Statement of Opposition does not differ from a defence in plenary proceedings. As a general rule, matters should only be excluded from pleadings in limited circumstances such as where such pleading is irrelevant and unnecessary, scandalous or otherwise an abuse of process. Authorities in relation to a strike out jurisdiction in respect of pleadings support the conclusion that the court should err on the side of allowing the pleading to stand.
5. I have reviewed the terms of the Statement of Opposition which details both factual and legal grounds of opposition in a manner which sets out why the DPP contends that the Applicant is not entitled to the relief she seeks in these proceedings. It is not a bare traverse but identifies factual and legal grounds of opposition and joins issue fully with the case made by the Applicant. It is true that the DPP refers in opposing these proceedings to matters not in evidence before the Circuit Court. There is no rule 11 preventing the parties from relying on material which was not before the trial court to provide a narrative background or if otherwise relevant or material to grounds of claim or opposition in subsequent judicial review proceedings. While material not before the trial court cannot usually be relied upon to support the decision made as the decision should stand or fall on the evidence available when the impugned decision was made, it may nonetheless be relevant in respect of grounds which do not relate to the sustainability of the decision on the evidence before the court and also to discretionary remedies in judicial review proceedings. There is a duty on all parties in judicial review proceedings to be candid with the court and to put all relevant material before the court. This should occur, even where the party putting the information before the court does not agree with its content.
6. In this case, the Applicant claims that she was not on notice of the District Court proceedings because the summonses were not served. She complains that by reason of this, she was deprived of a proper opportunity to defend herself. She seeks an order quashing the decision of the Circuit Court on this basis. The Circuit Court Judge made no finding on the notice issue, being satisfied that such issues, if any, were cured by the Applicant’s attendance before the Circuit Court for a de novo hearing.
7. It is clearly relevant to the exercise of my discretionary jurisdiction in respect of this issue which the Applicant pursues on this application by way of judicial review that it is contended that she had been notified in several different ways as to the process. In maintaining that she was not on notice of the proceedings, the Applicant did not refer to physical service of the summons upon her in May, 2023, or to her encounter with Sergeant Moulton in August, 2023 when he claims he verbally informed her of the adjourned hearing date or indeed the letter sent to her home address in early October,
8. This evidence is centrally relevant to the issues I must decide and the DPP was entitled to and quite properly put this material before me in circumstances where the Applicant contends that her conviction was unfair due to lapse in time and the failure to notify her of District Court proceedings.
9. Although significant evidence has now been put on affidavit in these proceedings in relation to service which suggests that it the Applicant was untruthful in maintaining that she was not on notice of the District Court proceedings, the Applicant has not 12 engaged with the material substantively. If the Applicant disputed this evidence she could have done so on affidavit and/or by seeking to cross-examine, but she did not do this. Instead, she seeks to have the evidence excluded without engaging with the true factual position. She is not entitled to have this relevant evidence excluded and to expect any judge to consider granting her discretionary relief by way of judicial review without being informed in relation to all relevant matters. I must properly weigh what the DPP says in respect of service in deciding on the question of the fairness of a delayed process and whether the Applicant’s contentions in relation to the prejudice she suffered because of her asserted ignorance of the existence of the proceedings are properly grounded in fact.
10. The Applicant also objects to evidence relating to her broader activities in respect of the lockdown protest on the basis that these matters were not in evidence before the Circuit Court. It is important to appreciate, however, that while evidence may not be relevant to guilt or innocence on a specific charge in the Circuit Court, it may become relevant in subsequent judicial review proceedings having regard to the nature of the legal issues raised and the factual basis contended for in grounding these proceedings. Indeed, the relevance of evidence to the matters advanced derives not only from the nature of the issues raised by way of judicial review (not pursued or not pursued in the same manner before a first instance court), but also because relief by way of judicial review is discretionary.
11. The discretionary nature of relief by way of judicial reviews means that questions of the Applicant’s conduct and candour which are not relevant to guilt or innocence on a specific charge and were not admitted for this purpose, may be relevant to whether a court will intervene by way of judicial review in subsequent proceedings. The fact that evidence of surrounding circumstances is adduced does not constitute a collateral attack on a judge’s ruling in relation to admissibility evidence on a specific charge. This material is not being relied upon in these proceedings to establish guilt or innocence on the charges before the Circuit Court but rather because it is relevant to the issue of an entitlement to relief in judicial review proceedings.
12. As the exercise of discretion is a matter for the judge hearing the judicial review proceedings and as the judge is capable of deciding what is relevant to the exercise of 13 that discretion or otherwise unduly prejudicial material which should not be weighed or given much weight, it would only be in rare cases, such as where scandalous material is put before the court which it is considered should not be permitted to remain on the record in any form, that the exercise of a strike out jurisdiction might be justified. This is not such a case. Indeed, it is noteworthy that while maintaining that certain material is scandalous or oppressive, the Applicant has not sought to reply to contest any element of the Affidavits filed on behalf of the DPP verifying opposition or to cross-examine on foot of same.
13. I am satisfied that no unfairness has arisen for the Applicant from the fact that material which was not before the Circuit Court Judge in relation to her activities on the day in question having regard to the specific charges before her, has been put in evidence before me on this judicial review application. The Applicant has had the opportunity to respond and make submissions in respect of this material. As apparent from my reasoning in respect of the substantive grounds of challenge addressed below, I have considered these submissions in coming to my decision on this application. I have considered additional evidence regarding the Applicant’s activities on the day in question and the notification of proceedings not from the perspective of justifying the impugned decision of the Circuit Court Judge but for the purpose of deciding on the grounds of challenge advanced in these separate judicial review proceedings and whether I should intervene by way of judicial review in the circumstances of this case.
14. The complaint that the DPP deployed “outrageous tactics against a lay litigant” has not been established. I am satisfied that the Applicant was not taken short in the conduct of these judicial review proceedings but given time to respond in respect of Opposition papers filed. It was open to her to seek more time if required for stated reason. There is no evidence before me that she needed or sought more time. Her focus has been limiting the information which the court may consider, rather than engaging with the truth or otherwise of the evidence offered on behalf of the DPP.
15. Having considered the terms of the Opposition papers, I am also satisfied that the alleged non-compliance with Order 84, r. 22

(5)of the RSC has not been established. The exercise of a strike-out jurisdiction is exceptional and used sparingly. If the Applicant truly apprehends a lack of particularisation in the Statement of Opposition, 14 which she did not specifically identify for me in argument, then it was open to her to seek the less draconian remedy of an order for better particulars. The fact that she has not done so is unsurprising in circumstances where the Statement of Opposition is detailed, both factually and legally, and is grounded on verifying affidavits from no less than three separate deponents. I am satisfied that the Opposition papers are adequately particularised and that the Applicant is not entitled to the strike out relief she seeks. Application for Protective Costs 52. By separate Notice of Motion also dated the 20th of November, 2025, the Applicant seeks a PCO pursuant to s. 50B of the Planning and Development Act 2000 (as amended) “applied by analogy”, the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, Order 99 of the RSC and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union capping the DPP’s recoverable costs at either nil or a nominal sum of €200.00 or less. Her Notice of Motion refers to the decision of the Supreme Court in Dunne v. Minister for the Environment [2007] IESC 60 which identifies a test for a departure from normal costs rules in public interest litigation, albeit not in a case involving a PCO. 53. In support of her application for a PCO, the Applicant submits that this case raises important issues of constitutional and public law, including fair procedures, right to notice and access to justice. She argues that these issues go beyond her personal situation and justify special protection as to costs. She relies on her limited financial means, arguing that she cannot afford the risk of an adverse costs order and without protection, she would be effectively prevented from pursuing the proceedings. A central theme is that refusal of a PCO would create a chilling effect, deterring her (and others) from litigating constitutional issues and undermine the ability of individuals to vindicate rights against the State. She emphasises the imbalance between herself and the State, contending that a PCO is necessary to ensure fairness and equality of arms. She submits that it would be unjust and inequitable to expose her to full costs risk and the Court should exercise its discretion to facilitate the proper ventilation of the issues. 54. The DPP opposes the PCO and submits that the case is not a true public interest or public law case warranting a PCO. It argues that the proceedings arise from the Applicant’s own criminal prosecution and are therefore personal in nature, not public 15 interest litigation. The DPP contends that the Applicant’s case does not display strong or exceptional merit and does not meet the threshold for costs protection. It maintains that the Applicant was properly notified, received a full de novo appeal and is effectively attempting to re-litigate factual findings. 55. The DPP points out that the 2000 Act applies only in respect of environmental issues raised in planning judicial reviews, pointing out that the Oireachtas has made no similar provision for other areas of law. The DPP emphasises that the default rule is that costs follow the event (now given statutory expression in the Legal Services Regulation Act, 2015) and a PCO is an exceptional departure from that principle. It is submitted that there is no justification for displacing the normal costs regime in this case. While acknowledging the Applicant’s claimed limited means, the DPP argues financial hardship alone is insufficient to justify a PCO as otherwise such orders would be granted routinely. The DPP disputes that refusing a PCO would undermine access to justice or create a broader chilling effect, as alleged. It argues the case does not concern a systemic issue of general importance, but rather a fact-specific challenge to a conviction. 56. Again, no authorities are identified by either party in their written submissions in support of their respective positions in respect of the protective costs application. Indeed, counsel for the DPP advised me that she had not identified any authorities on the point and submitted that this was consistent with there being no precedent for such applications. 57. In fact, while the jurisdiction to grant a PCO is rarely exercised outside the environmental law context, the existence of an inherent jurisdiction to make such an order is well acknowledged. Indeed, the first acknowledgement of this inherent jurisdiction in this jurisdiction occurred more than twenty-five years ago in Village Residents Association Ltd v An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2000] 2 I.R. 321, [2000] IEHC 34. In that case, Laffoy J. recognised the existence of a jurisdiction to award a PCO in an exceptional case. 58. Several years later, in Friends of the Curragh Environment Ltd v An Bord Pleanála [2006] IEHC 243, Kelly J. reiterated that a PCO will only be made in the most exceptional circumstances and where the interests of justice require such a course to be 16 taken. Kelly J. added that the first thing an applicant for a PCO must demonstrate is that the issues raised are of general public importance. Having considered a number of grounds advanced by the applicant in support of the argument to this effect in the Friends of the Curragh Environment, Kelly J. was unable to identify any points of law of general public importance and concluded that it was not in the public interest that the issues raised be resolved with the aid of a PCO. 59. Then, in Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner [2014] IEHC 310, a case involving EU, constitutional and data protection issues of major public importance, the High Court granted its first PCO limiting Mr. Schrems’ exposure to an adverse costs order to no more than €10,000 in legal costs should he lose his legal action arising from the mass transfer of data by Facebook Ireland to US intelligence services. The order was made through the courts’ inherent jurisdiction over costs. Despite the court being prepared to make a PCO in Schrems, outside the statutory or Aarhus environmental regime, PCOs remain very rare. 60. In Tearfund Ireland Ltd v. Commissioner of Valuation [2020] IEHC 621, a PCO was refused on the basis that the stringent criteria for such an order were not met, acknowledging that such discretion as the court enjoys is highly constrained, not least where there is a statutory framework governing the award of costs under the Legal Services Regulatory Authority Act, 2015 and Order 99 of the RSC. Similarly, in J.S. (A Minor) v. Minister for Education [2023] IEHC 80, a PCO was refused in a special needs education case primarily because the court in that instance did not consider the case to be a public interest case of the type warranting the exercise of a jurisdiction to grant a PCO. In addition, the court was not satisfied that the case had sufficient merit to justify the making of an order. 61. More recently, in Browne v. An Taoiseach [2023] IEHC 205, Twomey J. helpfully summarised the conditions which required to be satisfied for the grant of a PCO following a review of the authorities as follows (at para. 81): i. The court should be satisfied … that the application has a real prospect of success; 17 ii. The proceedings must raise a point of law of special and general public importance; iii. The public interest must require that this point of law should be resolved; iv. The applicant must have no private interest in the outcome of the case; v. It must be fair and just to make the order having regard to the financial resources of the applicant and the respondent(

1. s)and to the amount of costs that are likely to be involved; vi. The applicant will probably discontinue the proceedings, if the order is not made and will be acting reasonably in so doing. vii. If all six of these conditions are satisfied and if it is fair and just for the court to exercise its discretion to make such an order, it will do so, bearing in mind: (
2. a)that these orders are only made in the most exceptional of circumstances; (
3. b)the important role played by the awarding of costs, at the completion of a case, in ensuring that, during the case, the court process is not abused and unmeritorious applications are not pursued; (
4. c)that there is an unfairness to a litigant having to bear the cost of defeating an unmeritorious claim or pursuing a justified claim (whether that litigant is the State/taxpayer or a private party).” 62. In circumstances where it is established that the Irish courts should be very cautious about the exercise of an inherent jurisdiction to displace ordinary costs rules, something compelling and exceptional in the nature of the general public importance of the issues, a public interest requiring resolution of the issues, the absence of a private financial interest, the requirements of justice and cost risk deterrence as well as considerations of proportionality would be required to justify the making of such an order in a nonenvironmental case (where a specific statutory regime applies). The jurisprudence demonstrates that it is a largely unexercised jurisdiction. 18 63. These proceedings do not raise any matters of public interest. They do not comprise, for example, a challenge to the vires or constitutionality of the regulatory requirements in force in January, 2021. The Applicant is solely concerned in these proceedings with the prosecution taken against her under the Regulations, based on her contention that she had a reasonable excuse for her presence away from her residence and/or having regard to the factors such as procedural unfairness and delay arising on the facts of this case and specific to the Applicant. The decision to convict the Applicant challenged in these proceedings does not turn on a contested point of statutory interpretation or a matter of constitutional interpretation, but on the evidence and the Circuit Court Judge’s assessment of the evidence in one case. 64. I see no reason in principle nor any authority to support the proposition that this is a case which would warrant the court departing from the normal rules in relation to costs. Indeed, the Applicant has chosen to embark on resource intensive judicial review proceedings to challenge a fine of €200.00. The size of the fine is of course not determinative as the conviction itself carries significance no matter what the size of the fine, but the Court should not be blind either to the fact that the Applicant brings these proceedings in circumstances where there is ample evidence, to which she has not responded, to suggest that she was on notice of the District Court proceedings but elected not to attend, a good answer in respect of allegations of unfairness she advances in these proceedings. Nor can I ignore the fact that there is also ample evidence, not adduced before the Circuit Court in respect of the discrete charges and not responded to by the Applicant on affidavit, that she had been involved in the organisation and promotion of the anti-lockdown protest. This undermines her bona fides in protesting that she had a reasonable excuse for being outside her residence in consequence of any medical exigency. 65. Although not before the Circuit Court as evidence of her guilt on the charges alleged against her, material relating to her involvement in protests on the 10th of January, 2021, is undermining of the factual premise for these judicial review proceedings whereby the Applicant asserts the existence of a reasonable excuse defence on grounds not articulated contemporaneously with events in January, 2021. This is particularly so in circumstances where she fails to engage in relation to evidence as to service on her, which evidence fundamentally undermines a central factual premise of these 19 proceedings. It bears emphasis that these factors are personal to the Applicant only and do not touch on what might constitute a reasonable excuse generally in a manner which clarifies the law. The case is therefore wholly devoid of necessary elements of general public importance which must be present to ground the exercise of a discretion to grant a PCO. 66. Furthermore, in my view, there is no reasonable degree of proportionality between the Applicant’s actions in pursuing these proceedings and the consequences for her of the fine which has been imposed upon conviction arising from non-compliance with health measures in place during the Covid-19 Pandemic which might be invoked to argue for an enlarged jurisdiction to grant a PCO by reason of access to justice considerations. The Applicant has not averred that she could not continue with the proceedings without a PCO. The timing of the hearing of her application together with the substantive proceedings, reflects the fact that her proceedings are being maintained regardless of the outcome of an application for a PCO. 67. For completeness, considering the test summarised in Browne and for reasons canvassed below in respect of my conclusions reached in respect of the substantive proceedings, these proceedings also fail a merits test, a conclusion I would be satisfied to reach even on a preliminary basis for the purpose of considering whether the criteria for the grant of a PCO were met. It is inconceivable that a PCO might ever be granted in a case of this nature so peculiarly related to the facts and circumstances of this one case and where clear issues arise in relation to the bona fides and candour of the Applicant. 68. The power to impose adverse orders when unmeritorious proceedings are unsuccessfully pursued is an important means, provided for in law, by which the administration of justice is safeguarded from deleterious impact on the scarce resource of court time, at taxpayer expense, to the detriment of other cases and court users seeking access to the courts. There is a duty on the court in the circumstances to seek to preserve the scarce resource of court time to ensure effective access to the courts in accordance with the Constitution for all. Permitting unmeritorious actions to eat into the scarce resource of court time, without fear of consequence, is not consistent with a proper discharge of this duty. A court should, absent very compelling circumstances, 20 therefore, retain the power to safeguard against the abuse of court process by retaining the ability to make an adverse costs order, guided by principle and by statute, at the conclusion of the case. 69. In this case the risk of an adverse costs order has not had a chilling effect on litigation. The application was only made after delivery of opposition papers and came on for hearing contemporaneously with the substantive proceedings. There is no properly grounded suggestion that the proceedings would not be maintained with a PCO being made. 70. The Applicant has not laid any factual or legal basis upon which I could properly consider exercising the novel jurisdiction of making a PCO on an application heard contemporaneously with the hearing of the substantive action. She does not bring herself within the categories of case identified in Dunne in which a departure from normal costs rules might be warranted. Unlike the case of O’Doherty & Waters v. Minister for Health, Ireland and the AG [2022] IESC 32, which she refers to as authority in favour of such a departure, this case does not involve issues of fundamental and general public importance. As the power to make a PCO is a power which requires to be sparingly exercised in cases of some exceptional public importance, this application must also fail. Application for Relief by way of Judicial Review Lack of Notice 71. There is ample evidence before me to the effect that the Applicant was on notice of the District Court prosecution, notwithstanding her protestation to the contrary. The Applicant has not responded on affidavit to Sergeant Moulton’s contention that he told her personally of the hearing date in August, 2024 and that correspondence advising her of the adjourned date was sent to her in advance of the District Court hearing. Nor has the Applicant sought to cross-examine Sergeant Moulton on his evidence (see RAS Medical Limited v. Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland [2019] IESC 4 referred to in Criminal Assets Bureau v. Routeback Media & Ors. [2025] IESC 34 which was cited 21 by the Applicant). Accordingly, it has not been established that the Applicant was not on notice of the District Court proceedings. 72. In any event, I am satisfied that the decision of the Circuit Court Judge was made following a de novo hearing which, even if the Applicant’s claim not to be on notice of the District Court proceedings were accepted (which it is not), operated to cure potential unfairness arising from the fact that the convictions were recorded in her absence. 73. The DAR shows that the Applicant received a full rehearing in the Circuit Court. The Circuit Court decision was reached following a merits-based assessment of credibility and facts. Both sides gave evidence and were heard. As the appeal constituted a full rehearing and the Applicant was present in Court, procedural issues like service of summons were no longer relevant. Fair Procedures 74. The Applicant did not appear in the District Court and has not established to my satisfaction that this was because she was not on notice of the proceedings. Had she appeared, she could have sought disclosure in advance of trial and she would also know, from the conduct of the hearing, the nature of what was alleged against her and the evidence relied upon. She cannot lay the loss of this opportunity at the door of the DPP or the Court when it has not been established that this occurred by reason of a failure to properly notify her rather than her own simple failure to attend before the District Court to respond to the allegations on foot of duly issued and served summonses. 75. In any event, it was open to the Applicant to seek pre-trial disclosure in the Circuit Court. I accept the Court Presenter’s evidence that she did not do so. The Applicant does not respond in respect of this evidence or seek to cross-examine the Court Presenter on his evidence. Nor is there any evidence that she ever applied for legal aid either for the purpose of the hearing before the Circuit Court or the bringing of proceedings by way of judicial review. In the absence of any such evidence, I conclude that she elected to appear as a lay litigant and therefore must accept responsibility for the failure to make a routine pre-trial application for disclosure if she considered it necessary. 22 76. The DAR transcript of the Circuit Court hearing demonstrates that the Applicant was afforded fair procedures before the Circuit Court, the Circuit Court Judge ensuring she could hear, taking the additional step of confining the evidence to the specific charges before the Court in a manner which precluded evidence being adduced in relation to other activities of the Applicant on the day in question and giving the Applicant an opportunity to cross-examine (which she availed
5. of)and to be heard in response to the charges. 77. Evidence of the degree of fairness brought to bear on the appeal, the Circuit Court Judge refused to convict on one of the two charges. Insofar as the charge upon which the Applicant was convicted was concerned, however, there was evidence before the court to support conviction and the decision reached was a decision made within jurisdiction based on the trial judge’s assessment of the evidence. 78. It is not appropriate to intervene in respect of a judge’s assessment of the evidence by way of judicial review once there is a sufficiency of evidence to support conviction and it has not been demonstrated that the Circuit Court Judge erred in jurisdiction in this regard. I am satisfied that there was a sufficiency of evidence in this case and it was open to the Judge to convict, as she did. Failure to Consider Reasonable Excuse 79. I have been referred by the Applicant to Regulation 5 of the Health Act 1947 (Section 31A - Temporary Restrictions) (Covid-19) (No. 8) Regulations 2020 (S.I. No. 448/2020) which provided that a person should not leave his or her place of residence “without reasonable excuse.” Regulation 5

(2)further provided for circumstances which constituted a reasonable excuse which included attending a medical appointment or seeking essential medical assistance.

1. In fact, the applicable regulations are the Health Act, 1947 (Section 31A - Temporary Restrictions) (Covid-19) (No. 10) Regulations 2020 (S.I. No. 701/2020), in force at the time of the offences with which the Applicant was charged and breach of which was pursued by summons. These Regulations provided for temporary restrictions on a range 23 of indoor and outdoor events, along with temporary restrictions on access by the public to a range of businesses and services. They also provided for temporary restrictions on travel. It is unclear to me why the Applicant persisted in relying on the wrong Regulations when this was the subject of an express ruling by the Circuit Court Judge which she does not contest in these proceedings.
2. The applicable Regulations remained in operation from the 31st of December, 2020, until the 31st of January,
3. Regulation 4 prohibited leaving a residence without reasonable excuse in similar terms to Regulation 5 quoted above and included by the Applicant in the papers she presented to the Court.
4. To the extent that the Applicant contends that the learned Circuit Court Judge erred in law in failing to treat her claimed visit to the chemist as a “reasonable excuse”, I am satisfied that this case was not decided on the basis that a visit to the chemist was not a reasonable excuse. No such finding was made.
5. Instead, it is clear from the record of the hearing that this case was decided on the basis that the Circuit Court Judge did not believe that the Applicant had left her residence to attend the chemist to buy Calpol. The very clear, cogent and undisputed Garda evidence was that she never tendered this explanation. The only dispute before the Circuit Court being whether she was requested to provide an explanation or not.
6. While the Applicant disputes that she was ever asked for an explanation, the Circuit Court Judge as trier of fact, was entitled to prefer the Garda evidence, as she clearly did, in the circumstances of this case.
7. The Circuit Court Judge did not elaborate on her reasons for preferring the Garda evidence but the Statement of Grounds as filed contains no plea that the decision to convict is unsustainable for lack of reasons. Accordingly, the Applicant does not have leave to challenge the decision for lack of reasoning.
8. The reasoning of the Circuit Court Judge is, in any event, plainly discernible. She accepted the Garda evidence that the Applicant was requested to provide an excuse and failed to do so. Where it was common case that the Applicant had never stated that she was attending the chemist, then the Applicant’s claim to have been at large on the streets 24 of Dublin for the purpose of attending a chemist to buy Calpol by reason of medical exigencies which she believed authorised her travel but did not say so when stopped by the Gardai on the day is self-evidently and wholly implausible.
9. Furthermore, in an apparent effort to contain the proceedings, the Circuit Court Judge did not permit questioning in relation to the Applicant’s other activities on the day in question in circumstances where Sergeant Moulton attempted to cross-examine the Applicant in relation to her involvement in the protest, asking her about her actions in advertising the convoy in advance, attending the anti-lockdown protest and live streaming it on Twitter, even though this line of questioning was plainly relevant to the Applicant’s protestation that she was present in the City Centre only to attend the chemist.
10. It was clear from the Applicant’s own evidence, despite her objection to answering questions in relation to her activities earlier in the day and her involvement in promoting, participating and live-streaming the protest (an objection upheld by the Circuit Court Judge), that she was engaged in videoing events in an intentional and organised manner. Indeed, in her own words to the court, she had put out “an SOS” on her “live stream” seeking footage from that day from other persons present. She even told the court that two people had come forward with footage in response to this SOS, but it was not the footage she was seeking.
11. There can be no mystery in the circumstances as to why the Circuit Court Judge preferred the evidence of Sergeant Moulton. The Applicant’s bare assertions that she was in the City Centre that day to buy Calpol, fell to be assessed in the light of Sergeant Moulton’s clear evidence in relation to his interactions with her and the fact that the Applicant accepted that she never told Sergeant Moulton that she was in the City Centre because of a medical exigency. The Circuit Court Judge did not rule that attending a chemist to procure essential medication could never constitute a reasonable excuse, but she clearly did not accept that the Applicant was in the City Centre on the day in question to procure Calpol for her son, an entirely reasonable conclusion to reach given that the Applicant did not say so at the time. 25 Citizen Journalist
12. The Applicant also complains that the Circuit Court Judge should have accepted her presence outside her residence as a citizen journalist as a reasonable excuse but did not. The Applicant does not rely on any statutory definition of reasonable excuse in this regard, nor does she point to any authority. As a self-appointed “citizen journalist” who enjoys no formally recognised professional standing, it is not surprising that the Applicant did not press this argument before the Circuit Court, focussing instead on her putative visit to the chemist to buy Calpol. There is no necessity for a judge to address every plainly unmeritorious argument, not central to the arguments made, to explain why those arguments are not accepted. Delay
13. The Applicant contends that by reason of delay, she was impeded in defending herself against the charges and had she known about the charges in a timely manner she could have procured exonerating evidence, specifically video evidence.
14. In circumstances where I do not accept as established that the Applicant was not on notice of the District Court proceedings in view of the unchallenged evidence of Sergeant Moulton as to the various and several means by which she was notified of the existence of the District Court proceedings which she has neither responded to nor challenged by way of judicial review, it follows that much of the delay complained has not been established as being caused by anything other than the Applicant’s own failure to attend in answer to a summons and to participate in the District Court proceedings, despite due notice of same.
15. Furthermore, I am not satisfied that delay in the process has been established as having any bearing on the Applicant’s ability to defend herself in respect of the specific charge. The Applicant accepted that she had left her residence. She accepted that she did not tender any excuse at the time. As already noted, the failure to tender the excuse contemporaneously with being stopped by the Gardai undermines the plausibility of the excuse belatedly tendered before the Court and it is not immediately obvious what other material could be relied on, lost due to the passage of time, which might reasonably 26 bear on the question of guilt or evidence on the charge of being outside her residence without reasonable excuse.
16. The Applicant’s case before the Circuit Court was that the evidence she could have produced if she knew of the prosecution in time was video footage. She told the court that the video footage would have shown that she left when directed to by Sergeant Moulton. She did not seek to rely on video footage to show that she was not asked to provide an explanation. To establish that she was not asked to provide an explanation, given that it was accepted that he stopped her, questioned her and requested her to move on, would require footage with audio covering the entirety of her interaction with Sergeant Moulton on Bachelor’s Walk. She accepted in her evidence to the court that she had not given an explanation so there is no suggestion that video footage might show otherwise. In distinction with the direction to move on, compliance with which could potentially have been captured on video in the form of a visual record of the Applicant moving away, the potential probative value of video evidence in respect of her presence in the city centre without reasonable excuse is not strong. It bears note too that she told the Circuit Court Judge that she intended to pursue this matter before the High Court and she would have video footage for the High Court. The Applicant has made no attempt to produce any video footage (despite admitting she had some) in either the Circuit Court or the High Court.
17. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the lapse of time between the events in January, 2021 and the matter coming before the Circuit Court in October, 2024, rendered the Applicant’s conviction unfair. Inconsistency as between Charges
18. The Applicant complains of the alleged inconsistency of the Circuit Court Judge accepting that delay resulted in unfairness in proceeding to convict in respect of the charge of failing to comply with Garda direction but not the charge of leaving her place of residence without reasonable excuse. In fact, the Circuit Court Judge made no finding that the Applicant had been prejudiced by delay in respect of either charge. She did not rely on the alleged missing video evidence in deciding to find the Applicant not guilty on the charge of failing to comply with Garda direction. The Circuit Court Judge 27 found the Applicant not guilty for the stated reason that she was not satisfied that she had sufficient evidence to convict. This finding was made in circumstances where Sergeant Moulton’s evidence confirmed that the Applicant did move from Bachelor’s Walk when directed and he was relying on her presence on O’Connell Street and Talbot Street later as opposed to a failure to move from Bachelor’s Walk. It was against this background that the charge was dismissed. The evidential position in respect of the second charge was quite different.
19. In any event, it would be open to the Circuit Court Judge to take a different approach to the potential significance of video evidence depending on the nature of the charge and the totality of the evidence. The totality of the evidence in respect of each charge was qualitatively different in this case, as was the potential value of any missing video evidence. Lack of Candour
20. The DPP contends that the application brought by the Applicant lacks candour in that she did not acknowledge her role and participation in the anti-lockdown protest which took place on the 10th of January, 2021, despite the DPP’s contention that she had participated in the demonstration, had been part of the convoy that travelled North and was seen in a number of locations in possession of a mobile loud speaker, taking active part in the demonstration. This contention is made even though there is no evidence that the Applicant was convicted of an offence in respect of this prior involvement and the Circuit Court Judge ruled that she only wished to hear evidence in relation to the charges which were before her. It is the case, however, that Sergeant Moulton had sought to question the Applicant in this regard in the Circuit Court but questioning was not allowed. This fact should have been disclosed on an ex parte application when the DAR transcript was not yet in evidence.
21. Instead of disclosing that an attempt had been made on behalf of the Prosecution to refer to her alleged involvement with the protest but the Circuit Court Judge limited the evidence to the charges before the Court and did not permit matters relating to the Applicant’s alleged involvement to be pursued as she ought to have done, the Applicant 28 has elected not to engage with the evidence in relation to her involvement with the protest, resting on her objection to the admissibility of this evidence. There is certainly a basis for concluding that this approach lacks candour and seeks to prevent the Court in judicial review proceedings deciding the case on the real facts.
22. The lack of candour claim advanced on behalf of the DPP does not rest alone on the failure to refer to issues which the prosecution had sought to raise in the Circuit Court but also relies on the fact that the Applicant did not disclose that she had been served with a copy of the summons and cautioned as to the date for hearing in the District Court in person and by letter. Clearly, this would not constitute a lack of candour if it did not happen and the Applicant contested service as contended on behalf of the DPP and her version of events were accepted. In circumstances where she has not replied to this evidence and has not sought to challenge it by way of cross-examination leading me to conclude that a failure of service has not been established, then the failure to refer to service may go beyond a lack of candour and could constitute false evidence.
23. In addition, a plea of lack of candour is advanced on the basis that the Applicant failed to disclose in bringing her application ex parte for leave that she had not applied for disclosure. The contention made that she could not hear proceedings in the Circuit Court is also instanced as an example of lack of candour as it is not supported by the transcript of the DAR which shows full engagement with the evidence and questioning.
24. There is no doubt that the Applicant has sought to restrict consideration of evidence relating to surrounding events in this judicial review, contending that any attempt to introduce additional material is impermissible. In view of the Applicant’s contention that much of the surrounding facts had been excluded by the Circuit Court Judge, which is one interpretation of the Judge’s rulings in which she determined that she was considering only the charges before her, coupled with her contention that the information which the DPP has sought to introduce was not material to the charges before the Circuit Court and was unfairly prejudicial to the Applicant and in light of the fact that it has not been necessary to rely on a lack of candour in deciding to refuse relief, I do not propose to make any finding in this regard. 29 CONCLUSION
25. For the reasons aforesaid, I am satisfied that these proceedings by way of judicial review lack merit and should be refused. This matter will be listed before me for final orders following the expiry of fourteen days from the electronic delivery of this judgment. 30